Spycraft. Part 23

25 Ibid., 330. Ibid., 330.

26 Ibid., 29. Ibid., 29.

27 Ibid., 334. Ibid., 334.

CHAPTER FOUR.

1 I Samuel 19:18-42 relates the story of how Jonathan, son of Israel's King Saul, communicated covertly to David through shooting of arrows to specific locations. I Samuel 19:18-42 relates the story of how Jonathan, son of Israel's King Saul, communicated covertly to David through shooting of arrows to specific locations.

2 Schecter and Deriabin, Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, The Spy Who Saved the World, 320-321. 320-321.

3 Ibid., 394. Ibid., 394.

4 Ibid., 184 Ibid., 184 5 The Model IIIs was an improvement over the original Minox, which had been made of stainless steel throughout World War II. This new, postwar version of the cla.s.sic spy camera was light since it was made of aluminum and featured a better lens. The suffix "s" indicated that the camera could be used for synchronized flash, though in the world of espionage this feature was seldom employed. The Model IIIs was an improvement over the original Minox, which had been made of stainless steel throughout World War II. This new, postwar version of the cla.s.sic spy camera was light since it was made of aluminum and featured a better lens. The suffix "s" indicated that the camera could be used for synchronized flash, though in the world of espionage this feature was seldom employed.

6 The operational file on each staff member contained the available data that could be gleaned from previous a.s.signments abroad and with information from the KGB's network of Soviet nationals who regularly reported their suspicions to their contacts about their American colleagues. Information about the newly arriving diplomat's age, marital status, hobbies, education, and official position created the KGB's "profile of the individual." It was only those activities that were "out of profile" that would result in special attention from the "watchers." For example, a newly arrived midlevel employee seen having lunch regularly with more senior staff might draw interest. The Soviets working at the U.S. Emba.s.sy had been screened and approved by the KGB. Many spoke excellent English (sometimes without even a trace of an accent), and did the bulk of the actual work for the Emba.s.sy when dealing with other Soviets who wanted to apply for a travel visa or to emigrate to the United States. They also were "fixers" that enabled the Emba.s.sy to cut through the Byzantine Soviet bureaucracy, as well as cooks, drivers, cleaning staff, gardeners, and even building maintenance personnel. They were seen as so essential to the smooth running of the Emba.s.sy that they became ubiquitous. Too frequently their nationality was forgotten and they were treated as "friends and colleagues" by many of the American personnel stationed at the Emba.s.sy despite awareness that they reported regularly to the KGB. Even seemingly innocuous patterns of who sat next to each other in the cafeteria, or whose wives were chatting closely at official functions, were considered as they attempted to unmask officers. The operational file on each staff member contained the available data that could be gleaned from previous a.s.signments abroad and with information from the KGB's network of Soviet nationals who regularly reported their suspicions to their contacts about their American colleagues. Information about the newly arriving diplomat's age, marital status, hobbies, education, and official position created the KGB's "profile of the individual." It was only those activities that were "out of profile" that would result in special attention from the "watchers." For example, a newly arrived midlevel employee seen having lunch regularly with more senior staff might draw interest. The Soviets working at the U.S. Emba.s.sy had been screened and approved by the KGB. Many spoke excellent English (sometimes without even a trace of an accent), and did the bulk of the actual work for the Emba.s.sy when dealing with other Soviets who wanted to apply for a travel visa or to emigrate to the United States. They also were "fixers" that enabled the Emba.s.sy to cut through the Byzantine Soviet bureaucracy, as well as cooks, drivers, cleaning staff, gardeners, and even building maintenance personnel. They were seen as so essential to the smooth running of the Emba.s.sy that they became ubiquitous. Too frequently their nationality was forgotten and they were treated as "friends and colleagues" by many of the American personnel stationed at the Emba.s.sy despite awareness that they reported regularly to the KGB. Even seemingly innocuous patterns of who sat next to each other in the cafeteria, or whose wives were chatting closely at official functions, were considered as they attempted to unmask officers.

7 The Second Directorate is responsible for internal security. The Second Directorate is responsible for internal security.

8 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield The Sword and the Shield, 185.

9 Ibid. Ibid.

10 At Soviet emba.s.sies throughout the world, the spouses and dependents of diplomatic and intelligence personnel filled the required administrative and support jobs. At Soviet emba.s.sies throughout the world, the spouses and dependents of diplomatic and intelligence personnel filled the required administrative and support jobs.

11 Ronald Kessler, Ronald Kessler, Moscow Station Moscow Station (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), 68, 106. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), 68, 106.

12 As a result of his exposure, the officer received thorough annual medical checkups in the following years. No physical harm from the radiation was ever identified. As a result of his exposure, the officer received thorough annual medical checkups in the following years. No physical harm from the radiation was ever identified.

13 Allen Dulles, Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 192. (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 192.

14 Fifteen years later, in 1970, after most of CIA had relocated to the Langley Headquarters, East and South Buildings were occupied by TSD. The tech found himself a.s.signed to the office formerly occupied by the DCI. He removed one of the acoustic tiles above where he imagined the DCI's desk might have sat. Hanging by a now unconnected wire was a single DD-4 microphone, apparently missed when the recording system was dismantled. Fifteen years later, in 1970, after most of CIA had relocated to the Langley Headquarters, East and South Buildings were occupied by TSD. The tech found himself a.s.signed to the office formerly occupied by the DCI. He removed one of the acoustic tiles above where he imagined the DCI's desk might have sat. Hanging by a now unconnected wire was a single DD-4 microphone, apparently missed when the recording system was dismantled.

15 Grose, Grose, Gentleman Spy, Gentleman Spy, 308. 308.

16 Martin, Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, Wilderness of Mirrors, 61-62. 61-62.

17 Throughout the late 1950s, several TSS engineers worked on or were a.s.signed to the large technology programs such as the U-2, but the programs were neither managed nor owned by TSS. Throughout the late 1950s, several TSS engineers worked on or were a.s.signed to the large technology programs such as the U-2, but the programs were neither managed nor owned by TSS.

18 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 25. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 25.

19 Grose, Grose, Gentleman Spy, Gentleman Spy, 391. 391.

20 Schecter and Deriabin, Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, The Spy Who Saved the World, 101. 101.

21 Ibid. Ibid.

22 Helms, Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, A Look Over My Shoulder, 105. Compared to satellites and spy planes, agents were far less costly. During his time as an agent for the Americans in the 1950s, Colonel Pyotr Popov was paid an estimated $4,000 a year (approximately $25,000 adjusted for inflation) and provided intelligence on GRU and KGB operations in both Europe and the United States. A single satellite would pay the salaries of ten thousand agents like Popov. 105. Compared to satellites and spy planes, agents were far less costly. During his time as an agent for the Americans in the 1950s, Colonel Pyotr Popov was paid an estimated $4,000 a year (approximately $25,000 adjusted for inflation) and provided intelligence on GRU and KGB operations in both Europe and the United States. A single satellite would pay the salaries of ten thousand agents like Popov.

23 In 1962, the formation of the Directorate of Research consolidated high-alt.i.tude reconnaissance and satellite programs along with CIA-sponsored research in the new directorate. However, TSD and its technical support to operations responsibility remained under the Directorate of Plans. In 1962, the formation of the Directorate of Research consolidated high-alt.i.tude reconnaissance and satellite programs along with CIA-sponsored research in the new directorate. However, TSD and its technical support to operations responsibility remained under the Directorate of Plans.

CHAPTER FIVE.

1 Charles E. Lathrop, Charles E. Lathrop, The Literary Spy The Literary Spy (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004) 339. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004) 339.

2 The TOO's referred to this as "the tech culture." Mention is also made by Grose, The TOO's referred to this as "the tech culture." Mention is also made by Grose, Gentleman Spy, Gentleman Spy, 389. 389.

3 Grose, Grose, Gentleman Spy, Gentleman Spy, 155-156. 155-156.

4 When used in reference to TSD and OTS, "research and development" or "R&D" means "applied research and development." The term "development and engineering" is usually more descriptive of the type of work done by TSD and OTS. The TSD/OTS-sponsored R&D focused on technologies and development processes that would lead to production of a product, device, or capability that could be used in clandestine operations. TSD/OTS R&D programs aimed toward a two- to five-year payoff-the shorter the better. When used in reference to TSD and OTS, "research and development" or "R&D" means "applied research and development." The term "development and engineering" is usually more descriptive of the type of work done by TSD and OTS. The TSD/OTS-sponsored R&D focused on technologies and development processes that would lead to production of a product, device, or capability that could be used in clandestine operations. TSD/OTS R&D programs aimed toward a two- to five-year payoff-the shorter the better.

5 Undated CIA brochure, "Directorate of Science & Technology: People and Intelligence in the Service of Freedom," page 3. The CIA's Directorate of Research, established in 1962, preceded the DS&T by one year. Undated CIA brochure, "Directorate of Science & Technology: People and Intelligence in the Service of Freedom," page 3. The CIA's Directorate of Research, established in 1962, preceded the DS&T by one year.

6 TSD would be part of the operations directorate until 1973. In a CIA reorganization that year, TSD was moved to the Directorate of Science and Technology and renamed the Office of Technical Service (OTS). TSD would be part of the operations directorate until 1973. In a CIA reorganization that year, TSD was moved to the Directorate of Science and Technology and renamed the Office of Technical Service (OTS).

7 C Cambridge Dictionary of Science and Technology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 632. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 632.

8 Sergo A. Mikoyan, "Eroding the Soviet 'Culture of Secrecy,' Sergo A. Mikoyan, "Eroding the Soviet 'Culture of Secrecy,' Studies in Intelligence Studies in Intelligence , No. 11, Central Intelligence Agency, 2001. , No. 11, Central Intelligence Agency, 2001.

CHAPTER SIX.

1 Benjamin Weiser, Benjamin Weiser, A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid to Save His Country A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid to Save His Country (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 221-223. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 221-223.

2 Within ten years, TSD had developed several electronic short-range agent communication (SRAC) devices from this idea. Within ten years, TSD had developed several electronic short-range agent communication (SRAC) devices from this idea.

3 An accommodation address is most commonly a street or post office box address not a.s.sociated with an intelligence service or a government agency. An accommodation address is most commonly a street or post office box address not a.s.sociated with an intelligence service or a government agency.

4 The process, while complex for the novice, was well-known within the photographic industry. "Stripping film," was a commercial product. Intelligence services made direct contact prints on the emulsion as part of a covert microphotography process. "Bleaching" the completed emulsion was a step in standard microdot concealments that the KGB refined in the early years of the Cold War. If an agent had the necessary technical apt.i.tude to perform the procedures, affixing "bleached" emulsion of varying sizes onto postcards became a common technique for covert communications. The process, while complex for the novice, was well-known within the photographic industry. "Stripping film," was a commercial product. Intelligence services made direct contact prints on the emulsion as part of a covert microphotography process. "Bleaching" the completed emulsion was a step in standard microdot concealments that the KGB refined in the early years of the Cold War. If an agent had the necessary technical apt.i.tude to perform the procedures, affixing "bleached" emulsion of varying sizes onto postcards became a common technique for covert communications.

5 The instructions provide an exemplar of the detail and complexity necessary to provide technical training to an agent through impersonal communications. The exemplar does not convey the precise methodology or actual text of the operational message. The instructions provide an exemplar of the detail and complexity necessary to provide technical training to an agent through impersonal communications. The exemplar does not convey the precise methodology or actual text of the operational message.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

1 In 1963, during McCone's tenure as DCI, the Directorate of Research was renamed the Directorate of Science and Technology. In 1963, during McCone's tenure as DCI, the Directorate of Research was renamed the Directorate of Science and Technology.

2 The DDP had been redesignated as the Directorate of Operations (DO) in 1973. The DDP had been redesignated as the Directorate of Operations (DO) in 1973.

3 Despite the abrupt change, McMahon's engaging personality, and leadership skill earned the lasting respect of OTS during his fourteen-month tenure as Director. McMahon served as Honorary Chairman of the OTS fiftieth anniversary committee in 2001. However, for many senior DO and OTS officers, Schlesinger's separating TSD from the operations directorate was viewed as a historic mistake. Despite the abrupt change, McMahon's engaging personality, and leadership skill earned the lasting respect of OTS during his fourteen-month tenure as Director. McMahon served as Honorary Chairman of the OTS fiftieth anniversary committee in 2001. However, for many senior DO and OTS officers, Schlesinger's separating TSD from the operations directorate was viewed as a historic mistake.

4 Colby was sworn in as DCI in September. He served the CIA in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. President Reagan later tapped a fourth OSS veteran, William Casey, as DCI in 1981. Colby was sworn in as DCI in September. He served the CIA in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. President Reagan later tapped a fourth OSS veteran, William Casey, as DCI in 1981.

5 Seymour Hersh Seymour Hersh, The New York Times, December 22, 1974. The mail-opening program's crypt was HGLINGUAL.

6 OTS's role in the CIA mail-opening program is described in chapter 15. OTS's role in the CIA mail-opening program is described in chapter 15.

7 U.S. House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Committee on Armed Services, 1974; U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1975, 1976. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, 1977; Rockefeller Commission Report to the President on CIA Activities within the U.S., 1975. U.S. House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Committee on Armed Services, 1974; U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1975, 1976. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, 1977; Rockefeller Commission Report to the President on CIA Activities within the U.S., 1975.

8 "Family jewels" was an ironic nod to Allen Dulles who used the term to refer to a personal notebook during WWII that contained the names of his most important agents. "Family jewels" was an ironic nod to Allen Dulles who used the term to refer to a personal notebook during WWII that contained the names of his most important agents.

9 For pictures and technical details of the "Dart Gun," see: Melton, For pictures and technical details of the "Dart Gun," see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons & Equipment CIA Special Weapons & Equipment, 22.

10 Helms, Helms, A Look over My Shoulder, A Look over My Shoulder, 431. 431.

11 CCDs had also been among the technologies that allowed satellites to image targets and transmit the "pictures" back to earth in real time. The first of these satellites was the KH-11, launched in 1976. Before the KH-11, film capsules of photographs taken by satellite cameras were jettisoned from the satellite and parachuted to earth. CCDs had also been among the technologies that allowed satellites to image targets and transmit the "pictures" back to earth in real time. The first of these satellites was the KH-11, launched in 1976. Before the KH-11, film capsules of photographs taken by satellite cameras were jettisoned from the satellite and parachuted to earth.

CHAPTER EIGHT.

1 Milton Bearden and James Risen, Milton Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB (New York: Random House, 2003), 37. (New York: Random House, 2003), 37.

2 Various aids were improvised by the agent to a.s.sist in ensuring the proper distance between lens and doc.u.ment as well as centering the camera. Knitting needles and threads of the proper length could be used as reference points. While these could be used if the agent was a.s.sured of privacy while photographing, they could be alerting and the objective would be to provide the agent sufficient training and confidence to operate the camera without any other aids. Over time, with improved lens design, the focusing tolerance expanded. Various aids were improvised by the agent to a.s.sist in ensuring the proper distance between lens and doc.u.ment as well as centering the camera. Knitting needles and threads of the proper length could be used as reference points. While these could be used if the agent was a.s.sured of privacy while photographing, they could be alerting and the objective would be to provide the agent sufficient training and confidence to operate the camera without any other aids. Over time, with improved lens design, the focusing tolerance expanded.

3 In OTS jargon, the pen was known as an "active concealment" because the concealment functioned as the product it represented, in this case a writing instrument. In OTS jargon, the pen was known as an "active concealment" because the concealment functioned as the product it represented, in this case a writing instrument.

4 Comments by policy officials on intelligence are usually offered in informal exchanges with officers who present the information and pa.s.sed to senior Agency managers. The fact that the feedback reached a working-level case officer, like Saxe, was unusual and indicative of the significance of the information. Comments by policy officials on intelligence are usually offered in informal exchanges with officers who present the information and pa.s.sed to senior Agency managers. The fact that the feedback reached a working-level case officer, like Saxe, was unusual and indicative of the significance of the information.

5 The L-pill, concealed in a pen identical to the one that housed the agent's subminiature camera, was pa.s.sed to The L-pill, concealed in a pen identical to the one that housed the agent's subminiature camera, was pa.s.sed to TRIGON TRIGON during a single hourlong clandestine meeting with a CIA officer in Moscow in 1976. After during a single hourlong clandestine meeting with a CIA officer in Moscow in 1976. After TRIGON' TRIGON's arrest and suicide, the KGB produced the concealment pen said to have contained the L-pill.

6 Richelson, Jeffrey T., Richelson, Jeffrey T., A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 343. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 343.

7 Kalvar, a commercial product developed as an alternative to traditional microfilm, represented a commercial product that OTS could apply to reduced-image photography. The original company ceased operations in 1979 but other firms continued making the product. For operational use, Kalvar had the advantage that it could be handled and processed in normal room light and developed in boiling water without requiring special chemicals. Kalvar, a commercial product developed as an alternative to traditional microfilm, represented a commercial product that OTS could apply to reduced-image photography. The original company ceased operations in 1979 but other firms continued making the product. For operational use, Kalvar had the advantage that it could be handled and processed in normal room light and developed in boiling water without requiring special chemicals.

8 Wording is based on a translation of the purported note on display in the FSB museum in Moscow. Wording is based on a translation of the purported note on display in the FSB museum in Moscow.

9 Igor Peretrukhin, Igor Peretrukhin, Agent Code Name-TRIANON (Agenturnaya Klichka- TRIANON) Agent Code Name-TRIANON (Agenturnaya Klichka- TRIANON) (Moscow: Tsetrpoligraf, 2000), 217-218. (Moscow: Tsetrpoligraf, 2000), 217-218.

10 Polmar and Allen, Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, Spy Book, 362. 362.

CHAPTER NINE.

1 Bearden and Risen, Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, 10-11. 10-11.

2 The original stump is on display inside the FSB museum in Moscow. A replica is displayed inside the International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C. The original stump is on display inside the FSB museum in Moscow. A replica is displayed inside the International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C.

3 The TOO approach to providing technical support to operations officers contrasted with the OSS model. In 1944, OSS printed a catalog of available spy gear that could be ordered as needed. Following World War II and prior to the TOO program, TSS and TSD operated primarily as a supply and on-call service. If sustained technical support was needed for an operation, a TSS officer would be sent on TDY for that specific purpose. TOO represented a different philosophy that said a properly cross-trained officer with technical apt.i.tude could make an ongoing contribution to the full range of an office's operations. The forward-deployed TOO could provide expertise in his princ.i.p.al technical area and working-level technical support from his cross-training in other areas. Further, he would have immediate and direct access to the experts in every OTS discipline when those were required. The TOO became integral to operational planning and execution in locations of their a.s.signments. The TOO approach to providing technical support to operations officers contrasted with the OSS model. In 1944, OSS printed a catalog of available spy gear that could be ordered as needed. Following World War II and prior to the TOO program, TSS and TSD operated primarily as a supply and on-call service. If sustained technical support was needed for an operation, a TSS officer would be sent on TDY for that specific purpose. TOO represented a different philosophy that said a properly cross-trained officer with technical apt.i.tude could make an ongoing contribution to the full range of an office's operations. The forward-deployed TOO could provide expertise in his princ.i.p.al technical area and working-level technical support from his cross-training in other areas. Further, he would have immediate and direct access to the experts in every OTS discipline when those were required. The TOO became integral to operational planning and execution in locations of their a.s.signments.

4 The first SRR-100 models were approximately The first SRR-100 models were approximately 3 34 212 312 inches. The key design dimension was thickness because the unit would likely be worn in a shirt pocket or the inside pocket of a man's suit coat.

5 The basic technology to intercept surveillance transmissions was widely understood. Soviets stationed in the United States had once used Bearcat scanners purchased at the local Radio Shack to pick up FBI transmissions. Decades later, some KGB technicians would still exhibit a genuine fondness for the stores and merchandise, praising the reliability and quality of the products such as batteries, wires, and other parts they had been able to obtain. The basic technology to intercept surveillance transmissions was widely understood. Soviets stationed in the United States had once used Bearcat scanners purchased at the local Radio Shack to pick up FBI transmissions. Decades later, some KGB technicians would still exhibit a genuine fondness for the stores and merchandise, praising the reliability and quality of the products such as batteries, wires, and other parts they had been able to obtain.

6 Victor Sheymov, Victor Sheymov, Tower of Secrets: A Real Life Spy Thriller Tower of Secrets: A Real Life Spy Thriller (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Inst.i.tute Press, 1993). (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Inst.i.tute Press, 1993).

7 Barry G. Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," Barry G. Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," Studies in Intelligence, Studies in Intelligence, Vol 47:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003, 12. Vol 47:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003, 12.

CHAPTER TEN.

1 Driven by the character of Q, Major Boothroyd, who was not in the Bond novels, but added to the movies, spy gadgets became an instant hit. Q's equipment was impressive on the movie screen, often defying the laws of physics. A more realistic portrayal of spy gadgetry was seen in Driven by the character of Q, Major Boothroyd, who was not in the Bond novels, but added to the movies, spy gadgets became an instant hit. Q's equipment was impressive on the movie screen, often defying the laws of physics. A more realistic portrayal of spy gadgetry was seen in Mission: Impossible Mission: Impossible, where every device had to be based upon technology available at the time. For more information see: Danny Biederman, The Incredible World of SPY-FI The Incredible World of SPY-FI (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2004). (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2004).

2 Case officers were not encouraged by the fact that a great many of the elements required in technical collection violated some of the basic tenets of denied area tradecraft. For instance, installation of a technical device could involve an officer remaining at the target site for extended periods of time. In virtually every other operational procedure in denied areas, dead drops, signals, brush pa.s.ses, car tosses, and the expanding a.r.s.enal of SRAC technology was aimed at minimizing the time of the operational act. Technical operations, such as installing a tap or emplacing a sensor, could require longer times at the target site to attach, adjust, and test the system. Case officers were not encouraged by the fact that a great many of the elements required in technical collection violated some of the basic tenets of denied area tradecraft. For instance, installation of a technical device could involve an officer remaining at the target site for extended periods of time. In virtually every other operational procedure in denied areas, dead drops, signals, brush pa.s.ses, car tosses, and the expanding a.r.s.enal of SRAC technology was aimed at minimizing the time of the operational act. Technical operations, such as installing a tap or emplacing a sensor, could require longer times at the target site to attach, adjust, and test the system.

3 Bearden and Risen, Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, 194. 194.

4 Polmar and Allen, Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, Spy Book, 508-510; Richelson, 508-510; Richelson, A Century of Spies, A Century of Spies, 422. Polyakov is also known under the FBI codename 422. Polyakov is also known under the FBI codename TOPHAT TOPHAT and CIA codename and CIA codename BOURBON BOURBON.

5 Polmar and Allen, Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, Spy Book, 509. A "brush pa.s.s" allows for an imperceptible exchange of a small "package" such as a message or film ca.s.sette, to take place between two people as they "brush" past each other in a public area. There is no outward sign of recognition between the parties involved. 509. A "brush pa.s.s" allows for an imperceptible exchange of a small "package" such as a message or film ca.s.sette, to take place between two people as they "brush" past each other in a public area. There is no outward sign of recognition between the parties involved.

6 Communications between agents and case officers divides into two general systems known as "agent send" and "agent receive." Due to the difficulty of concealing spy gear, agents were limited in the type of covert communications (covcom) equipment they could possess. As a result, agents had fewer options in sending messages-secret writing, in limited cases microdots, and dead drops. Options for agent receive systems included those plus OWVL, microprinting, and "blind" newspaper placements. Satellites introduced the option of long-range electronic covcom and BUSTER introduced short-range electronic covcom options. Communications between agents and case officers divides into two general systems known as "agent send" and "agent receive." Due to the difficulty of concealing spy gear, agents were limited in the type of covert communications (covcom) equipment they could possess. As a result, agents had fewer options in sending messages-secret writing, in limited cases microdots, and dead drops. Options for agent receive systems included those plus OWVL, microprinting, and "blind" newspaper placements. Satellites introduced the option of long-range electronic covcom and BUSTER introduced short-range electronic covcom options.

7 A "mole" is a serving intelligence officer who is secretly working for another intelligence service. A "mole" is a serving intelligence officer who is secretly working for another intelligence service.

8 David Wise, David Wise, Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America (New York: Random House, 2002), 20-24. (New York: Random House, 2002), 20-24.

9 Ibid., 193. Ibid., 193.

10 Ibid., 193-194. Ibid., 193-194.

11 Polmar and Allen, Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, Spy Book, 509. 509.

12 Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," Studies in Intelligence Studies in Intelligence, 47:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003, 5.

13 Ibid., 12. Ibid., 12.

14 Schecter and Debriabin, Schecter and Debriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, The Spy Who Saved the World, 5, 25, 28. 5, 25, 28.

15 "Dangles" appear to be legitimate volunteers, but are actually being controlled by another intelligence service. "Dangles" appear to be legitimate volunteers, but are actually being controlled by another intelligence service.

16 The prepared text was often in the form of a personal letter containing information designed to avoid attracting unwanted attention and scrutiny from Soviet postal censors. The content was written in another person's handwriting so even if censorship detected secret writing, the handwriting would not incriminate the agent. The prepared text was often in the form of a personal letter containing information designed to avoid attracting unwanted attention and scrutiny from Soviet postal censors. The content was written in another person's handwriting so even if censorship detected secret writing, the handwriting would not incriminate the agent.

17 Soviet postal censors used the word "perl.u.s.tration" for the examination of mail to detect secret writing and microdots. Soviet censors detected secret writing by swabbing across the item with a "c.o.c.ktail" of chemical reagents designed to expose the hidden content. Examination of the item after it was received by OTS would detect traces of the swabbing. For CIA use, secret writing systems developed by OTS were tested against such "c.o.c.ktails" before being approved for operational use. Soviet postal censors used the word "perl.u.s.tration" for the examination of mail to detect secret writing and microdots. Soviet censors detected secret writing by swabbing across the item with a "c.o.c.ktail" of chemical reagents designed to expose the hidden content. Examination of the item after it was received by OTS would detect traces of the swabbing. For CIA use, secret writing systems developed by OTS were tested against such "c.o.c.ktails" before being approved for operational use.

18 Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," 10. Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," 10.

19 The location in which the car was parked, direction it was facing, and other simple variables could be used as the signal. The location in which the car was parked, direction it was facing, and other simple variables could be used as the signal.

20 Personal meetings in a denied area are inherently dangerous for the agent and avoided if at all possible. Though the agent may be unknown to counterintelligence, the case officer is always subject to being surveilled and may unknowingly lead surveillance to the meeting. Dead drops are a form of "impersonal communication" in which the agent and handler are separated by time, but not s.p.a.ce. Personal meetings do, however, provide the handler with the important advantage of a.s.sessing the agent's mental state and verifying that operational instructions are understood. Personal meetings in a denied area are inherently dangerous for the agent and avoided if at all possible. Though the agent may be unknown to counterintelligence, the case officer is always subject to being surveilled and may unknowingly lead surveillance to the meeting. Dead drops are a form of "impersonal communication" in which the agent and handler are separated by time, but not s.p.a.ce. Personal meetings do, however, provide the handler with the important advantage of a.s.sessing the agent's mental state and verifying that operational instructions are understood.

21 Information has more value when the adversary does not realize that it has been "lost." As such, secretly copying doc.u.ments is almost always preferred to taking the original doc.u.ment. Information has more value when the adversary does not realize that it has been "lost." As such, secretly copying doc.u.ments is almost always preferred to taking the original doc.u.ment.

22 The KGB and other intelligence services recommended Minox cameras for their agents. U.S. Navy Warrant Officer John Walker, a mole for the KGB, was trained in the use of a Minox Model-C camera for "doc copy" during a trip to Vienna in the late 1960s. His technical instructions are still valid: use B/W Plus-X Pan film (ASA 125), shutter speed at 1/100th, distance to doc.u.ment eighteen inches, and even illumination with a 75-100 watt bulb placed at a 45-degree angle to the doc.u.ment. The KGB and other intelligence services recommended Minox cameras for their agents. U.S. Navy Warrant Officer John Walker, a mole for the KGB, was trained in the use of a Minox Model-C camera for "doc copy" during a trip to Vienna in the late 1960s. His technical instructions are still valid: use B/W Plus-X Pan film (ASA 125), shutter speed at 1/100th, distance to doc.u.ment eighteen inches, and even illumination with a 75-100 watt bulb placed at a 45-degree angle to the doc.u.ment.

23 In 1938, the original "Riga" Minox camera could be concealed in a man's closed fist. Postwar Minox models (II and III) were just as small, but often necessitated the use of a separate light meter which also had to be concealed. In 1958 Minox incorporated an internal light meter for the first time into the slightly larger Model-B. Though still a "pocketable" camera, the Minox "B" and later models would continue to add features and size. In 1981 Minox introduced its smallest and lightest camera series, the "EC," but its fixed-focus lens (three feet to infinity) was unusable for doc.u.ment photography. Regardless of the Minox camera being used, they were not designed for covert use and the act of "doc copy" would be obvious to anyone observing the user. In 1938, the original "Riga" Minox camera could be concealed in a man's closed fist. Postwar Minox models (II and III) were just as small, but often necessitated the use of a separate light meter which also had to be concealed. In 1958 Minox incorporated an internal light meter for the first time into the slightly larger Model-B. Though still a "pocketable" camera, the Minox "B" and later models would continue to add features and size. In 1981 Minox introduced its smallest and lightest camera series, the "EC," but its fixed-focus lens (three feet to infinity) was unusable for doc.u.ment photography. Regardless of the Minox camera being used, they were not designed for covert use and the act of "doc copy" would be obvious to anyone observing the user.

24 Tolkachev was instructed to be home from 6:00 PM till 8:00 PM on the evening of the date that corresponded to the number of the month; 1 January, 2 February, 3 March, 4 April, etc., and "cover" (stand by to answer) his phone. The call would be disguised as a "wrong number" wherein the caller would ask for one of three names. Each name was linked to a prearranged dead drop site: OLGA, ANNA, or NINA. If the caller asker for VALERIY it would trigger a personal meeting at a prearranged location exactly one hour following the call. Each month, on a date that equaled the number of the month plus fifteen-21 June, 22 July, 23 August-Tolkachev was further instructed to be at a prearranged site at a specific time and wait for five minutes. If his regular handler did not meet him, he was provided with a "parole" (a recognition signal and pa.s.sword) to authenticate the ident.i.ty of the person sent to meet him. Tolkachev was instructed to be home from 6:00 PM till 8:00 PM on the evening of the date that corresponded to the number of the month; 1 January, 2 February, 3 March, 4 April, etc., and "cover" (stand by to answer) his phone. The call would be disguised as a "wrong number" wherein the caller would ask for one of three names. Each name was linked to a prearranged dead drop site: OLGA, ANNA, or NINA. If the caller asker for VALERIY it would trigger a personal meeting at a prearranged location exactly one hour following the call. Each month, on a date that equaled the number of the month plus fifteen-21 June, 22 July, 23 August-Tolkachev was further instructed to be at a prearranged site at a specific time and wait for five minutes. If his regular handler did not meet him, he was provided with a "parole" (a recognition signal and pa.s.sword) to authenticate the ident.i.ty of the person sent to meet him.

25 An additional advantage of using the unmodified commercially available Pentax ME camera was that it was not a piece of "tradecraft" equipment and there was a plausible explanation for him to have it in his apartment. Conversely, possession of a noncommercial subminiature "doc copy" camera was proof of espionage. An additional advantage of using the unmodified commercially available Pentax ME camera was that it was not a piece of "tradecraft" equipment and there was a plausible explanation for him to have it in his apartment. Conversely, possession of a noncommercial subminiature "doc copy" camera was proof of espionage.

26 Tolkachev was also provided with parked-car signals (PCS) which would confirm receipt of a transmission by the direction in which his car was parked. The CIA also parked cars on routes frequented by Tolkachev in a similar prearranged PCS to signal to the agent. Tolkachev was also provided with parked-car signals (PCS) which would confirm receipt of a transmission by the direction in which his car was parked. The CIA also parked cars on routes frequented by Tolkachev in a similar prearranged PCS to signal to the agent.

27 Tolkachev used the updated OTS-provided demodulator to receive the ciphered message. At the predetermined time and date a ten-minute-long transmission would take place that could include both real and dummy messages. To keep the KGB guessing about the messages the airwaves were often filled with dummy messages; only the real agent would know the date, time, and frequency for the message intended for him. The newly developed demodulator was connected to the radio and captured the message as it was received. The agent could then later recall it and scroll it across the screen of the demodulator unit. The first three digits of the message contained an indicator that told Tolkachev if the following message was intended for him. If so, he could scroll out the reaming portion of the message, which could be as long as 400 five-letter groups. Tolkachev would then use his OTP to decipher the message. Tolkachev attempted to monitor the IOWL transmission, but was unable to do so because of the lack of privacy in his apartment. Shortwave transmissions usually took place at night when atmospheric conditions provided greater transmission ranges and clearer signals, but this also conflicted with the times his family was in the apartment. As a result, subsequent transmissions were moved to the daytime hours when Tolkachev could arrange to be home. Unfortunately his inst.i.tute's change in security regulations eliminated trips away from the office during working hours and in December of 1982 Tolkachev returned all of his IOWL equipment to his handler. Tolkachev used the updated OTS-provided demodulator to receive the ciphered message. At the predetermined time and date a ten-minute-long transmission would take place that could include both real and dummy messages. To keep the KGB guessing about the messages the airwaves were often filled with dummy messages; only the real agent would know the date, time, and frequency for the message intended for him. The newly developed demodulator was connected to the radio and captured the message as it was received. The agent could then later recall it and scroll it across the screen of the demodulator unit. The first three digits of the message contained an indicator that told Tolkachev if the following message was intended for him. If so, he could scroll out the reaming portion of the message, which could be as long as 400 five-letter groups. Tolkachev would then use his OTP to decipher the message. Tolkachev attempted to monitor the IOWL transmission, but was unable to do so because of the lack of privacy in his apartment. Shortwave transmissions usually took place at night when atmospheric conditions provided greater transmission ranges and clearer signals, but this also conflicted with the times his family was in the apartment. As a result, subsequent transmissions were moved to the daytime hours when Tolkachev could arrange to be home. Unfortunately his inst.i.tute's change in security regulations eliminated trips away from the office during working hours and in December of 1982 Tolkachev returned all of his IOWL equipment to his handler.