Problems of the Pacific Part 9

That would necessitate 3,000,000 a year expenditure for the first five years, rising gradually to 5,000,000 a year. To this the Australian Government is understood to be agreeable.

New Zealand does not propose to organise a naval force of her own, but will a.s.sist the British Admiralty with a subsidy. That subsidy is to be devoted to the use of the unit in China waters.

Canada's naval plans at present are not known. After the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 Sir Wilfrid Laurier found both his instincts for frugality and for peace outraged by the forward policy favoured by other of the Dominions. He decided to sacrifice the former and not the latter, and embarked on a naval programme which, whilst it involved a good deal of expenditure, made it fairly certain that no Canadian warship would ever fire a shot in anger, since none would be completed until she had become hopelessly obsolete. His successor in office has stopped that naval programme. It is possible that the new administration will decide that Canada should contribute in some effective form to Imperial naval defence, and she may be responsible for a naval unit in the Pacific.

_Latin America._--Brazil (whose interests, however, are in the Atlantic rather than the Pacific) has two modern battleships of the "Dreadnought"

type, and one other building. Chili has at present no really modern warship, but projects two "Dreadnoughts" and up-to-date small craft. The existing Fleet consists of one battleship, two armoured cruisers, and four protected cruisers. The Republic of Argentine has at present several vessels practically obsolete, the most modern cruisers having been built in 1896. There are three battleships, four armoured cruisers, and three protected cruisers. A modern navy is projected with, as a nucleus, two 25,000-ton battleships of twenty-two knots, armed with twelve-inch guns. Mexico, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, have no useful Fleets.

The following table will give as accurate a forecast as possible of naval strength in the Pacific in the immediate future:--

"DREADNOUGHT" TYPES IN 1912 AND 1915.

1912. 1915.

British Empire 20 38 Germany 11 21 United States 8 14 j.a.pan 4 8 Brazil 3 4 Argentine Republic ... 2 Chili ... 2

_Note._--All the South American "Dreadnoughts" are open to some doubt, though Brazil has three vessels of the type actually in the water.

Battleships and cruisers of the "Dreadnought" type are included in the above table. It has been computed on the presumption that there will be no change in the 1912 naval programmes. The United States, the British Empire and j.a.pan, are stronger in battleships of the pre-Dreadnought period than is Germany. Russia is ignored, for she has no present intention of restoring her Pacific naval Power. Germany is included because of her future position as the second naval Power of the world, and her possible appearance in the Pacific as the ally of one or other of the Powers established there now.

The following additional table deals not merely with warships of the "Dreadnought" type, but with the effective tonnage, _i.e._ the tonnage of ships of all cla.s.ses of the three greatest naval Powers:--

"EFFECTIVE TONNAGE" IN 1912 AND 1913-14.

1912. 1913-14.

British Empire 1,896,149 2,324,579 United States 757,711 885,066 Germany 749,699 1,087,399

FOOTNOTES:

[7] A "Reuter" telegram from Washington, dated March 17, stated:

"Significant orders have been issued by the Navy Department directing three big armoured cruisers of the Pacific Fleet to proceed immediately to the Philippines for an indefinite stay. Their arrival will make the American Fleet in the Orient the most powerful there excepting the j.a.panese. The vessels under order are the cruisers _California_, _South Dakota_, and _Colorado_."

CHAPTER XIII

THE ARMIES OF THE PACIFIC

The military forces available for service in the Pacific are those (1) of Russia; (2) of China; (3) of j.a.pan; (4) of the United States; (5) of the British Empire including India; (6) of the Latin-American peoples of Mexico and South America. The great armies of France, Germany, and Austro-Hungary can have no voice in the destinies of the Pacific Ocean unless indirectly, as, for instance, through Germany or Austria helping or hindering a Russian movement in the Far East by guaranteeing or threatening her European frontier.

The Russian army, though driven back by the forces of j.a.pan during the recent war, still demands respectful consideration in any calculations as to the future of the Asian littoral of the Pacific Ocean. The Russians, as has been pointed out in a previous chapter, fought that campaign under many serious disadvantages. The Siberian railway gave them a very slender line of communication with their base. Now that railway is being duplicated, and in a future war would have at least double its old military capacity. The conditions of unrest at home in Russia during the war were so serious as almost to paralyse the executive government. Those conditions are not likely to be repeated, since Russia has now entered upon a fairly peaceful, if somewhat slow, progress towards const.i.tutional reform. In a war on a land frontier for which the people were enthusiastic, the military power of Russia would be tremendous, though there was never any real foundation for the bogey of Russia as an all-powerful aggressive force.

The Russian army, based upon conditions of universal liability to service, can muster in the field for war some 4,000,000 of men. But considering the vast frontiers to be defended, and the great claims therefore made by garrison fortresses, it is not likely that more than 1,500,000 could be mobilised in any one district. It is reasonably possible to imagine a Russian army of a million men being brought to and maintained on the Pacific littoral: of an even greater army based on, say, Harbin. That would be a formidable force, especially if enrolled to fight for the White Races against an Asiatic peril: for then it would share the old military enthusiasm of the Cossacks.

There is nothing which will give the inquirer into national characteristics a better key to the Russian than a knowledge of the old Cossack organisation. It was formed, in the days of Russia's making as a nation, from the free spirits of the land, suffering on the one side from Turkish cruelty, on the other from the devastations of the Tartars. "Cossacks" meant simply "free men," and, at the outset, they were freebooters mainly, the Robin Hoods and Hereward the Wakes of Russia. But the patriotic work of resisting the Tartars and the Turks gave them a national aim, and in time they formed a military and religious organisation, unique in the history of European civilisation.

From the village Cossacks--irregular volunteer troops, pursuing normally the life of villagers, but ready ever to take up arms against Tartar or Turkish bandits, or to become in turn themselves raiders of the enemy's caravans and villages--sprung up the Cossack Zaporojskoe, garrisoning the "Setch," a great military camp in the heart of the Cossack country.

The Cossacks who joined the Setch devoted themselves wholly to military life. They had to swear to complete chast.i.ty, to abstinence whilst at war from alcohol, and to obedience to the Greek Church. The Cossack could leave the Setch if he were so inclined, but while he remained within its boundaries discipline was inexorable.

In the Setch there was neither organised training, nor compulsory drill, nor military manoeuvres. With the exception of a few elected officers, there were, in time of peace, no social distinctions; but the bravest and the most experienced were treated with respect. For war a Cossack was elected to command each hundred men; his power was absolute. Several hundreds formed a regiment, with a colonel at its head, a temporary officer, elected for one campaign only. The organisation had some artillery and infantry, but its chief strength lay in its cavalry. It also built a Fleet of small boats with which it repeatedly raided the Turkish coast.

This military monastic order pa.s.sed away with the closer organisation of the Russian nation. Despotic Czars could not tolerate a community so formidable in its virtues. Characteristically enough, it was Catherine the Great who dealt the final blow to the Cossack Setch. But the Cossack organisation and spirit, as well as the Cossack name, survive in the Russian army to-day, and the million or so men whom Russia could muster on the sh.o.r.es of the North Pacific might have some great say in the future destinies of the ocean.

The j.a.panese army of to-day, an army of veterans, must be credited, in calculating its value as a military engine, with the moral force of its record of victory. I confess to a belief in the superiority of the White Man, _qua_ White Man over any Asiatic: and I am not inclined, therefore, to accept j.a.panese generalship and j.a.panese initiative at their Tokio valuation. But the 600,000 men whom j.a.pan can put into the field, perfect in discipline, armed as to the infantry with a first-cla.s.s rifle, a little deficient though they may be in artillery and cavalry, is a most formidable force, una.s.sailable in j.a.pan's home territory, not to be regarded lightly if called to a campaign on the Asiatic mainland.

Since the war with Russia the j.a.panese army has been increased: the fact is evidence of the unslaked warlike enthusiasm of the people.

China will probably emerge from her present revolutionary troubles, whatever may be their result, with a seasoned army of great proportions.

The actual military organisation of China at the time of the outbreak of the present revolt was somewhat nebulous. But an effort was being made to organise an Imperial army (on plans laid down in 1905) which would have numbered about 360,000 men trained on the j.a.panese model. Should the reformed China decide to follow in the footsteps of j.a.pan as regards military organisation, the Chinese field force of the future would number some 2,500,000 men. It is already announced that the new Chinese Republic will adopt universal military training as part of its system of national reorganisation.

The United States, relying on a purely voluntary system for its military organisation, has, in the opinion of most critics, the framework of an army rather than an army. The peace strength of the United States regular army is about 100,000, and from these the Philippine garrison draws 13,000 men, and the Hawaiian garrison 1000 of all ranks. A partially trained militia numbers about 100,000 men. For the rest there are 16,000,000 of men of military age in the nation, but they are absolutely untrained. In case of a powerful enemy obtaining naval control of the Pacific, there is danger that the United States would suffer the ignominy of the occupation, for a time, of her Pacific coast.

British military forces available for the Pacific come under three headings:

British garrisons in India and elsewhere in the Pacific.

The citizen armies of Australia and New Zealand, and the militia forces of Canada.

The Sepoy forces in India.

The British garrisons total some 80,000 men. They may be cla.s.sed, without prejudice, among the best troops in the world, well trained and with some experience of warfare. But the majority of them are stationed in India, and few of them could be safely drawn from there in an emergency. The Sepoy troops number some 250,000, officered generally by British leaders. It is conceivable that a portion of them could be used outside of India against coloured races.

The citizen armies of Australia and New Zealand must be spoken of in the future tense: for their organisation has just begun, and it will be some five years before that organisation will be well under way. But so important is the bearing on Pacific problems of the training of some quarter of a million of citizen soldiers in the Australasian Dominions of the British Empire, that attention must be given here to a description of this army of the future.

Taking the Australian organisation as the model: The population of Australia in 1911 was about 4-1/2 millions, of whom there were, on the basis of the last census--

188,000 males of 14 years and under 18 years; and 295,000 males of 18 years and under 25 years.

Allowing for those living in districts too thinly populated to admit of training without excessive expenditure, or medically unfit for training, upon the figures at present available, it is estimated that Australia will have in training, when the scheme is in full operation, each year--

100,000 senior cadets; and 112,000 citizen soldiers.

The system will give in eight years' time a force of 126,000 trained men, and fully equipped. Every year afterwards will increase the reserve by 12,000 men. And if the training be extended into the country areas, the numbers may be increased by 40 per cent. Increase of population will bring, too, an increase of numbers, and my estimate of an eventual 200,000 for the Australian army and 50,000 for the New Zealand army is probably correct.

For the leading positions in this army there is provision to train a number of professional officers. The Military College of Australia is already in existence, and is organised on a basis of simplicity and efficiency which reflects the serious purpose of this democratic military organisation. It is not reserved for the children of the rich.

It is not allowed to become intolerable to the children of the poor by the luxury of wealthy cadets. To quote from the official conditions:--

"The Military College of Australia is established to educate candidates for commissions in all arms of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth.

"Only candidates who intend to make the Military Forces their profession in life will be admitted as Cadets to the Military College. Parents or guardians are therefore not at liberty to withdraw their sons or wards at will.

"Cadets, in joining the Military College, shall be enlisted in the Permanent Military Forces for a term of twelve years. Service as a Cadet at the Military College shall be deemed service in the ranks of the Permanent Military Forces of the Commonwealth.

"No fees will be charged for equipment or instruction or maintenance of Cadets, and their travelling expenses within the Commonwealth between their parents' or guardians' residences and the College will be paid on first joining and on graduation.

"The following charges will be admitted against the public and credited to Cadets' accounts after they have joined:--