Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet Part 23

"By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding circ.u.mstances, that point was reached. Then and thereby the a.s.sailants of the government began the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight or in expectancy to return their fire, save only the few in the fort, sent to that harbor years before for their own protection, and still ready to give that protection in whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all else, they have forced upon the country the distinct issue, 'immediate dissolution or blood.'

"And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States.

It presents to the whole family of man the question, whether a const.i.tutional republic, or democracy--a government of the people by the same people--can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. It presents the question, whether discontented individuals, too few in number to control administration according to organic law in any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or on any other pretenses, or arbitrarily, without any pretense, break up their government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask: 'Is there, in all republics, this inherent and fatal weakness?'

'Must a government, of necessity, be too _strong_ for the liberties of its own people, or too _weak_ to maintain its own existence?'

"So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the government; and so to resist force employed for its destruction, by force for its preservation."

He closed with this appeal to the people:

"It was with the deepest regret that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power in defense of the government forced upon him. He could but perform this duty, or surrender the existence of the government. No compromise by public servants could in this case be a cure; not that compromises are not often proper, but that no popular government can long survive a marked precedent that those who carry an election can only save the government from immediate destruction by giving up the main point upon which the people gave the election. The people themselves, and not their servants, can safely reverse their own deliberate decisions.

"As a private citizen, the Executive could not have consented that those inst.i.tutions should perish; much less could he, in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as these free people have confided to him. He felt that he had no moral right to shrink, or even to count the chances of his own life, in what might follow. In full view of his great responsibility, he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views and your action may so accord with him as to a.s.sure all faithful citizens who have been disturbed in their rights of a certain and speedy restoration of them, under the const.i.tution and the laws.

"And having thus chosen our course, without guile and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in G.o.d, and go forward without fear and with manly hearts."

Secretary Chase also submitted to Congress, on the first day of the session, a clear statement of the financial condition of the United States. He estimated the sum needed for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1862, at $318,519,581. He recommended a large increase of duties on imports, especially upon such articles as were then free from duty; also a direct tax of $20,000,000, to be apportioned among the states according to population; also a tax on distilled spirits, ale, beer, tobacco, bank notes, and other articles of domestic production. He also suggested the property of those engaged in insurrection or in giving aid and comfort to insurgents should be made to contribute to the expenditures made necessary by their criminal misconduct. As the receipts from taxation would still be inadequate to meet the expenses of the war, he discussed the best mode and form of borrowing money, including bonds running for a long period with a fixed rate of interest, and treasury notes bearing interest, payable on demand.

Kansas having recently been admitted into the Union, twenty-three states were represented in the Senate by forty-six Senators. Eleven states being in open war against the United States, twenty-one of their Senators withdrew, but Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, remained in the Senate, making the total of Senators forty-seven. Some of these Senators were new in congressional life, and some had been transferred from the House of Representatives. This transfer of a Member, though eagerly sought, is not for a time agreeable.

However conspicuous the Member may have been in the House, he must take his place in the Senate at the bottom of the ladder, and, according to Senatorial usage, must be reasonably modest in expressing his opinions. The withdrawal of so many Senators in 1861, however, gave the new Members better positions than usual. I was a.s.signed to the committee on finance and on naval affairs.

At that time the committee on finance had charge of all bills appropriating money for the support of the government, all tax or revenue bills, all loan and coinage bills, and, generally, all bills relating to the treasury department, and to the finances of the government. It was soon manifest that, in view of the war, and the enormous sums required to conduct it, the task of the committee would be a Herculean one, and that the labor required would fall chiefly on Mr. Fessenden, the chairman of the committee, and, I may with due modesty add, myself. My former position in the House of Representatives, as chairman of the committee of ways and means, and my personal a.s.sociation with Secretary Chase, with whom I was intimate, led to my taking an active part in financial legislation, which was considered my specialty. Congress, in substantial conformity with the recommendations of Secretary Chase, pa.s.sed the act to authorize a loan which was approved July 17, 1861, providing for the issue of $250,000,000 of bonds running twenty years, bearing not exceeding seven per cent. interest, or treasury notes for not less than fifty dollars each, bearing interest at not less than seven and three-tenths per cent. annually, and payable in three years, and treasury notes of less denomination than fifty dollars, not bearing interest and not exceeding $50,000,000, payable on demand, and commonly known as demand notes. We knew that this act was entirely inadequate for the great struggle before us. The problem was not whether we could muster men, but whether we could raise money. We had to create a system of finance that would secure an enlarged revenue, unquestioned credit, absolute certainty of payment of interest in coin, a national currency, and such economy as is possible during war.

The first feeble attempt to create a national currency was the issue of demand notes under the act of July 17, 1861, described as follows:

"And the Secretary of the Treasury may also issue, in exchange for coin, and as part of the above loan, or may pay for salaries or other dues from the United States, treasury notes of a less denomination then fifty dollars, not bearing interest, but payable on demand by the a.s.sistant treasurer of the United States, at Philadelphia, New York or Boston."

The fatal defect of these notes was the promise to pay on demand.

How could they be paid? In what kind of money? They could not be paid out of the current revenue, for that was insufficient to meet current expenses. No reserve was provided for their payment, and, when paid, there was no authority for their re-issue. All other forms of securities bore interest, and these notes, not bearing interest, were convertible into bonds and that was the end of them.

If that was the process why issue them at all? They did not prevent, but rather expedited, the disappearance of gold. Of American silver dollars there were none. Even the new fractional silver coins rose to a premium, and were h.o.a.rded or exported. Still, the necessity existed for some form of paper money that would be available for circulation. The solution of this problem was properly left to the next regular session of Congress.

Congress did not act upon the recommendations for internal taxes, but this subject was also left over until the next session. It did provide, however, for a large increase of revenue from imports, mainly upon articles that were then free from taxation and upon articles regarded as luxuries; also for a direct tax on the states of $20,000,000, and for a graded tax, from and after the first day of January, 1862, upon the annual income of every person residing in the United States, from whatever source the income should be derived; if such annual income should exceed the sum of $800 a tax of three per cent. on the excess above that limit. A provision was made reducing the tax on incomes from treasury notes and other securities of the United States one-half. The tax on incomes of citizens of the United States residing abroad was placed at five per cent., except on that portion derived from interest on treasury notes and other securities of the United States, which was taxed one and one-half per cent.

While Congress was engaged in legislative duties in Washington, the military forces of the Confederate States were gathering in Virginia, with the princ.i.p.al force at Mana.s.sas, about twenty-five miles southwest of Washington, under the command of General Beauregard. The Union troops, composed mainly of three months'

volunteers, were in camp occupying the region about Washington on both banks of the Potomac River, under the immediate command of General McDowell, but with Lieutenant General Scott in full command.

I frequently visited the Union camps where the soldiers, fresh from civil life and confident of easy success over the "rebels," were being drilled. The cry was, "On to Richmond!" They could not foresee the magnitude of the task they had undertaken. I will not attempt to narrate the incidents of the Battle of Bull Run. I knew it was to be fought on Sunday, the 21st of July. Soon after noon of that day I mounted my horse, and with James Rollins, a Member of Congress from Missouri, called on General Scott, and inquired for news of the battle then going on. He told us he was quite sure of a favorable result, but feared the loss of his gallant officers as, the troops being raw, it would be necessary for their officers to lead them. We crossed the pontoon bridge from Georgetown, and then, pa.s.sing by Arlington, we went to a new fort on the main road from the Long Bridge. As we approached we could hear the distant firing of cannon. We asked a sentinel on duty if he had heard the sound all day. He said, "Yes, but not so loud as now." This was significant but not encouraging. We returned to my lodgings on Fifteenth street. Everywhere there was an uneasy feeling. At eight o'clock in the morning I started for the residence of the Secretary of War to get information of the battle. As I approached I was seized by the arm, and, turning, saw Secretary Cameron. I asked about the battle, but, without answering, he hurried me into the house and said: "Our army is defeated, and my brother is killed."

He then gave way to pa.s.sionate grief. His brother, Colonel Cameron, had been killed, and the Union army was in full retreat. I was enjoined to say nothing until morning. I obeyed his injunction.

At eleven o'clock that night I heard the clatter of a horse's feet in full gallop. My nephew, Robert McComb, a boy about nineteen, a private soldier in an Ohio regiment, but detailed as an orderly, had been sent to the rear with a message. He saw the army in retreat, and, being well mounted and believing that discretion was the better part of valor, rode rapidly to my lodgings in Washington.

It is uncertain whether he or "Bull-Run" Russell, an English reporter, made the best time to the Long Bridge. McComb gave me a doleful account of the battle and retreat. The official reports from both armies show that it was a drawn battle. General Sherman, in his "Memoirs," gives a graphic history of the battle and expresses the same opinion.

Still, the battle of Bull Run was an important event. It dispelled the illusion of the people of the north as to the duration and gravity of the war. It demonstrated the folly of ninety days'

enlistments. It brought also, to every intelligent mind, the dangers that would inevitably result from disunion. On the 22nd of July, the day after the battle, the bill to authorize the employment of 500,000 volunteers became a law.

On the 29th of July two bills, one for the increase of the military establishment of the United States, and one to provide for the suppression of the rebellion, were pa.s.sed. On the 5th of August an act pa.s.sed for the better organization of the military establishment.

Armed with the largest military power ever conferred upon a President, with the almost unlimited power of taxation, the administration of Mr. Lincoln entered upon the task before it.

Having pa.s.sed these provisions in aid of the government, the special session of Congress closed on the 6th of August, 1861.

I immediately returned to my home at Mansfield. Regiments were being organized but it seemed to me that the mode of enlistment was too slow. The people, though still resolute, were somewhat troubled by the failure of military operations. I felt this so strongly that I determined at once to adopt some plan to raise a brigade to be composed of two regiments of infantry, one battery of artillery and one squadron of cavalry. When I made application to Governor Dennison for the requisite authority, he feared my plan might interfere with existing organizations then being enlisted in the different parts of the state, and I was persuaded to wait until after the 15th regiment was recruited and in the field, and the 42nd was well under way. I also made up my mind to delay actual recruiting until after the election in October of that year, so that no political bias might enter into it.

On the 24th of September I addressed a letter to the Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, as follows:

"Mansfield, Ohio, September 24, 1861.

"Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War:

"Dear Sir:--I respectfully ask for an order granting me leave to recruit and organize, in this part of Ohio, a brigade of two regiments of infantry, one squadron of cavalry, and two companies of artillery. I know I can do it promptly. The squadron of cavalry authorized to Major McLaughlin may, if desired, be considered as part of the brigade.

"For reasons that are probably unjust the governor and state military authorities are less successful than I hoped, and I know that I can get you recruits that they cannot. I wish no rank, pay, or expenses for myself, and will freely act without compensation. I care not who are the field officers, so I know they are men of honor, honesty and experience. I will only ask of the department the usual rations, pay and armament and equipage for the men; I ask nothing for myself, will undertake upon my individual responsibility to purchase any of them desired, receiving in return government securities therefor.

"I will so execute the order as not to interfere with the state authorities, and will act in subordination to them. I will freely confer with the government as to details, but would rather be left as free as practicable in the selection of officers.

"I hope, my dear sir, this application will receive your sanction, and I will stake my reputation and property that what I offer shall be accomplished.

"Very truly yours, "John Sherman."

On the same day, in order to secure the active co-operation of Secretary Chase, I wrote him as follows:

"Mansfield, Ohio, September 24, 1861.

"Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury:

"My Dear Sir:--I have to-day written to General Cameron, asking an order allowing me to recruit a brigade in this part of Ohio. I know I can do it. I ask no office, rank, pay, or expenses for myself, and will undertake to recruit this force in subordination to the state and general government, and within such limits as may be allowed. Whatever may be the reason, it is manifest that voluntary enlistment needs the spur of active exertion and solicitation. This I am willing to give, and, from offers freely made to me by personal acquaintances, know that I can enlist hundreds whom the state authorities cannot reach.

"Can I ask your favorable influence and co-operation? I will pay my own expenses, and ask only rations, tents and armament for the men. Any of these I am willing to purchase upon my individual credit, receiving in payment government securities. I pledge you my reputation and all I am worth to accomplish what I offer.

"If it is objected that my operation will interfere with state enlistments, I will agree to subordinate my movements to the orders of the governor, but for the good of the service I hope to be left as free as possible. In the selection of officers I should want to be especially consulted, so as to insure the honor, probity and personal habits of such officers. Further than this I have no choice.

"If this meets your approbation promptly say so to General Cameron, and let him set me to work.

"Very truly yours, "John Sherman."

About the same time I had arranged with Governor Dennison for a plan of enlistment which enabled the recruits to select their officers, by allowing persons securing a certain number of recruits to be captains, a less number first lieutenants, and a less number second lieutenants. The governor very kindly agreed that he would commission the persons selected in this way, leaving the regimental organization to be composed of the best material that could be found anywhere. On the 28th of September I issued and distributed, mainly in the region near the line of the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne & Chicago railroad, this circular:

"TO THE YOUNG MEN OF OHIO.

"I am authorized by the governor of Ohio to raise at once two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry.

"I am also authorized to recommend one lieutenant for each company, who shall at once receive their commissions and be furnished with proper facilities for enlisting. I am now ready to receive applications for such appointments, accompanied with evidence of good habits and character, the age of applicant, and his fitness and ability to recruit a company.

"Major Wm. McLaughlin will command the squadron of cavalry.

"The company officers will be designated by the soldiers of each company, subject to the approval of the governor.

"The field officers are not yet designated, but shall be men of experience, and, if possible, of military education.

"The soldiers shall have, without diminution, all they are ent.i.tled to by law.

"Danger is imminent. Promptness is indispensable. Let the people of Ohio now repay the debt which their fathers incurred to the gallant people of Kentucky for the defense of Ohio against the British and Indians. They now appeal to us for help against an invasion more unjustifiable and barbarous.

"Letters can be addressed to me, marked 'Free,' at Mansfield, Ohio.