Rulers of India: Lord Clive Part 2

{42}

CHAPTER V CLIVE DECIDES FOR THE CAREER OF A SOLDIER

Before the conditions of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had become known in India, the English governor of Fort St. David had despatched thence a small force of 430 Englishmen and 1000 sipahis to a.s.sist the ex-Raja of Tanjore, who had been dethroned for gross misconduct, to recover his kingdom. That, at least, was the nominal reason. The ambition to obtain for the English possession of Devikota, a fort on the river Coleroon, at the point where that river runs into the sea, was the true cause of the action. The force was commanded by Captain Cope, an officer of inferior merit. Clive accompanied it as a volunteer. The expedition failed from causes which it was impossible to combat. The ex-Raja had no partisans, and the season was that of the monsoon-storms.

Still the idea was too popular to be abandoned. After the treaty between the two nations had reached India the expedition was therefore resumed. This time Major Lawrence, released by the action of that treaty, a.s.sumed the command. He took with him the entire available European force of the Company, leaving only a few to man the defences, and giving Clive a commission for the time only, to accompany {43}him as lieutenant, proceeded to Devikota by sea, landed his troops, and commenced to batter the place. On the morning of the fourth day a practicable breach was p.r.o.nounced, and a storming party was ordered. By his conduct Clive had already won the esteem of Lawrence,[1] and it was to him that he gave command of the party.

[Footnote 1: The partiality which induced Lawrence to entrust Clive with so important a duty is to be found under his own hand. 'A man of undaunted resolution,' he writes in his memoirs, 'of a cool temper, and a presence of mind which never left him in the greatest danger.

Born a soldier, for, without a military education of any sort or much conversing with any of the profession, from his judgement and good sense, he led an army like an experienced officer and a brave soldier, with a prudence that certainly warranted success. This young man's early genius surprised and engaged my attention, as well before as at the siege of Devikota, where he behaved in courage and judgement much beyond what could have been expected from his years, and his success afterwards confirmed what I had said to so many people concerning him.' Cambridge's _War in India_, pp. 18-19.]

To lead a storming party is an honour full of danger. So found Clive on this occasion. Of the twenty-nine Europeans who composed it, twenty-six were swept away by the enemy's hors.e.m.e.n, the sipahis halting and witnessing the deed. Clive with the three survivors managed to join the main body which was advancing under Lawrence, and this body, repulsing a charge of cavalry which endeavoured to thwart it, pushed vigorously on, and stormed Devikota. Abandoning the cause of the ex-Raja, Lawrence then made a treaty with the powers that were, in virtue of which Devikota was ceded to the East India Company, and the Raja paid all the expenses of the {44}war. The force returned to Fort St. David to find the fleet of Admiral Boscawen still off the coast.

But, during the absence of the English troops, there had occurred in the Karnatik one of those revolutions which were not uncommon in the days of the dissolution of the Mughal empire.

On the 17th of April, 1748, the t.i.tular King of Delhi, Muhammad Shah, had died. His son, Ahmad Shah, had succeeded him. Rather less than a month later, the Subahdar of the Deccan, the famous Nizam-ul-Mulk, also died. He had in his lifetime arranged that the succession to the inheritance of the Deccan should devolve upon his second son, Nasir Jang, and Ahmad Shah at once confirmed the nomination.[2] But those were not the days when a succession to vast power and great territories went unopposed. A claimant to the sovereignty of the Deccan soon appeared in the person of Muzaffar Jang, grandson of the late Subahdar, and at the moment holding the government of Bij.a.pur.

Not sufficiently powerful to press his claim without a.s.sistance Muzaffar Jang proceeded at once to Satara, enlisted the Marathas in his cause, persuaded them to release Chanda Sahib, and to supply him with troops. The arrangement between the two princes was that, in case of success, Muzaffar Jang should become Subahdar of the Deccan, Chanda Sahib Nawab of the Karnatik. It is necessary to state these facts clearly, because the war, thus initiated, formed the basis of the continued hostilities {45}between the French and English after peace had been proclaimed in Europe.

[Footnote 2: Elliott's _History of India_, pp. 112-3, vol. viii.]

The reader may recollect that in the earlier part of this book[3] I have shown how Chanda Sahib had formed a very high opinion of the French and how he had cultivated their friendship. Resolving now to avail himself of former favours, he made overtures to Dupleix, and obtained from him promise of substantial a.s.sistance. These promises were kept, and, towards the end of July, 1749, a detachment of French soldiers joined the armies of the two conspirators at the Damalcherri Pa.s.s. A few days later (August 3) they met at Ambur the army of Anwar-ud-din, completely defeated it, slew Anwar-ud-din himself, took prisoner his eldest son, the Ma'afuz Khan who had been defeated by Paradis at St. Thome, and forced the second son, Muhammad Ali, to save himself by flight to Trichinopoli. Marching straight to Arcot, Muzaffar Jang proclaimed himself Subahdar of the Deccan, and Chanda Sahib to be Nawab of Arcot. As the French had espoused the cause of Chanda Sahib it was natural that the English should sustain the claims of the rival. This rival was Muhammad Ali, the son of the late Nawab, just escaped from the field of Ambur. The two pretenders, whose cause had been adopted by the French, then proceeded to Pondicherry. There Dupleix, whose vision on political matters was remarkably clear, insisted that before committing themselves {46}further, they should rid themselves of the only possible rival then at large, and should march against Trichinopoli. This they hesitated to do so long as the English fleet should remain off the coast.

[Footnote 3: Chapter III.]

This was the situation when Lawrence and Clive returned from the storming of Devikota. The chief of the English settlement was then Mr. Floyer, a gentleman who had a great dread of responsibility. The fighting party in the Council of Fort St. David urged that Muhammad Ali should be supported, that the English fleet should remain off the coast, and that Trichinopoli should be defended. The admiral declared his willingness to remain if Mr. Floyer would only ask him. But Floyer shrank from the responsibility. Consequently the fleet sailed on the 1st of November, leaving behind 300 men as an addition to the garrison.

The very day after the disappearance of the English fleet had become known (November 2), Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib, with their French allies, marched towards Trichinopoli. But the two Indian princes had been most improvident. They had spent all their funds. To obtain more they a.s.sailed the strong fortress of Tanjore, captured one of the gates of the fortress, and forced the Raja to agree to pay them very large sums. But the wily prince, learning that Nasir Jang was marching to his aid, managed to delay the chief payment until he had ascertained that the Subahdar was within striking distance of the place. He then point-blank refused to hand over {47}the money. The news of the approach of Nasir Jang spread disorder in the ranks of the armies of Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib, and they hurriedly retreated on Pondicherry.

Scenes of indescribable turmoil followed. In one of the skirmishes that ensued there occurred an event which, unpromising as it appeared at the outset, proved the means of the temporary accomplishment of the plans of the two conspirators. In a skirmish Muzaffar Jang was taken prisoner and placed in irons by the Subahdar. When in that position, however, he managed to corrupt three of the princ.i.p.al chiefs who followed the banner of that prince. Their schemes were communicated to Chanda Sahib and to his French allies. The result was that when the two rival armies joined battle at a place sixteen miles from the strong fortress of Gingi, which, meanwhile, the French under Bussy had captured, Nasir Jang's own levies turned against him and slew him; released Muzaffar Jang, and acknowledged him Subahdar of the Deccan.

This event occurred on the 16th of December, 1750. Chanda Sahib himself carried the news of the accomplished revolution from the battlefield to Pondicherry. The new Subahdar followed him, and, for a while, French interests seemed predominant in the Karnatik. Then, for a moment, the tide seemed to ebb. On his way to Aurangabad Muzaffar Jang was slain by the very three conspirators who had compa.s.sed the death of his predecessor. The French {48}troops with the force, commanded by the energetic Bussy, speedily avenged his death, and caused Salabat Jang, the third son of the late Nizam-ul-Mulk, to be proclaimed his successor. As Bussy with a force of French troops was to remain with him as his protector, it seemed as though French influence was destined to remain predominant in Southern India.

And so but for one man it would have remained, increasing its strength until its roots had spread far and wide below the surface.

This, we believe, is the true lesson of the early part of this biography. It was one man's genius which, meeting the French on the ground of their own selection, seized their idea, made it his own, and worked it to their destruction. It was Clive who hoisted Dupleix with his own petard. We shall now see how.

After the return of the troops from the conquest of Devikota, the Government of Fort St. David had appointed Clive to be Commissary of the forces. Before, however, he could a.s.sume the duties of the office he had fallen sick, and had been sent by the doctors for a cruise in the Bay of Bengal. On his return thence in the early days of 1751 he found great demands on his activity. It devolved on him to equip a force of 280 English and 300 sipahis, ordered, under Cope, to proceed to Trichinopoli, still threatened by the French and their allies.

This accomplished, Clive was directed to accompany, as Commissary, a larger force of 500 English, 1000 sipahis, and 100 Africans, ordered, under Captain Gingens, for Volkonda, 38 miles {49}to the north-north-east of Trichinopoli, there to intercept a French force marching in that direction.

Gingens was not a strong officer, and by gross mismanagement he allowed the French to get the better of him. Clive, whose soldier's eye and martial instincts disapproved entirely of the evils he could not, from his position, prevent,[4] then and there quitted the force and returned to Fort St. David.

[Footnote 4: Captain Dalton, who served under Captain Gingens, writes of him in his journal as 'a man of unfortunately jealous temper which made him mistrust the goodwill of any who offered to give him advice.' Vide _Memoir of Captain Dalton_, 1886, pp. 93-4.]

The return of Clive was opportune. The new Governor, Mr. Saunders, a man of a large and comprehensive intellect, was waiting the arrival of troops from England to fit out a new expedition of 80 Englishmen and 300 sipahis to convoy provisions to Trichinopoli. He had no officer, however, to whom he dared entrust the command. A civilian of his Council, Mr. Pigot, was then deputed to lead the force the first forty miles, when it would be beyond the reach of hostile attack, and Clive volunteered to go with him. The force set out in July, 1751, and on the third day reached Verdachelam, the point indicated. Thence the two English civilians turned back as had been arranged, and, though attacked on the way by a swarm of native hors.e.m.e.n, reached Fort St. David in safety. The detachment then marched through a safe country to Trichinopoli.

A few days later fresh troops arrived from England. Mr. Saunders was anxious to despatch these to {50}reinforce the troops under Gingens, but again the same difficulty presented itself. Meanwhile Clive had deliberately considered his position. As a civilian, he had had a career which did not satisfy him. As Commissary, it had been his fate to witness the inefficient leading of others, without any authority to interfere. He felt within him the power to command. His transfer to the military service would, he saw, relieve the Governing Council from a great difficulty, and give him, possibly, a command which he could exercise for the benefit of his country. Very soon did he decide. Mr. Saunders, whose appreciation of him was not inferior to that of Major Lawrence, sanctioned the transfer of his name to the military list, bestowed upon him the commission of captain,[5] and directed him to proceed at once, with a detachment of the few troops available, to Devikota, to place himself there under the orders of Captain Clarke, whose total force would thus be augmented to 100 English, 50 sipahis, and one field-piece. The two officers were then to march with this detachment to Trichinopoli. There Clive was to take stock of the position and report to Mr. Saunders.

[Footnote 5: The order of appointing Clive ran as follows:--'Mr.

Robert Clive, who has lately been very serviceable in conducting several parties to camp, offering to go, without any consideration of pay, provided we will give him a Brevet to ent.i.tle him to the rank of a Captain, as he was an Officer at the Siege of Pondichery, and almost the whole time of the War, and distinguished himself on many occasions, it is conceived that this Officer may be of some service, and, therefore, now ordered that a Brevet be drawn out, and given him.' Forrest.]

This happened towards the end of July, 1751.

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CHAPTER VI THE FIRST YEAR OF SOLDIERING AT TRICHINOPOLI AND ARCOT

The state of affairs in Trichinopoli was sufficient to cause considerable alarm as to the result of the war. Chanda Sahib was besieging that fortress with a very large native force, aided by 900 Frenchmen. His rival, Muhammad Ali, depended solely on the 600 English who were a.s.sisting him, for of his own troops there were but 5000, and of these 2000 were hors.e.m.e.n.

But that which most impressed Clive when he arrived there with Captain Clarke early in August was the depression which filled the minds of the native prince and the English soldiers. The treasury of Muhammad Ali was exhausted, and he despaired of success. The English soldiers had no confidence in their leaders, and, with a few exceptions,[1] the leaders had no confidence in themselves. To rouse leaders and men from their apathy Clive felt that something startling must be attempted. Not indeed at Trichinopoli, for Captain Gingens, who commanded there, though a brave man, was scarcely equal to taking {52}a bold initiative in face of the preponderating troops of the enemy. Alike at school, and in his researches in the Governor's library at Madras, Clive had read of the achievements of great commanders who, pressed hard by enemies at home, had changed the fate of the campaign by carrying the war into the enemy's country. What an opportunity for such a strategy where he was! To take Trichinopoli Chanda Sahib had ma.s.sed all, or nearly all, his available troops before that place, leaving the capital of the Karnatik, Arcot, absolutely denuded of trustworthy fighting men. The true method of relieving the former place was to seize and hold the latter.

Impressed with this idea, Clive returned to Fort St. David and communicated it to Mr. Saunders. This large-minded man embraced the plan with fervour, and although at the two princ.i.p.al places held by the English, Madras and Fort St. David, he had but 350 English soldiers, he resolved to risk 200 of them on the expedition.[2] The command of it he gave to Clive, but one month before a simple civilian, and despatched him forthwith to Madras, to march thence with his raw levies, most of them recently arrived from England.

[Footnote 1: One of these exceptions was Captain John Dalton, whose journal, published in 1886 (Messrs. W. H. Allen & Co.), adds much to our knowledge of the individuals engaged in the campaign.]

[Footnote 2: Forrest, page 10. The Board unanimously concurred with Mr. Saunders.]

It was on the 26th of August, 1751, that Clive set forth from Madras on the march which was to bring to him immortal fame, and to secure for his countrymen the first footing on the ladder which was to conduct them to empire. He had with him 200 English {53}soldiers, 300 sipahis, and three small field-pieces. Of his eight officers, four were volunteers from the civil service who, with two of the others, had never been under fire. On the 29th the little force reached Kanchipuram, 42 miles from Madras and 27 from Arcot. There he learned that that place was garrisoned by about 1200 native soldiers, that the discipline was lax, and that a surprise was quite feasible; but that the place itself was capable of a good defence. He did not wait longer. Setting out in a terrible storm, he reached the vicinity of Arcot on the 31st, surprised the fort, and compelled the town to surrender, without losing a single man. Having taken measures to store provisions, he marched on the 4th September to the mud fort of Timeri, frightened the 600 native soldiers encamped there into retreating, and returned. Two days later, having been informed that the enemy had again gathered there to the number of 2000, he marched again against them, attacked and completely defeated them. From want of heavy guns he did not take the fort.

Relieved from the chances of immediate attack, Clive returned to improve, as far as he could, the defences of the place he had captured. One of his first acts had been to write to Madras for some 18-pounder guns. These were at once despatched. But the enemy, now fully awake, attempted to intercept them at Kanchipuram. To save his guns Clive marched thither with all his force except 80 men. He did save the guns, but the enemy, profiting by his {54}absence, attacked Arcot with all their available numbers. The garrison, however, small as it was (30 Englishmen and 50 sipahis), had become imbued with their leader's spirit. They repulsed the attack, Clive brought the guns into the fort, and the enemy dispersed.

Meanwhile the news of the brilliant enterprise had spread far and wide; had brought hope to the defenders of Trichinopoli, and alarm and irritation to Chanda Sahib and his French allies. More even than that. The important kingdom of Mysore, the ruler of which had been long pressed by the rival combatants, declared now in favour of Muhammad Ali, and sent an army under its Dalwai (Prime Minister) to a.s.sist him. The native chiefs who ruled the territories which connected the beleaguered town with the eastern coast followed the example of Mysore;--an enormous gain, for it ensured the safety of the English convoys from the coast. Greatly impressed with these defections, Chanda Sahib at once despatched 3000 of his best troops to join the forces which his son, Raja Sahib, was commanding in North Arcot. There they would be joined by 150 Frenchmen. One of Clive's objects had thus been already attained. The capture of Arcot had enormously weakened the enemy's attack: had more than proportionately increased the strength of the defence of Trichinopoli.

The eyes of India south of the great Vindhyan range were now turned upon Arcot. Upon its successful or unsuccessful defence depended the future in India of the two European nations which, though {55}nominally at peace, were warring desperately against each other.

The siege began on the 23rd of September. It was characterized by extraordinary tenacity, great daring, infinite powers of resource, on the part of Clive and the defenders. The sipahis vied with the English alike in courage and in capacity to withstand fatigue, hunger, and thirst. Their self-denial, displayed when they insisted that the water which was brought to them under much difficulty should be offered first to their European comrades, went the round of the world. It gave evidence of the cordiality which was to exist for a century, and to be renewed in 1861-2 under conditions more favourable than ever. At length, after more than seven weeks of continuous pounding, the breach became practicable. The rumour that the great Maratha soldier, Morari Rao, was approaching the place to lend a hand to Clive, determined Raja Sahib to utilize his advantage without delay. On the 14th of November he sent every available man to the breach. The garrison, enfeebled though they were by privations, few in number from their losses, separated by the necessities of the defence, met their a.s.sailants with a courage as stern, a resolution as dogged, as that which, in difficult circ.u.mstances, English soldiers have always displayed. After an hour's fierce fighting, in which the French took no part, the besiegers fell back, beaten, baffled, and humiliated. At two o'clock that afternoon they begged to be allowed to bury their dead. At two o'clock the following morning they disappeared in the direction of Vellore.

{56}Thus ended the siege of Arcot. It had lasted fifty days. The manner in which it ended gave the English, and especially the English leader, a prestige which had an enormous effect on the campaigns that followed. What a great thing this much-abused 'prestige' is in India was ill.u.s.trated by the fact that the minds of the native princes and peoples all over the southern part of the peninsula turned to Clive as to a master whom they would follow to the death. He inverted the positions of the two nations, confounded by his brilliant action the schemes of Dupleix, and, very soon afterwards, was able to impose his will, representing the will of the English nation, upon all the native princes who ruled or reigned in the territories of Haidarabad and the Karnatik.

For--another great feature in the character of this man--Clive never left a work half-finished. The blow, he felt, was weak and paltry unless it were driven home. So he felt, so he acted, on this occasion. On the 19th he took Timeri, the fort which had before baffled him. Joined then by Morari Rao with 1000 Maratha hors.e.m.e.n, he marched on Arni, seventeen miles south of Arcot, to attack Raja Sahib, who had taken post there with the army which had lately besieged him, reinforced by French troops just arrived from Pondicherry. The superiority in numbers of the force of Raja Sahib was so great that, when he noted the approach of Clive, he turned to meet him. Clive halted where he was. He had recognized that his position was excellent for defence, covered in front {57}by rice-fields impracticable for guns, on the right by a village, and on the left by a grove of palm-trees. There he ranged his troops to meet the threatened attack.

It came very quickly, for the s.p.a.ce between the two forces was but 300 yards. The enemy had discovered a narrow causeway leading across the marshy ground to the village on Clive's right. Heralding their approach with an advance of cavalry, they directed a portion of their hors.e.m.e.n to a.s.sail the village on the right; another portion to drive Morari Rao from the grove; whilst the main body of the infantry should cross the causeway. The last-named was a dangerous operation in the face of a man like Clive, for whilst the narrowness of the causeway rendered the advance slow, it gave time to Clive to concentrate upon it the fire of his guns. And this he did. For a time the French, who led the attack, marched boldly. At length they came under the full fire of the guns. It was the story of the bridge of Arcola, but there was no Bonaparte to lead them on. They hesitated, halted, then fell back with precipitation; and, quitting the causeway, formed on the rice-fields, almost touching the cavalry on their left, who were fighting fiercely to gain an entrance into the village. This was the supreme moment, and Clive's genius utilized it to the utmost. Whilst the enemy were busily engaged on the right and left, their centre still reeling under the losses sustained on the causeway, he detached a body of English soldiers into the {58}village, directing them to seize the head of the causeway, and, traversing it rapidly with a portion of the sipahis, to dash on the enemy's centre, and seize their guns. Well was he served. No sooner did the enemy perceive the English on the causeway than a panic struck their centre, and they hastened to fall back. The panic communicated itself to the two wings, already severely handled; they too let go their hold, and turned to follow their comrades. True to the principle referred to in a preceding page, Clive pressed them hardly, not staying pursuit until darkness rendered it fruitless. The record of this, his first real battle, fought against more than double his numbers, was a splendid one. Whilst his own losses were but eight sipahis of his own force, and some fifty hors.e.m.e.n of his Maratha allies, there were killed or wounded fifty Frenchmen and about three times that number of the natives. Whilst the English had fought mostly under cover, the enemy had had the disadvantage of being exposed, especially on the causeway.

Fit sequel to the defence of Arcot was this fight at Arni. It dispersed the army of Raja Sahib, caused many of his soldiers, always in the East inclined to side with the strongest, to desert to the victors; it induced the ruler of the fort of Arni to declare for Muhammad Ali; and it deprived the enemy of their military chest. From its field Clive marched rapidly on Kanchipuram, took possession, after a short siege, of the strong paG.o.da which, meanwhile, had been {59}seized by the enemy; then, having placed in Arcot a sufficient garrison, returned to Madras, thence to Fort St. David, having carried out to the letter the programme he had submitted at the latter place to Governor Saunders.

Well had he done it. The army of Chanda Sahib, doubled up by the terrible blow struck in the very centre of his possessions, still indeed held the position before Trichinopoli, but, from an enemy confident, boastful, certain of ultimate success, he had become an enemy timid, irresolute, doubtful of the issue, shrinking from his own shadow. The prestige gained by the young Englishman paralyzed his vitality. It required apparently but one more blow to complete his demoralization. The one condition of that blow was that it must be struck quickly, suddenly, before the enemy should have time to recover. Considerations such as these, we may be sure, formed the staple of the conversations at Fort St. David between the young captain and the Governor after the return of the former from Arcot.

{60}

CHAPTER VII 'THE SWELL AND DASH OF A MIGHTY WAVE'[1]

[Footnote 1: 'The battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave before which the barrier yielded, and the roaring flood poured onwards, covering all things.' Sir W. Napier's _Peninsular War_.]

But there was one distinguished actor in the events I have recorded who was by no means inclined to sit pa.s.sively under the severe blow which had but just upset all his calculations. This man was Dupleix, the Governor of Pondicherry. The plan of taking Trichinopoli had been his plan. To take that place he had used all the resources open to him: he had, in fact, for that purpose p.a.w.ned the resources of Pondicherry. But one thing he had not done. He had not removed from the court of the Subahdar the one competent general, Bussy-Castelnau, generally known as Bussy, to carry out his ideas. He had bent all his hopes on Law of Lauriston, nephew of the famous Scotch financier, and who commanded the French troops before Trichinopoli. He leant, however, on a reed, on which, when a man leaneth, it pierces his hand. As a soldier under command Law was excellent. As a Commander-in-chief he was pitiable, dreading responsibility, timid, nervous, wanting in {61}every quality of a general. At the moment Dupleix did not know this. He had seen Law fight well and gallantly at the siege of Pondicherry: he had known him full of self-confidence, and he had believed him capable of great things.

When, then, Clive struck that blow at the middlepiece of the Karnatik dominion, which paralyzed the army before Trichinopoli, Dupleix, whose brain had not been paralyzed, sent the most pressing orders to Law not to care for events pa.s.sing at Arcot, but to redouble his efforts against the fortress he was besieging; to use every effort to take the place before Clive's unexpected blow should produce its natural consequences. To accomplish this end he despatched to him a battering-train and all the Frenchmen he had available.