South America and the War Part 4

Things are changed since the names of Brazilian and Argentine were almost mutual bugbears and since Chile and Argentina seemed to be chronically "spoiling for a fight." The figure of Christ, which stands on the boundary between these two nations, symbolises a truth--a reality all the more valuable inasmuch as it is in part intangible, a product of the realm of ideas, not merely of the material world. The fault of these countries and an unfortunate result of their business connexion with Europe has been that, however prolific in rhetoric, they have been at bottom too materialistic and have been apt to suppose that the convenient appurtenances of civilisation--railways, telephones, tramways, motor-cars, all provided by the foreigner--in themselves const.i.tute civilisation, not quite realising that the word means the faculty of living in organised communities. It is an admirable thing if they can find an ideal, transcending their own borders, in the sentiment or principle or fact of Americanismo: for that word does represent a fact. An Englishman or a Frenchman, if asked about his origin, would never think of saying, "I am a European"; but from the lips of an Argentine or a Colombian the words _Soy Americano_ fall quite naturally, with the addition _Colombiano_ or _Argentino_. I have heard a South American speak in conversation of _La America Nuestra_, "Our America,"

when he had occasion to distinguish Latin America from the United States. The word was casually dropped for purposes of definition: yet it is an inspiring and significant phrase, _America Nuestra_. Which of us could now so speak of "Our Europe"?

The war has favoured this spirit of Americanism in a tangible way through the growth of economic intercourse. On a higher and broader plane, the same thing is happening. We saw this when Brazil severed relations with Germany. Her announcement, communicated to her neighbour-republics, was received with a kind of demonstration of Latin-American solidarity. Almost every Latin-American state responded in terms of warm appreciation and sympathy. The Argentine Government wrote that it "appreciated thoroughly the att.i.tude of Brazil, which was justified by principles of universal public right, and expressed to Brazil the most sincere sentiments of confraternity."

As the Americano looks across the Atlantic, he may congratulate himself, not without a feeling of civic pride, that he belongs to another world, a system of republics living at peace with one another. A century ago Canning boasted, "I have called a New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." It was a prophecy rather than a boast. Now is the time for that New World to fulfil that prophecy by realising itself, by creating itself.

It is no inconsistency to add once more that Latin America is at the same time drawing nearer to all the nations of the world, that its long-standing historic connexion with Europe becomes emphasised and extended. Who could have foretold, even a year ago, that the Republics of Peru and of Uruguay would offer the use of their ports to the warships of belligerent European monarchies, that Brazil, Cuba and Panama would be represented, as recently happened, at the Allied Conference in Paris, or that a Brazilian squadron would be acting with the British fleet in European waters? It can no longer be said of these states, as was said some years ago, that they stand upon the margin of international life. This closer partic.i.p.ation in world affairs does not contradict, but rather confirms and explains, what has been said concerning the growth of _Americanismo_, the consolidation of a younger and distinct Europe across the ocean. As these states become drawn into the general movement of world affairs, they are compelled to define more clearly their own position in a world of their own. One may find some a.n.a.logy in the British Empire, whose members, as they grow into nations and become severally involved in relations with all other peoples, find it more necessary to reaffirm and to define their relations with one another.

But in speaking of Latin America, one has to draw a line, or rather a note of interrogation, round Mexico. The history of that unfortunate country has been profoundly affected by her geographical position within the North American continent. The path which she has followed in recent years--a path not entirely of her own choosing--seems rather to lead outside the ring-fence of Latin America. It is an interesting speculation whether that path may not eventually lead her into another fold, the fold whose shepherd resides in the White House at Washington, whether that shepherd desires to undertake the responsibility or not.

The present position is an anomalous one. The political frontier of the United States is the Rio Grande, but the geographical frontier of North America is the Isthmus of Panama, and that geographical frontier has been occupied--merely as an outpost so far---by the United States. The Republics of Nicaragua and of Panama have been drawn under American tutelage. The question arises whether after the great war the United States may not be led on by the logic of events so to extend the struggle on behalf of democracy against autocracy that the frontier, dividing Latin America from the region under Anglo-Saxon control, shall be the geographical boundary between the two continents. President Wilson indeed has a.s.sured the Mexicans, with obvious conviction and sincerity, that no aggression is intended against their territory, and that he desires a common guarantee of all the American republics to protect the "political independence and territorial integrity" of all.

But no statesman can shape the future or absolutely bind his successors.

It may be pointed out that there are various degrees and methods of control, some of which may be found not quite incompatible with the spirit of President Wilson's a.s.surances. The precedents of Cuba, Panama and Nicaragua are suggestive.

This leads us to our last topic. We have discussed _Americanismo_, the sentiment or system which aims at uniting the Latin-American republics.

What about Pan-Americanism, the sentiment or system which aims at uniting all the American republics?

CHAPTER VI

PAN-AMERICANISM

The relations of Latin America with the United States are chiefly connected with those tendencies of United States policy which are a.s.sociated with the name of Monroe. A survey of the Monroe Doctrine would here be out of place: but the main points bearing on the present situation may be indicated. The injunction imposed in 1823 by President Monroe upon European interference in America was intended to meet certain European designs which at that time seemed to endanger the "peace and safety" of the United States. But Monroe's declaration, although its immediate purpose was self-defence, involved a permanent protest against any European aggression in Latin America, and thus set up the United States as self-const.i.tuted champion of those countries.

Such a position involves a certain superiority of att.i.tude and cannot be very clearly distinguished from protection; and protection is apt to merge by gradual steps, often only half perceived and not deliberately intended, into Protectorate. Thus, the development of the Monroe Doctrine has followed two parallel lines of policy, protection against Europe and national self-a.s.sertion. This latter more positive aspect has impressed itself upon the public mind. The advances in the Caribbean region, which have been mentioned in the first chapter, were undertaken not in order to satisfy any doctrine or theory, but to satisfy the irresistible needs of a vigorous growing Power. But since, for a generation past, it has been expected of American statesmen that they should justify their orthodoxy as adherents of this doctrine, these steps towards protectorate or dominion have been explained in a series of public p.r.o.nouncements as developments or examples of the doctrine.

Naturally, therefore, the term "Monroe Doctrine" is popularly understood as connoting an imperial policy, a movement towards supremacy or hegemony.

In any case, the obvious comment on the Monroe Doctrine is that it has indeed protected the American republics from European aggression, but has not protected them from American aggression. It has not protected Peru from Chile nor Mexico and Colombia from the United States. Again, it is a uni-lateral arrangement announced by one Power alone, on the a.s.sumption that this action would be taken for granted by the other American republics. This att.i.tude does not entirely commend itself to those states, especially as they grow stronger and more conscious of their strength. American business men plainly a.s.sert that the Monroe Doctrine is bad for business[4], and warn their countrymen against straining after a fict.i.tious inter-American sentiment--an att.i.tude which "is often a cause for resentment, the more felt because seldom expressed by the courteous Latin[5]." An article in the Pan-American Bulletin for December 1917 deserves particular attention. It cleaves through the difficulty by declaring, on the authority of Mr Root, that the Monroe Doctrine today means no more than what President Monroe meant a century ago: "The Monroe Doctrine is an a.s.sertion of the right of self-defence, that and nothing more. France and Britain are in the field to protect their Monroe Doctrine, the sovereignty and independence of Belgium ...

there is nothing here ... in any way derogatory to the full sovereignty and independence of even the smallest of the Latin-American countries.

It is true that the first proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine carried with it an implied offer of aid to the newly liberated Spanish-American colonies against proposed aggressions by the Holy Alliance.

Self-protection was the motive ... it counts for nothing against a set purpose to defend one's own house that in so doing one performs an act by which one's neighbour is likewise defended." The article concludes by declaring that the Monroe Doctrine still prevails, strictly limited to its original sense, and that Pan-Americanism is an entirely distinct policy, which must not be confused with it.

This re-statement of the Monroe Doctrine in its original terms, this declaration that United States policy is just like that of other nations, was probably prompted by the sense that the later developments of the Monroe Doctrine hindered the economic propaganda which is the main business of the Pan-American Union. But it has been further argued that the great war has exposed the weakness of Monroism, since, in the event of a German victory, nothing but superior force could prevent German invasion and occupation in Canada or in any trans-Atlantic country which might be at war with Germany. The arming of the United States has in some degree answered this objection, which is perhaps as contingent and theoretical as the doctrine itself. But the war has certainly emphasised the fact that emergencies must be met and settled as they arise, and that, since they cannot be foreseen, they cannot be covered by pre-conceived theories. At any rate a sentiment has for some time been gaining force that the inter-American policy of the United States calls for some kind of revision or re-statement; and the solution is sought in "Pan-Americanism."

In seeking a definition of that phrase, European a.n.a.logies will scarcely help us. The word "Pan-Germanism" usually implies some common action or interest among all those who speak the German language, and suggests some kind of racial bond or sense of kindred. The word "Pan-Slavism"

appears to mean common action or interest among all who speak the Slav tongues, and similarly suggests some ethnological bond of kinship.

Obviously Pan-Americanism must mean something quite different, for the American differs from his nearest southern neighbour, the Mexican, more widely than the Norwegian differs from the Greek. Moreover, "Pan-American" is a term of recent origin and still somewhat fluid in its application. It has sometimes been used merely as the equivalent of "European" or "Asiatic"; for the word "American" commonly bears a national sense and there is no convenient and accepted term covering the two Americas. For example, Mr Taft in his Presidential message of 1909 spoke of "our Pan-American policy" much as a British Prime Minister might speak of "our European policy."

Thus, the obvious application of the term is geographical. Yet Americans of authority are fully aware of the need of reservation in this geographical application. In 1909, the Director of the Pan-American Union pointed out, with some mortification, that on the occasion of the Pan-American Congress at Buenos Aires, most of the delegates from the north found that the easiest route from the chief city of North America to the chief city of South America lay through Europe. And an eminent American economist[6] has lately uttered a warning against geographical misapprehensions, explaining that, whereas the Panama Ca.n.a.l makes the west coast of South America an extension of the east coast of the United States, nevertheless the bulk of the South American population lives upon the Atlantic coast and prefers its traditional, customary and natural intercourse with Europe.

But in considering the meaning of an incipient and growing force, it would be a mistake to dwell on possible limitations and difficulties; and it would be pedantic and unpractical to demand precise consistency or exact definition. We are rather concerned with aspirations, tendencies and formative ideas. Indeed, it might fairly be argued that these limitations, which are fully realised and avowed in North America, are no argument against the Pan-American movement, but rather an argument in support of it, as being a prudent and wholesome effort to overcome existing obstacles and promote a better understanding between neighbours.

Pan-Americanism may be described as the movement which aims at uniting all the American republics:--one cannot say all the American countries; for in the map printed on the cover of the Pan-American Bulletin, Canada is left blank, as not forming part of "Pan-America." This omission alone is enough to prove, if proof were needed, that there is something artificial about Pan-Americanism: for obviously a New Yorker is more at home in Toronto or Halifax than in Rio or Buenos Aires; and there is a closer political similarity as well as a closer political bond between Washington and Ottawa than between Washington and Caracas. But, after all, most political combinations are largely artificial: they are products of statesmanship rather than of nature, or at all events they are products of nature a.s.sisted by statesmanship. And Pan-Americanism need not be less real or less valuable for being a construction deliberately planned instead of a spontaneous organism. But since the Pan-American movement is artificial, and a matter of policy and management, still rather formless, Americans of both continents differ considerably both as to its meaning and its usefulness, some declaring that it means nothing and is useless or even mischievous, while others regard it as a kind of perfect circle embracing all the future.

Dr Usher, the American historian, dismisses the whole notion, on the ground that the United States and Latin America are utterly unlike, unsympathetic and even antipathetic to one another. Against this conclusion may be quoted two opinions from Chile and from Colombia, the two South American countries which have in the past shown most resentment at North American pretensions. "We want no papa" exclaimed a Chilian public man some years ago: yet in 1910 Senor Echeverria, Chilian consul in London, in a public lecture declared himself a decided believer in the benefits of Pan-Americanism, and as disposed to accept the sincerity of North American pacific and non-aggressive professions: and in the same year Senor Perez Triana, the Colombian diplomatist, expressed a restrained but decided optimism concerning the benefits to be derived from the Pan-American Congresses, and pointed out that they had already brought about the general acceptance of the principle of arbitration among American Governments. These favourable views have regard to the practical benefits to be found in a certain course of action. The destiny of Pan-Americanism depends on the question whether these practical benefits are strong enough to overcome the barriers of race, language, religion, law, customs and tradition.

The objections based upon these obstacles to union is not quite convincing. Incompatibility of temper is a bar to marriage: it is no bar to a practical and thoroughly friendly business understanding supported by mutual respect and methods of give and take. The tendencies of the age favour large combinations, overstepping the bounds of nationality and sometimes cutting across the lines of kindred and tradition. The challenge of Central Europe has raised up such a combination in Western Europe, and may help to give birth to a fresh and large grouping of the Powers of the western hemisphere.

The question occurs whether, apart from reasons of practical convenience, any fundamental basis can be found for the union of communities so dissimilar in character and in action. These republics have this at least in common: they have all started life in "new lands"; they are all trans-Atlantic offshoots from European monarchies; they have all thrown off political dependence upon Europe; they have all adopted republican forms of government; and, to whatever extent some of them may avoid democratic or even republican methods, they have all rejected the hereditary principle in government. Moreover, before the present crisis they all cultivated, so far as possible, a certain political aloofness from Europe: and they all aim at pursuing a destiny distinct from and, in their belief, transcending that of Europe through the inexhaustible possibilities offered by a New World.

What success has attended the United States in her recent policy of approaching Latin America? Here we are on delicate ground, and whatever view be expressed is sure to meet with disagreement on the part of qualified judges. It is not easy to keep one's finger on the pulse of South American sentiment, nor can we expect to find unanimity. We can only watch indications and symptoms. In the past, on the whole, the att.i.tude of the United States has been accepted in so far as it implied protection; but it has been warmly resented in so far as it seemed to imply any kind of protectorate. A certain arrogance in the public pretensions of the United States has been felt to be an offence and a menace; and this feeling has been intensified by the bearing of individual Americans. Yet a representative Chilian, Senor Vildosola, writing since the outbreak of the war, says, "The United States was not popular in Chile; her political att.i.tude was rude and overbearing (_une politique brutale_); but in the past ten years this is changed. The Big Stick is relegated to the cellars of the White House. A certain refinement of forms has appeared in the Secretaryship of State, and a deeper knowledge of the peoples of the continent has induced the Government, press and people of the United States to treat Chile and her neighbours with a new respect and consideration." It may here be noted that Chile has lately entered into close economic relations with the United States, through the American acquisition of great mining properties in Chile and through the export of nitrate and copper to North America, largely carried in Chilian government transports.

A representative Brazilian lately remarked to the present writer, "I believe there is no danger at all from the United States" and, referring to the preferential tariff granted by Brazil to certain imports from the United States, he added, "The Americans admit our coffee free, and we grant this abatement in return. They tax imports of things that they produce, and admit free the things they cannot produce. You English are different. You tax our coffee: you tax things you cannot produce and let in free the things you can produce." There can be no doubt that these close commercial relations and recent large American investments in Brazilian industries conduce to this tentative entente with the United States.

The relations of the A.B.C. countries seem to indicate similar tendencies. It is probable that the main object, which led these three republics to entertain proposals of alliance, was security against possible danger from the United States. As these apprehensions diminished, the proposals were shelved, and the A.B.C. resolved itself into its component alphabet. There was another not less interesting reason for this dissolution: the proposed combination of the stronger South American states was not welcomed by the other republics, which felt that an arrangement of this kind did not favour the union and harmony of the whole continent, even though the professed intention was that it should serve as a nucleus which might gradually win the voluntary adhesion of other republics.

Again, those republics which have been drawn closely under the influence of the United States, threw in their lot with her by declaring war against Germany--a decision which seems to be an act of grat.i.tude, and a recognition that their position of dependence is not felt to be irksome or degrading.

A recent act of the small but st.u.r.dy Republic of Uruguay seems to be very significant. After first severing relations with Germany and then rescinding her declaration of neutrality, Uruguay decreed that "No American State, if engaged in a war against a European State in defence of its rights, shall be treated as a belligerent by Uruguay." There is something a little whimsical in this previous sweeping aside of all contingencies, and one may imagine circ.u.mstances where the interpretation of this decree might puzzle the legal advisers of the Uruguayan Foreign Office. But the whole-hearted comprehensive intention of the decree is obvious. Uruguay is prepared to go the whole way in the direction of Pan-Americanism, and opens her arms equally to all the republics of both American continents.

The proposal to establish a Pan-American University at Panama may be worth mentioning here. The suggestion sounds like a product of the tropical spirit of those regions; but it may yet take significant shape.

The United States, before entering the war, had largely increased her trade with Latin America. She succeeded in supplying, in great degree, the gaps left by Germany and Great Britain. Her entry into the war has deprived her of part of that advantage. But, on the other hand, the final decision, the manner in which it was made, and the resolute way in which it is being pursued, have vastly strengthened the moral standing of the United States in the New World. Those Latin-American states which are dependent on her joined her as belligerents. The action of Brazil, though taken independently and inspired more by French than by North American sympathies, followed North American action and cannot be wholly dissociated from it. Most of the Latin-American states, by their att.i.tude towards the war, have as it were mounted guard behind the Allies. But the United States stands embattled in front of her southern neighbours, to fight the monster which threatens them all. The United States now, at last, appears, not merely as the theoretic propounder of a protection which was really ensured by the a.s.sent of Great Britain and the strength of the British fleet, but as the active champion in a common cause. This position has been strengthened by President Wilson's solemn disavowals of any aggressive intention. These promises have produced a marked impression in South America.

The war has brought into view another practical reason for a closer inter-American understanding. As long as the United States remained neutral, no other American state, such as Brazil, could have incurred the risk of entering the war. In the past, while South American countries were able to keep apart from European politics, this complication or hindrance was latent and remote. But the period of aloofness is closed, and the American republics are taking their place among the nations of the world. Some kind of permanent entente, some standing arrangement for exchanging views and adjusting policy, would seem to be the best means of obviating any friction or awkwardness between north and south in respect of external relations. Thus a closer understanding with the United States may be regarded as a necessary condition of closer relations with the rest of the world.

Many who know South America well will dissent from the suggestion that the war is helping to mould into some kind of shape the rather shadowy scheme called Pan-Americanism. They will point to the fact that most South Americans would rather have dealings with a European than with a North American and will recall what has been said elsewhere, namely, that the two Americas, both historically and actually, face severally towards Europe and not towards one another. All this is true; yet there are signs that the tendency called Pan-Americanism, hitherto a rather unsubstantial vision, may become a reality, differing indeed from the picture traced by some North American prophets, but resting upon more solid bases. We have touched upon business relations and the machinery for carrying them on. As to political relations, the growing strength of the greater South American republics counts for much. They feel themselves to be in a position to say, "We do not want your protection; but we value your equal friendship; for we are Americans as well as you.

And we are willing to group ourselves together for the preservation and protection of that America which is ours." An equal understanding between equals--provided it is not too formal at first, and is allowed to be moulded by the course of events--would probably meet with a fairly general a.s.sent, which might gradually win over those holding aloof at first. Something of the kind seems to be taking form at the present time. The ultimate result may be the formation of a Concert of America, in which the more tranquil and educated elements may guide the whole.

President Wilson has suggested some such arrangement, and proposes a combination of American republics as the best security against aggression by one American Power upon another.

From what has been said above, it is obvious that some of the Caribbean lands would enter such a combination as satellites or subject-allies of the United States. Such an arrangement is not unparalleled and does not seem impracticable, since these small states have already entered the war in that capacity. Obviously, Pan-Americanism cannot aim at precise symmetry or theoretical consistency. It must be an elastic system, and must be prepared to meet and overcome difficulties. That is the purpose of its existence. But in general the first condition of a Pan-American combination would seem to be the abandonment of any pretensions to hegemony by any one state. Such pretensions have shattered the Concert of Europe. But America is a younger Europe which may take example--and warning too--from that old Europe which has given her such inst.i.tutions and such order as she possesses. Thus a New World may indeed arise to redress the balance of the Old.

To the emanc.i.p.ation of Latin America Great Britain and the British contributed more than any other outside nation. In the subsequent development of those countries, Britain has had a large share. In the moral protection afforded to them by the att.i.tude of the United States, the unostentatious and almost tacit support of Great Britain has counted for much. And those countries are now being drawn nearer to Great Britain and nearer to Europe than ever before. The question now arises:--In the closer grouping of American states now in process of formation, is Great Britain to stand aloof, a sympathetic but silent and inactive spectator? That this question has actually been raised in the United States, is shown by the following quotation from _The Times History of the War_ (chapter 222, page 9): "As the _Philadelphia Ledger_ put it 'it seemed an absurdity to talk of Pan-Americanism and in the same breath to ignore the fact that one of the greatest of the American Powers is not included in it.' The _New Republic_ went further ...

'Pan-Americanism,' it declared, 'is a tripod that cannot stand on two legs for ever. Only a combination of the Latin countries, the United States and Great Britain, that is to say a combination of all the American Powers, can make it a safe and useful organization in the world to-day.'"

There is nothing new in this idea; for Bolivar, with singular magnanimity, invited Great Britain and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to send delegates to the Pan-American Congress which he attempted to a.s.semble at Panama in 1826: the circ.u.mstances of the time precluded an invitation to France. And now that Brazil and Cuba sit at the council-board of the Allies in Paris, a conception, which seemed feasible a century ago to a great imaginative mind, may perhaps not seem so very remote to a practical mind today. For the present epoch has brought home to all Americans of both continents a fact which has long been known to Canadians and Englishmen, namely that the ocean is no estranging gulf between nations. Today it is known that the geographical boundary which divides the peoples into two categories and separates the Old World of force from the New World of reason is not the Atlantic but the Rhine. Thus now, more than ever, does it seem a little incongruous that Washington should deny to Ottawa a community of American interests which is conceded to Caracas, Asuncion and La Paz.

Yet the scheme thus adumbrated is not at the present time clearly in sight. The inclusion of Canada would reverse the system which now confines Pan-Americanism to those states which have thrown off all political connexion with Europe together with all monarchical forms.

Moreover, new and large combinations must keep within manageable limits.

Yet it is significant that a Uruguayan public man, Senor Lopez Lomba, is now vigorously agitating, in Paris and in South America, for the formation of a Pan-Atlantic Union, wherein the three great Atlantic Powers, Britain, France and the United States, are to combine with the Latin-American states, in order to wield with full effect that economic weapon which is to decide the world conflict. A combination formed for an immediate purpose may well have further and larger results. It is an interesting speculation whether, in some not very remote future, the daughter nations of the Iberian Peninsula may not be drawn into a wide circle of understanding with Britain and her daughter nations. Thus, that grouping of the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon peoples, which has been formed under stress of war, might continue its beneficent working through generations of peace. Portugal and Brazil, Great Britain and the United States stand side by side. Most of the daughter nations of Spain have ranged themselves in the same ranks, beside France, their intellectual foster-mother. Spain may yet re-discover herself and her true place in the comity of nations. At all events it is a great thing to have proved that the line dividing freedom from autocracy does not divide the peoples of the New World from their mother Europe, or preclude the whole of the former from joining any great international league such as the future may have in store for succeeding generations.

FOOTNOTES:

[4] Notably an article by Mr Pratt, Chief of the United States Bureau of Commerce, in the _Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science_.

[5] Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, March 1918.

[6] Mr Pepper, former Foreign Trade Adviser to the United States Government, writing in the _Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science_.

LATIN-AMERICAN REPUBLICS