Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism Part 15

The Trope, _circulus in probando_, arises when the thing 169 which ought to prove the thing sought for, needs to be sustained by the thing sought for, and as we are unable to take the one for the proof of the other, we suspend our judgment in regard to both. Now we shall briefly show that it is possible to refer every thing under investigation to one or another of these Tropes, as follows: the thing before us is either sensible or intellectual; difference of opinion exists, however, as to what it is in itself, for some say that only the things of sense 170 are true, others, only those belonging to the understanding, and others say that some things of sense, and some of thought, are true. Now, will it be said that this difference of opinion can be judged or cannot be judged? If it cannot be judged, then we have the result necessarily of suspension of judgment, because it is impossible to express opinion in regard to things about which a difference of opinion exists which cannot be judged. If it can be judged, then we ask how it is to be judged? For 171 example, the sensible, for we shall limit the argument first to this--Is it to be judged by sensible or by intellectual standards? For if it is to be judged by a sensible one, since we are in doubt about the sensible, that will also need something else to sustain it; and if that proof is also something sensible, something else will again be necessary to prove it, and so on _in infinitum_. If, on the contrary, the sensible must be judged by something intellectual, as there is disagreement 172 in regard to the intellectual, this intellectual thing will require also judgment and proof. Now, how is it to be proved?

If by something intellectual, it will likewise be thrown into _infinitum_; if by something sensible, as the intellectual has been taken for the proof of the sensible, and the sensible has been taken for that of the intellectual, the _circulus in probando_ is introduced. If, however, in order to escape 173 from this, the one who is speaking to us expects us to take something for granted which has not been proved, in order to prove what follows, the hypothetical Trope is introduced, which provides no way of escape. For if the one who makes the hypothesis is worthy of confidence, we should in every case be no less worthy of confidence in making a contrary hypothesis. If the one who makes the a.s.sumption a.s.sumes something true, he makes it suspicious by using it as a hypothesis, and not as an established fact; if it is false, the foundation of the reasoning is unsound. If a hypothesis is any help towards a 174 trustworthy result, let the thing in question itself be a.s.sumed, and not something else, by which, forsooth, one would establish the thing under discussion. If it is absurd to a.s.sume the thing questioned, it is also absurd to a.s.sume that upon which it rests. That all things belonging to the senses are also in 175 relation to something else is evident, because they are in relation to those who perceive them. It is clear then, that whatever thing of sense is brought before us, it may be easily referred to one of the five Tropes. And we come to a similar conclusion in regard to intellectual things. For if it should be said that there is a difference of opinion regarding them which cannot be judged, it will be granted that we must suspend the judgment concerning it. In case the difference of opinion 176 can be judged, if it is judged through anything intellectual, we fall into the _regressus in infinitum_, and if through anything sensible into the _circulus in probando_; for, as the sensible is again subject to difference of opinion, and cannot be judged by the sensible on account of the _regressus in infinitum_, it will have need of the intellectual, just as the intellectual has need of the sensible. But he who accepts anything which is hypothetical again is absurd. Intellectual things stand also 177 in relation, because the form in which they are expressed depends on the mind of the thinker, and, if they were in reality exactly as they are described, there would not have been any difference of opinion about them. Therefore the intellectual also is brought under the five Tropes, and consequently it is necessary to suspend the judgment altogether with regard to every thing that is brought before us. Such are the five Tropes taught by the later Sceptics. They set them forth, not to throw out the ten Tropes, but in order to put to shame the audacity of the Dogmatics in a variety of ways, by these Tropes as well as by those.

CHAPTER XVI.

_The Two Tropes._

Two other Tropes of [Greek: epoche] are also taught. For as it 178 appears that everything that is comprehended is either comprehended through itself or through something else, it is thought that this fact introduces doubt in regard to all things.

And that nothing can be understood through itself is evident, it is said, from the disagreement which exists altogether among the physicists in regard to sensible and intellectual things. I mean, of course, a disagreement which cannot be judged, as we are not able to use a sensible or an intellectual criterion in judging it, for everything that we would take has a part in the disagreement, and is untrustworthy. Nor is it conceded that anything can be comprehended through something else; for if 179 a thing is comprehended through something, that must always in turn be comprehended through something else, and the _regressus in infinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_ follow. If, on the contrary, a thing is comprehended through something that one wishes to use as if it had been comprehended through itself, this is opposed to the fact that nothing can be comprehended through itself, according to what we have said. We do not know how that which contradicts itself can be comprehended, either through itself or through something else, as no criterion of the truth or of comprehension appears, and signs without proof would be rejected, as we shall see in the next book. So much will suffice for the present about suspension of judgment.

CHAPTER XVII.

_What are the Tropes for the overturning of Aetiology?_

In the same manner as we teach the Tropes of [Greek: epoche], 180 some set forth Tropes through which we oppose the Dogmatics, by expressing doubt in regard to the aetiology of which they are especially proud. So Aenesidemus teaches eight Tropes, by which he thinks that he can prove all the dogmatic aetiology useless.

The first of these Tropes, he said, relates to the character 181 of aetiology in general, which does not give incontestable testimony in regard to phenomena, because it treats of unseen things. The second Trope states that although abundant resources exist by which to investigate the cause of a thing in question, some Dogmatics investigate it in one way only. The third Trope 182 states that the Dogmatics a.s.sign causes which do not show any order for things which have taken place in an orderly manner. The fourth Trope states that the Dogmatics, accepting phenomena as they take place, think that they also understand how unseen things take place, although perhaps the unseen things have taken place in the same way as the phenomena, and perhaps in some other way peculiar to themselves. The fifth Trope states 183 that they all, so to speak, a.s.sign causes according to their own hypotheses about the elements, but not according to any commonly accepted methods. The sixth states that they often explain things investigated according to their own hypotheses, but ignore opposing hypotheses which have equal probability. The seventh states that they often give reasons for things that 184 not only conflict with phenomena, but also with their own hypotheses. The eighth states that although that which seems manifest, and that which is to be investigated, are often equally inscrutable, they build up a theory from the one about the other, although both are equally inscrutable. It is not impossible, Aenesidemus said also, that some Dogmatics 185 should fail in their theories of causality from other combinations of reasons deducible from the Tropes given above.

Perhaps also the five Tropes of [Greek: epoche] are sufficient to refute aetiology, for he who proposes a cause will propose one which is either in harmony with all the sects of philosophy, with Scepticism, and with phenomena, or one that is not.

Perhaps, however, it is not possible that a cause should be in harmony with them, for phenomena and unknown things altogether disagree with each other. If it is not in harmony with them, the reason of this will also be demanded of the one who proposed 186 it; and if he accepts a phenomenon as the cause of a phenomenon, or something unknown as the cause of the unknown, he will be thrown into the _regressus in infinitum_; if he uses one cause to account for another one, into the _circulus in probando_; but if he stops anywhere, he will either say that the cause that he proposes holds good so far as regards the things that have been said, and introduce relation, abolishing an absolute standpoint; or if he accepts anything by hypothesis, he will be attacked by us. Therefore it is perhaps possible to put the temerity of the Dogmatics to shame in aetiology by these Tropes.

CHAPTER XVIII.

_The Sceptical Formulae._

When we use any one of these Tropes, or the Tropes of 187 [Greek: epoche], we employ with them certain formulae which show the Sceptical method and our own feeling, as for instance, the sayings, "No more," "One must determine nothing," and certain others. It is fitting therefore to treat of these in this place.

Let us begin with "No more."

CHAPTER XIX.

_The Formula "No more."_

We sometimes express this as I have given it, and sometimes 188 thus, "Nothing more." For we do not accept the "No more," as some understand it, for the examination of the special, and "Nothing more" for that of the general, but we use "No more" and "Nothing more" without any difference, and we shall at present treat of them as one and the same expression. Now this formula is defective, for as when we say a double one we really mean a double garment, and when we say a broad one we really mean a broad road; so when we say "No more" we mean really no more than this, or in every way the same. But some of the Sceptics use 189 instead of the interrogation "No?" the interrogation "What, this rather than this?" using the word "what" in the sense of "what is the reason," so that the formula means, "What is the reason for this rather than for this?" It is a customary thing, however, to use an interrogation instead of a statement, as "Who of the mortals does not know the wife of Jupiter?" and also to use a statement instead of an interrogation, as "I seek where Dion dwells," and "I ask why one should admire a poet." The word "what" is also used instead of "what for" by Menander--"(For) what did I remain behind?" The formula "Not more this than this"

expresses our own condition of mind, and signifies that 190 because of the equality of the things that are opposed to each other we finally attain to a state of equilibrium of soul. We mean by equality that equality which appears to us as probable, by things placed in opposition to each other we mean simply things which conflict with each other, and by a state of equilibrium we mean a state in which we do not a.s.sent to one thing more than to another. Even if the formula "Nothing 191 more" seems to express a.s.sent or denial, we do not use it so, but we use it loosely, and not with accuracy, either instead of an interrogation or instead of saying, "I do not know to which of these I would a.s.sent, and to which I would not." What lies before us is to express what appears to us, but we are indifferent to the words by which we express it. This must be understood, however, that we use the formula "Nothing more"

without affirming in regard to it that it is wholly sure and true, but we present it as it appears to us.

CHAPTER XX.

_Aphasia._

We explain Aphasia as follows: The word [Greek: phasis] is used 192 in two ways, having a general and a special signification.

According to the general signification, it expresses affirmation or negation, as "It is day" or "It is not day"; according to the special signification, it expresses an affirmation only, and negations are not called [Greek: phaseis]. Now Aphasia is the opposite of [Greek: phasis] in its general signification, which, as we said, comprises both affirmation and negation. It follows that Aphasia is a condition of mind, according to which we say that we neither affirm nor deny anything. It is evident from this that we do not understand by Aphasia something that 193 inevitably results from the nature of things, but we mean that we now find ourselves in the condition of mind expressed by it in regard to the things that are under investigation. It is necessary to remember that we do not say that we affirm or deny any of those things that are dogmatically stated in regard to the unknown, for we yield a.s.sent only to those things which affect our feelings and oblige us to a.s.sent to them.

CHAPTER XXI.

_"Perhaps," and "It is possible," and "It may be."_

The formulae "Perhaps," and "Perhaps not," and "It is 194 possible," and "It is not possible," and "It may be," and "It may not be," we use instead of "Perhaps it is," and "Perhaps it is not," and "It is possible that it is," and "It is possible that it is not," and "It may be that it is," and "It may be that it is not." That is, we use the formula "It is not possible" for the sake of brevity, instead of saying "It is not possible to be," and "It may not be" instead of "It may not be that it is,"

and "Perhaps not" instead of "Perhaps it is not." Again, we do not here dispute about words, neither do we question if the 195 formulae mean these things absolutely, but we use them loosely, as I said before. Yet I think it is evident that these formulae express Aphasia. For certainly the formula "Perhaps it is"

really includes that which seems to contradict it, _i.e._ the formula "Perhaps it is not," because it does not affirm in in regard to anything that it is really so. It is the same also in regard to the others.

CHAPTER XXII.

[Greek: epoche] _or the Suspension of Judgment._

When I say that I suspend my judgment, I mean that I cannot 196 say which of those things presented should be believed, and which should not be believed, showing that things appear equal to me in respect to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. Now we do not affirm that they are equal, but we state what appears to us in regard to them at the time when they present themselves to us. [Greek: epoche] means the holding back of the opinion, so as neither to affirm nor deny anything because of the equality of the things in question.

CHAPTER XXIII.

_The Formula "I determine Nothing."_

In regard to the formula "I determine nothing," we say the 197 following: By "determine" we mean, not simply to speak, but to give a.s.sent to an affirmation with regard to some unknown thing.

For it will soon be found that the Sceptic determines nothing, not even the formula "I determine nothing," for this formula is not a dogmatic opinion, that is an a.s.sent to something unknown, but an expression declaring what our condition of mind is. When, for example, the Sceptic says, "I determine nothing," he means this: "According to my present feeling I can a.s.sert or deny nothing dogmatically regarding the things under investigation,"

and in saying this he expresses what appears to him in reference to the things under discussion. He does not express himself positively, but he states what he feels.

CHAPTER XXIV.