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"I entirely concur in all you say, and shall exercise the greatest prudence. I am completing a perfect case for defence, showing:
"(1) Purity, honesty of Arabi's inspirations.
"(2) Perfect concurrence of Tewfik till July 12.
"(3) Perfect concurrence of the Sultan throughout.
"(4) Universality of the movement.
"(5) Wholly illegal const.i.tution of the Court Martial.
"(6) Absurdity of the white flag (on which subject Napier has secured A 1 deposition from Lambton).
"(7) Abnormal humanitarian character of Arabi.
"(8) Abnormal iniquity of all proceedings until our arrival.
"(9) Torture of prisoners.
"(10) Letters from Tewfik to Constantinople against England.
"(11) Systematic falsification of the 'Moniteur.'
"Shall demand release of all the accused. _Keep this private._
"Now all I fear is the enormous expense of a protracted trial of eight or nine months. Arabi _alone_ calls 400 witnesses.... I spend freely. I entertain the correspondents. I have wheedled the 'Egyptian Gazette' into being our special organ. I have turned public opinion here quite in favour of Arabi. We are obliged to employ a dozen interpreters at salaries varying from 1 to 2 10_s._ a week.... My absence from Tunis means utter loss of _all_ there. All my pending cases have been given up, including some of great magnitude. Bourke will tell you I have one retainer alone of 250 a year, and another of 100.... I hope you will take all this into consideration.... I only say I believe all will depend on liberal if not lavish expenditure. Remember we have every one against us, and people don't work without a reward here.... An Arabi fund should be raised. The nine months' Tichborne trial is a specimen. But I don't think we should exceed _one-tenth_ of that at the worst.... All I say hinges on expenses. Don't think of me but only of incidental expenses.... I work sixteen hours a day....
Napier is invaluable."
_Napier to Blunt, November 6th_:
"You seem to be doubtful about the _acte d'accusation_. We have not had it officially communicated. It is not proposed by the prosecution to frame it until the close of the evidence. But in substance it is fairly stated in a telegram I think to the 'Times':
"(1) The abuse of the White Flag.
"(2) Complicity in ma.s.sacres and pillage, June 11.
"(3) Complicity in destruction by fire of the city.
"(4) Carrying war into territory of the Sultan.
"(5) General acts of mutiny and rebellion against the Khedive and the Sultan."
_Broadley to Blunt, November 7th (telegraphed)_:
"If you don't mind expense great success sure--see my yesterday's letter. I shall crush Tewfik and his crew past hope of redemption."
_Napier to Blunt, November 10th_:
"I have seen Dufferin to-day. He received me most kindly, though he declined to enter on business at once. He had only just received his instructions. Broadley and I are to meet him to-morrow.
"There seems to be a desire to burk inquiry into the rebellion question. The Government and all the papers are pledged to the ridiculous rebel cry, the one of all others that incenses me most.
It is an old trick that has been played in Afghanistan, the Cape, and elsewhere. Any one can see that it may be smashed into a c.o.c.ked hat at once.... Proposals for a compromise must come from the other side, must be put in writing, and must contain all that you claim--indeed I think they ought to amount to unconditional surrender. Of this of course more fully afterwards. You may be a.s.sured that we will not consent to anything without communication with you, and fullest deliberation."
_Napier to Blunt, November 15th_:
"I suppose you can guess the innumerable difficulties with which we have to deal. In the first place since we were not permitted to be present at the examination of the witnesses, it is necessary for us not only to have the whole of the evidence copied, but also to submit the whole of it to each of the prisoners for his observation and consideration.... There are 136 witnesses who will be brought against us. Besides these, 125 prisoners have been interrogated, and their answers will be used against each other. Then anybody who pleases seems to have been allowed to write letters to the Court, among others, H. H. the Khedive and, I believe, the Ministers, or some of them.... Not one word of the evidence is on oath, and most of it consists of hearsay and opinion.... 'In your opinion is Arabi a rebel?' 'I don't know.' 'You bad, wicked man, why don't you know?' 'I can't tell why I don't know.' 'Then think it over, and to-morrow bring a written statement of what you do know.' To-morrow the wretch arrives with a written statement that the prisoner in question is a rebel and incendiary.
"Then again the translations afforded us are not correct translations from the originals, and the originals are not true records of the evidence of the witnesses themselves....
"Thank Heaven they have imprisoned a man named Rifaat. [He had been Secretary to the Government and Director of the Press.] They could not have done anything so destructive to their own case. Not only does he know French well, but he has good literary ability, and a very fair knowledge of all these tortuous and involved intrigues rolled up one within another the untanglement of which is a business enough to make the head reel. How if it were to appear that the Abdin, Sept. 9, demonstration had been got up by the Khedive as the best means of ridding him of the disagreeable tutelage of Riaz and his Ministry! And how if the dark deeds of June 11 were plotted in the Palace to force the English and French to crush the now uncontrolled and uncontrollable National movement!
"I have been in hopes all along that the Government would not face the trial, and that they would find some means to put an end to the scandal that must ensue. But I begin to think that that will not be so. Many people in high places are prompted by motives of revenge, and still hope to wreak it upon their enemies. Others hope that by the unworthy devices of the Court a fair trial may yet be prevented. And I have no doubt they will in a great measure succeed. Again, perhaps it is the policy of the English Cabinet to insist upon the matter being threshed out, so as to give them time to meet the storm, and an opportunity of throwing over the Turks and perhaps Tewfik. If the trial is to go on I cannot tell what the expense will be, but I fear it will be very great."
_Napier to Lady Anne Blunt, November 16th_:
"Lord Dufferin began at once by lending us his a.s.sistance. Broadley and I called a day or two after his arrival. Broadley made a very masterly statement which put him in possession of the whole of our numerous causes of complaint. He has also been given copies of our formal protests, and I believe will indirectly a.s.sist us to defeat the Court of imbeciles with whom we have to deal.... The correspondents, with the exception of Bell, are all, I believe, favourable. The 'Daily News' especially. Wallace of the 'Times' has just arrived, and I believe his influence will go far to counteract Bell's extraordinary correspondence. Bell will particularly be called to account for his 'Arabi's head-in-a-charger' policy. I think he seems a little uncomfortable on the prospect of being examined on his telegrams in Court."
Mackenzie Wallace, here alluded to, arrived with Dufferin from Constantinople, where he was "Times" correspondent, and afterwards became Dufferin's private secretary when His Lordship went to India as Viceroy. He was an able man, and acted while in Egypt entirely in concert with Dufferin, and has written the only English narrative of the events of 1882 which has any historical value.
What follows is in connection with the final attempt made by the prosecution to get evidence against Arabi on a point which might be treated as a capital one, namely, the arrest of Suliman Sami, who had been in command of the Egyptian rear-guard at the evacuation of Alexandria, and who, having been subjected to the usual intimidation treatment in prison, was now said to be ready to give evidence that Arabi had ordered him to burn the city. It was this sudden desperate attempt to obtain a capital verdict that brought matters to a crisis at Cairo, and resulted, as we shall see, in the compromise effected by Dufferin of the trial.
_Broadley to Blunt, November 17th_:
"An attempt has been made to force Suliman Bey to implicate Arabi.
It has been done so clumsily that Suliman has contradicted every other witness called to prove the same thing, _but_ I believe it was done at a midnight or secret sitting when Wilson was absent....
Try and make your peace with the Foreign Office, Dufferin is square, and we could get a lot by soft words."
_Beaman to Blunt, November 17th_:
"I just write a line ... to say that things are going on very well.
The evidence of Suliman Sami, which seems to have rejoiced the prosecution, is not worth a straw, having been palpably invented for the occasion, and not supported by any of the preceding testimony. The only question seems to be if the prisoners will get off without a trial, or if they will have a chance of being fairly heard in their own defence. I am convinced that the Government here is using every effort to quash the proceedings, as the facts that would come out in cross-examination would be compromising to every man almost now in power, and would lay bare some very unpleasant facts about the Khedive. For this last reason it is just possible that our Government may feel inclined to propose terms to Arabi, as it will be a rough _expose_ if the trial proves the biggest scamp in Egypt is the man whom we brought an army here to uphold.
Personally I have very little doubt that the Khedive and Omar Loutfi arranged the Alexandrian ma.s.sacre in order to aim a blow at Arabi, who had just declared himself responsible for public safety.
I hold proofs which carry me half way to conviction, but the time has not yet come to produce them."
_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 18th_:
"Believe excellent compromise possible. Do not attack the Foreign Office. Absolute secrecy necessary."
_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 20th_: