Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism Part 11

[2] Diog. IX. 11, 64.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 70, 64.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 69; IX. 11, 61.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 202; Diog. IX. 8, 51; _Photius_ Bekker's ed.

280 H.

[6] _Photius_ Bekker's ed. 280 H.

[7] _Hyp._ I. 197; Diog. IX. 11, 76.

[8] _Aristocles ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev._ XIV. 18.

[9] _Hyp._ I. 213.

[10] Diog. IX. 11, 68-76.

[11] Diog. IX. 11, 76; _Hyp._ I. 206.

In comparing the later Pyrrhonism with the teachings of Pyrrho, we would sharply contrast the moral att.i.tude of the two. With Pyrrho equilibrium of soul was a means to be applied to his positive theory of life; with the later Pyrrhoneans it was the end to be attained. We would attribute, however, the empirical tendency shown during the whole history of Pyrrhonism to Pyrrho as its originator. He was an empirical philosopher, and the result of his influence in this respect, as seen in the subsequent development of the school, stands in marked contrast to the dialectic spirit of the Academic Scepsis. The empiricism of the school is shown in its scientific lore, in the fact that so many of the Sceptics were physicians, and in the character of the ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. We may safely affirm that the foundation principles of Pyrrhonism are due to Pyrrho, and the originality which gave the school its power. The elaborated arguments, however, and the details of its formulae belong to later times.

Coming now to the relation of Pyrrhonism to the Academy, the connection between the two is difficult to exactly determine, between the time of Pyrrho and that of Aenesidemus. Scepticism in the Academy was, however, never absolutely identical with Pyrrhonism, although at certain periods of the history of the Academy the difference was slight. We can trace throughout the evolution of doubt, as shown to us in Pyrrhonism, and in Academic Scepticism, the different results which followed the difference in origin of the two movements, and these differences followed according to general laws of development of thought.

Arcesilaus, who introduced doubt into the Academy, claimed to return to the dialectic of Socrates, and suppressing the lectures,[1] which were the method of teaching in the later schools of philosophy, introduced discussions instead, as being more decidedly a Socratic method. Although, according to s.e.xtus, he was the one leader of the Academy whose Scepticism most nearly approached that of Pyrrhonism,[2] yet underneath his whole teaching lay that dialectic principle so thoroughly in opposition to the empiricism of Pyrrho. The belief of Socrates and Plato in the existence of absolute truth never entirely lost its influence over the Academy, but was like a hidden germ, destined to reappear after Scepticism had pa.s.sed away. It finally led the Academy back to Dogmatism, and prepared the way for the Eclecticism with which it disappeared from history.

[1] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 36.

[2] _Hyp_. I. 232.

The history of Pyrrhonism and that of Academic Scepticism were for a time contemporaneous. The immediate follower of Pyrrho, Timon, called by s.e.xtus the "prophet of Pyrrho,"[1] was a contemporary of Arcesilaus. That he did not consider the Scepticism of the Academy identical with Pyrrhonism is proved from the fact that he did not himself join the Academy, but was, on the contrary, far from doing so. That he regarded Arcesilaus as a Dogmatic is evident from his writings.[2] One day, on seeing the chief of the Academy approaching, he cried out, "What are you doing here among us who are free?"[3] After the death of Timon, the Pyrrhonean School had no representative till the time of Ptolemy of Cyrene,[4] and Greek Scepticism was represented by the Academy. That Pyrrho had a strong influence over Arcesilaus, the founder of the Middle Academy, is evident[5]; but there was also never a time when the Academy entirely broke away from all the teachings of Plato, even in their deepest doubt.[6] It is true that Arcesilaus removed, nominally as well as in spirit, some of the dialogues of Plato from the Academy, but only those that bore a dogmatic character, while those that presented a more decided Socratic mode of questioning without reaching any decided result, men regarded as authority for Scepticism.

[1] _Adv. Math._ I. 53.

[2] Diog. IV. 6, 33, 34.

[3] Diog. IX. 12, 114.

[4] Diog. IX. 12, 115.

[5] Diog. IV. 6, 33.

[6] Diog. IV. 6, 32.

s.e.xtus does not deny that Arcesilaus was almost a Pyrrhonean, but he claims that his Pyrrhonism was only apparent, and not real, and was used as a cloak to hide his loyalty to the teachings of Plato.[1] As Ariston said of him,[2] "Plato before, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle." s.e.xtus also characterises the method of Arcesilaus as dialectic,[3] and we know from Cicero that it was his pride to pretend to return to the dialectic of Socrates.

It is interesting to note that s.e.xtus, in his refutation of the position that the Academy is the same as Pyrrhonism, takes up the entire development of Academic thought from the time of Plato till that of Antiochus, and does not limit the argument to Scepticism under Arcesilaus. The claim made by some that the two schools were the same, is stated by him,[4] and the word 'some'

probably refers to members of both schools at different periods of their history. s.e.xtus recognises three Academies, although he remarks that some make even a further division, calling that of Philo and Charmides, the fourth, and that of Antiochus and his followers, the fifth.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 234.

[2] Diog. IV. 6, 33.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 234.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 220.

That many in the Academy, and even outside of it, regarded Plato as a Sceptic, and an authority for subsequent Scepticism, we find both from s.e.xtus and Diogenes.[1] As Lewes justly remarks, one could well find authority for Scepticism in the works of Plato, as indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sum total of his teachings was considered. The spirit of Plato's teachings was dogmatic, as s.e.xtus most decidedly recognises, and as Aenesidemus and Menodotus[2] recognised before him.[3] s.e.xtus himself shows us that Plato's idealism and ethical teachings can have nothing in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts the desirability of the virtuous life, and the existence of Providence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards them as probable, he gives preference to one set of ideas over another, and departs from the sceptical character. s.e.xtus characterises the sceptical side of Plato's writings as mental gymnastics,[4]

which do not authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirms that Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknown things to others in trustworthiness. The ethical difference underlying the teachings of the Academy and Pyrrhonism, s.e.xtus was very quick to see, and although it is very probable that the part of the _Hypotyposes_ which defines the difference between the Academy and Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the introduction to Aenesidemus' works, yet s.e.xtus certainly gives these statements the strong stamp of his approval. He condemns the Academy because of the theory that good and evil exist, or if this cannot be decidedly proved, yet that it is more probable that what is called good exists than the contrary.[5]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 221; Diog. IX. 11, 72.

[2] Bekker's edition of _Hyp._ I. 222.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 222.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 223.

[5] _Hyp_. I. 226.

The whole Academic teaching of probabilities contradicted the standpoint of the Sceptics--that our ideas are equal as regards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,[1] for the Academicians declared that some ideas are probable and some improbable, and they make a difference even in those ideas that they call probable.

s.e.xtus claims that there are three fundamental grounds of difference between Pyrrhonism and the Academy. The first is the doctrine of probability which the Academicians accept in regard to the superior trustworthiness of some ideas over others.[2]

The second is the different way in which the two schools follow their teachers. The Pyrrhoneans follow without striving or strong effort, or even strong inclination, as a child follows his teacher, while the Academicians follow with sympathy and a.s.sent, as Carneades and c.l.i.tomachus affirm.[3] The third difference is in the aim, for the Academicians follow what is probable in life. The Sceptics follow nothing, but live according to laws, customs, and natural feelings undogmatically.[4]

The difference between the later teaching of the Academy and Pyrrhonism is evident, and s.e.xtus treats of it briefly, as not requiring discussion,[5] as Philo taught that the nature of facts is incomprehensible, and Antiochus transferred the Stoa to the Academy. It is therefore evident, from the comparison which we have made, that we do not find in the Academy, with which Scepticism after the death of Timon was so long united, the exact continuance of Pyrrhonism. The philosophical enmity of the two contemporaries, Timon and Arcesilaus, the Academician who had most in common with Pyrrhonism, is an expression of the fundamental incompatibility between the two schools.

[1] _Hyp_. I. 227.

[2] _Hyp_. I. 229.

[3] _Hyp_. I. 230.

[4] _Hyp_. I. 231.

[5] _Hyp_. I. 235.

During all the chequered history of the Academy the dormant idealism was there, underlying the outward development. Although during the time of Arcesilaus and Carneades the difference was so slight as to seem a mere matter of form of expression, yet the different foundations on which the two schools stood was always recognisable. On the one hand there was the germ of idealism which was destined to awake to a new life, and on the other, the attempt at absolute negation which was to result in the final extinction of Pyrrhonism. We find in both, it is true, especially in the time of Arcesilaus, the aim of [Greek: epoche].[1] Both placed great weight on [Greek: isostheneia], or the equal value of opposing arguments.[2] The foundation of the [Greek: epoche] was, however, different in the two cases.

Arcesilaus founded his on dialectic, while Pyrrho's was empirical.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 232.

[2] Diog. IX. 73; _Hyp._ II. 130; III. 65.

The Pyrrhonean believed that ideas give us no knowledge of the outer world; the Academic Sceptic believed that we cannot distinguish between true and false ideas, so such knowledge is impossible. The Pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist in ideas because of their contradictory nature, and consequently the existence of all truth, [Greek: meden einai te aletheia epi panton].[1] The Academic Sceptic granted that the truth was possibly contained in ideas, but affirmed that it could never be known to us. The Pyrrhoneans prided themselves on still being seekers, for although ordinary ideas are too contradictory to give knowledge of the outer world, they did not deny that such knowledge might be possible, but simply suspended the judgment regarding it. To the Pyrrhonean the result corresponded to the method. All ideas thus far known revealed nothing of the truth, therefore he still sought. The Academician tried logically to prove that the truth is impossible to find. It is the relation of the dialectician to the empiricist, and the two varieties of Scepticism are explained by their difference in origin. In Pyrrhonism there was no constructive element. In the Academic Scepsis such an element was found throughout all its history in the theory of Probability. Arcesilaus himself laid great stress upon this doctrine, which s.e.xtus carefully shows us[2] is utterly inconsistent with Pyrrhonism. Arcesilaus plainly teaches that, having suspended one's judgment in regard to matters of knowledge, one should control his choices, his refusals, and his actions by the probable.[3]

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 229.