Putnam's Handy Law Book for the Layman Part 13

"Thus, it is declared that an act of invention is primarily mental and involves the conception or mental construction of a means not previously known for accomplishing a useful result. It is not the mere adaptation of old means by common reasoning, but is the construction of new means through an exercise of the creative faculties of the mind." Between invention and discovery the patent laws draw no distinction. Again, it has been often said that the design of the patent laws is to reward those who make a substantial invention or discovery, which is an additional step in the useful arts. The law never intended to grant a monopoly for every trifling device which would naturally occur to a skilled mechanic in the ordinary progress of manufacture.

An article of manufacture is not patentable because means have been devised to make it more perfectly than before; it must be new in itself and not merely in its workmanship. A machine-made article therefore is not patentable simply because it is thus made, and no longer by hand.

The subst.i.tution of an art, manufacture, or composition of matter of one element or device for another which does the same thing in the same way and accomplishes a similar result is not invention. Even if the subst.i.tuted part performs the function better, there is no patentable invention unless some new function or result is secured.

Changes therefore of the relative location of parts without changing the functions performed by them are not an invention, nor is the omission of a part with a corresponding omission of function.

A patent can issue only to the inventor, or if he is dead to his executor or administrator. If there be two original inventors the one who first made it or brought it to this country is ent.i.tled to a patent. A patent granted on the application of a non-inventor is void.

By first inventor is meant the one who first had a mental conception of the invention provided he exercised diligence in perfecting it. If there be a rival claimant the party who first reduced to practice the invention was, until the contrary fact is shown, the first inventor.

One who merely utilizes the ideas of others is not an original inventor and is not ent.i.tled to a patent. In the United States any person, regardless of residence, citizenship or age may obtain a patent.

An invention is reduced to practice when it is so far perfected that it may be put into practical and successful use. The machine may not be perfectly constructed, but it embodies all the essential elements of the invention. Demonstration of its success by actual use is usually necessary, but not always. The reduction to practice must be by the applicant for a patent, or by his agent; to do this by a third party will not suffice. The person who first conceived the invention, but was later than his rival in reducing it to practice, is not regarded as the first inventor unless he exercised due diligence to perfect his invention after the time that his rival entered the field against him.

Two or more parties may contribute in developing an idea and producing an invention, which is truly the result of their joint mental efforts, and not the separate invention of either. In such case both must apply for the patent, which is granted to them jointly. But if a patent is thus issued to two and only one of them is the inventor, the patent is invalid. Nor can one of two joint inventors make application and secure the patent on a.s.signment from the other; both must join.

The patent must issue on the application of and in the name of the real inventor even though he was employed to make it for the benefit of another. Notwithstanding, the employer is the owner of the patent and may compel the patentee to transfer it to him. Of course their respective rights may be changed by agreement. If no agreement exists, a company that employs a skilled workman to make improvements on its machinery is not ent.i.tled to the patents granted to the workman. Says Justice Duell: "An employee, performing all the duties a.s.signed to him in his department of service, may exercise his inventive faculties in any direction he chooses with the a.s.surance that whatever invention he may thus conceive and perfect is his individual property. The company, however, has an implied license to make, use and sell the invention."

Where a party employs another to a.s.sist him in perfecting an invention the presumption is that the employer is the real inventor of the thing produced by their joint effort. On the other hand, where a person is employed to exercise his inventive skill, because he is known to be the possessor of it, Edison for example, the presumption is in favor of the employee. Government employees may secure patents on inventions made by them during their employment, after their relationship has ceased. The government may have an implied license to use the invention without any t.i.tle thereto.

Patents may be issued and reissued to a.s.signees on the application of inventors. On the death of an inventor before a patent has been issued to him, his executor or administrator may apply therefor, who takes the patent in trust for the heirs. A foreign executor or administrator may make a similar application. He must, however, present a proper certificate of his authority to act. Likewise, a legally appointed guardian or conservator of an insane inventor may apply for and obtain a patent in trust for him.

The inventor must apply to the commissioner of patents for letters patent which secure to him his invention. The application comprises a pet.i.tion, specification, claims, oath, drawings if the nature of the invention may be thus shown, and a model, when this is required by the patent office. A fee of fifteen dollars also must be sent with the papers. The application must be signed by the inventor and two witnesses.

The specification is the written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making, constructing, compounding, and using the invention; whatever it may be. He must describe not merely the principle of the invention, but the mode of applying it in such a clear, intelligible manner that those who are "skilled in the art"

can, without other aid, use the invention. Nothing should be left to experiment. The phrase "skilled in the art" means persons of ordinary skill. Whether a description is clear, exact and sufficient is a question for the jury whenever it is a matter of legal contention.

In describing an improvement the same rule is applied. The description should show clearly the nature of it. The description should distinguish between the old and the new. "A description in a patent for an improvement is sufficient if a practical mechanic acquainted with the construction of the old machine in which the improvement is made, can, with the aid of the patent and diagram, adopt the improvement." If an inventor intentionally conceals facts or misleads the public by an erroneous description, his patent is void.

Concerning the claim or claims with which the inventor concludes his specification many questions have arisen. First, the claim must be clearly stated so that the public may know what it is. The claim should not be too broad. Several claims may be made, but they should not be varying phraseology for the same thing. They should state the physical structure or elements of mechanism by which the end or result is produced.

The inventor must make oath that he believes himself to be the original and first inventor, that he does not believe that the thing was ever before known or used, and as to his citizenship. If dead or insane, the oath must be made by his executor, administrator, or other representative. After the application is granted another fee of twenty dollars must be paid.

The commissioner of patents must make an examination for the purpose of deciding whether a patent may be granted or allowed. This examination is made by an examiner, whose decision, however, is not conclusive and may be set aside by the commissioner. The patent office is not confined to technical evidence in rejecting applications, but may base its action on anything disclosing the facts relating to the matter.

When objection is made to the form of the application, an amendment may be made by the applicant or his attorney to correct the error; and this may be done at any time prior to the entry by the first examiner of a final order of rejection, and within one year from the date of the preceding action by the patent office.

When two parties apply for a patent for substantially the same thing an interference is declared and the respective parties must present proofs in support of their claims. The question between them is priority of invention. The proceeding then is much like an equity trial with perhaps a wider lat.i.tude in admitting evidence bearing on the inquiry.

The applicant, if dissatisfied with the rejection of his claim by the first examiner, or with the decision in an interference case, can appeal to the board of the examiners-in-chief, and if dissatisfied with their decision he may appeal to the commissioner in person, and if still dissatisfied he can appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. All appeals must be taken from the patent office within a year, or a shorter period, if one has been fixed in a decision.

The decision of the commissioner of patents in granting a patent is not conclusive that the inventor is the first and original inventor, but only prima facie, that is, in the absence of other evidence to the contrary. Consequently, the question of patentability in every case may be reexamined in the courts. In the early days of administering the patent law an inventor often applied to a court for an injunction to prevent an infringer from continuing his work. The court, a.s.suming that the patent had been properly granted, did not hesitate, on adequate proof of the infringement to grant the injunction. The courts were not slow in finding out that patents were sometimes granted that ought not to have been, and so the practice was changed and patentees were required to establish their right to a patent in a court of law before a court would enjoin an infringer, except in very clear cases.

These hearings in the courts to decide the claims of patentees, are often prolonged, running through years to collect testimony, and are appealed from one court to another finally reaching the supreme federal tribunal. After a patent is thus judicially established injunctions are readily granted against all infringers.

=Payment.=--In making payment the parties to an agreement always have in mind cash, unless they otherwise agree. Not every kind of money can be used, nor only in limited amounts. Thus, if one owed another a thousand dollars he could not deliver to him, unless he were willing to accept them, one thousand silver dollar pieces, but only ten of them. Nor can a debtor compel his creditor to receive one cent and five cent pieces to a greater amount than twenty-five cents. National bank notes may be paid or tendered to the government, and by one bank to another, yet they may be refused by an individual in payment of his debt. It is important, when one owes another and there is a dispute over the amount, that the debtor should tender or offer to pay his creditor the proper kind of money, because should he offer him some other kind, national bank notes for example instead of United States notes, or those issued by the federal reserve bank, and he declined to take them and should afterwards sue his debtor for the amount, the latter's offer to pay in national bank notes would be regarded as no payment, or even offer of payment.

A note or check given for a bill of goods is not payment. In everyday affairs a check is thus given and received, in fact it is only a payment conditioned on payment of the check. Consequently if it is not paid, the creditor can sue to recover on the check, or for the original goods as he might elect. In most cases he would ignore the check and sue for the original bill. Suppose some one had endorsed the maker's check, then the creditor would probably sue on that in order to hold both parties.

Does a debtor who turns over a note to his creditor in payment, thereby cancel the debt? If he does not, of course the creditor can still sue the debtor; but if he turned the note over in actual payment, then his right to sue his debtor is gone. What was the intention of the two parties? This is a question of fact to be ascertained like any other.

How shall the money be applied of one who owes several debts to the same person and makes a general payment? The debtor can make the application, if he does not, the creditor can do so; if neither does this, then the law applies it, first to the payment of interest that may be due on any of the debts, and the balance left, should there be any, to the payment of the princ.i.p.al. Of several debts the law applies it to the oldest debt. Again, if there is a surety for any of the debts, he may insist on the application of the money in order to be relieved.

If a depositor in a bank has made a note payable there this is regarded very much like a check, it is a direction to the bank to pay it, especially by the Negotiable Instruments law. Unless the maker of a note is insolvent, a bank can never pay the unmatured note of a depositor. Nor can a bank apply a deposit, which is known to be trust money, or belonging to another person than the depositor to the payment of his note. Generally a bank declines to pay a note that is overdue though there is no law, except in a few states, against paying it should the bank decide to do so. In all cases a depositor may make any application of his deposit he desires, for it is his own and the bank cannot divert it in any way against his direction.

A receipt taken in payment of a debt is not conclusive evidence of payment and may be contradicted by other evidence, though it is regarded on its face as payment. When received, a receipt should be kept for at least six years, because it is such strong evidence of payment. After that period the statutes of limitation in most states have the effect of canceling a debt, on the theory or presumption that it has been paid. If the debtor afterward promises to pay, his new promise is valid though there is no consideration therefor, and he is legally required to pay the debt.

Should a receipt also contain any other statement or contract beside the payment of money, this would have the same effect as any other contract between the parties, and would be equally binding on them.

The effect of a seal after the receiptor's name may be explained in this connection. A sued B and C for a debt. Before trial he gave C a receipt stating that if he did not recover from B he would nevertheless not hold C liable. Having failed in his suit against B, he sought to hold C notwithstanding his receipt releasing him. And he succeeded for the reason that his release was given without consideration and therefore was worthless. Had A added after his name a seal this would have imported or implied a consideration and the receipt would have been an effective release.

=Prescriptive rights.=--A person may gain rights in the land of another by acting in such a way as to indicate that he clearly makes a claim to them. Thus, if a man goes over the land of another in the same direction to his own land for a period of fifteen years or longer, the period differing in the several states, he acquires the right to continue, in other words he acquires a permanent right of way by such action. As such a right is contrary to the interest of another, it cannot be gained against a person who is incapable of preventing the acquisition of such a right if he pleases. Such a right, therefore, cannot be gained against a minor, nor an insane person, nor any one who is incapable of defending his possessions.

Whether the right has been fully acquired is not always easily determined. Suppose one claims a right of way over another's land, and the right is disputed. How often has he traveled that way? Has the other person known of his going and said nothing? Again, suppose a man sells another a piece of his farm away from a road, the law presumes that he intended to grant or permit the buyer to have ingress and egress to his land, otherwise he would not have purchased. This is called a way of necessity. Can the purchaser choose any outlet he pleases? The law says he must exercise reasonable discretion in making his selection.

When a way has been acquired by such use, the law is strict in confining the gainer in the use of it. Thus A buys a piece of land of another for the purpose of erecting a house thereon. The use of the way thereto must be confined to A and his family, friends and those who come to see him on business. Suppose A should decide to divide it into building lots, which would require a greatly increased use of the way. This could not be done without a new agreement with the seller.

Again, a tenant cannot by any use of the land acquire a right therein that will continue beyond his lease. If he had a long lease, say thirty years, and could gain a prescriptive right by an adverse use of fifteen or twenty years, he would, if gaining any prescriptive rights, be obliged to give them up at the end of his tenancy. In claiming a right of way the use need not be exclusive. Other persons may also use the way with the same claim of right.

The owner of land has no natural right to light or air and cannot complain that either has been cut off by the erection of buildings on adjoining land. He may, however, acquire, by grant or some other way, a right to have light and air enter a particular window, or other place, without interruption by the owner of adjacent land. Nor can he acquire a right to light and air across another's land for his own house by simply erecting it on the edge of his own land while the adjoining land is unoccupied. To erect windows on that side is not an adverse use of the land adjoining. But a person may gain a right to light and air by presumption, and if one has acquired the right to maintain a window in a specified place he loses his right by closing it up and opening another of a different size in another place. And the same thing happens to one who tears down his house and builds a new one with windows of the same size and in the same places as in the old one. A person cannot maintain an action against another for cutting off his view unless the right has been expressly acquired.

The general rule with respect to the use of water is, any person through whose land flows a stream may use it in a reasonable manner.

What is such a use has occasioned many a legal dispute, especially among mill owners. Each one of them located on a stream may use the water, but can they hold it back for any length of time? As a general rule this can be done for a short time in order to get the use of the power, if they could not, the water could run to waste and no one would derive any benefit. Again, can any diversion be made of it? Any use, almost, is a diversion. If one used water even to supply his cattle, it would be a diversion, yet such a use ordinarily is lawful.

Suppose one had a very large herd, then the use might be excessive especially in view of the needs of other users on the stream. A still more important question has arisen of late concerning the fouling of water. Has a factory the right of putting its dyestuffs into the water, impairing its quality and rendering it unfit for use by all below? This cannot be legally done. Can a stream be used as a sewer?

Naturally all the water in a valley flows downward and at last reaches a stream running through it. As population increases the use of streams becomes greater, and questions concerning their use more difficult.

Suppose a land owner on the hillside wishes to use all the surplus water, can he gather it and thus prevent its flowing to the land below? He can. Can he build ditches or other obstructions whereby he can collect the water and pa.s.s it to the land below in other than the natural way? He cannot. On the other hand, the lower proprietor can, if he pleases, make an embankment that will prevent the water from coming upon his land. This, though, is not the law everywhere.

The owners of a well may prevent its overflow and thereby cut off water that formerly ran into a stream. But the owner of a spring that flows into the land of another cannot change its course, nor exhaust the water, nor pollute it to the injury of another. Nor can surface water be changed into a water course by impounding it. On the other hand this rule does not apply to water or springs beneath the surface.

If in digging a well the source of supply to another is cut off, it is a loss for which there is no redress, unless the well has been dug maliciously. But where percolating water abounds and is obtained by artesian wells a land owner has no right to sink wells on his land and draw off the water supply of his neighbor. The right to cut ice is a natural one, and the owner of a lake or stream may cut a reasonable quant.i.ty, but not enough to diminish the water appreciably to the lower proprietor.

While a person has the natural right also to the lateral support of his land, yet he cannot use it to the injury of another. This is a legal maxim. If, therefore, he should excavate to the edge of his land and his neighbor's building should in consequence fall down, would he be without redress? The rule is, the excavation must be made in a reasonable manner. This is a question of fact in every controversy of the kind. The owner of land adjoining a highway has no right to the lateral support of the soil of the street. Therefore, if the grade of a street were lowered by proper authority and one's house located by the side of it should fall, he would have no redress against the city or other public body.

=Quasi Contracts.=--A quasi contract is a legal obligation arising without the a.s.sent of one from the receipt of a benefit which, if retained, would be unjust. The law therefore compels him to make rest.i.tution. He is required to do this, not because he has promised to make rest.i.tution, but because he has received a benefit which he cannot justly retain.

If one at the time of conferring a benefit on another confers it as a gift, it cannot afterward be claimed that the gift was conferred relying on a supposed contract. Consequently, though the donor's intention may be subsequently altered, no obligation to make rest.i.tution will arise. Nor does the failure of the donee to reciprocate the donor's generosity or indirectly reward him, create any right or claim on the donor's part to a return from the donee.

Where one, in the preservation of his own property or the promotion of his own interests, bestows some incidental advantage to another, there is no legal obligation to pay for the value of it. Thus the owner of the lower part of a house is not liable for the advantage resulting to him from the repair of the roof by the owner of the upper part and roof. Nor is one who has thickened and strengthened that part of an ancient party wall which is on his own land, in order to sustain the building he is erecting, ent.i.tled to recover from the adjoining owner who used the wall. Nor can anything be recovered from the owner of a vessel by the underwriters who had her docked for repairs though by such docking the owner gained an important benefit. Nor can one who in pumping out his quarry frees another quarry from water recover anything for the service. Nor can one who is benefited by experiments made by another to test the value of patented inventions, in which both are interested, be legally required to pay for the benefit he has received.

As no expectation of payment does presumptively arise when services are rendered by one member of a family to another member, one who claims payment for them must prove that they were not rendered as a gratuity, but on the legal supposition that he had a right to compensation.

One who knows or who has reason to believe that compensation is expected for goods or services tendered to him ought not to accept them unless he intends to pay for them. If he does his act of acceptance will be regarded as a promise of payment, and can be enforced. But if one accepts goods or services without knowledge or reason to believe that compensation will be expected, what then?

Suppose A sends a barrel of apples to B supposing, from their previous course of dealing, that B will return them if he does not want them? B should either return them or pay. Suppose B is misinformed and learns that A is giving a barrel of apples to each of his customers? Then he would be justified in keeping them until he learned the truth.

If, in making a contract it is taken for granted by both parties that a certain fact exists, which, if not existing, would make the contract impossible of execution, the contract is void. Thus, in contracts for the sale of specific personal property, its existence at the time of the sale is generally a.s.sumed. If the property has perished or been destroyed, the contract is void. The same rule has been applied to the sale of non-existent reality, of the transfer of void or spurious securities, of the a.s.signment of a void lease. In all these cases the money paid in misreliance on the void contract is recoverable.

Premiums paid on a policy of marine insurance by one who in reality had no goods on board, or for a voyage that was never begun, may be recovered. The existence of a risk is a.s.sumed by both parties, in fact there is no risk, consequently there was nothing to which the contract of insurance related.

"A promise," says Woodward, "which is so general or indefinite that it does not enable the courts to determine the nature and extent of the obligation a.s.sumed must be regarded as no promise at all. Such has been the fate of a promise to pay good wages; a promise to convey a hundred acres of land, the land not being described; a promise to divide profits, no rate of division being indicated. Instances might be multiplied. A benefit conferred, in the honest, though mistaken, belief that such a promise is binding ought in justice to be restored.

Rest.i.tution is accordingly enforced."