Side-Lights on Astronomy and Kindred Fields of Popular Science Part 15

To suppose that the advocates on the other side meant to take issue on this proposition would be to a.s.sume that they did not know what they were saying. The conclusion forced upon us is that though men spend their whole lives in the study of the most elevated department of human thought it does not guard them against the danger of using words without meaning. It would be a mark of ignorance, rather than of penetration, to hastily denounce propositions on subjects we are not well acquainted with because we do not understand their meaning. I do not mean to intimate that philosophy itself is subject to this reproach. When we see a philosophical proposition couched in terms we do not understand, the most modest and charitable view is to a.s.sume that this arises from our lack of knowledge. Nothing is easier than for the ignorant to ridicule the propositions of the learned. And yet, with every reserve, I cannot but feel that the disputes to which I have alluded prove the necessity of bringing scientific precision of language into the whole domain of thought. If the discussion had been confined to a few, and other philosophers had a.n.a.lyzed the subject, and showed the fict.i.tious character of the discussion, or had pointed out where opinions really might differ, there would be nothing derogatory to philosophers. But the most suggestive circ.u.mstance is that although a large proportion of the philosophic writers in recent times have devoted more or less attention to the subject, few, or none, have made even this modest contribution. I speak with some little confidence on this subject, because several years ago I wrote to one of the most acute thinkers of the country, asking if he could find in philosophic literature any terms or definitions expressive of the three different senses in which not only the word freedom, but nearly all words implying freedom were used. His search was in vain.

Nothing of this sort occurs in the practical affairs of life. All terms used in business, however general or abstract, have that well-defined meaning which is the first requisite of the scientific language. Now one important lesson which I wish to inculcate is that the language of science in this respect corresponds to that of business; in that each and every term that is employed has a meaning as well defined as the subject of discussion can admit of. It will be an instructive exercise to inquire what this peculiarity of scientific and business language is. It can be shown that a certain requirement should be fulfilled by all language intended for the discovery of truth, which is fulfilled only by the two cla.s.ses of language which I have described. It is one of the most common errors of discourse to a.s.sume that any common expression which we may use always conveys an idea, no matter what the subject of discourse. The true state of the case can, perhaps, best be seen by beginning at the foundation of things and examining under what conditions language can really convey ideas.

Suppose thrown among us a person of well-developed intellect, but unacquainted with a single language or word that we use. It is absolutely useless to talk to him, because nothing that we say conveys any meaning to his mind. We can supply him no dictionary, because by hypothesis he knows no language to which we have access. How shall we proceed to communicate our ideas to him? Clearly there is but one possible way--namely, through his senses. Outside of this means of bringing him in contact with us we can have no communication with him.

We, therefore, begin by showing him sensible objects, and letting him understand that certain words which we use correspond to those objects.

After he has thus acquired a small vocabulary, we make him understand that other terms refer to relations between objects which he can perceive by his senses. Next he learns, by induction, that there are terms which apply not to special objects, but to whole cla.s.ses of objects. Continuing the same process, he learns that there are certain attributes of objects made known by the manner in which they affect his senses, to which abstract terms are applied. Having learned all this, we can teach him new words by combining words without exhibiting objects already known. Using these words we can proceed yet further, building up, as it were, a complete language. But there is one limit at every step. Every term which we make known to him must depend ultimately upon terms the meaning of which he has learned from their connection with special objects of sense.

To communicate to him a knowledge of words expressive of mental states it is necessary to a.s.sume that his own mind is subject to these states as well as our own, and that we can in some way indicate them by our acts. That the former hypothesis is sufficiently well established can be made evident so long as a consistency of different words and ideas is maintained. If no such consistency of meaning on his part were evident, it might indicate that the operations of his mind were so different from ours that no such communication of ideas was possible.

Uncertainty in this respect must arise as soon as we go beyond those mental states which communicate themselves to the senses of others.

We now see that in order to communicate to our foreigner a knowledge of language, we must follow rules similar to those necessary for the stability of a building. The foundation of the building must be well laid upon objects knowable by his five senses. Of course the mind, as well as the external object, may be a factor in determining the ideas which the words are intended to express; but this does not in any manner invalidate the conditions which we impose. Whatever theory we may adopt of the relative part played by the knowing subject, and the external object in the acquirement of knowledge, it remains none the less true that no knowledge of the meaning of a word can be acquired except through the senses, and that the meaning is, therefore, limited by the senses. If we transgress the rule of founding each meaning upon meanings below it, and having the whole ultimately resting upon a sensuous foundation, we at once branch off into sound without sense. We may teach him the use of an extended vocabulary, to the terms of which he may apply ideas of his own, more or less vague, but there will be no way of deciding that he attaches the same meaning to these terms that we do.

What we have shown true of an intelligent foreigner is necessarily true of the growing child. We come into the world without a knowledge of the meaning of words, and can acquire such knowledge only by a process which we have found applicable to the intelligent foreigner. But to confine ourselves within these limits in the use of language requires a course of severe mental discipline. The transgression of the rule will naturally seem to the undisciplined mind a mark of intellectual vigor rather than the reverse. In our system of education every temptation is held out to the learner to transgress the rule by the fluent use of language to which it is doubtful if he himself attaches clear notions, and which he can never be certain suggests to his hearer the ideas which he desires to convey. Indeed, we not infrequently see, even among practical educators, expressions of positive antipathy to scientific precision of language so obviously opposed to good sense that they can be attributed only to a failure to comprehend the meaning of the language which they criticise.

Perhaps the most injurious effect in this direction arises from the natural tendency of the mind, when not subject to a scientific discipline, to think of words expressing sensible objects and their relations as connoting certain supersensuous attributes. This is frequently seen in the repugnance of the metaphysical mind to receive a scientific statement about a matter of fact simply as a matter of fact.

This repugnance does not generally arise in respect to the every-day matters of life. When we say that the earth is round we state a truth which every one is willing to receive as final. If without denying that the earth was round, one should criticise the statement on the ground that it was not necessarily round but might be of some other form, we should simply smile at this use of language. But when we take a more general statement and a.s.sert that the laws of nature are inexorable, and that all phenomena, so far as we can show, occur in obedience to their requirements, we are met with a sort of criticism with which all of us are familiar, but which I am unable adequately to describe. No one denies that as a matter of fact, and as far as his experience extends, these laws do appear to be inexorable. I have never heard of any one professing, during the present generation, to describe a natural phenomenon, with the avowed belief that it was not a product of natural law; yet we constantly hear the scientific view criticised on the ground that events MAY occur without being subject to natural law.

The word "may," in this connection, is one to which we can attach no meaning expressive of a sensuous relation.

The a.n.a.logous conflict between the scientific use of language and the use made by some philosophers is found in connection with the idea of causation. Fundamentally the word cause is used in scientific language in the same sense as in the language of common life. When we discuss with our neighbors the cause of a fit of illness, of a fire, or of cold weather, not the slightest ambiguity attaches to the use of the word, because whatever meaning may be given to it is founded only on an accurate a.n.a.lysis of the ideas involved in it from daily use. No philosopher objects to the common meaning of the word, yet we frequently find men of eminence in the intellectual world who will not tolerate the scientific man in using the word in this way. In every explanation which he can give to its use they detect ambiguity. They insist that in any proper use of the term the idea of power must be connoted. But what meaning is here attached to the word power, and how shall we first reduce it to a sensible form, and then apply its meaning to the operations of nature? Whether this can be done, I do not inquire. All I maintain is that if we wish to do it, we must pa.s.s without the domain of scientific statement.

Perhaps the greatest advantage in the use of symbolic and other mathematical language in scientific investigation is that it cannot possibly be made to connote anything except what the speaker means. It adheres to the subject matter of discourse with a tenacity which no criticism can overcome. In consequence, whenever a science is reduced to a mathematical form its conclusions are no longer the subject of philosophical attack. To secure the same desirable quality in all other scientific language it is necessary to give it, so far as possible, the same simplicity of signification which attaches to mathematical symbols. This is not easy, because we are obliged to use words of ordinary language, and it is impossible to divest them of whatever they may connote to ordinary hearers.

I have thus sought to make it clear that the language of science corresponds to that of ordinary life, and especially of business life, in confining its meaning to phenomena. An a.n.a.logous statement may be made of the method and objects of scientific investigation. I think Professor Clifford was very happy in defining science as organized common-sense. The foundation of its widest general creations is laid, not in any artificial theories, but in the natural beliefs and tendencies of the human mind. Its position against those who deny these generalizations is quite a.n.a.logous to that taken by the Scottish school of philosophy against the scepticism of Hume.

It may be asked, if the methods and language of science correspond to those of practical life, why is not the every-day discipline of that life as good as the discipline of science? The answer is, that the power of transferring the modes of thought of common life to subjects of a higher order of generality is a rare faculty which can be acquired only by scientific discipline. What we want is that in public affairs men shall reason about questions of finance, trade, national wealth, legislation, and administration, with the same consciousness of the practical side that they reason about their own interests. When this habit is once acquired and appreciated, the scientific method will naturally be applied to the study of questions of social policy. When a scientific interest is taken in such questions, their boundaries will be extended beyond the utilities immediately involved, and one important condition of unceasing progress will be complied with.

XXI

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FLYING-MACHINE

Mr. Secretary Langley's trial of his flying-machine, which seems to have come to an abortive issue for the time, strikes a sympathetic chord in the const.i.tution of our race. Are we not the lords of creation? Have we not girdled the earth with wires through which we speak to our antipodes? Do we not journey from continent to continent over oceans that no animal can cross, and with a speed of which our ancestors would never have dreamed? Is not all the rest of the animal creation so far inferior to us in every point that the best thing it can do is to become completely subservient to our needs, dying, if need be, that its flesh may become a toothsome dish on our tables? And yet here is an insignificant little bird, from whose mind, if mind it has, all conceptions of natural law are excluded, applying the rules of aerodynamics in an application of mechanical force to an end we have never been able to reach, and this with entire ease and absence of consciousness that it is doing an extraordinary thing. Surely our knowledge of natural laws, and that inventive genius which has enabled us to subordinate all nature to our needs, ought also to enable us to do anything that the bird can do. Therefore we must fly. If we cannot yet do it, it is only because we have not got to the bottom of the subject. Our successors of the not distant future will surely succeed.

This is at first sight a very natural and plausible view of the case.

And yet there are a number of circ.u.mstances of which we should take account before attempting a confident forecast. Our hope for the future is based on what we have done in the past. But when we draw conclusions from past successes we should not lose sight of the conditions on which success has depended. There is no advantage which has not its attendant drawbacks; no strength which has not its concomitant weakness. Wealth has its trials and health its dangers. We must expect our great superiority to the bird to be a.s.sociated with conditions which would give it an advantage at some point. A little study will make these conditions clear.

We may look on the bird as a sort of flying-machine complete in itself, of which a brain and nervous system are fundamentally necessary parts.

No such machine can navigate the air unless guided by something having life. Apart from this, it could be of little use to us unless it carried human beings on its wings. We thus meet with a difficulty at the first step--we cannot give a brain and nervous system to our machine. These necessary adjuncts must be supplied by a man, who is no part of the machine, but something carried by it. The bird is a complete machine in itself. Our aerial ship must be machine plus man.

Now, a man is, I believe, heavier than any bird that flies. The limit which the rarity of the air places upon its power of supporting wings, taken in connection with the combined weight of a man and a machine, make a drawback which we should not too hastily a.s.sume our ability to overcome. The example of the bird does not prove that man can fly. The hundred and fifty pounds of dead weight which the manager of the machine must add to it over and above that necessary in the bird may well prove an insurmountable obstacle to success.

I need hardly remark that the advantage possessed by the bird has its attendant drawbacks when we consider other movements than flying. Its wings are simply one pair of its legs, and the human race could not afford to abandon its arms for the most effective wings that nature or art could supply.

Another point to be considered is that the bird operates by the application of a kind of force which is peculiar to the animal creation, and no approach to which has ever been made in any mechanism.

This force is that which gives rise to muscular action, of which the necessary condition is the direct action of a nervous system. We cannot have muscles or nerves for our flying-machine. We have to replace them by such crude and clumsy adjuncts as steam-engines and electric batteries. It may certainly seem singular if man is never to discover any combination of substances which, under the influence of some such agency as an electric current, shall expand and contract like a muscle.

But, if he is ever to do so, the time is still in the future. We do not see the dawn of the age in which such a result will be brought forth.

Another consideration of a general character may be introduced. As a rule it is the unexpected that happens in invention as well as discovery. There are many problems which have fascinated mankind ever since civilization began which we have made little or no advance in solving. The only satisfaction we can feel in our treatment of the great geometrical problems of antiquity is that we have shown their solution to be impossible. The mathematician of to-day admits that he can neither square the circle, duplicate the cube or trisect the angle.

May not our mechanicians, in like manner, be ultimately forced to admit that aerial flight is one of that great cla.s.s of problems with which man can never cope, and give up all attempts to grapple with it?

[Ill.u.s.tration with caption: PROFESSOR LANGLEY'S AIR-SHIP]

The fact is that invention and discovery have, notwithstanding their seemingly wide extent, gone on in rather narrower lines than is commonly supposed. If, a hundred years ago, the most sagacious of mortals had been told that before the nineteenth century closed the face of the earth would be changed, time and s.p.a.ce almost annihilated, and communication between continents made more rapid and easy than it was between cities in his time; and if he had been asked to exercise his wildest imagination in depicting what might come--the airship and the flying-machine would probably have had a prominent place in his scheme, but neither the steamship, the railway, the telegraph, nor the telephone would have been there. Probably not a single new agency which he could have imagined would have been one that has come to pa.s.s.

It is quite clear to me that success must await progress of a different kind from that which the inventors of flying-machines are aiming at. We want a great discovery, not a great invention. It is an unfortunate fact that we do not always appreciate the distinction between progress in scientific discovery and ingenious application of discovery to the wants of civilization. The name of Marconi is familiar to every ear; the names of Maxwell and Herz, who made the discoveries which rendered wireless telegraphy possible, are rarely recalled. Modern progress is the result of two factors: Discoveries of the laws of nature and of actions or possibilities in nature, and the application of such discoveries to practical purposes. The first is the work of the scientific investigator, the second that of the inventor.

In view of the scientific discoveries of the past ten years, which, after bringing about results that would have seemed chimerical if predicted, leading on to the extraction of a substance which seems to set the laws and limits of nature at defiance by radiating a flood of heat, even when cooled to the lowest point that science can reach--a substance, a few specks of which contain power enough to start a railway train, and embody perpetual motion itself, almost--he would be a bold prophet who would set any limit to possible discoveries in the realm of nature. We are binding the universe together by agencies which pa.s.s from sun to planet and from star to star. We are determined to find out all we can about the mysterious ethereal medium supposed to fill all s.p.a.ce, and which conveys light and heat from one heavenly body to another, but which yet evades all direct investigation. We are peering into the law of gravitation itself with the full hope of discovering something in its origin which may enable us to evade its action. From time to time philosophers fancy the road open to success, yet nothing that can be practically called success has yet been reached or even approached. When it is reached, when we are able to state exactly why matter gravitates, then will arise the question how this. .h.i.therto unchangeable force may be controlled and regulated. With this question answered the problem of the interaction between ether and matter may be solved. That interaction goes on between ethers and molecules is shown by the radiation of heat by all bodies. When the molecules are combined into a ma.s.s, this interaction ceases, so that the lightest objects fly through the ether without resistance. Why is this? Why does ether act on the molecule and not the ma.s.s? When we can produce the latter, and when the mutual action can be controlled, then may gravitation be overcome and then may men build, not merely airships, but ships which shall fly above the air, and transport their pa.s.sengers from continent to continent with the speed of the celestial motions.

The first question suggested to the reader by these considerations is whether any such result is possible; whether it is within the power of man to discover the nature of luminiferous ether and the cause of gravitation. To this the profoundest philosopher can only answer, "I do not know." Quite possibly the gates at which he is beating are, in the very nature of things, incapable of being opened. It may be that the mind of man is incapable of grasping the secrets within them. The question has even occurred to me whether, if a being of such supernatural power as to understand the operations going on in a molecule of matter or in a current of electricity as we understand the operations of a steam-engine should essay to explain them to us, he would meet with any more success than we should in explaining to a fish the engines of a ship which so rudely invades its domain. As was remarked by William K. Clifford, perhaps the clearest spirit that has ever studied such problems, it is possible that the laws of geometry for s.p.a.ces infinitely small may be so different from those of larger s.p.a.ces that we must necessarily be unable to conceive them.

Still, considering mere possibilities, it is not impossible that the twentieth century may be destined to make known natural forces which will enable us to fly from continent to continent with a speed far exceeding that of the bird.

But when we inquire whether aerial flight is possible in the present state of our knowledge, whether, with such materials as we possess, a combination of steel, cloth, and wire can be made which, moved by the power of electricity or steam, shall form a successful flying-machine, the outlook may be altogether different. To judge it sanely, let us bear in mind the difficulties which are encountered in any flying-machine. The basic principle on which any such machine must be constructed is that of the aeroplane. This, by itself, would be the simplest of all flyers, and therefore the best if it could be put into operation. The principle involved may be readily comprehended by the accompanying figure. A M is the section of a flat plane surface, say a thin sheet of metal or a cloth supported by wires. It moves through the air, the latter being represented by the horizontal rows of dots. The direction of the motion is that of the horizontal line A P. The aeroplane has a slight inclination measured by the proportion between the perpendicular M P and the length A P. We may raise the edge M up or lower it at pleasure. Now the interesting point, and that on which the hopes of inventors are based, is that if we give the plane any given inclination, even one so small that the perpendicular M P is only two or three per cent of the length A M, we can also calculate a certain speed of motion through the air which, if given to the plane, will enable it to bear any required weight. A plane ten feet square, for example, would not need any great inclination, nor would it require a speed higher than a few hundred feet a second to bear a man. What is of yet more importance, the higher the speed the less the inclination required, and, if we leave out of consideration the friction of the air and the resistance arising from any object which the machine may carry, the less the horse-power expended in driving the plane.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

Maxim exemplified this by experiment several years ago. He found that, with a small inclination, he could readily give his aeroplane, when it slid forward upon ways, such a speed that it would rise from the ways of itself. The whole problem of the successful flying-machine is, therefore, that of arranging an aeroplane that shall move through the air with the requisite speed.

The practical difficulties in the way of realizing the movement of such an object are obvious. The aeroplane must have its propellers. These must be driven by an engine with a source of power. Weight is an essential quality of every engine. The propellers must be made of metal, which has its weakness, and which is liable to give way when its speed attains a certain limit. And, granting complete success, imagine the proud possessor of the aeroplane darting through the air at a speed of several hundred feet per second! It is the speed alone that sustains him. How is he ever going to stop? Once he slackens his speed, down he begins to fall. He may, indeed, increase the inclination of his aeroplane. Then he increases the resistance to the sustaining force.

Once he stops he falls a dead ma.s.s. How shall he reach the ground without destroying his delicate machinery? I do not think the most imaginative inventor has yet even put upon paper a demonstratively successful way of meeting this difficulty. The only ray of hope is afforded by the bird. The latter does succeed in stopping and reaching the ground safely after its flight. But we have already mentioned the great advantages which the bird possesses in the power of applying force to its wings, which, in its case, form the aeroplanes. But we have already seen that there is no mechanical combination, and no way of applying force, which will give to the aeroplanes the flexibility and rapidity of movement belonging to the wings of a bird. With all the improvements that the genius of man has made in the steamship, the greatest and best ever constructed is liable now and then to meet with accident. When this happens she simply floats on the water until the damage is repaired, or help reaches her. Unless we are to suppose for the flying-machine, in addition to everything else, an immunity from accident which no human experience leads us to believe possible, it would be liable to derangements of machinery, any one of which would be necessarily fatal. If an engine were necessary not only to propel a ship, but also to make her float--if, on the occasion of any accident she immediately went to the bottom with all on board--there would not, at the present day, be any such thing as steam navigation. That this difficulty is insurmountable would seem to be a very fair deduction, not only from the failure of all attempts to surmount it, but from the fact that Maxim has never, so far as we are aware, followed up his seemingly successful experiment.

There is, indeed, a way of attacking it which may, at first sight, seem plausible. In order that the aeroplane may have its full sustaining power, there is no need that its motion be continuously forward. A nearly horizontal surface, swinging around in a circle, on a vertical axis, like the wings of a windmill moving horizontally, will fulfil all the conditions. In fact, we have a machine on this simple principle in the familiar toy which, set rapidly whirling, rises in the air. Why more attempts have not been made to apply this system, with two sets of sails whirling in opposite directions, I do not know. Were there any possibility of making a flying-machine, it would seem that we should look in this direction.

The difficulties which I have pointed out are only preliminary ones, patent on the surface. A more fundamental one still, which the writer feels may prove insurmountable, is based on a law of nature which we are bound to accept. It is that when we increase the size of any flying-machine without changing its model we increase the weight in proportion to the cube of the linear dimensions, while the effective supporting power of the air increases only as the square of those dimensions. To ill.u.s.trate the principle let us make two flying-machines exactly alike, only make one on double the scale of the other in all its dimensions. We all know that the volume and therefore the weight of two similar bodies are proportional to the cubes of their dimensions.

The cube of two is eight. Hence the large machine will have eight times the weight of the other. But surfaces are as the squares of the dimensions. The square of two is four. The heavier machine will therefore expose only four times the wing surface to the air, and so will have a distinct disadvantage in the ratio of efficiency to weight.

Mechanical principles show that the steam pressures which the engines would bear would be the same, and that the larger engine, though it would have more than four times the horse-power of the other, would have less than eight times. The larger of the two machines would therefore be at a disadvantage, which could be overcome only by reducing the thickness of its parts, especially of its wings, to that of the other machine. Then we should lose in strength. It follows that the smaller the machine the greater its advantage, and the smallest possible flying-machine will be the first one to be successful.

We see the principle of the cube exemplified in the animal kingdom. The agile flea, the nimble ant, the swift-footed greyhound, and the unwieldy elephant form a series of which the next term would be an animal tottering under its own weight, if able to stand or move at all.

The kingdom of flying animals shows a similar gradation. The most numerous fliers are little insects, and the rising series stops with the condor, which, though having much less weight than a man, is said to fly with difficulty when gorged with food.

Now, suppose that an inventor succeeds, as well he may, in making a machine which would go into a watch-case, yet complete in all its parts, able to fly around the room. It may carry a b.u.t.ton, but nothing heavier. Elated by his success, he makes one on the same model twice as large in every dimension. The parts of the first, which are one inch in length, he increases to two inches. Every part is twice as long, twice as broad, and twice as thick. The result is that his machine is eight times as heavy as before. But the sustaining surface is only four times as great. As compared with the smaller machine, its ratio of effectiveness is reduced to one-half. It may carry two or three b.u.t.tons, but will not carry over four, because the total weight, machine plus b.u.t.tons, can only be quadrupled, and if he more than quadruples the weight of the machine, he must less than quadruple that of the load. How many such enlargements must he make before his machine will cease to sustain itself, before it will fall as an inert ma.s.s when we seek to make it fly through the air? Is there any size at which it will be able to support a human being? We may well hesitate before we answer this question in the affirmative.

Dr. Graham Bell, with a cheery optimism very pleasant to contemplate, has pointed out that the law I have just cited may be evaded by not making a larger machine on the same model, but changing the latter in a way tantamount to increasing the number of small machines. This is quite true, and I wish it understood that, in laying down the law I have cited, I limit it to two machines of different sizes on the same model throughout. Quite likely the most effective flying-machine would be one carried by a vast number of little birds. The veracious chronicler who escaped from a cloud of mosquitoes by crawling into an immense metal pot and then amused himself by clinching the antennae of the insects which bored through the pot until, to his horror, they became so numerous as to fly off with the covering, was more scientific than he supposed. Yes, a sufficient number of humming-birds, if we could combine their forces, would carry an aerial excursion party of human beings through the air. If the watch-maker can make a machine which will fly through the room with a b.u.t.ton, then, by combining ten thousand such machines he may be able to carry a man. But how shall the combined forces be applied?

The difficulties I have pointed out apply only to the flying-machine properly so-called, and not to the dirigible balloon or airship. It is of interest to notice that the law is reversed in the case of a body which is not supported by the resistance of a fluid in which it is immersed, but floats in it, the ship or balloon, for example. When we double the linear dimensions of a steamship in all its parts, we increase not only her weight but her floating power, her carrying capacity, and her engine capacity eightfold. But the resistance which she meets with when pa.s.sing through the water at a given speed is only multiplied four times. Hence, the larger we build the steamship the more economical the application of the power necessary to drive it at a given speed. It is this law which has brought the great increase in the size of ocean steamers in recent times. The proportionately diminishing resistance which, in the flying-machine, represents the floating power is, in the ship, something to be overcome. Thus there is a complete reversal of the law in its practical application to the two cases.

The balloon is in the same cla.s.s with the ship. Practical difficulties aside, the larger it is built the more effective it will be, and the more advantageous will be the ratio of the power which is necessary to drive it to the resistance to be overcome.

If, therefore, we are ever to have aerial navigation with our present knowledge of natural capabilities, it is to the airship floating in the air, rather than the flying-machine resting on the air, to which we are to look. In the light of the law which I have laid down, the subject, while not at all promising, seems worthy of more attention than it has received. It is not at all unlikely that if a skilful and experienced naval constructor, aided by an able corps of a.s.sistants, should design an airship of a diameter of not less than two hundred feet, and a length at least four or five times as great, constructed, possibly, of a textile substance impervious to gas and borne by a light framework, but, more likely, of exceedingly thin plates of steel carried by a frame fitted to secure the greatest combination of strength and lightness, he might find the result to be, ideally at least, a ship which would be driven through the air by a steam-engine with a velocity far exceeding that of the fleetest Atlantic liner. Then would come the practical problem of realizing the ship by overcoming the mechanical difficulties involved in the construction of such a huge and light framework. I would not be at all surprised if the result of the exact calculation necessary to determine the question should lead to an affirmative conclusion, but I am quite unable to judge whether steel could be rolled into parts of the size and form required in the mechanism.

In judging of the possibility of commercial success the cheapness of modern transportation is an element in the case that should not be overlooked. I believe the princ.i.p.al part of the resistance which a limited express train meets is the resistance of the air. This would be as great for an airship as for a train. An important fraction of the cost of transporting goods from Chicago to London is that of getting them into vehicles, whether cars or ships, and getting them out again.

The cost of sending a pair of shoes from a shop in New York to the residence of the wearer is, if I mistake not, much greater than the mere cost of transporting them across the Atlantic. Even if a dirigible balloon should cross the Atlantic, it does not follow that it could compete with the steamship in carrying pa.s.sengers and freight.

I may, in conclusion, caution the reader on one point. I should be very sorry if my suggestion of the advantage of the huge airship leads to the subject being taken up by any other than skilful engineers or constructors, able to grapple with all problems relating to the strength and resistance of materials. As a single example of what is to be avoided I may mention the project, which sometimes has been mooted, of making a balloon by pumping the air from a very thin, hollow receptacle. Such a project is as futile as can well be imagined; no known substance would begin to resist the necessary pressure. Our aerial ship must be filled with some substance lighter than air.

Whether heated air would answer the purpose, or whether we should have to use a gas, is a question for the designer.