Ocean Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post Part 7

But there are some things that, with the entire concentrated skill and ability of the nation, her citizens can not accomplish; and one of these is the maintenance of steamship mail lines upon the ocean. In ordinary enterprises compet.i.tion necessitates improvement; and mechanical improvement and skill, in due course of time, enable individuals to compa.s.s ends otherwise deemed impracticable and unattainable. These attempts have all been made, in every form, with ocean steam navigation. It was supposed, as elsewhere stated, that, by superior engines and great economy of fuel, a speed high enough for all ordinary mail purposes could be attained, and yet leave enough room for freight and pa.s.sengers to enable the income from these, at rates much higher than on sailing vessels, to pay for fuel, engineering, and the great additional cost of running a steamer. Vast engineering skill and ability have been directed to this point both in this country and Europe; and this object has been declared the commercial desideratum of the age. But all of these efforts have failed in their design; so much so that there is not, to-day, more than one permanent steam line upon the high seas of the whole world which is not sustained by a subsidy from some government. Many attempts have been made by British merchants to do a freighting and pa.s.senger business in _propellers_, without any mail pay, and depending on their receipts alone. These, too, have all failed. No permanent line of these propellers has been established to any of our American cities, except by subsidized companies, owning side-wheel steamers also.

The only trade in which it has ever been supposed that steamers of any description whatever could carry freight is that between Europe and the United States, where there are large quant.i.ties of rich, costly goods, in small and valuable packages, which pay an extra rate of freight, as express goods; but, even here, the steam freighting system without governmental aid has proved a failure. There have been one or two cases where a steamer could make money in carrying freight and pa.s.sengers alone, as between this country and California during the early part of the gold crisis, and owing to the great distance around the Horn, as well as an unnaturally large pa.s.senger trade.

This, however, was a state of commerce wholly abnormal and of short duration, and such as is not likely to occur once in a century, or last very long; or prove more than an infinitesimal exception to the great general laws of freighting and commercial transport.

Great Britain has learned this doctrine from experience, and is profiting by it. Her wise merchants and statesmen know that commerce can be accommodated only by rapid steam mails, which have regular and reliable periods for arrival and departure; and that, although these mails cost the Government and the people something more than those slow and uncertain communications which depend on sailing vessels and overland transit, yet they are enabled, by the facilities which they afford, to monopolize and control the commerce of the world, and divert it from even the most natural channels into the lap of British wealth. It is in this view of the subject that our merchants so justly complain that our Government, by refusing to give them the facilities commensurate with the demands of the age, _deprives_ them of the _power_ or _privilege_ of competing with foreign nations, and palsies their hands, simply because they are not able, individually and by their a.s.sociated capital, to do that which the Government only can do.

The reason why our mail steamers require the aid of our Government is that foreign Governments subsidize their lines; hence our individual enterprise can not compete with their individual enterprise and that of their Government combined. The reason why foreign Governments thus subsidize their mail lines is, that _those lines can not depend upon their own receipts for support, or run without Governmental aid_. This is also the prime reason for Governmental aid in running our lines.

These facts are undisputed by steamshipmen and merchants, and are verified by the practice of the whole world, and the great number of failures in attempting to sustain steamers, from year to year, on regular lines, by their receipts alone.

Being thus unable to compete with other countries under our present limited steam arrangements, and considering the startling expenses which attend the running of steamers, such as their fuel, their extra prime cost, their large repairs, their depreciation, their wages, their insurance, their dock charges and light dues, their sh.o.r.e establishments, and the long list which comes under the head of items and accidents, it is unquestionably the duty of the Government to meet this question in a frank and resolute manner, and afford to the people all those necessary facilities which they can get in no other way.

SECTION VIII.

HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY?

WE NEED A STEAM MAIL SYSTEM: HOW OUR LINES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED: AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICY CONTRASTED: SPASMODIC AND ENDURING LEGISLATION: MR. POLK'S ADMINISTRATION ENDEAVORED TO INAUGURATE A POLICY: GEN. RUSK ENDEAVORED TO EXTEND IT: THE TERM OF SERVICE TOO SHORT: COMPANIES SHOULD HAVE LONGER PERIODS: A LEGISLATION OF EXPEDIENTS: MUST SUBSIDIZE PRIVATE COMPANIES FOR A LONG TERM OF YEARS: SHOULD WE GIVE TO OUR POSTAL VESSELS THE NAVAL FEATURE: OUR MAIL LINES GAVE AN IMPULSE TO SHIP-BUILDING: LET US HAVE STEAM MAILS ON THEIR MERITS: NO NAVAL FEATURE SUBTERFUGES: THESE VESSELS HIGHLY USEFUL IN WAR: THEY LIBERALLY SUPPLY THE NAVY WITH EXPERIENCED ENGINEERS WHEN NECESSARY: THE BRITISH MAIL PACKETS GENERALLY FIT FOR WAR SERVICE: LORD CANNING'S REPORT: EXPEDIENTS PROPOSED FOR CARRYING THE MAILS: BY FOREIGN INSTEAD OF AMERICAN VESSELS: DEGRADING EXPEDIENCY AND SUBSERVIENCY: WE CAN NOT SECURE MAIL SERVICE BY GIVING THE GROSS RECEIPTS: THE GENERAL TREASURY SHOULD PAY FOR THE TRANSMARINE POST: REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW CONTRACTS: METHOD OF MAKING CONTRACTS: THE LOWEST BIDDER AND THE LAND SERVICE: THE OCEAN SERVICE VERY DIFFERENT: BUT LITTLE UNDERSTOOD: LOWEST-BIDDER SYSTEM FAILURES: SENATOR RUSK'S OPINION: INJURIOUS EFFECTS OF LOWEST BIDDER: INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS AND RIGHTS.

As it will scarcely be denied that the Government should furnish ample and liberal mail facilities, as well foreign as domestic, to its people, in view of the well-established fact that these facilities can not be attained in any other way, the question naturally arises, how shall the Government discharge this clear and unquestionable duty to the citizen? I trust that it will be admitted that we can not rely on the Sailing-ship mail, or the Naval steam mail, or the Private Enterprise mail; while it is equally evident that we can not depend on the Foreigner's mail, or should not if we could.

A first step toward this important end, and one which every interest of the country demands, is the establishment of a governmental steam mail system, a fixed steam policy, based upon common-sense, and guided by the dictates of justice to the enterprising citizen, at the same time that it is productive of certain efficiency toward the people. It can not be denied that our legislation on this subject has. .h.i.therto been that of expedients, and merely temporary arrangement. We have had no wise, immutable purpose, no great fixed rule of action. We have laid no broad foundations for a system which should extend itself wherever our trade extended, and work equitably with all of the large interests of the American people. When, by a spasmodic effort, we opened communication in one direction, and found that we had a few steamers running, we became self-complacently satisfied with our action, shut our ears to all other equally urgent claims and appeals, forgot that we had simply commenced instead of having finished, and contented ourselves with the appearance of a mail system rather than its realization. When we established the two lines to Europe, which were positively necessary to commerce, it was not so much because those were the only necessary lines, but because they were urged by parties who stood ready to build the ships, and run them in the service. The California lines were established because the people would not longer tolerate the neglect of our large and important interests in the Pacific. But there were several other lines which were of the greatest importance to our commerce and manufactures, extending to fields where we could have established the richest trade, but which never enlisted the attention of Congress, simply because there was no one who made it his special business to press them. This of itself manifested great want of a matured steam mail system, which should operate equally on all of the great interests of the country, and extend its facilities wherever American industry and enterprise could find a footing.

We need not only a steam system, but a fixed steam policy that shall extend from generation to generation, and operate equally, as well at all times and in all fields of American enterprise, as upon all cla.s.ses. No such system can be built up in one year or in ten years; much less by one spasmodic steam effort, even in the right direction, followed by an eternal sleep, or a total indifference. It is the work of ages. It is not a system which, if set in motion, will work on perpetually of itself, without a.s.sistance. It needs constant care and fostering; and its results prove it worthy of all the care and attention that can be expended on it. The mature system of Great Britain has not grown up in a day. It has been constantly before the British public during twenty-four years, and has never been neglected for an hour. There has been no hiatus in it; for this would have disrupted the system, broken the chain, and resulted in disastrous failure. Neither has the one great purpose been changed every few years to suit the caprice of some new cabinet. It was a great cardinal idea, founded in reason and justice, that has gone on maturing from year to year; and none had the hardihood to touch it, or trifle with the people's purpose in establishing it; not even so far as to make it a pa.s.sing text for demagoguery. It composed and yet composes a part of the far-reaching and controlling policy of the British crown; a purpose limited not to the visions of to-day, or the financial crises and panics of to-morrow, or to some new field of British effort, to be developed in a year or two; but limited to that time only, when men shall cease the strife of commerce, abandon the pursuit of wealth, yield the palm of enterprise, and unlearn the love of money and its power. There has been nothing spasmodic in this; nothing fitful, alluring, and evanescent; nothing that held out a hope to the enterprising man, and deceived him in all the essential conditions of its fulfillment in the end. It was founded in reason, founded in necessity; and it was well determined that it should endure.

It is creditable to the administration of President Polk, that there was one effort made in this country to found a similar judicious and fruitful system. We had until that time taken no notice whatever of marine steam navigation; and British steamers swarmed around our coast north and south, thick as cruisers in a blockade. (_See Paper E._) Indeed, it was a veritable blockade of our commerce, and told most disastrously upon our enterprise and independence. The Cabinet of Mr.

Polk, headed by our present venerable Chief Magistrate of the Nation, determined to reverse this system, and did it as effectually as any thing can be accomplished in a country, where a given policy, however wisely inaugurated, has no guaranty or safeguard against the revolutionary changes of new administrations. They established a basis of action, and inaugurated three steam lines under contracts which placed them beyond the attacks of the capricious; well knowing that if the system had merits, they would be manifested to the country within ten years by the fruits of these lines. The period was shorter than that designated by Great Britain; yet with the immensely rapid development of our people it inwrought itself into the affections of the public so effectually, even in this short time, that none will dare risk his reputation by attacking it boldly, or by other means than an indirect and hara.s.sing guerrilla warfare. But here the effort ended, and the system, deprived of the aids and new lines which Congress should have extended it, and of that continued development which was necessary to its perfection and usefulness, has been left to work itself out and die, until it may be resurrected by another great demonstration of public sentiment, and by an administration bold enough and far-seeing enough to grasp the interests of the whole country, and do itself and the people justice. It is due, however, to the reputation of a lamented and departed statesman, the large-minded and n.o.ble Gen. Rusk, of Texas, to say that he made a manly and systematic effort in 1852, after seeing the fruitful workings of the three lines noticed, to extend, enlarge, and fortify the good beginnings of President Polk and Secretary Buchanan, by inaugurating several new lines, and establishing a permanent and recognized basis of action. But in all this he was thwarted by the machinations of narrow-minded men, who deemed it a higher effort to agitate the country and endeavor to separate the North and the South, than establish and secure those mighty aids to industry which should give development, wealth, strength, and security to the whole American Union, and check the fratricidal blow of the disunionist.

It is essential that we shall have in this country a policy on this subject, which shall remain untouched under the changes of administrations, just as standard commercial laws and regulations remain untouched. No system of such magnitude can mature or cheapen when but a few years are a.s.signed to it, and when there is no certainty that it will survive the life of a single ship. Companies undertaking the mail service under such circ.u.mstances must be paid larger sums for their general establishment, that they may be enabled to meet the exigencies and caprices of irregular legislation, which may at the close of their contracts suddenly throw a dozen good ships out of employment. Every well-regulated and efficient company necessarily builds new steamers through all the stages of its existence; and when the term of its service expires, necessarily has several partially new ships. If the term of service is to be short, and if there is no rule by which those who do good service on a line are to have, in renewing contracts, the preference of new and untried parties, then it is reasonable to infer that they can not themselves incur the expense of so large an establishment of new and useless vessels, and that their service is either to be inefficient and unreliable, or that the department must pay a larger price than necessary under a judicious and fixed system. The want of a reliable system operates injuriously both on the department and on the contractors. It subjects us to expedients, and to all of the evils of constant lobbying and legislation on the subject. And one of the first wants of this system is an extension of the term of contracts. The period hitherto a.s.signed has not been long enough for the proper development of the service. The short term is a constant premium for building an inferior cla.s.s of vessels, which shall have become worthless by the time that the contract expires, so as not to entail loss upon the company. Such vessels are ever unfit for the mails or pa.s.sengers. Short terms also keep the subject continually before Congress and the Executive Government, and foster that extensive and depraved lobbying which has wrought so injuriously on our legislation.

Moreover, there is no reason why the term of service should not be extended, when it will certainly simplify and cheapen it, if, as I have a.s.sumed, the progress of engineering is not such as to throw well-built ships out of use within twelve years, or in any way introduce improvements by which the Government could get the service at lower rates. Nor have we any reliable hope for the future. We wait until commerce has been perverted into unnatural channels, and then become suddenly and galvanically aroused, when it is too late to effect a change until two or three years have expired in building ships. We thus find ourselves in the midst of the difficulty without having foreseen it, and without being prepared for it. The wise man planned the campaign before others had even contemplated any disturbance of the peace. As a matter of course he controlled the battle, and brought up the victory in his own way.

The only effectual means of accomplishing the foreign mail service in this country is by liberally subsidizing private companies for a long term of years, such as will induce them to provide first-cla.s.s ships, run them rapidly, and fit them for the most comfortable conveyance of pa.s.sengers. Lord Canning in his Report to both houses of Parliament on the contract packet system in 1853, says, after showing that the naval vessels have been abandoned for the mail service: "There is no peculiarity in this branch of business which renders it an exception to the general rule, that work is done more cheaply by contract than by Government agency." But when the idea of performing the mail service by naval vessels was wholly abandoned in 1837, another question of equal importance arose, as to how far the mail steam packets might be made efficient as vessels of war in times of emergency. As a consequence of the discussion nearly all of the mail contracts made from that day until this by Great Britain contained stipulations requiring the vessels to be capable of carrying an armament, in addition to the requirements of speed and punctuality.

The same thing was done in this country in 1846-7; and one of the princ.i.p.al means of carrying the Collins bill through Congress was the self-deception of making the steamers equivalent to vessels of war. It was a plea to which statesmen and enterprising business men resorted, and was used as a means of securing those commercial facilities which const.i.tutional quibblers would not vote for directly, but which they would afford if allowed the subterfuge of "defenses" as a means of protecting them against a certain set of const.i.tuencies who foolishly opposed the extension of commerce. Many of these would not grant one dollar for the aid of that commerce on which the revenues of the country and their own real prosperity and wealth depended; but they were willing to suffer long and bleed freely at the old and just, though unrenewable war-cry: "The British and the Hessians." Our case was rather different from that of Great Britain which had a large steam navy while we had neither naval nor commercial steamers. There was, consequently, and there yet is, more propriety in demanding a capacity for the naval service in our vessels than in the case of Great Britain.

In obedience to this very proper spirit we produced some of the n.o.blest vessels that ever floated. Stronger vessels than the Collins, Aspinwall, and Pacific Mail Steamers were never built in any country.

And although we have fortunately not been compelled to test their capacity in naval transport or in action, yet there is no doubt that they would do honorable and efficient service in both, and by no means sully the glory of the American colors. The establishment of these and the Havre and Bremen lines, certainly gave an impulse to shipbuilding and the manufacture of steam machinery in this country which could have been given in no other way, and which in a few short years has demonstrated that we are behind no people on earth in capacity for these n.o.ble and difficult arts. And although we are yet but in our infancy in experience, as compared, especially with Great Britain, yet the increasing demand for mail facilities, the necessity for a large war marine, and the rapidly increasing coast steam service, all indicate that we shall require a large amount of this cla.s.s of work and a mechanical skill to which our ingenious countrymen have thus proven themselves entirely adequate. And although it is certainly indispensable that we shall ever be provided adequately against all the exigencies of foreign war, yet it is to be trusted that bold and fearless statesmen will support and extend our steam mail service on the tenable grounds of its necessity to commerce and our citizens at large, and that its productive services will not be obscured by or subordinated to the subterfuges and deceits of the war marine feature.

Let us have steam mail facilities on high and independent grounds, and for their benefits _per se_. The system is abundantly tenable on this ground alone; on this only ground that it will probably ever practically occupy. Let us also have our war marine, efficiently separate, as it should be. Let both systems be perfect, both independent, both mutually conducive to the prosperity and the defense of the country. But there is no doubt that these vessels would do excellent service in a conflict. They could swarm any particular coast with troops in a few days. They could easily run away from dangerous vessels, or pursue and overtake others when necessary. They are alway needed for transport, while the time will probably never again come when mail steamers will not be even more necessary during war than in times of peace. But this is not all. They fit and train a large number of marine engineers who are ever ready at a day's warning to enter efficiently on the naval service. This is a point of greater importance than is generally supposed. Engineers, however skilled in the shops, are wholly unfit for the service at sea until they have had months of experience, and become accustomed to sea-sickness. When one of our first American mail steamers sailed for Europe, no practised marine engineer could be found to work her engines. They took a first-cla.s.s engineer and corps of a.s.sistants from one of the North River packets; but as soon as the ship got to sea, and heavy weather came on, all the engineers and firemen were taken deadly sick, and for three days it was constantly expected that the ship would be lost.

It is abundantly evident from all of the testimony, that most of the mail packets are capable of carrying a handsome armament. Mr. Atherton says to me in his letter: "Many of our ocean steamers are fit for naval service of every description; and they are generally fit for all transport service." The Report of Lord Canning, the British Post Master General, to which I have referred, was made in 1853, in obedience to a Treasury Minute issued by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who directed the Post Master General to form a committee, and report to both houses, on the propriety of continuing and extending the mail steam packet system; as there had been suggestions that the sum expended for the mail service was large. These gentlemen after a lengthy investigation of several months, the examination of a great number of witnesses, and the record of their testimony in shorthand, made their report, accompanied by the evidence in a large volume. At page 5 of the report, in speaking of the requirements for naval efficiency, they say:

"In arranging the terms of these contracts, the Government seized the opportunity of requiring that the vessels should be constructed in a manner that would render them as serviceable for national defense in war as steam-packets belonging to the Crown would have been if employed in their stead. A provision to this effect was first inserted in the contract with the Royal Mail Company in 1840; and in most of the existing contracts stipulations are to be found requiring that the vessel should be of a construction and strength fit to carry such an armament as the Admiralty may think proper. In several cases they must be built of wood and not of iron; and there are some contracts which confer on the Admiralty the right of taking the ships at a valuation when it may be thought desirable to do so.

"Generally speaking, these stipulations have been fulfilled, as appears from a return which has been laid before us by the Surveyor of the Navy, showing the number, tonnage, and power of the vessels constructed by the various companies under contract with the Admiralty for the conveyance of the mails, distinguishing those built of wood from those built of iron, and stating whether the companies have in any cases violated the terms of the contracts, and if so, whether any authority has been given by the Board of Admiralty for the deviation. It results from this return that out of 98 vessels which had been surveyed by the Government officers, one only (the 'Australian') has been reported as incapable of carrying guns if required, and two iron vessels (the 'Levantine' and the 'Petrel') have been accepted instead of wooden vessels, on Mr. Cunard's Halifax and Bermuda line. Two other vessels--one belonging to the Australian Royal Mail Company, and the other to Mr. Macgregor Laird's West Coast of Africa line--had also been accepted (temporarily) by Admiralty authority, although of less tonnage and power than the contracts prescribed.

"The Surveyor's report upon most of these vessels, as regards their fitness for war purposes, is in the following terms: 'Not fitted for armament, but capable of carrying guns when so fitted.'

This report accords with the opinion expressed by the Committee of Naval and Artillery officers upon the vessels which have come under their notice. It appears, however, from the statements of that Committee, that although the packets they have examined are for the most part of sufficient strength to carry and fire a certain number of guns, the expense of the alterations which would be necessary before they could be got ready for service would be very considerable, and that even when such alterations had been made, the efficiency of the vessels would be very small in proportion to their size, and that they could not encounter hostile vessels of equal tonnage without endangering the honor of the British flag.

"With reference to future contracts, we are decidedly of opinion that no expense should be incurred for the sake of imposing conditions for giving a military character to the postal vessels.

We believe the imposition of such conditions to be a measure of false economy. _Should a war suddenly break out, the immediate demand for mail steamers would probably be greater than ever, and it might be exceedingly inconvenient to withdraw them at such a time from their legitimate use for the purpose of arming them for battle._ Moreover, the high charge for the packet service has been borne with the greater readiness, because it has been supposed by some to include a provision of large but unknown amount, for the defense of the country; while on the other hand the Naval Estimates have sometimes been complained of as excessive, on the ground that the force provided for was in addition to the large reserve of postal war steamers. We accordingly recommend that for the future the contracts for the conveyance of the mails should be wholly free from stipulations of the nature we have been describing, though it may be desirable in some cases to retain the power in the Government to take possession of the vessels in the event of national emergency."

Again, in the _resume_, after considering each of the British lines separately, the committee say:

"An erroneous impression appears to have prevailed among the public as to the efficiency of our postal steamers for direct purposes of warfare. We do not believe that those who are charged with the direction of the military affairs of the country have ever regarded them as likely to be of any great service in an engagement; but their advantages as an auxiliary force will be very considerable. They will be available, in the event of the breaking out of hostilities, for the rapid conveyance of dispatches, of specie, and, to a certain extent, of troops and stores. Their speed will be such as probably to secure them from the risk of capture, and will render them highly valuable for procuring intelligence of hostile movements. They may also be expected to furnish the Queen's ships with men trained to steam-navigation, and possessing an amount of local knowledge which can not fail to be valuable in several ways."

We have arrived at about the same conclusions in this country as those presented by the British Post Master General to Parliament in 1853, on this subject. And yet, with our small navy we may at any time need all of our steam packets for actual service, and the Government should always have the right to demand them for transport service. We have abundant evidence that our mail packets are well fitted for carrying an armament, and being highly efficient in war duty. The testimony of Commodore M. C. Perry, Mr. Cunningham, and others, as published in the Special Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is conclusive on this point. They found that they were built with extraordinary strength and of good materials.

Many expedients have been proposed for the transmission of our foreign mails. It is said that the late Post Master General entertained the purpose of paying some of the foreign screw lines to carry the mails, if Congress would permit it; but however all parties disapprove of the contracted policy proposed by that gentleman, I can not believe that he entertained any purpose so unpatriotic, and so subversive of American shipping interests. It is true, however, that, as he frequently said, he would prefer returning to the old packet system, and carrying the mails by sail, if private enterprise could not carry them across the ocean without a subsidy. But it is a consoling reflection that these singular views of that worthy gentleman never anywhere took root in Congress. Certainly there is no reason why this great, and rich, and proud nation should resort, like some little seventh rate power, to expedients in the carriage of our ocean mails.

We are not so poor as to have to live by practices; not so degraded as to be willing to catch at any little thing that may pa.s.s along for resources. We have a teeming prosperity, an abundant wealth, unending resources, and a people everywhere clamorous for liberal expenditures for adequate mails. Why shall we degrade ourselves by depending upon others for our mail facilities? It alway humbles and mortifies me to see one human being lick the hand of another; one who acknowledges himself a stupid drone that must needs have a master to direct and protect him. And so with our nation when she stoops to subserviency and begging, for even so much as the postal charities of other enterprising and commanding nations.

It has been suggested that the Government could secure the transit of the mails on the receipts, taking both ocean and inland postage; and indeed a temporary arrangement was made with two of our contending companies running to Europe, to transport them on these terms; but such arrangements are temporary only, and can not be made the basis of regular action. They would operate most unequally on different lines.

While on the European lines they would pay probably one half the sum of subsidy required, on many other, and especially on new and untried lines, they would not at first pay probably one tenth. And granting that on a given line, the receipts during fifteen years would amount to as much as the whole subsidy required for that time; yet no company could live on them, as for the first few years the receipts from the mail would be very small, while the general income of the line from pa.s.sengers and freight would also be smaller than at any other time.

Moreover, almost every steam company has to borrow money largely during its first years, in antic.i.p.ation of the larger income from increased trade during the last years of its existence. Thus, while the system of the receipts would operate most unequally, the same aggregate sum given in the form of a regular annual subsidy operates as an a.s.surance for the company and keeps it alive. But the postal receipts are not adequate to the support of any ocean line. In the report before cited, the Committee say, at page 5, that the sum of subsidy then paid was 822,390 per annum, whereas the postal receipts were only 443,782, or but a fraction over one half. There is probably no regular service in the world where the postal receipts would pay for the transport, especially where compet.i.tion existed.

In making our contracts common-sense must dictate the lines necessary, and the general treasury should pay for them. There is no good reason why the sums of subsidy to be paid for mail transportation should be chargeable on the Post Office Department. Nor is it really of much consequence where the account is settled, as the general treasury must after all meet the bills. It may create some misapprehension as to the services on which the sums annually voted are bestowed. But the service, whether sea or inland, is alike incapable of sustaining itself, and is alike beneficial to every citizen of the Republic. And as this service so greatly benefits commerce, it is well that it should be paid from the general revenues of the country; from the duties which it creates. At any rate, almost every Post Master General will feel better disposed to subsidize ocean mail steamers adequately if the bills are payable by the treasury department, and not chargeable upon his own.

It would be well in all new contracts that the law of Congress authorizing them should require strength of vessel, a fair dynamic efficiency of performance, water-tight bulkheads for the safety both of the vessel, and pa.s.sengers and mails, and all those other safeguards compatible with speed and mail efficiency. But the most essential point is the mode of making the contracts. We have pursued two system in this country, that of the lowest bidder, and that of Congressional contracts. Some have supposed that as the land mails are submitted to the lowest bidder, so those of the ocean ought to be also. But the cases are very unlike. The land service is a familiar thing, which every farmer understands, because running a wagon is one of the first things in life that he learns. Every body is familiar with the land service, and every body has more or less experimented in it, or in something very similar to it. But it is far otherwise with that of the ocean. Steamshipping is a comparatively new, a very difficult, and a very little understood science. But few who know its difficulties will undertake its hazards. Steam power and its expenses are by no means understood by the people; and the first mistake made by those unacquainted with it is in supposing it much cheaper than it really is. This mistake leads to fatal consequences in bidding for the ocean service, as most of those unacquainted with the business would engage to perform a given service for less than the actual price that it would cost them, and certainly for much less than practical, experienced men would. And herein consists one of the evils of the lowest bidder system, that inexperienced persons taking such contracts either perform them inefficiently, or appeal constantly to Congress for relief, or for increase of their pay. Such cases are exceedingly numerous. Post Master General Campbell said that the lowest bidder system was "a nuisance." Senator Mallory declared in a debate about the close of the last Congress, that it was a system which never wrought efficiently, which never gave final satisfaction, and which generally brought in a set of adventurers. The department and members of Congress had experienced the annoyance and inefficiency of the system in the contract for carrying the mails between Key West and New-Orleans through the Gulf. It was several times given to the lowest bidder, and as often fell through; being finally awarded by private arrangement to other parties, at more than double the prices of the lowest bidders.

In the elaborate Report made in 1852 to the Senate by Gen. Rusk, as Chairman of the Committee on the _Post Office and Post Roads_, of which Messrs. Soule, Hamlin, Upham, and Morton were members, in speaking on this subject the Committee said:

"Contracts to carry the ocean mail should, like all other contracts made by the Government, be the subjects of a fair compet.i.tion, and granted with reference to the public good, due regard being had to the excellence of the proposals made, under all the circ.u.mstances of the cases which may present themselves.

Your committee are aware that it has been too much the practice to regard the _lowest_ as the _cheapest_ bid; but experience has taught them that _lowness of price_ and _cheapness in the end_, are not convertible terms, as the daily applications, from _low bidders_, to Congress for indemnity against losses incurred in the public service, will amply demonstrate. For examples of the kind the committee would respectfully refer to the numerous applications for remuneration, in connection with the public printing, which have for years past occupied the time and attention of Congress, and threaten to continue to do so to a most alarming extent, involving, in the end, an acc.u.mulation of expense infinitely beyond the cost that would have attended the performance of the work, at a fair and liberal compensation. This may be, by some, called economy, but it is the very worst sort of economy. It excludes the honest workman, who knows the real value of the service to be performed, and is unwilling to undertake to do his duty well, at the expense of himself and family; while it lets in the needy and greedy speculator who, having nothing to lose in point of character or money, will readily undertake what he can not perform, and become dependent upon the magnanimity of Congress for remuneration for his losses, real or fict.i.tious. An honest and fair liberality should characterize the dealings between the Government and individuals, just as much as those between private citizens; and, when contracts are made, they should be entered into in the spirit of good faith, and with a full knowledge of the risks to be run, and the expenses to be incurred."

It is claimed on the other hand that in contracts made by Congress the two Committees have every opportunity of testing the value of the service to be performed, of ascertaining the sum of subsidy really necessary to its support, of giving to every applicant a fair and impartial hearing, and of presenting to Congress any case of doubt and difficulty, or of contested right. When the committees take any line into consideration it is in effect inviting compet.i.tion and proposals from every one else than the projector who supposes that he has better claims to it, or can perform the service at cheaper rates.

Such proceedings are always open and advertised to the world for months and sometimes for years. And there are many persons who will come forward and make a low bid for a service after some one else has brought it to the attention of the Government and labored it through Congress, who would not turn their fingers over, or risk a dollar in bringing it before the nation, and securing for it a due consideration. These are the adventurers who never produce any thing themselves by a legitimate and honest effort, but who alway stand back to take the chances of wresting from some enterprising, more far-seeing, and more industrious person the fruits of the toil perhaps of years. There are many enterprises in which the public have taken no interest because ignorant of the facts. Some enterprising individual goes zealously to work, travels thousands and tens of thousands of miles, ascertains all of the facts bearing upon the question, determines its feasibility or its impracticability, spends years of time and toil, and many thousands of dollars of money, indoctrinates the people of his country with the new and interesting facts, travels, writes, labors day and night for years, finally secures the attention of the Government and Congress, and asks a fair and reasonable compensation for the necessary service which he proposes performing for the public. He has contended with every species of opposition, overcome unwonted embarra.s.sments, foiled the machinations of selfish, interested parties who would through all time mislead the public if they could but continue a monopoly of trade, and finally succeeded in getting a bill through Congress for the establishment of the long-sought line.

This done, he supposes that he is of course to be rewarded for the effort, the toil, and the expenditure of years, and that he will have an opportunity of indemnifying himself for his losses and sacrifices.

He hears many beautiful apostrophes to the principles of equal justice and right which are said to characterize the legislation of his country, and control the action of the Government; but he is not prepared to hear that some adventurer has carried off his prize simply because by chance or by concert he has made his bid one thousand or ten thousand dollars lower than the prime projector. He becomes disheartened; finds that the country neither appreciates nor desires honorable effort and enterprise; that it will not reward the citizen in his self-sacrificing attempts to benefit the country and himself together; and that it will look on with careless indifference while his almost vested, his equitably vested rights, are neglected or stricken down. This is certainly one of the practical and demoralizing effects of the lowest bidder system, which respects no rights, however sacred, simply because based upon a dogma which is technically true.

The system of the lowest bidder is technically correct, but practically wrong. It can not be carried out in practice without abandoning equity and honest rights under the plea of technicalities and the action of chances. It is in reality but a species of gambling, a miserable lottery, in which those who are most honest and truthful are invariably sacrificed. It is proper, then that Congress should not only establish the postal routes, but also determine either specifically or proximately the compensation to be paid; or leave this entirely to the discretion and the largest liberty of action of the Post Master General. Responsibility must attach somewhere if justice is obtained. With the lowest bidder system it rests and operates nowhere; and the most important operations of the Government are taken out of the hands of a wise public functionary and the intelligent legislators of the country, and put into a great wheel of fortune, where the proper person has, probably, but one chance in a hundred.

This although true in every case of contract, is eminently so in cases of untried lines, where the experiment is to be made, and where it is generally necessary that an individual shall have spent years in bringing it to light.

I come to the conclusion, therefore, that the Government can discharge the clear and unquestionable duty of affording liberal mail facilities to the people, only by establishing all of the lines which the commerce and convenience of the country and the Government require; by maintaining them as a fixed policy of the country from generation to generation; by encouraging enterprising companies to continue well-performed services, and enterprising citizens to open new avenues of trade and wealth; and by paying for the same from the general treasury of the people, and from the revenues which these postal facilities, more than any other series of influences, conspire to produce and to conserve. (_See Report of Lord Canning, Section IX.: also Report of Gen. Rusk, Paper E: also remarks of Hon. Edwin Croswell, Paper E._)

SECTION IX.

THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.

STEAM MAIL SYSTEM INAUGURATED AS THE PROMOTER OF WEALTH, POWER, AND CIVILIZATION: THE EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM ON COMMERCE: THE LONG PERIOD DESIGNATED FOR THE EXPERIMENT: NEW LINES, WHEN, HOW, AND WHY ESTABLISHED: THE WORKINGS OF THE SYSTEM: FIRST CONTRACT MADE IN 1833, LIVERPOOL AND ISLE OF MAN: WITH ROTTERDAM IN 1834: FALMOUTH AND GIBRALTAR, 1837; ABERDEEN, SHETLAND, AND ORKNEYS, 1840: THE "SAVANNAH," THE FIRST OCEAN STEAMER: THE SIRIUS AND GREAT WESTERN: CUNARD CONTRACT MADE IN 1839: EXTRA PAY "WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS:" MALTA, ALEXANDRIA, SUEZ, EAST-INDIES, AND CHINA IN 1840: THE PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY: WEST-INDIA SERVICE ESTABLISHED IN 1840: POINTS TOUCHED AT: PROVISIONAL EXTRA PAY: PANAMA AND VALPARAISO LINE ESTABLISHED IN 1845: HOLYHEAD AND KINGSTON IN 1848: ALSO THE CHANNEL ISLANDS: WEST COAST OF AFRICA AND CAPE OF GOOD HOPE IN 1852: CALCUTTA VIA THE CAPE IN 1852, AND ABANDONED: PLYMOUTH, SYDNEY, AND NEW SOUTH WALES ALSO IN 1852, AND ABANDONED: INVESTIGATION OF 1851 AND 1853, AND NEW AUSTRALIAN CONTRACT IN 1856: HALIFAX, NEWFOUNDLAND, BERMUDA, AND ST. THOMAS IN 1850: NEW-YORK AND BERMUDA SOON DISCONTINUED: COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN SUBSIDIES, RATES PER MILE, TOTAL DISTANCES, AND POSTAL INCOME: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PAYS HIGHER SUBSIDIES THAN THE AMERICAN: WORKINGS AND INCREASE OF THE BRITISH SERVICE: GEN. RUSK'S VIEWS: SPEECH OF HON. T. B. KING: COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION, 1849: NEW INVESTIGATION ORDERED IN 1853, AND INSTRUCTIONS: LORD CANNING'S REPORT AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS: GREAT BRITAIN WILL NOT ABANDON HER MAIL SYSTEM: THE NEW AUSTRALIAN LINE: TESTIMONY OF ATHERTON AND MURRAY: MANY EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT: STEAM INDISPENSABLE: NOT SELF-SUPPORTING: THE MAIL RECEIPTS WILL NOT PAY FOR IT: RESULT OF THE WHOLE SYSTEM: ANOTHER NEW SERVICE TO INDIA AND CHINA: SHALL WE RUN THE POSTAL AND COMMERCIAL RACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN? CANADA AND THE INDIES.

It is admitted that it is the clear and unquestionable duty of the Government to establish ample foreign mail facilities for the nation, and that the only means of accomplishing this is by guaranteeing a liberal allowance for a long term of years for the transport of the mails, and paying for the same from the general treasury of the country. We will, therefore, now examine the British ocean steam mail system, and shall see that the practice of that great nation fully corroborates and sustains the views which have been advanced in the preceding chapters.

The steamship policy of that nation has not been treated as a matter of slight or secondary importance. British statesmen from the earliest days of the development of marine steam power saw the influence which it was likely to exert in the revolutions of commerce and the control of the nations of the world, and determined, with the sagacious foresight and the firm, fixed purpose for which they are distinguished, that it should be at once inaugurated as the great instrument of individual wealth and national power. They properly conceived that the nation which used this transforming agent most freely in commerce, defenses and diplomacy would unquestionably exert a high controlling influence over the nations of the earth, and make every land tributary to its wealth and power. The end justifies the effort, and the few temporary sacrifices and insignificant expenditures which have been made. The British nation launched at once into an extended foreign mail system which has been twenty years maturing and untouched, and which, on a small annual expenditure, has given it the profitable control of every trade and every market on the face of the globe. It was wisely conceded that a long period would be necessary to make the great experiment of marine steam mails, and that term was granted in the outset. When the first term of twelve years had ended, the contracts were renewed for another term of twelve years, in every instance with the companies first authorized, and the sums of subsidy were in every case increased. Not only thus. New lines were established all along the course of these experiments, in a quiet executive way, without agitation, without lobbying, without corruption, just as the Post Master General would put some short and necessary land route into operation. The last of these lines established was that in 1856, between Southampton and Australia for seven years, at an annual subsidy of 185,000, or $925,000. And this line was established, not because there was no postal communication; for the Government already had a semi-monthly line to China, India, and Australia, and another around Africa; but because the increased demands of British trade, and convenience to the British public, made it necessary.

During all of this time the system has operated with unbroken regularity. Established on a great general principle, as well as the highest possible expediency, it has been regarded as a fixed policy of the Government and the people, and has been suffered to do its excellent work quietly and undisturbed. The legislation introducing it was not an accident. It was not a spasm of generosity to the people; but it was a fixed purpose of the British public; the wise and only adequate means adapted to accomplish an important, an indispensable end. The first contract for carrying the mails in steamers, was made by the Post Master General in 1833, with the "Mona Isle Steam Company," to run semi-weekly between Liverpool and the Isle of Man at 850 per annum. This Company has run the line ever since, a period of twenty-four years, and at the same price per annum. After this, a contract was made in 1834 with the "General Steam Navigation Company,"

for the semi-weekly conveyance of the mails between London and Rotterdam, and London and Hamburg, at 17,000 per year. The contract was not annulled until 1853, nineteen years, when it was found best to send the mail by a new route; that is, to Ostend, and over the railways of Belgium. The first contract for a long voyage was made with Richard Bourne, in 1837, to convey the mails weekly from Falmouth to Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, for 29,600 per annum.