Socialism and Democracy in Europe Part 18

The second development that we are to trace relates to the program, or platform, of the party. The official program has not undergone any change, but the interpretation, the spirit, has mellowed. The Erfurter program of 1891 is still their party pledge. The program is in two parts; the first an elaborate exposition of Marxian economics, the second a series of practical demands differing only slightly from the Gotha program.

Only one speech was made in the national convention on the adoption of this bifurcated platform, that attempted to link Marxian theory to La.s.sallian realism. This speech was made by Liebknecht, friend of Marx, who elaborately explained his friend's theory of value, doctrine of cla.s.s war and social evolution. The program was adopted _en bloc_.

The chairman ignored a few protesting "noes" when the vote was called, and declared it unanimously adopted. These few voices of protest soon swelled to considerable volume. Within one year after the repeal of the Socialist law the party had entered upon the difficult task of being both critic and parliamentarian, constructive and destructive, under rigid military discipline.

To the few protesters at Erfurt, it seemed as though the party had entered the lifeboat, manned the oars, and neglected to untie the painter.

When the elections of 1897 recorded a severe setback for the party the progressives were told to keep the eyes of faith on the "ultimate goal" of Socialism. One of the reformistes replied: "The whole idea of an ultimate goal is distasteful to me. There is no ultimate goal; for beyond your ultimate goal is another world of striving."[30] And another critic said: "Nothing wears threadbare so rapidly by constant use as words of faith. Constantly spoken or heard, they become stereotyped into phrases, and the inspired prophet creates the same offensive impression as a priest who has nothing else to offer but words." The interest of the workingman "finds its expression in the practicalness of the second part of the Erfurter program, and the wholly practical work of the party."[31] It was at this time that Edward Bernstein, friend and literary heir of Engel, published a series of critical papers in the party journal, _Die Neue Zeit_, attacking especially the catastrophic and revolutionary postulates and saying "the movement is everything, the goal is nothing." Kautsky, the dogmatist of the party, replied to these articles and a feverish discussion followed in all the party press.[32]

In the party conventions of 1898 and 1899 this controversy was waged with considerable energy. Von Vollmar made merry over Kautsky's "inquisition" and called the debate "a noisy cackling over nothing."

The ma.s.s of the party, he said, did not trouble their heads about theories, but plodded along unmindful of hairsplitting.[33] Bebel made a herculean effort to reconcile both elements. To the revisionists he said, "We are in a constant state of intellectual moulting,"[34] to the orthodox he said, "We remain what we have always been."[35]

It was at Dresden, 1903, that the revisionist tempest reached its height in the party teapot. The Germans' love for polysyllabic phrase-making, for which Jaures taunted them at the Amsterdam congress, was here given full play. Von Vollmar repeated that n.o.body except a few dull theorists read Kautsky's or Bernstein's views; the ma.s.s of voters cared for practical results, and "revisionists and anti-revisionists are nothing but a bugbear."[36]

Here the matter rested until the elections of 1907 opened the eyes of the party high priests. They gained only 248,249 votes and lost one-half of their seats in the Reichstag. A number of the leading Socialists promptly began to attack the dogmas of the party program as illusions and pitfalls. The cla.s.s war, the revolutionary method, the theory of an ever-increasing proletariat and decreasing bourgeoisie were attacked as unscientific, and illusory. "The Erfurt program recites a vagary, it repels the intellect, it must be changed;" that was the opinion of the advanced thinkers of the party.

No party congresses, no priestly p.r.o.nunciamentos have been able to check the spread of revolt. As long as Kautsky and Bebel live the program will probably not be re-phrased. But even Kautsky is mellowing under the ripeness of years and circ.u.mstances; and Bebel, shrewd politician, knows the campaigning value of appearing at the same time orthodox and progressive.[37]

To-day one hears very little of Marx and a great deal of legislation.

The last election, with its brilliant victory for Social Democracy, was not won on the general issues of the Erfurter program but on the particular issue of the arrogance of the bureaucracy, and ballot reform. A large ma.s.s of voters cast their ballots for Social Democratic candidates as a protest against existing governmental conditions, not as an affirmation of their a.s.sent to the Marxian dogmas. The truth is, Marx is a tradition, democracy is an issue.[38]

Another indication of the notable changes that have come over Social Democracy is seen in the Socialists' relation to other parties. Here their dogmatic aloofness is the most tenacious. During the years of their bitter persecution by the government they found their excuse in an isolation that was forced upon them. Von Vollmar told his colleagues, immediately after the repeal of the anti-Socialist law, that the South Germans were ready to co-operate with every one who would be willing to give them an inch. In reply to this Bebel introduced a resolution affirming that "the primary necessity of attaining political power" could not be "the work of a moment," but was attained only by gradual growth. During the period of growth the Social Democrats should not work for mere "concessions from the ruling cla.s.ses," but "have only the ultimate and complete aim of the party in mind." The Bebelian theory linked the ultimate goal with ultimate power, both to be attained by waiting until the flood tide.

This question became practical when the Social Democratic members of the provincial legislatures voted with other parties for the state budget. The national party claimed authority over the local party, a claim which was resented by the Bavarians and other South German delegations.[39]

In 1894 the South Germans were chastised by a vote of 164 to 64 for voting for their state budget. They were rebuked again in 1901 and in 1908. In the latter year Bebel told them "three times is enough,"

indicating that there would be a split in the party if they insisted on voting for their local budgets. The South Germans defended their action by saying that they had always agitated for more pay for state employees, and that they were willing to vote the funds that would make this possible. A new champion appeared for the reformistes--Dr.

Frank of Mannheim, a brilliant speaker who is called by his following a "second La.s.salle." He made a withering attack on the Marxian school, but Bebel's censure was carried by 256 to 119.

Finally at Magdeburg, 1910, the budget question reached its climax.

Bebel boasted that his policy of negation had wrought great changes in Germany. "I say it without boasting, in the whole world there is no Social Democracy that has accomplished as much positive good as the German Social Democracy."[40] He claimed the insurance laws, factory laws, and the repeal of special and oppressive legislation as the fruits of his policy. Bebel then warned the Badensians that this is the last time they will be forgiven; one other offense, and they will be put out of the party.

Dr. Frank made an elaborate reply. He said that there was a working agreement between the Social Democrats and Liberals whereby they co-operated against the Conservatives. In the state legislature they had a "bloc" with the Liberals and had elected a vice-president and secretary and important chairmanships by means of this coalition. They had, moreover, reformed the public school system, secured factory legislation, and had secured direct elections in all towns of 4,000 or over. The reformistes' principles are so clearly stated in this speech that I quote several paragraphs:

"I tell you, comrades, if you think that under all the circ.u.mstances you can win only small concessions; with such a message of hopelessness you will not conquer the world, not even the smallest election district. [_Great commotion and disturbance._] But what would be the meaning of this admission that small concessions can be secured? In tearing down a building dramatic effects are possible. But the erection of a building is accomplished only by an acc.u.mulation of small concessions. Behold the labor unions, that are so often spoken of, how they struggle for months, how they suffer hunger for months, in order to win a concession of a few pennies. Often one can see that a small concession contains enormous future possibilities, and in twenty or thirty years will become a vital force in the shaping of the society that is to come."

"Nor will I examine the question whether in parliamentary activity only small concessions can be won. Is it not possible, through parliamentary action, to take high tariffs and business speculations from the necks of the workingmen? Is it not possible to modify police administration, and the legislative conditions that profane Prussia to-day? Are these conditions necessary concomitants of the modern cla.s.s-state (Kla.s.senstaat)? Is it not possible to create out of Prussia and Germany a modern state, where our workingmen, even as their brethren in Western Europe, can fight their great battles upon the field of democratic equality and citizenship? If you wish to view all that as 'small concessions' you are at liberty to do so. I view it as a tremendous revolution, if it succeeds, to secure, through such a struggle, liberty for the Prussian working cla.s.s."[41]

The censure was carried, the Baden delegation left the hall during the voting. On the following day it returned to declare its loyalty to the party, but with the proviso that they would by no means promise how they would vote on their state budget in the future.

Events are shaping themselves rapidly in Germany. Ministerial responsibility cannot much longer be denied. The elections of 1912 should serve as a plain portent to the reactionaries. That Bebel is willing to be a candidate for President of the Reichstag is a significant concession; that the Radicals and many National Liberals are willing to vote for him, would have been deemed impossible ten years ago.

Such conditions as prevail between the government and the Radicals and Social Democrats cannot long continue. The break with the past must come, sooner or later. The pressure of Radical and Democratic votes will become so powerful, that not even the strong traditions of the empire can wholly withstand it.

In May, 1911, I visited the Reichstag on an eventful occasion. The Social Democrats had voted with the government for a new Const.i.tution for Alsace-Lorraine containing universal manhood suffrage. Herr Bebel was jubilant. He said: "It marks a new epoch. We have voted with the government. Not that we have capitulated. But the government have come to our convictions, they have granted universal suffrage to Alsace, now they cannot long deny that right to Prussia and the other states."[42]

We have now seen that politically a great change has come over the German Socialists; that they are partic.i.p.ating in legislation, and are especially solicitous about all acts that pertain to labor and political liberty; that they are gradually moving toward co-operation with other parties; that they are gradually sloughing off the inflexible Marxian armor, and are a.s.suming the pliable dress of modernism.

All this is to be expected of a party that began as a vigorous, narrow, autocratic party of revolution and protest, and is emerging from its hard experiences, a self-styled "cultural party" ("Kultur Partei"). Dr. Sudek.u.m, editor of Communal Praxis, in his report of the parliamentary group, in 1907, wrote: "We have in the Reichstag two kinds of duties; first, the propaganda of our ideas and program; second, practical work, i.e., to enhance, not alone the interests of the working cla.s.s, but the entire complex, so-called cultural interests. The problems that the Social Democratic party as a 'cultural party' has to solve, which are a.s.signed to it as the representative of cultural progress in every realm of human activity, must increase in the same proportion that the bourgeois parties allow themselves to be captured by the government and neglect these problems."[43]

It is a far cry from "cla.s.s war" to "human cultural activities." Such an expansion of purpose requires a greatly enlarged electorate. The majority of the workingmen are already in the party, where will the increase come from?

There are two directions in which the party can hope to gain new recruits--the small farmer and the small tradesman. The small farmer is peculiarly hard to reach. He is well guarded--the Church on the one side, the landlord and _junker_ on the other. To step in and steal his heart is a very difficult task. The work is pushed steadily, with tenacity, but results are slow in coming.

Among the tradespeople and business men, there is more rapid progress, especially in southern Germany. In Munich a great many tradespeople vote for Von Vollmar.[44]

Primarily it will always be a workingman's party. Its soul is the labor movement. Its political aim is democracy, and its hope is the power of sheer preponderance of numbers. What it will do when it has that power is a speculation that does not lure the prosaic Teutonic mind. "We will find plenty to do," one of them said, "when we have the government. We have plenty to do now, that we haven't the government."

This is wisdom learned of France.

This means that the party have given up their "splendid isolation"--what Von Vollmar called their "policy of sterility and despair"[45]--a policy which they acknowledged by words long after they had abandoned it in fact. They abandoned it the moment they championed labor legislation, and sought the sanitation of cities and the opening of parks, in their munic.i.p.al councils.

The pressure of things as they are has been too powerful for even the German Social Democracy, with its dogmatic temper and strength of millions. Revolution has, even here, been replaced by a slow and orderly development.

The rapidity with which the medieval empire will be democratized will depend upon the formation of a genuine liberal party that will enlist those citizens who are inclined toward modernism but cannot be enticed into the Social Democratic or Radical parties. When such a party is formed, and an alliance made with the Social Democrats, then the transformations will be rapid.[46] Among the most significant accessions to the Social Democracy are many professional men: lawyers, physicians, engineers, etc. This augurs a change in party spirit and method. Dr. Frank of Mannheim told me that he considered the extent to which the party could lure the intellectual element the measure of the party greatness and power.

VI

A word should be added upon the att.i.tude of the Social Democrats toward militarism. The standing army and the increasing navy of Germany are a heavy tax upon the people. The Germans for centuries have been military in ambition, soldiers by instinct.

The Social Democrats, in common with all Socialists, are opposed to war. But the German is a patriot. In the International Congress at Stuttgart, the French and Russian delegations imposed an extreme anti-military resolution upon the Socialists, against the protest of the Germans. Bebel called their anti-patriotic utterances "silly word-juggling."[47]

The Berlin congress, 1892, adopted the following resolution, in view of the added military burdens proposed by the Reichstag: "The prevailing military system, not being able to guarantee the country against foreign invasion, is a continual threat to international peace and serves the capitalistic cla.s.s-government, whose aim is the industrial exploitation and suppression of the working cla.s.ses, as an instrument of oppression against the ma.s.ses.

"The party convention therefore demands, in consonance with the program of the Social Democratic platform, the establishment of a system of defense based upon a general militia, trained and armed. The congress declares that the Social Democratic members of the Reichstag are in complete accord with the party and with the politically organized working cla.s.ses of Germany, when they vote against every measure of the government aimed at perpetuating the present military system."[48]

During a debate in the Reichstag in 1907, Bebel declared, in the defense of the Fatherland, _if it were invaded_, even he in his old age would "shoulder a musket." He demanded military drill for youths as a preliminary to the shortening of military service in the standing army; if this were not done the defense of the country would be weakened whenever the service shall be reduced to one year.

The Chancellor had on this occasion introduced a bill making all military service uniformly two years, and abolishing the privileges that had been granted to a few favored cla.s.ses.

For this action they were severely criticised in the next party convention. Bebel replied: "I said, _if the Fatherland really must be defended_, then we will defend it. Because it is our Fatherland. It is the land in which we live, whose language we speak, whose culture we possess. Because we wish to make this, our Fatherland, more beautiful and more complete than any other land on earth. We defend it, therefore, not for you but against you."[49] This patriotic declamation was received with "tremendous applause."

Von Vollmar, himself a soldier of distinction, said, in the Bavarian Diet, a few years ago:

"If the necessity should arise for the protection of the realm against foreign invasion, then it will become evident that the Social Democrats love their Fatherland no less than do their neighbors; that they will as gladly and heroically offer themselves to its defense. On the other hand, if the foolish notion should ever arise to use the army for the support of a warring cla.s.s prerogative, for the defense of indefeasible demands, and for the crushing of those just ambitions which are the product of our times, and a necessary concomitant of our economic and political development,--then we are of the firm conviction that the day will come when the army will remember that it sprang from the people, and that its own interests are those of the ma.s.ses."

This makes their position very clear.

VII

The party that for years held itself in disdainful aloofness, was so defiant of co-operation, in the national parliament, is ductile, neighborly, and eager to help in the munic.i.p.al and communal councils.

It has a communal program of practical details, and no small part of the splendid progress in munic.i.p.al administration in Germany is due to the Social Democrats. Everywhere you hear praise from officials and from political rivals for the careful work of the Social Democratic members of munic.i.p.al bodies.

Owing to the unfavorable election laws, the Social Democrats do not elect a large number of members to local councils. In no important city do they preponderate. If universal manhood suffrage were enacted, they would control the majority of the local legislative bodies. As it is, they are an active minority, and guard jealously the interests of the working cla.s.ses.

Munich may be taken as the type of city in which the Social Democrats are active.[50]

In 1907 there were 130,000 qualified electors for the Reichstag election in Munich, in 1905 there were only 31,252 qualified electors for the munic.i.p.al elections. This shows the restrictive influence of property qualifications for local elections.