Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt Part 22

_Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 29th, 3 p. m._:

"Have consulted De la Warr. We approve full discretion on basis of telegram just received."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 30th_:

"All progressing well. Try to negotiate in concert with De la Warr the place of exile--Fiji suggested. Gratified at your confidence."

_Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 30th, 2.30 p. m._:

"Reject Fiji or Azores. Insist on Moslem country for religious life. They cannot refuse. Will consult Chenery. De la Warr away."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 1st_:

"Dufferin's conduct admirable. Suggests De la Warr's arranging place of exile with Foreign Office. Prisoners entirely satisfied."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 3rd_:

"Arabi's trial over. For correct account see 'Standard.' Egyptian Government fulfilled all engagements to the letter."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th_:

"Arabi delighted at result and sends thanks--inclined Cape.

Dufferin brick [_sic_]."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th, 4.50 p. m._:

"Surprised your not wiring. Success complete. Anglo-Egyptian colony furious."

_Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. December 4th_:

"Congratulate all. De la Warr says place of exile in English territory left to Dufferin. I don't fancy Cape. How about Gibraltar or Guernsey. Consult Arabi."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th_:

"Many thanks kind telegram."

It will be perceived by these telegrams that it was not without reluctance that I agreed to the compromise proposed by Dufferin. We had at the moment the full tide of English opinion with us, and I knew that the Foreign Office could not do otherwise than agree to almost any terms we chose to impose, and I was most unwilling that the charge of rebellion should be admitted by us. At the same time it was not possible for me in the face of Broadley's, and especially Napier's, telegrams to withhold my a.s.sent. The responsibility was too great. I had also the question of costs to consider. It is true that a public subscription had been opened which had brought us valuable names. But the actual sums subscribed did not yet amount to 200, while Broadley's bill was running already to 3,000. A continuation for another month of the trial would have meant for me a larger expenditure than I was prepared to face in a political quarrel which was not quite my own. I therefore took counsel with De la Warr, and especially with Robert Bourke, of whom I have already spoken, and who warned me how frail a thing public opinion was to rely on, and advised me strongly to consent. I remember walking up and down with him in Montagu Square, where he lived, in indecision for half an hour before I was finally convinced and yielded. I consequently sent the telegram of approval, and eventually, after much argument, we succeeded in obtaining as Arabi's place of exile the Island of Ceylon, the traditional place of exile of our father Adam when driven out of Paradise. No more honourable one could possibly have been fixed upon.

The exact terms of the arrangement come to with Dufferin were unfortunately not committed by him to writing, an oversight on Broadley's part, who ought to have insisted on this and thus saved us much after trouble and misunderstanding. The negligence allowed the Egyptian Government to inflict degradation of rank on the prisoners, which was certainly not in the spirit of Lord Dufferin's arrangement, though, perhaps, legally following the _pro forma_ sentence of death for rebellion. Room, too, was left for dispute as to what was the amount of the allowance intended as compensation for the confiscations. Broadley seems to have exaggerated to his clients the promises on this head.

Personally I consider that they were not illiberally dealt with, as the property of most of them was insignificant, and they were allowed to retain property belonging to their wives. The only considerable sufferer pecuniarily was Mahmud Pasha Sami, who had a large estate which he forfeited. As to Arabi, his sole worldly possessions, besides what furniture was in his house at Cairo, a hired one, and some horses in his stable, consisted of the eight acres of good land he had inherited from his father in his native village, to which he had at various time added parcels of uncultivated land on the desert edge, amounting to some six hundred acres, paid for out of his pay in prosperous days. These at the time of the confiscation cannot have been worth much over 2,000 or 3,000, for barren land was then selling for only a few reals the acre, and he had not had time to reclaim or improve them.[33]

A point, too, which was long disputed, but which is no longer of importance, was whether the _paroles_ of the prisoners were given to the Egyptian or the English Governments. But with these matters I need not trouble myself more than to say that the English Government, having gained its end of getting the rebellion admitted by us, and so a t.i.tle given for their intervention in Egypt, gave little more help to the defence of certain unfortunate minor prisoners who on various pretexts found themselves excluded from the amnesty, and were subjected to all the injustices of the Khedive's uncontrolled authority. These, however, belong to a period beyond that of which I now propose to write, namely, that of the permanent Occupation, and cannot be detailed in my present memoir, which now, I think, has made clear at least my own part in the events of the revolution to the last point where that part was personal.

Looking back at my action in Egypt during that period, with its early successes and its final failure to obtain for the National Government fair treatment at English hands, I cannot wholly regret the course I took. I made, of course, many mistakes, and I feel that I am in considerable measure responsible for the determination the Nationalists came to to risk their country's fortune on the die of battle. But I still think their fate would have been a worse one if they had not fought, tamely surrendering to European pressure. They at least thus got a hearing from the world at large, and if any attention since has been paid to fellah grievances it has been won wholly by Arabi's persistence, which I encouraged, in accepting the logic of their political principles even to the point of war. It obliged England to listen to their complaints and, if it could not prevent her from depriving them of their political liberty, it has forced her since to remedy most of their secular material wrongs.

What the future may bring to Egypt I know not. She has grown rich under English tutelage, and though I do not consider riches synonymous with the well being of a nation, they have been in Egypt of at least this value, that they have enabled the native Nile population so far to hold its own against foreign intrusion as owner of the soil. While this is, the Nation will remain alive, and the day may yet come for the fellah race when self-government will be restored to them, and the armed struggle of 1882 will appear to them in its true light as the beginning of their national life, and one, as such, glorious in their annals. To that day of final emanc.i.p.ation I still pin my hopes, though it is not likely I shall live to see it.[34]

If my life is prolonged for a few years, it is my intention to continue the writing of my memoirs, and this will include much that is of importance to Egypt, though nothing of such high historical value as the recital already made. The present volume may well stand by itself, and so with regret I leave it. I should have wished to include in it an account of Lord Dufferin's mission of reconstruction, and the weak efforts made by Gladstone to undo the wrong he had inflicted on the cause of liberty, and on his own reputation as a man of good. But this would lead me too far, and I prefer to end my actual narrative at the point where we have now arrived, the close of the eventful year, 1882.

On one of the last days of it I received a second characteristic letter from Gordon in which, speaking of the war and the suppression of liberty in Egypt, he quotes the following appropriate verse:

"When thou seest the violent oppression of the poor, or the subversion of justice, marvel not at it, for the Higher than the Highest regardeth it."

FOOTNOTES:

[33] A claim made recently in his name for a large indemnity in regard to these lands, and embodied in a pet.i.tion addressed to our King Edward, is an entire illusion on Arabi's part, and marks the fact, otherwise very apparent to those who know him, that he has fallen into a condition of senile decay for which there is no remedy.

The worst oversight was that the promised general amnesty was not exactly defined. Hence the later prosecutions on so-called "criminal"

charges.

[34] This was written in 1904.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

ARABI'S ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND OF THE EVENTS OF 1881-1882, AS TOLD TO ME, WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT, IN ARABIC YESTERDAY, MARCH 16TH, 1903, AT SHEYKH OBEYD

I was born in the year 1840 at Horiyeh, near Zagazig, in the Sherkieh.

My father was Sheykh of the village, and owned eight and a half feddans of land, which I inherited from him and gradually increased by savings out of my pay, which at one time was as much as 250 a month, till it amounted to 570 feddans, and that was the amount confiscated at the time of my trial. I bought the land cheaply in those days for a few pounds a feddan which is worth a great deal now, especially as it was in a poor state (_wahash_) when I bought it and now is in good cultivation. But none of it was given me by Sad Pasha or any one, and the acreage I inherited was only eight and a half. I invested all the money I could save in land, and had no other invested money or movable property except a little furniture and some horses and such like, which may have been worth 1,000.

As a boy I studied for two years at the Azhar, but was taken for a soldier when I was only fourteen, as I was a tall well grown lad and Sad Pasha wanted to have as many as possible of the sons of the village Sheykhs, and train them to be officers. I was made to go through an examination, and what I had learned at the Azhar served me well, and I was made a _boulok-amin_, clerk, instead of serving in the ranks, at sixty piastres a month. I did not, however, like this, as I thought I should never rise to any high position, and I wished to be a personage like the Mudir of our province, so I pet.i.tioned Ibrahim Bey, who was my superior, to be put back into the ranks. Ibrahim Bey showed me that I should lose by this as my pay would then be only fifty piastres, but I insisted and so served. I was put soon after to another examination, out of which I came first, and they made me _chowish_, and then to a third and they made me lieutenant when I was only seventeen. Suliman Pasha el Franzawi was so pleased with me that he insisted with Sad Pasha on giving me promotion, and I became captain at eighteen, major at nineteen, and Lieutenant-Colonel, _Caimakam_, at twenty. Then Sad Pasha took me with him as A. D. C. when he went to Medina, about a year before he died. That was in A. H. 1279 (1862?).

Sad Pasha's death was a great misfortune to me and to all, as he was favourable to the children of the country. Ismal was quite otherwise.

In his time everything was put back into the hands of the Turks and Circa.s.sians, and the Egyptians in the army got no protection and no promotion. I went on serving as Caimakam for twelve years without much incident till war came with Abyssinia. I was not sent to the war with Russia, but when the war with Abyssinia broke out all available troops were wanted, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the stations on the Haj Road, and I was sent to do this. I was sent quite alone without a single soldier or a single piastre and had to get there as best I could on a camel. I went in this way to Nakhl and Akaba and Wej collecting the garrisons and putting in Arabs to take charge of the forts there as _ghaffirs_. Then we crossed over the sea to Kosseir and so by Keneh to Cairo. I was not paid a penny for this service or even my expenses. The country was in a fearful state of oppression, and it was then I began to interest myself in politics to save my countrymen from ruin. I was sent on to Ma.s.sowa from Cairo and took part in the campaign of which Ratib Pasha was commander-in-chief, with Loringe Pasha, the American, as Chief of the Staff. I was not present at the battle of Kora, being in charge of the transport service between Ma.s.sowa and the army. It was a disastrous battle, seven _ortas_ being completely destroyed. Loringe Pasha was the officer mostly in fault. The Khedive's son, Ha.s.san, was there, but only as a boy, to learn soldiering. He was not in command nor is it true that he was taken prisoner by the Abyssinians.

After this I thought much about politics. I remember to have seen Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din, but not to speak to, but my former connection with the Azhar made me acquainted with several of his disciples. The most distinguished of them were Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, and Sheykh Ha.s.san el Towil. The first book that ever gave me ideas about political matters was an Arabic translation of the "Life of Bonaparte" by Colonel Louis.

The book had been brought by Sad Pasha with him to Medina, and its account of the conquest of Egypt by 30,000 Frenchmen so angered him that he threw the book on the ground, saying "See how your countrymen let themselves be beaten." And I took it up and read all that night, without sleeping, till the morning. Then I told Sad Pasha that I had read it and that I saw that the French had been victorious because they were better drilled and organized, and that we could do as well in Egypt if we tried.

You ask me about the affair of the riot against Nubar Pasha in the time of Ismal and whether I had a hand in it. I had none, for the reason that I was away at Rashid (Rosetta) with my regiment. But the day before the thing happened I was telegraphed for by the War Office with my fellow Caimakam, Mohammed Bey Nadi, to deal with the case of a number of soldiers that had been disbanded by the new Ministers without their arrears of pay or even bread to eat, and who were at Abba.s.siyeh. But I knew nothing of what was being arranged against Nubar. That was done by order of the Khedive, Ismal Pasha, through a servant of his, Shahin Pasha, and his brother-in-law, Latif Eff. Selim, director of the military college. These got up a demonstration of the students of the college, who went in a body to the Ministry of Finance. They were joined on the way by some of the disbanded soldiers and officers, not many, but some. At the Ministry they found Nubar getting into his carriage, and they a.s.saulted him, pulled his moustache, and boxed his ears. Then Ismal Pasha was sent for to quell the riot and he came with Abd-el-Kader Pasha and Ali Bey Fehmy, the colonel of his guard, whom he ordered to fire on the students, but Ali Fehmy ordered his men to fire over their heads and n.o.body was hurt. Ali Fehmy was not with us at that time. He was devoted to Ismal, having married a lady of the palace, but he did not like to shed the blood of these young men.

Ismal Pasha, to conceal his part in it and that of those who got up the affair, accused Nadi Bey and me and Ali Bey Roubi of being their leaders and we were brought before a _mejliss_ on which were Stone Pasha and Ha.s.san Pasha Afflatoun with Osman Rifki, afterwards Under-Secretary of War, and others. I showed, however, that it was impossible we could be concerned in it as we had only that very night arrived from Rosetta.

Nevertheless we were blamed and separated from our regiments, Nadi being sent to Mansura, Roubi to the Fayum, and I to Alexandria where I was given a nominal duty of acting as agent for the Sheykhs of Upper Egypt, whose arrears of taxes in the shape of beans and other produce were to be collected and sent to Alexandria in security for money advanced to Ismal by certain Jews of that place. But before we separated we had a meeting at which I proposed that we should join together and depose Ismal Pasha. It would have been the best solution of the case, as the Consuls would have been glad to get rid of Ismal in any way, and it would have saved after complications as well as the fifteen millions Ismal took away with him when he was deposed. But there was n.o.body as yet to take the lead, and my proposal, though approved, was not executed. The deposition of Ismal lifted a heavy load from our shoulders and all the world rejoiced, but it would have been better if we had done it ourselves as we could then have got rid of the whole family of Mohammed Ali, who were none of them, except Sad, fit to rule, and we could have proclaimed a republic. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din proposed to Mohammed Abdu to kill Ismal at the Kasr-el-Nil Bridge and Mohammed Abdu approved. Ismal collected the money of the Mudiriehs six months before his deposition. Latif afterwards avowed his part in the affair. Latif was put in prison but released on application of the freemasons to Nubar.