New York Times Current History The European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 Part 1

The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915.

by Various.

In the Supreme Court of Civilization

Argued by James M. Beck.

THE NEW YORK TIMES _submitted the evidence contained in the official "White Paper" of Great Britain, the "Orange Paper" of Russia, and the "Gray Paper" of Belgium to James M. Beck, late a.s.sistant Attorney General of the United States and a leader of the New York bar, who has argued many of the most important cases before the Supreme Court. On this evidence Mr. Beck has argued in the following article the case of Dual Alliance vs. Triple Entente. It has been widely circulated in France and Great Britain._

Let us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, Nineteen Hundred and Fourteen, there had existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a Supreme Court of Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could litigate their differences without resort to the iniquitous and less effective appeal to the arbitrament of arms.

Let us further suppose that each of the contending nations had a sufficient leaven of Christianity to have its grievances adjudged not by the ethics of the cannon or the rifle, but by the eternal criterion of justice.

What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?

Any discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must start with the a.s.sumption that there is an international morality.

This fundamental axiom, upon which the entire basis of civilization necessarily rests, is challenged by a small cla.s.s of intellectual perverts.

Some hold that moral considerations must be subordinated either to military necessity or so-called manifest destiny. This is the Bernhardi doctrine.

Others teach that war is a beneficent fatality and that all nations engaged in it are therefore equally justified. On this theory all of the now contending nations are but victims of an irresistible current of events, and the highest duty of the State is to prepare itself for the systematic extermination, when necessary or expedient, of its neighbors.

Notwithstanding the clever plat.i.tudes under which both these doctrines are veiled, all morally sane minds are agreed that this war is a great crime against civilization, and the only open question is, which of the two contending groups of powers is morally responsible for that crime?

Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?

Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?

Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?

As the last of these questions is the most easily disposed of, it may be considered first.

England's Justification.

England's justification rests upon the solemn Treaty of 1839, whereby Prussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia "became the guarantors" of the "perpetual neutrality" of Belgium, as reaffirmed by Count Bismarck, then Chancellor of the North German Confederation, on July 22, 1870, and as even more recently reaffirmed in the striking fact disclosed in the Belgian "Gray Book."

In the Spring of 1913 a debate was in progress in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag with reference to the Military Budget. In the course of the debate the German Secretary of State said:

"The neutrality of Belgium is determined by international conventions, _and Germany is resolved to respect these conventions_."

To confirm this solemn a.s.surance, the Minister of War added in the same debate:

"Belgium does not play any part in the justification of the German scheme of military reorganization. The scheme is justified by the position of matters in the East. _Germany will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties._"

A year later, on July 31, 1914, Herr von Below, the German Minister at Brussels, a.s.sured the Belgian Department of State that he knew of a declaration which the German Chancellor had made in 1911, to the effect "that Germany had no intention of violating our neutrality," and "that he was certain that the sentiments to which expression was given at that time _had not changed_." (See Belgian "Gray Book," Nos. 11 and 12.)

Apart from these treaty stipulations, which are only declaration of Belgium's rights as sovereign nations, The Hague Conference, in which forty-four nations (including Germany) partic.i.p.ated, reaffirmed as an axiom of international law the inherent right of a nation to the sanct.i.ty of its territory.

It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these solemn obligations and protestations, when the present Chancellor of the German Empire, in his speech to the Reichstag and to the world on Aug. 4, 1914, frankly admitted that the action of the German military machine in invading Belgium was a wrong. He said:

"We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. _Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law._ It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. _The wrong--I speak openly--that we are committing_ we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought--how he is to hack his way through."

This defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a plea of "Guilty" at the bar of the world. It has one merit, that it does not add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy. It virtually rests the case of Germany upon the gospel of Treitschke and Bernhardi, that each nation is justified in exerting its physical power to the utmost in defense of its selfish interests and without any regard to considerations of conventional morality. Might as between nations is the sole criterion of right. There is no novelty in this gospel. Its only surprising feature is its revival in the twentieth century. It was taught far more effectively by Machiavelli in his treatise, "The Prince," wherein he glorified the policy of Cesare Borgia in trampling the weaker States of Italy under foot by ruthless terrorism, unbridled ferocity, and the basest deception. Indeed, the wanton destruction of Belgium is simply Borgiaism amplified ten-thousandfold by the mechanical resources of modern war.

This Answer Cannot Satisfy.

Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of barbarism; unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and the conscience of the cannon; unless mankind after uncounted centuries has made no real advance in political morality beyond that of the cave dweller, then this answer of Germany cannot satisfy the "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." Germany's contention that a treaty of peace is "a sc.r.a.p of paper," to be disregarded at will when required by the selfish interests of one contracting party, is the negation of all that civilization stands for.

Belgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of any offense, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its voluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality will "plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep d.a.m.nation of its taking off." On that issue the Supreme Court could have no ground for doubt or hesitation. Its judgment would be speedy and inexorable.

The remaining two issues, above referred to, are not so simple.

Primarily and perhaps exclusively, the ethical question turns upon the issues raised by the communications which pa.s.sed between the various Chancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, for it is the amazing feature of this greatest of all wars that it was precipitated by diplomats and rulers, and, a.s.suming that all these statesmen sincerely desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian ultimatum, (which is by no means clear,) it was the result of ineffective diplomacy and clumsy diplomacy at that.

I quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a war and the anterior and more fundamental causes; nevertheless, with the world in a state of Summer peace on July 23, 1914, an issue, gravely affecting the integrity of nations and the balance of power in Europe, is suddenly precipitated by the Austrian ultimatum, and thereafter and for the s.p.a.ce of about a week a series of diplomatic communications pa.s.sed between the Chancelleries of Europe, designed on their face to prevent a war and yet so ineffective that the war is precipitated and the fearful Rubicon crossed before the world knew, except imperfectly, the nature of the differences between the Governments involved. The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the record that has been made up by the official communications which can, therefore, be treated as doc.u.mentary evidence in a litigated case.

A substantial part of that record is already before the court of public opinion in the British and German "White Papers," the Russian "Orange Paper," and the Belgian "Gray Paper," and the purpose of this article is to discuss what judgment an impartial and dispa.s.sionate court would render upon the issues thus raised and the evidence thus submitted.

Primarily such a court would be deeply impressed not only by what the record as thus made up discloses, _but also by the significant omissions of doc.u.ments known to be in existence_.

The official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit all of the doc.u.ments in their possession, _but the German "White Paper" on its face discloses the suppression of doc.u.ments of vital importance, while Austria has as yet failed to submit any of the doc.u.mentary evidence in its possession_.

We know from the German "White Paper"--even if we did not conclude as a matter of irresistible inference--that many important communications pa.s.sed in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is probable that some communications must also have pa.s.sed between those two countries and Italy. Italy, despite its embarra.s.sing position, owes to the world the duty of a full disclosure. What such disclosure would probably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion that her allies had commenced an _aggressive_ war, which released her from any obligation under the Triple Alliance.

The fact that communications pa.s.sed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture.

Germany admits and a.s.serts as part of her defense that she faithfully exercised her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is such mediatory influence not disclosed by any practical results of such mediation, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna.

Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations,"

"we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the _utmost_ and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy."

[German "White Paper."]

This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office in giving other diplomatic doc.u.ments had only added the _text_ of the advice which it thus gave Vienna.

The same significant omission will be found when the same official defense states that on July 29 the German Government advised Austria "to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof." But here again _the text_ is not found among the doc.u.ments which the German Foreign Office has given to the world. The communications, which pa.s.sed between that office and its Amba.s.sadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given _in extenso_, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German official defense it is most significant that not a single communication is given of the many which pa.s.sed from Berlin to Vienna and only two that pa.s.sed from Vienna to Berlin.

This cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them.

Until Germany is willing to put the most important doc.u.ments in its possession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world, remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of Germany's mediatory efforts.

Austria's Case Against Servia.

To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Servia would take us outside the doc.u.mentary record and into the realm of disputed facts and would expand this discussion far beyond reasonable length.