Slavery and Four Years of War Part 55

The Sixth and Nineteenth Corps held their positions of the previous evening, and threatened the enemy in front. Part of my brigade was continued on the advance line during the forenoon of the 22d, the remainder in reserve. The real attack was to be made by Crook, but this rendered it desirable to conceal his movements and deceive the vigilant enemy. While Crook remained in hiding in the timber, Sheridan decided to demonstrate against Early's left centre in such way as to lead him to expect a formidable a.s.sault there. Accordingly the whole of Ricketts' division with Averell's cavalry was, about 12 M., rather defiantly displayed and moved conspicuously to our right, and close upon the enemy's front. My position in partial reserve made my command the most available for this movement. I was therefore ordered to take the advance, followed by Colonel Emerson with the First Brigade. The movement was made in full sight of the enemy and under the fire of his guns. We gained, after some fighting, a ridge that extended near to Tumbling Run on the north of the enemy's fortifications. The enemy fought hard to hold possession of this ridge as a protection to his left and as a good lookout. Under Ricketts' orders I continued by repeated charges to push the enemy along this ridge for about three quarters of a mile until he was forced to abandon it, cross the Run, and take refuge within his works. Under such cover as we could get my men were now held within easy musket shot of the enemy. During this movement our guns in the rear tried to aid us, but it was hard to tell which we suffered from the most--our own sh.e.l.ls or the enemy's fire. Averell's cavalry pushed back the enemy's skirmishers still farther to our right.

The enemy, from his signal station of Three-Top Mountain, took the movements of Ricketts and Averell to be a preparation for a real attack, designed to fall upon the front of Ramseur's division, and he prepared to meet it. While these operations were taking place, Crook moved his infantry under cover of the thick timber along the face of Little North Mountain, and by 4 P.M. reached a position with his two divisions full on Early's left flank. Crook at once crossed the narrow Valley and bore down on the enemy's extreme left, which at once gave way. Ramseur, in my front, had been attentively watching Ricketts, and now seeing the danger from Crook, commenced drawing his troops out of his breastworks and changing front to his left. I was near enough to discover this movement, and, to prevent its consummation, I ordered an immediate charge, which was executed on a run. Ramseur, discovering the new and seemingly more imminent danger, tried to reoccupy his works, but, simultaneously, Crook charged, and Ramseur's troops, caught in the mist of his movement, fell into confusion, became panic-stricken, and fled through the timber or were captured. This spread a panic to Early's entire army. The troops of my command did not halt to fire in the charge, but crossed the Run and struggled up the precipitous banks and over the breastworks, suffering little loss, and were soon in possession of eight of the enemy's guns and some prisoners. They met inside of the enemy's fortifications and commingled with Crook's men. When the charge was well under way, Colonel George A. (Sandy) Forsyth ( 4) of Sheridan's staff reached me on the gallop. He was the bearer of orders, but did not deliver them. He only exclaimed: "You are all right; you need no orders."

He, later, explained that Sheridan had sent him to direct me to a.s.sault, if opportunity presented, in co-operation with Crook.

In pa.s.sing on horseback around the right of the enemy's works to gain an entrance, and while going up a steep hill in the timber, I fell in with a mounted officer wearing a plain blouse and a slouch hat, but with no insignia of rank. We continued together for a short time, he inquiring of the progress of the battle as I had observed it. I asked him if he knew what General Crook was doing.

He modestly laughed, and said Crook was just then engaged with me in gaining an entrance to the enemy's fortifications, and that he supposed his command was pursuing Early. Here began an acquaintance with the hero of this battle, that ripened into a friendship which ended only with his death.

Early could not rally his troops to a stand, and all his guns in position behind his works fell into our hands. Night only saved him and his demoralized army from capture. The other divisions of the Sixth and the Nineteenth Corps came up promptly, but the battle was over with the a.s.sault.

Captain Jed. Hotchkiss, of the Topographical Engineers serving in Early's army, describes the operations in his journal of the 22d, thus:

"The enemy at 1 P.M. advanced several lines of battle in front of Ramseur, but did not come far, and only drove in our skirmish line.

At 4.30 P.M. they drove in the skirmishers in front of Gordon and opened a lively artillery duel. At the same time a flanking force that had come on our left, near the North Mountain, advanced and drove away the cavalry and moved on the left flank of our infantry --rather beyond it. The brigade there (Battle's) was ordered to move to the left, and the whole line was ordered to extend that way, moving along the line of the breastworks. But the enemy attacking just then (5.30 P.M.) the second brigade from the left, instead of marching by the line of works, was marched across an angle by its commander. The enemy seeing this movement rushed over the works, and the brigade fled in confusion, thus letting the enemy into the rear of Early's division, as well as of Gordon's and the rest of Rodes'; our whole line gave way towards the right, offering little or no resistance, and the enemy came on and occupied our line. General Early and staff were near by, and I with others went after Wharton (to the right), but it was too late."

At 4 A.M. next morning Early dispatched Lee:

"Late yesterday the enemy attacked my position at Fisher's Hill and succeeded in driving back the left of my line, which was defended by the cavalry, and throwing a force in the rear of the left of my infantry, when the whole of the troops gave way in a panic and could not be rallied. This resulted in the loss of twelve pieces of artillery, though my loss in men is not large."( 5)

He, later, reported his killed and wounded at Fisher's Hill at 240, missing 995; total, 1235.( 6) Many of his missing were doubtless killed or wounded.

The Union killed and wounded were:( 7)

Killed. Wounded. Aggregate.

Sixth Army Corps 27 208 235 Nineteenth Army Corps 15 86 101 Army of W. Va. (Crook) 8 152 160 Cavalry 2 11 13 --- --- --- Totals 52 457 509

The killed and wounded in my brigade were 80, exactly one half the casualties in Crook's command, and above one third in the Sixth Corps.

The victory of Fisher's Hill, though comparatively bloodless, was one of the most complete of the war. But from the inability of Torbert to drive Fitz Lee's cavalry (then under Wickham in consequence of Fitz Lee being wounded at Opequon) from the Luray Valley and to gain a position in Early's rear, the latter's army would have been destroyed. Torbert encountered Wickham in a narrow gorge and was unable to dislodge him in time. Sheridan's infantry a.s.sembled on the Valley pike south of Fisher's Hill after dark, and continuing the pursuit all night, capturing many stragglers and two more guns, reached Woodstock twelve miles farther south at daybreak. Averell was ordered to push forward up the Cedar Creek road and debouch at Woodstock in rear of the retreating foe. This, for some reason, he did not do, but soon after dark went into camp and awaited daylight. He reached Woodstock after the infantry corps, too late to cut off or a.s.sail the enemy. For this and some other alleged delinquencies Sheridan relieved him from command of his division, and a.s.signed Colonel William H. Powell to succeed him.

Early collected his broken forces and essayed to make a stand at Rude's Hill, east of the Shenandoah and south of Mount Jackson.

As our troops advanced to attack him, however, he withdrew rapidly in the direction of Staunton. After pa.s.sing New Market he took a road leading to Brown's Gap, where he was joined by his cavalry from the Luray Valley and Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's artillery, which had left him at Stephenson's Depot on the 15th.

Not until the 25th did Torbert with his cavalry reach Sheridan at New Market. Some of Sheridan's infantry advanced as far as Mount Crawford and Lacey Springs, while the main body of the cavalry pushed to Staunton and Waynesboro.

An incident occurred on the evening of the 3d of October that had something to do with the severity of the orders relating to the destruction of property in the Shenandoah valley. Lieutenant John R. Meigs, Sheridan's engineer officer, while returning from a topographical survey of the country near Dayton, accompanied by two a.s.sistants, fell in with three men in our uniform, and rode with them towards Sheridan's headquarters. Suddenly these men turned on Lieutenant Meigs and, though demanding his surrender, shot and killed him. One of his a.s.sistants was captured and one escaped and reported the event. Sheridan was much enraged, as the killing of the Lieutenant was little less than murder, occurring, as it did, within our lines. The three men were probably disguised Confederates operating near their homes. Sheridan ordered Custer, who had succeeded to the command of Wilson's cavalry division, to burn all houses within an area of five miles within the spot where Meigs was killed. The next morning Custer proceeded to execute this order. The designated area included the village of Dayton.

When a few houses had been burned the order was suspended, and Custer was required instead to bring in all able-bodied men as prisoners.( 8)

General T. W. Rosser, with a cavalry brigade from Richmond, joined Early on the 5th of October, and the latter's army, being otherwise much strengthened, soon began again to show signs of activity.

As the Sixth Corps was expected to rejoin the Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg, Sheridan decided to withdraw at least as far as Strasburg, and he determined also to lay waste the Valley, as it was a great magazine of supplies for the Confederate armies.

He commenced to move on the 6th, the infantry taking the advance.

The cavalry had begun the work of destruction at Waynesboro and Staunton. It usually remained quiet during the day, then at night, while moving, set fire to all grain stacks, barns, and mills, thus leaving behind it nothing but a waste. The fires lit up the Valley and the mountain sides, producing a picture of resplendent grandeur seldom witnessed. The flames lighted up the fertile Valley, casting a hideous glare, commingled with clouds of smoke, over the foot- hills and to the summits of the great mountain ranges on each side of the doomed Valley. The occasional discharge of artillery helped to make the panorama sublime. Fire and sword here literally combined in the real work of war. Of the necessity or wisdom of this destruction of property there may be doubts, yet the war had then progressed to an acute stage. All possible means to hasten its termination seemed justifiable. Chambersburg, Pa., had been wantonly burned July 30, 1864. It has been charged that Sheridan declared that he would so completely destroy everything in the Valley that a "crow would have to carry a haversack when he flew over it."

The Confederates, with Rosser, their new cavalry leader, pursued and daily a.s.saulted Sheridan's rear-guard. This continued until the evening of the 8th. Rosser's apparent success was heralded in an exaggerated way at Richmond. He was bulletined there as the "Savior of the Valley." He had recently before his advent in the Valley won reputation in a raid on which he had captured and driven off some cattle belonging to Grant's army. Torbert was ordered by Sheridan, on the night of the 8th, to whip Rosser the next morning or get whipped.

The infantry of the army was halted to await the issue of the cavalry battle. Sheridan informed Torbert that he would witness the fight from Round Top Mountain. Merritt's division was encamped on the Valley pike at the foot of this mountain, just north of Tom's Brook, and Custer's division about five miles farther north and west near Tumbling Run. Custer during the night moved southward by the Back road, which lay about three miles to the westward of the pike. At early daylight, Rosser, believing our army was still falling back, unexpectedly met and a.s.sailed Custer with three cavalry brigades, and almost simultaneously Merritt, in turn, a.s.sailed Lomax and Johnson's cavalry divisions on the valley pike.

Merritt extended his right and Custer his left until the two divisions united, when, under Torbert, they charged upon and broke Rosser's lines all along Tom's Brook. The battle lasted about two hours, when Rosser's entire force fell into the wildest disorder, and in falling back degenerated into a rout. Torbert ( 9) pursued for twenty-five miles, capturing about three hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery with their caissons, and all Rosser's wagons and ambulances, including his headquarters wagons with his official papers. It was said that subsequent bulletins announcing Rosser's antic.i.p.ated victories for the day were found. Rosser's fame as a soldier, earned by years of hard fighting, was lost at Tom's Brook in two hours.

Disasters had now become so frequent to the Confederates in the Valley that some wag at Richmond marked a fresh shipment of new guns destined for Early's army: "_General Sheridan, care of Jubal A. Early_."

Sheridan's army retired to the north of Cedar Creek. The Sixth Corps, having orders to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, continued its march eastward towards Front Royal, expecting to proceed to Piedmont and there take cars for Alexandria. It abandoned that route, however, on the 12th, and marched towards Ashby's Gap, with a view of pa.s.sing through it to Washington, and going thence, by transports, to City Point.(10) When this corps was partly across the Shenandoah near Millwood, on the 13th, an order came from Sheridan for Wright to return with his corps to Cedar Creek. This order was given in consequence of Early's return to Fisher's Hill.

The necessity of the Sixth Corps' action will soon be apparent.

It reached Cedar Creek and went into camp at noon of the 14th.

I recall the incident of a red fox starting to run through the temporary bivouac of the corps at Millwood. The troops all turned out, about 10,000, formed a ring around it, while a few hors.e.m.e.n rode after it until it fell from fright and exhaustion. The officers and men of an army always enjoyed incidents of this character.

There was, however, more serious diversion near at hand for these bronzed soldiers.

( 1) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 152.

( 2) _Ibid_., p. 152.

( 3) _Ibid_., p. 223 (Ricketts' Report).

( 4) Forsyth, precisely four years later, while in command of fifty picked scouts was surrounded on Beecher Island, on the Arickaree fork of the Republican River, by about nine hundred Indians, led by the celebrated chief, Roman Nose, and made the most desperate fight known in the annals of our Indian wars. Lieutenant Beecher, Surgeon Movers, and six of the scouts were killed and twenty others severely wounded. Forsyth was himself struck in the right thigh and his left leg was broken by rifle b.a.l.l.s. He held out eight days; meantime two of his scouts succeeded in eluding the Indians, and, reaching Fort Wallace, 110 miles distant, returned with a relieving party.--Custer's _Life on the Plains_, 88-98.

( 5) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 557.

( 6) _Ibid_., p. 556.

( 7) _Ibid_., p. 124.

( 8) _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., pp. 50-2.

( 9) General A. T. A. Torbert distinguished himself on many fields and survived the war. While making a voyage on the steamer _Vera Cruz_ he was shipwrecked off the Florida coast, August 29, 1880.

He heroically aided others to escape death, and with almost superhuman exertion kept himself afloat on a broken spar for twenty hours, and thus reached sh.o.r.e, only to sink down and die from exhaustion.

(10) _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., p. 59.

CHAPTER X Battle of Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864, with Comments Thereon-- Also Personal Mention and Incidents

General Early, upon his arrival at Fisher's Hill with his reorganized army, a.s.sumed, on the 13th of October, an aggressive att.i.tude by pushing a division of infantry north of Strasburg and his cavalry along the Back road towards Cedar Creek. This brought on sharp engagements, in which Colonel Thoburn's division of Crook's corps and Custer's cavalry partic.i.p.ated. Early seems to have acted in the belief that all but Crook's command had gone to Petersburg.

This action resulted in bringing Wright back to Cedar Creek, as we have seen.

Secretary Stanton, by telegram on the 13th, summoned Sheridan to Washington for consultation as to the latter's future operations.

Early, having met unexpected resistance, withdrew his forces at night to Fisher's Hill, and quiet being restored, Sheridan started on the 16th to Washington, _via_ Front Royal and Mana.s.sas Gap. He took with him as far as Front Royal his cavalry, under Torbert, intending to push them through Chester Gap to the Virginia Central Railroad at Charlottesville, to make an extensive raid east of the Blue Ridge.

Early had a signal station on Three Top Mountain in plain view of our signal officers, who knew the Confederate signal code. From this station there was flagged, on the 16th, this message:

"To Lieutenant-General Early:

"Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan.

"Longstreet, Lieutenant-General."

Wright, who was left in command of the army at Cedar Creek, forwarded this message to Sheridan, who received it when near Front Royal.

Wright, also, in a communication accompanying the message, expressed fear of an attack in the absence of the cavalry. He antic.i.p.ated that it would fall on his right. Sheridan, deeming it best to be on the safe side, abandoned the cavalry raid, and ordered Torbert to report back to Wright, cautioning the latter to be well on his guard, and expressing the opinion to Wright that if attacked he could beat the enemy.( 1) Sheridan with a cavalry escort proceeded to Rectortown, the terminus of the railroad; there took cars, and arrived in Washington the morning of the 17th. He held a consultation with Stanton and Halleck, and with certain members of his staff left Washington at 12 M. by rail, arriving the evening of the same day at Martinsburg. Here he was met by an escort of three hundred cavalry. He left Martinsburg the next morning (18th), and reached Winchester about 3 P.M., twenty-two miles distant. He tarried at the latter place over night, making some survey of the surrounding heights as to their utility for fortifications.

But to return to his army. Torbert reached Cedar Creek with the cavalry on the 17th. The Longstreet message was a ruse. Longstreet, though in Richmond, was not on duty, not having fully recovered from his wound received in the Wilderness.( 2)