New York Times Current History The European War From The Beginning To March Part 21

OPPOSITION CONCURS.

a.s.sent of Bonar Law, Leader of the British Opposition, and of Sir Edward Carson, July 30.

As the Prime Minister has informed the House, it is with our concurrence that he has made the suggestion which we have just heard. At a moment like the present, when even those of us who do not share diplomatic secrets feel that the statement of the Prime Minister is true, that peace and war may be trembling in the balance, I think it is of the utmost importance that it should be made plain to every one that, whatever our domestic differences may be, they do not prevent us from presenting a united front in the councils of the world. I am obliged to the Prime Minister for saying that in the meantime party controversial business will not be taken. I am sure that it is his intention, as it would be the wish of the whole House, that this postponement will not in any way prejudice the interests of any of the parties to the controversy. I should like to add--and I do so, not to give information to the House, the members of which quite understand the position, but in order that it may be plain outside that in what I have now said I speak not only, so far as I am ent.i.tled to speak, for the Unionist Party, but for Ulster--that in what I have just said I have the concurrence of my right honorable friend the member for Trinity College [Sir Edward Carson].

PEACE THE GREAT OBJECT.

Statement by Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons, July 30.

I regret that I cannot say the situation is less grave than it was yesterday. The outstanding facts are much the same. Austria has begun war against Servia. Russia has ordered a partial mobilization. This has not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other powers, so far as our information goes. We continue to pursue the one great object of preserving European peace, and for this purpose we are keeping in close touch with other powers. In thus keeping in touch we have, I am glad to say, had no difficulty so far; though it has not been possible for the powers to unite in diplomatic action as was proposed on Monday.

RUSSIA'S MOBILIZATION.

Statement in House of Commons by Prime Minister Asquith, Aug. 1.

We have just heard, not from St. Petersburg but from Germany, that Russia has proclaimed a general mobilization of her army and fleet, and in consequence of this martial law is to be proclaimed in Germany.

We understand this to mean that mobilization will follow in Germany if the Russian mobilization is general and is proceeded with.

In these circ.u.mstances I should prefer not to answer any further question until Monday.

THE GERMAN INVASION.

Editorial Article of The London Times, Aug. 3.

The die is cast. The great European struggle which the nations have so long struggled to avert has begun. Germany declared war upon Russia on Sat.u.r.day evening, and yesterday her troops entered Luxemburg and crossed the French frontier in Lorraine without any declaration at all. It is idle to dwell upon events such as these. They speak for themselves in a fashion which all can understand. They mean that Europe is to be the scene of the most terrible war that she has witnessed since the fall of the Roman Empire. The losses in human life and in the acc.u.mulated wealth of generations which such a contest must involve are frightful to think on. That it should have come about despite the zealous efforts of diplomacy, and against the wishes of almost all the nations whom it is destined to afflict, is a grim satire upon the professions of peace yet fresh upon the lips of those who have plunged the Continent into its miseries and its calamities. The blame must fall mainly upon Germany.

She could have stayed the plague had she chosen to speak in Vienna as she speaks when she is in earnest. She has not chosen to do so. She has preferred to make demands in St. Petersburg and in Paris which no Government could entertain, and to defeat by irrevocable acts the last efforts of this country and of others for mediation. She has lived up to the worst principles of the Frederician tradition--the tradition which disregards all obligations of right and wrong at the bidding of immediate self-interest. She believes that her admirable military organization has enabled her to steal a march upon her rivals. She has been mobilizing in all but name, while their mobilization has been r.e.t.a.r.ded by the "conversations" she continued until her moment had come.

Then she flung the mask aside. While her Amba.s.sador was still in Paris, while by the customs traditional with all civilized peoples she was still at peace with France, she has sent her soldiers into Luxemburg, and invaded the territory of the republic. It is hard to say which of these acts is the grosser infringement of public right. With Luxemburg she makes no pretense of quarrel. She is herself a party to the guarantee of its neutrality contained in the Treaty of 1867. The other guarantors are Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, and the Netherlands. She solemnly pledged herself with some of them, including France and ourselves, to respect this neutrality. The world sees how Germany keeps her word. She has been weak enough, or cynical enough, to issue an explanation of her breach of faith. Let Englishmen, who have been disposed to trust her, judge it for themselves. She has not, she says, committed a hostile act by crossing the frontiers, by forcibly seizing the Government offices, and by forcibly interrupting the telephonic communication. These are merely measures to protect the railways from a possible attack by the French.

For the sudden invasion of France no excuse has yet been published. When it comes it will doubtless be of about equal worth.

The whole situation has been revolutionized by the events of yesterday.

The doubts which many of us tried hard to cherish as to Germany's real intentions have been dispelled by her high-handed contempt for public law. The Government and the nation now realize that she has been bent on a European war--a European war to be waged in the first instance against France, and through at least one of those neutral States whose safety we have bound ourselves to defend because it is indispensable to our own.

The Cabinet, which has been sitting almost uninterruptedly since Sat.u.r.day morning, reached a decision at an early hour yesterday, which shows that they know what is before us. They have called up the Naval Reserves. They would not have taken this step had they not felt that in this quarrel our interests are now directly at stake. After the example of what Germany has done in Luxemburg and on the French border we can no longer rely upon the presence of her Amba.s.sador as a security against some sudden surprise. We have no controversy with her, it is true. We have been willing and anxious to develop those better relations with her which had of late sprung up. We were eager to work with her for mediation and for peace. Now she has shown her hand. She is resolved to crush France, and to trample upon the rights of those who happen to stand in her way. Yesterday it was Luxemburg. Today it may be Belgium or Holland, or she may treat us as she has treated our French friends, and a.s.sail us without a declaration of war. She will find the empire ready.

Here at home and in the far-off dominions the sure instinct of our peoples teaches them that the ruin of France or of the Low Countries would be the prelude to our own. We can no more tolerate a German hegemony in Europe than we can tolerate the hegemony of any other power.

As our fathers fought Spain and France in the days of their greatest strength to defeat their pretense to Continental supremacy, and their menace to the narrow seas, which are the bulwark of our independence, so shall we be ready, with the same unanimity and the same stubborn tenacity of purpose, to fight any other nation which shows by her acts that she is advancing a like claim and confronting us with a like threat. If any individual member of the Cabinet dissents from this view, the sooner he quits the Government the better. Mr. Asquith may find it no disadvantage to take fresh blood into his Administration, as M.

Viviani has undoubtedly strengthened the French Government by the admission of M. Delca.s.se and M. Clemenceau. The controversy between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that between Austria-Hungary and Russia, have pa.s.sed away from the eyes of the nation. These are fixed on the German attack upon the French Republic and upon Luxemburg. In that conflict the nation know their duty. With the blessing of Heaven they will do it to the uttermost.

PEACE OF EUROPE CANNOT BE PRESERVED.

Sir Edward Grey's Speech in House of Commons, Aug. 3.

Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. Today events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of his Majesty's Government I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our att.i.tude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all, let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as his Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the great powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labor and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition--at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell--to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the great powers generally are concerned is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which powers were most in favor of peace, which were most disposed to risk war or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honor, and British obligations, free from all pa.s.sion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace, and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have a.s.sured the House--and the Prime Minister has a.s.sured the House more than once--that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British att.i.tude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honor upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple Entente, for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an alliance--it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis--also a Balkan crisis--originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support--up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to his Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I--spending three days a week in my const.i.tuency and three days at the Foreign Office--was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco--a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides--that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Amba.s.sador and the German Amba.s.sador at the time. I made no promise and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which pa.s.sed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer.

That was the most I could do, and they authorized that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on--I think much later on, because that crisis pa.s.sed, and the thing ceased to be of importance--but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.