Personal Recollections of a Cavalryman Part 18

At this critical juncture, Sheridan ordered Custer to the front to reinforce Gregg. It was time. The Michigan men were having a rest, thinking it was their turn for "a day off." But, as in the "Wilderness"

and at Meadow Bridge, they were instantly in the saddle and en route.

Marching by fours along a country road, hearing the sounds, but not yet within sight of the conflict, lines of federal infantry were seen marshaled for action, and a knot of officers of high rank gazing toward the front. Pa.s.sing to the right of these, the column turned to the right into the road leading past Haw's Shop, and through the woods where the two lines were fiercely contending, and which road bisected the battle-field. An impressive scene came into view. Beyond the wood, less than a mile away, which extended on both sides of the road, one of Hampton's batteries was firing sh.e.l.l with the utmost rapidity. These sh.e.l.ls were exploding both in the woods and in a broad plain behind them and to the right of the column as it advanced. Hundreds of non combatants were fleeing to the rear across this open s.p.a.ce. The woods, like a screen, hid the battery from view. Only the screaming and exploding sh.e.l.ls could be seen. When the head of the Michigan column came into their line of vision, the confederate cannoneers trained one of their guns on the road and the sh.e.l.ls began to explode in our faces.

A right oblique movement took the column out of range.

Gregg's men had been gradually forced back to the very edge of the woods, and were hanging on to this last chance for cover with bull dog tenacity. The enemy were pressing them hard and, apparently conscious that reinforcements for them were coming, seemed to redouble their fire both of artillery and small arms. It was a fearful and awe inspiring spectacle.

Custer lost no time. Ma.s.sing the brigade close behind Gregg's line of battle he dismounted it to fight on foot. Every fourth man remained with the horses which were sent back out of danger. The line formed in two ranks like infantry. The Sixth was to the right, its left resting on the road; the Seventh to the left, its right on the road. The First formed on the right of the Sixth, the Fifth on the left of the Seventh. The time for action had come. It was necessary to do one thing or the other.

No troops in the world could have been held there long without going forward or back.

Custer, accompanied by a single aide, rode along the line from left to right, encouraging the men by his example and his words. Pa.s.sing the road he dashed out in front of the Sixth and taking his hat in his hand, waved it around his head and called for three cheers. The cheers were given and then the line rushed forward. Custer quickly changed to the flank but, though thus rashly exposing himself, with his usual luck, he escaped without a scratch. Christiancy, his aide, had his horse shot under him and received two wounds, one a severe one through the thigh.

Gregg's men permitted the Michigan men to pa.s.s. In a moment the Wolverines and the Palmetto men were face to face and the lines very close. Michigan had Spencers. South Carolina, Enfields. Spencers were repeaters, Enfields were not. The din of the battle was deafening. It was heard distinctly back where the infantry was formed and where Grant, Meade, and Sheridan anxiously were awaiting the event. The Spencers were used with deadly effect. The South Carolinians, the most stubborn foe Michigan ever had met in battle, refused to yield and filled the air with lead from the muzzles of their long range guns as fast as they could load and fire. The sound of their bullets sweeping the undergrowth was like that of hot flames crackling through dry timber. The trees were riddled. Men began to fall. Miles Hutchinson, son of my father's foreman, who had left home to go to the war with me, fell dead at my side. "Jimmie" Brown, the handsome and brave sergeant, dropped his piece and falling, died instantly. Corporal Seth Carey met his fate like a soldier, his face to the foe. A member of troop H, shot through the breast, staggered toward me and exclaiming, "Oh, major," fell literally into my arms, leaving the stains of his blood upon my breast.

This strenuous work did not last long. It may have been ten minutes from start to finish--from the time we received the South Carolinians' fire till the worst of it was over and they began to give way. But, in that brief ten minutes eighteen brave men in the ranks of the Sixth Michigan had been either killed or mortally wounded; and as many more were wounded but not fatally. The enemy suffered even more severely. The brigade lost forty-one killed--eighteen in the Sixth; thirteen in the Fifth; five in the First and five in the Seventh. The losses of the Fifth in officers and men wounded but not fatally were larger than those in the Sixth, the total of killed and wounded aggregating something like fifty in the regiment. The First, though it did not meet with so st.u.r.dy a resistance in its immediate front, was able to work around the flank of the enemy, thus materially aiding in breaking their spirit and putting them to rout.

Some of the South Carolina men exhibited a foolhardy courage never seen anywhere else so far as my knowledge extends.

"Surrender," said Sergeant Avery to one of them who had just discharged his piece and was holding it still smoking in his hands.

"I have no orders to surrender, ---- you," returned the undaunted confederate.

He surrendered, not his person, but his life. Such a fate befell more than one of those intrepid heroes. It was a pity but it was war and "war is h.e.l.l." The enemy's line, at that time, had been driven beyond the woods into a clearing where was a house. While crossing a shallow ravine before reaching the house it was noticed that shots were coming from the rear. An officer with a troop was ordered back to investigate. It was found that at the first onset the regiment had obliqued slightly to the right, thus leaving an interval between the left flank and the road in consequence of which about fifteen confederates had been pa.s.sed unnoticed. Some of them had the temerity to begin giving us a fire in the rear. They were all made prisoners.

The force in front was driven from the field, leaving their dead and wounded. Eighty-three dead confederates were counted by those whose duty it was to bury the dead and care for the wounded in the field and woods through which the Michigan men charged. Those who were killed in front of the Sixth Michigan were South Carolinians from Charleston and evidently of the best blood in that historic city and commonwealth. They were well dressed and their apparel, from outer garments to the white stockings on their feet, was clean and of fine texture. In their pockets they had plenty of silver money.

In this engagement, as well as in that at Hanovertown the day before, the Fifth Michigan was commanded by Captain Magoffin, Colonel Alger having remained at White House for a few days on account of illness.

Colonel Stagg and Major Alexander Walker led the First and Seventh, respectively.

General Sheridan narrates that when he called upon Mr. Lincoln in Washington the president made a facetious reference to General Hooker's alleged fling at the cavalry, when he asked: "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" It is perhaps doubtful whether Hooker uttered so pointless a saying, devoid alike of sense and of wit. If such a question was ever seriously propounded by him or by any one else, its sufficient answer could have been found upon the battle field of Haw's Shop. And not there alone. The First Michigan cavalry had sixteen killed including its colonel at the second Bull Run and twelve at Gettysburg. The Fifth Michigan lost fifteen killed at Gettysburg; the Sixth Michigan twenty-four at Falling Waters and the Seventh Michigan twenty-two at Gettysburg--all of these before General Sheridan had that interview with Mr. Lincoln in the White House. This record was enough of itself, to render the cavalry immune to ironical disparagement. If there were any honest doubts as to the efficiency and fighting qualities of the Potomac cavalry, they were dissipated by the campaign of 1864. After Todd's Tavern, Yellow Tavern, Haw's Shop, Cold Harbor and Trevilian Station no slurring remarks aimed at the cavalry were heard. Its prestige was acknowledged in and out of the army by all those who had knowledge of its achievements and were willing to give credit where credit was deserved.

An all night march followed the battle, after the dead had been buried and the wounded cared for. The morning of May 29 found the two divisions in the neighborhood of Old Church and thence in the afternoon of May 30 Custer and Merritt marched out toward Cold Harbor, the Reserve brigade in advance, to reinforce Devin, who was having a hot fight at Matadequin Creek with Butler's South Carolinans, posted on the opposite side in a strong position. The entire division became engaged, the fighting being mostly dismounted and the opposing force was driven in great confusion from the field. The Sixth Michigan was held in reserve mounted and expected to be ordered in for a mounted charge but for some unexplained reason the order did not come. The First, Fifth and Seventh were in the thickest of it and rendered excellent service. The pursuit was kept up for several miles and the enemy retreated to Cold Harbor, leaving his dead and wounded on the field, as at Haw's Shop. Butler's men behaved with great gallantry, but were ready to surrender when the logic of the situation demanded it. They made no such resistance as in the former action.

May 31, in the afternoon, the First division advanced on Cold Harbor, Merritt in advance, on the road leading from Old Church. Custer followed Merritt. Devin was sent by another road to the left with the intention of having him attack in flank the force which the other two brigades were engaging in front. The Sixth Michigan moved by a country road to make connection between the First and Second brigades. Gregg's division followed Torbert as a reserve and support but did not become engaged.

Cold Harbor was a very important strategic point, as can be seen by a glance at the map, roads radiating from it in all directions. It was strongly held by Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, supported by a brigade of infantry. They had thrown up breastworks of rails and logs, and made preparations for a stout resistance.

I reached the intersection of the country road with the left hand road before Devin appeared. My orders being to connect with him, I awaited his arrival, sending a few men out to keep watch in both directions.

When Devin's advance came up they saw these men and appeared to be suspicious of them, and did not advance very promptly. As soon as I could I gave them to understand who we were and what we were there for.

Devin then moved along the main road and the Sixth deployed through the woods until touch with its own brigade was obtained.

In the meantime, a hard fight was in progress. Torbert, not hearing from Devin, changed his plans and attacked the enemy's left flank with the Reserve brigade and the First and Fifth Michigan. This was most skilfully and successfully done. The flanking movement was led by the First and Second United States, and the Fifth Michigan, still under Captain Magoffin. The final blow was struck by Major Melvin Brewer with one battalion of the First Michigan, whose charge mounted at the critical moment decided the fate of the field. The enemy who had been putting up a very hard fight did not await this charge but threw down their arms and fled, the pursuit being followed up to a point a mile and a half beyond the town. The Sixth took little part except to fill the gap between Custer and Devin. The latter found the confederate right flank too strong to circ.u.mvent, and added one more to the long list of lost opportunities.

Thus, Cold Harbor, the key to the maneuvers of the two armies, came into possession of the Union cavalry, but there was no infantry support within ten miles, the result having been unexpected by Meade, and Sheridan decided that it would not be safe for his command to try to hold it, unsupported. He, however, notified the general of the army what he had done and withdrew his cavalry after dark to the position of the night before. Grant, realizing the importance of the capture, directed Sheridan to return and hold Cold Harbor at all hazards, until the infantry could get up. The march was retraced and, reaching the position before daylight, the breastworks which the enemy had thrown up were brought into service, strengthened as much as possible and the division dismounted placed in line behind them. Ammunition boxes were distributed on the ground by the side of the men so they could load and fire with great rapidity. This was a strong line in single rank deployed thick along the barricade of rails. Behind the line only a few yards away were twelve pieces of artillery equally supplied with ammunition. The brigade was thus in readiness to make a desperate resistance to any attack that might be made. The only mounted man on the line was General Custer, who rode back and forth giving his orders. The Sixth was lying down behind the rails and directly in front of the artillery, the pieces being so disposed as to fire over our heads. I do not remember any other engagement in which so many pieces of artillery were posted directly on a skirmish line with no line of battle behind it and no reserves. It was an expedient born of a desperate emergency.

In front of the line was open ground. Two hundred yards to the front were woods. In the woods the confederate infantry was in bivouac.

Kershaw's division was in front of the Michigan brigade. Before the first streaks of dawn began to appear in the east, their bugles sounded the reveille, and there was immediate commotion in the confederate camps. So close to us were they that the commands of the officers could be heard distinctly. Soon after daybreak an attack was made on the right of the line. As soon as the enemy emerged from the woods General Custer ordered all the twelve pieces of artillery to fire with sh.e.l.l and canister which they did most effectively. So furious was the fire that the confederate infantry did not dare to come out of the woods in front of Custer's left where the Sixth was, the artillery and the fire from the Spencers from behind the rails keeping them back. An attempt was made to charge the part of the line where the First Michigan was posted but each time it was repulsed. Here Captain Brevoort, one of the bravest and best officers in the brigade, was killed. Captain William M.

Heazlett, another fine officer, was wounded. They both belonged to the First Michigan.

During the progress of the engagement, when the first attempt of Kershaw's infantry to come out of the woods had been repulsed, and there was a temporary suspension of the firing, General Custer riding along the line, in rear of the artillery, noticed that several of us who were lying down behind the barricade, were directly in front of one of the bra.s.s pieces. Though these pieces were firing over our heads, they were very nearly, if not quite, on the same level as the barricades. He, with characteristic thoughtfulness, called my attention to the danger of remaining where we were and I moved away from in front of the gun to a position in front of the interval between two of them, directing the others to do likewise. The three men who were with me were Lieutenant William Creevy, Corporal John Yax, and private Thomas W. Hill of troop C. Hill moved to the right when I moved to the left, but Creevy and Yax were slow about it. The very next time the gun was fired, there was a premature explosion, which killed Yax and wounded Creevy. Hill was a boy only seventeen years of age, one of the recruits of 1863-64. He survived the war and is now cashier of the Cleveland national bank, of Cleveland, Ohio, and one of the most influential and respected business men of that city. Another one of those young recruits of 1863-64 was A.V. Cole, corporal in the same troop as Hill. He was badly wounded in the action at Haw's Shop, May 28. For many years he was adjutant general of the state of Nebraska.

[Ill.u.s.tration: THOMAS W. HILL]

This line was successfully held, a most meritorious performance, by the cavalry until nearly noon, when the Sixth corps came on the ground and relieved it.

Never were reinforcements more cordially welcomed. Never did the uniform and arms of the infantry look better than when the advance of the Sixth corps made its appearance at Old Cold Harbor. In solid array and with quick step they marched out of the woods in rear of the line, and took our places. The tension was relaxed and for the first time since midnight the cavalryman drew a long breath.

This was the beginning of the intimate a.s.sociation of the First cavalry division with the Sixth corps. So close a bond did it become that its hold was not released until the war closed. It was a bond of mutual help, mutual confidence and respect. The Greek cross and the cross sabers were found together on all the battle fields of the Shenandoah valley and we shall see how at Cedar Creek they unitedly made a mark for American valor and American discipline unexcelled in all the annals of war. There, side by side, Wright and Ricketts, Getty and Wheaton stood with Merritt and Custer in the face of an enemy flushed with success, and refused to be beaten until Sheridan came on the field to lead them to victory.

The division then moved back near Old Church and went into camp. June 2 went into camp at Bottom's bridge, where we remained skirmishing with cavalry across the river. June 6 found the First and Second divisions in camp at Newcastle Ferry on the Pamunkey river, in readiness for what is known in the records and in history as the Trevilian raid, conducted by General Sheridan in person.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

CHAPTER XX

THE TREVILIAN RAID

The contents of this chapter const.i.tute the latest contribution of the author to the literature of the events recorded in this book. Much of that which has gone before and all of what follows was written many years ago. But in this final draft, every line has been revised. Time and the ripeness of years have tempered and mellowed prejudice; the hasty and sometimes intemperate generalizations of comparative youth have been corrected by maturer judgment; something of ill-advised comment and crudity has been eliminated. Many of his conclusions and even the accuracy of some of his statements of fact, he realizes fully, may not remain unchallenged; yet it has been his honest endeavor and purpose to give, so far as in him lies, a truthful and impartial recital of those salient memories that remain to him of the stirring experiences of the youthful days when, as a boy he "followed the fortunes of the boy general" in the campaigns of 1863-64, in the great civil war.

The outlines of the sketches herein made have been drawn from the official "records of the rebellion" which have been carefully consulted; the details for the most part have been taken from the storehouse of a somewhat retentive memory; something of color and atmosphere necessarily has been left to the imagination. It is a picture that he would present, rather than a dry recital of dates and places, or a mere table of statistics. The importance of these things need not be lessened by seeking to give them an attractive form.

The writer must confess, also to an ambition to contribute something, albeit but a little, toward giving to the Michigan cavalry brigade the place in history which it richly earned; so that it may receive in its due proportions the credit which it deserves for the patriotic and valiant services rendered on so many battle fields. And especially does it seem to be to him a duty to do this for the regiment in which it was his privilege and good luck to serve.

This ambition, however, was nearly stifled, soon after its birth, by an experience very galling to the pride of a well meaning, if sensitive and fallible historian.

It was something like twenty years ago that a paper on the battle of Cedar Creek, prepared with conscientious care and scrupulous fidelity to the facts as the writer understood them, was mailed to General Wesley Merritt, with the request, couched in modest and courteous phrase, that he point out after having read it any inaccuracies of statement that he might make a note of, as the article was intended for publication.

The distinguished cavalry officer replied, in a style that was bland, that he had "long since ceased to read fiction;" that he no longer read "even the Century war articles;" that an officer one month would give his version of things which another officer in a subsequent number of the same magazine would stoutly contradict; and that he was heartily tired of the whole business.

General Merritt was, however, good enough to give in detail his reasons for dissenting from the writer's account of a certain episode of the battle, and his letter lent emphasis to the discussion in one of the early chapters of this volume concerning men occupying different points of view in a battle. This particular matter will be more fully treated in its proper place. One must not be too sure of what he sees with his own eyes and hears with his own ears, unless he is backed by a cloud of witnesses.

Moreover this was notice plain as holy writ, that no mere amateur in the art of war may presume, without the fear of being discredited, to have known and observed that which did not at the time come within the scope of those who had a recognized status as professional soldiers and find its way into their official reports. Indeed, a very high authority as good as told the writer in the war records office in Washington that no man's memory is as good as the published record, or ent.i.tled to any weight at all when not in entire harmony therewith.

It is evident that this rule, though perhaps a proper and necessary one, to protect the literature of the war against imposition and fraud, may very easily bar out much that is valuable and well worth writing, if not indispensable to a fair and complete record, provided it can in some way be accredited and invested with the stamp of truth.

It was quite possible for brigade and even regimental commanders, not to draw the line finer still, to have experiences on the battle field of which their immediate superiors were not cognizant; nor is it necessary to beg the question by arguing that all commanding officers were allowed to exercise a discretion of their own within certain limits.

Official reports were oftentimes but hastily and imperfectly sketched amidst the hurry and bustle of breaking camp; or on the eve of battle, when the mind might be occupied with other things of immediate and pressing importance. Sometimes they were prepared long afterwards, when it was as difficult to recall the exact sequence and order of events as it would be after the lapse of years. Some of the "youngsters" of those days failed to realize the value their reports would have in after years as the basis for making history. Others were so unfortunate as to have them "lost in transit" so that, although they were duly and truly prepared and forwarded through the official channels, they never found their way into the printed record.

Attention already has been called to the absence of reports of the commanders of the Michigan cavalry brigade regiments for the Gettysburg campaign. General George B. Davis, U.S. army, when in charge of the war records office in Washington, told the writer that he had noticed this want and wondered at it. He could not account for it. A like misfortune befell the same regiments when they partic.i.p.ated in the Kilpatrick raid.

Only a part of their reports covering the campaign of 1864, including the Trevilian raid, were published. In this respect the Sixth Michigan suffered more than either of the others. Not a single report of the operations of that regiment for that period, appears in the record, though they were certainly made as required. General Custer's reports cover that regiment, of course, as they do the others in the brigade, but it is unfortunate that these are not supplemented by those of the regimental commander. Until the volumes successively appeared, he was not aware of this defect; nor did he ever receive from any source an intimation of it, or have opportunity to supply the deficiency. Hence, it appeals to him as a duty to remedy, so far as it can be done at this late day, the omissions in the record as published of this gallant regiment.

From the beginning to the end of the campaign of 1864, in Virginia--from the Wilderness, May 4, to Cedar Creek, October 19--except for a single month when he was in command of the brigade, the writer was present with and commanded the Sixth Michigan cavalry. Not a single day was he absent from duty, nor did he miss a battle or skirmish in which the regiment was engaged. Reports were made, but as we have shown they did not find their way into the war department. No copies were retained, so there is a hiatus in the record. There are numerous cases of a similar kind. Some officers, there is reason to believe, were smart enough to seek and were given the opportunity to restore the missing links.

The Trevilian raid resulted from the seeming necessity of drawing the confederate cavalry away from the front of the army of the Potomac while the movement of the latter from the Chickahominy to the James was in progress. Sheridan was ordered to take two divisions and proceed to Charlottesville, on the Virginia Central railroad. Incidentally he was to unite there with the force operating under General Hunter in the direction of Lynchburg. He decided to take the First and Second divisions (Gregg and Torbert). Wilson with the Third division was to remain with the army, taking his orders directly from General Meade.