Ontology or the Theory of Being Part 24

If, then, order is _the right arrangement or disposition of things according to their destination, or in the mutual relations demanded by their ends_, it necessarily follows that the very existence of _natural_ order in the universe implies that this universe is not a work of _chance_ but a _purposive_ work, just as the existence of _artificial_ order in products of human art implies that these products are not the result of chance but of activity influenced by final causes.(526)

It is in fact impossible to conceive order except as resulting from the influence of final causes. Right reason rejects as an utterly inadequate explanation of the natural order of the universe the fantastic and far-fetched supposition of a chance collocation of indifferent, undetermined and aimless physical agencies.(527) If we find in the actual physical universe difficulties against the view that this universe reveals the influence of final causes, such difficulties do not arise from the fact that there is order in the universe, but rather from the fact that with this order there seems to coexist some degree of disorder also. In so far forth as there is natural order there is _cogent_ evidence of the influence of final causes. And so necessary is this inference that even one single authentic instance of natural order in an otherwise chaotic universe would oblige us to infer the existence and influence of a final cause to account for that solitary instance. We mean by an authentic instance one which evidences a real and sustained uniformity, regularity, mutual co-ordination and subordination of factors in the behaviour of any group of natural agencies; for we allow that transient momentary collocations and concurrences of _indifferent_ agencies, acting aimlessly and without purpose as a matter of fact, might present to our minds, accustomed to seek for orderly and purposive phenomena, the deceptive appearance of order.

Order, then, we take it, necessarily implies the existence and influence of final causes. This in turn, as we have already observed, implies with equal necessity the existence of _Intelligent Purpose_. If, then, there is natural order in the universe, there must exist an _Intelligent Will_ to account for this natural order.

Leaving the development of this line of argument to its proper place in Natural Theology, there remains the simple question of fact: Is the physical universe a _cosmos_? Does it reveal order-a natural order distinct from the artificial order realized by the human mind in the mechanical and fine arts, an order, therefore, realized not by the human mind but by some other mind, by the Divine Mind? The evidences of such order superabound. We have already referred to some of them (106), nor is there any need to labour the matter. Two points, however, in connexion with this universally recognized fact of order in the universe, call for a brief mention before we conclude. They are in the nature of difficulties against the ordinary, reasonable view of the matter, the view on which the theistic argument from order is based.

In accordance with the Kantian theory of knowledge it is objected that the order which we apprehend, or think we apprehend, in the universe, is not _really in_ the universe of our experience, but is as it were _projected into_ this universe by our own minds in the very process of cognition itself. It is therefore not real but only apparent, not noumenal but only phenomenal. It is simply a product of the categorizing, unifying, systematizing activity of our minds. It is a feature of the phenomenon or mental product, _i.e._ of the noumenal _datum_ as _invested with a category of thought_. But whether or not it is a characteristic of the real universe itself man's speculative reason is by its very const.i.tution essentially incapable of ever discovering. The theory of knowledge on which this difficulty is based can be shown to be unsound and erroneous.

For a criticism of the theory we must refer the reader to scholastic works on Epistemology. It may be observed, however, apart from the merits or demerits of the theory, that the experienced fact of order is by no means demolished or explained away by any questions that may be raised about the exact _location_ of the fact, if we may so express it. Order is a fact, an undeniable, experienced fact; and it looms just as large, and cries out just as insistently for explanation, with whichever of the imposing adjectives "noumenal" or "phenomenal" a philosopher may choose to qualify it; nor do we diminish its reality by calling it phenomenal one whit more than we increase that reality by calling it noumenal.

The other difficulty arises from the existence of _disorder_ in the universe. Pessimists of the type of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche concentrate their attention so exclusively on the evidences of disorder, the failures of adaptation of means to ends, the defects and excesses, the prodigality and penury, the pain and suffering, which abound in physical nature-not to speak of moral evil,-that they become blind to all evidences of order, and proclaim all belief in order an illusion.

The picture of

Nature, red in tooth and claw With ravine(528)

is, however, the product of a morbid and distraught imagination rather than a sane view of the facts. The undeniable existence of disorder, of physical evils, defects, failures, frustrations of natural tendency in the universe, does not obscure or conceal from the normal, unbia.s.sed mind the equally undeniable evidences of a great and wide and generally prevailing order. Nor does it conceal from such a mind the fact that the existence of order in any measure or degree implies of necessity the existence of plan or design, and therefore of intelligent purpose also. Inferring from this fact of order the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, and inferring by other lines of reasoning from the data of experience the dependence of the universe on this Intelligence as Creator, Conserver and Ruler, the theist is confronted with the reality of moral and physical evil (52), _i.e._ of _disorder_ in the universe. But he does not see in this disorder anything essentially incompatible with his established conclusion that the universe is a finite creation of Infinite Wisdom, and a free manifestation of the latter to man. If the actual universe is imperfect, he knows that G.o.d created it freely and might have created a more perfect or a less perfect one. Knowing that G.o.d is All-Powerful as He is All-Wise, he knows that the actual universe, though imperfect _absolutely_, is perfect _relatively_, in that it infallibly reveals the Divine Wisdom and Goodness exactly in the measure in which G.o.d has willed to reveal Himself in His works.

Conscious on the one hand that his finite mind cannot trace in detail all the purposes of G.o.d in nature, or a.s.sign to all individual events their divinely appointed ends, he is confident on the other hand that the whole universe is intelligible only as the working out of a Divine plan, and not otherwise. To his mind as a theist these lines are a clearer expression of rationally grounded optimism than they were perhaps even to the poet who penned them:-

I trust in nature for the stable laws Of beauty and utility. Spring shall plant And Autumn garner to the end of time.

I trust in G.o.d-the right shall be the right And other than the wrong, while He endures; I trust in my own soul, that can perceive The outward and the inward, Nature's good And G.o.d's.(529)

We have seen that the agencies which const.i.tute the universal order have each its own inner principle of finality; that these agencies are not isolated but mutually related in such ways that the ends of each subserve an extrinsic and remoter end which is none other than this universal order whereby we recognize the world as a _cosmos_. The maintenance of this order is the _intrinsic_ end of the universe as a whole: an end which is _immanent_ in the universe, an end which is of course _a good_. But this universal order itself is _for an end_, an _extrinsic_, _transcendent_ end, distinct from itself; and this end, too, must be _a good_. "The universe," says St. Thomas,(530) "has the good of order and another distinct good." The universal order, says Aristotle, has itself an end, a _good_, which is _one_, and to which all else is ordained: "p??? ?? ?pa?ta s??t?ta?ta?".(531) What can this Supreme Good be, this absolutely Ultimate End, this Transcendent Principle of all nature, and of all nature's tendencies and activities? Whence comes this universal tendency of all nature, if not from the Being who is the One, Eternal, Immutable Prime Mover,(532) and whose moving influence is Love?(533) Such is the profound thought of Aristotle, a thought re-echoed so sublimely by the immortal poet of Christian philosophy in the closing line of the _Paradiso_:-

L'amor che muove il Sole e l'altre stelle.

The immediate factors of the universal order of nature, themselves devoid of intelligence, must therefore be the work of Intelligent Will. To arrange these factors as parts of one harmonious whole, as members of one orderly system, Supreme Wisdom must have conceived the plan and chosen the means to realize it. The manifestation of G.o.d's glory by the realization of this plan, such is the ultimate transcendent end of the whole created universe. "The whole order of the universe," writes St. Thomas, developing the thought of Aristotle,(534) "is for the Prime Mover thereof; this order has for its purpose the working out in an orderly universe of the plan conceived and willed by the Prime Mover. And hence the Prime Mover is the principle of this universal order."

The truths so briefly outlined in this closing chapter on the order and purpose of the universe have nowhere found more apt and lucid philosophical formulation than in the monumental writings of the Angel of the Christian Schools; nor perhaps have they ever elsewhere appeared in a more felicitous setting of poetic imagery than in these stanzas from the immortal epic of the Poet of the Christian Schools:-

... Le cose tutte quante Hann' ordine tra lora; e questa e forma Che l'universo a Dio fa simigliante.

Qui veggion l'alte creature l'orma Dell'eterno Valore, il quale e fine Al quale e fatta la toccata norma.

Nell' ordine ch'io dico sono accline Tutte nature per diverse sorti Piu al Principio loro e men vicine;

Onde si muovono a diversi porti Per lo gran mar dell'essere, e ciascuna Con instinto a lei dato che la porti.

Questi ne porta il fuoco inver la Luna: Questi ne' cuor mortali e permotore; Questi la terra in se stringe ed aduna.

Ne pur le creature, che son fuore D'intelligenza, quest' arco saetta Ma quelle ch' hanno intelletto ed amore.

La Providenza, che cotanto a.s.setta, Del suo lume fa il ciel sempre quieto, Nel qual si volge quel ch'ha maggior fretta:

Ed ora li, com' a sito decreto, Cen porta la virtu di quella corda, Che ci che scocca drizzo in segno lieto.(535)