New York Times Current History The European War From The Beginning To March Part 12

IV.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

The highest representatives of the German Empire with emphatic seriousness declared that it was with a heavy heart and only following the law of self-preservation that they decided to violate the neutrality of the Kingdom of Belgium, guaranteed by the great powers in the treaties of 1831 and 1839.

The German Secretary of State on Aug. 4 informed the English Government through the emba.s.sy in London that Germany intended to retain no Belgian territory, and added:

Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned, according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being with her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.--(British "White Paper" No. 157.)

In answer Grey caused the English Amba.s.sador in Berlin to demand his pa.s.sports and to tell the German Government that England would take all steps for defense of Belgian neutrality. This, therefore, represents, in the view which very cleverly has been spread broadcast by British publicity, the real reason for the war. But in spite of the moral indignation that is apparent against Germany, the consideration for Belgium, up until very late, does not seem in any way to have been in the foreground. We find on July 31 Grey stated to Cambon:

The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important, factor in determining our att.i.tude.--(British "White Paper" No. 119.)

Here, therefore, there was no talk about England grasping the sword on account of Belgium. Now no one will claim that the a.s.sumption that the German troops could march through Belgium would be new or unheard of.

For years this possibility had been discussed in military literature.[04]

This expression on the part of the historical Faculty is very interesting. It shows that a plan of campaign between the English and French had long been considered, and that the Belgian entry into the alliance against Germany was a matter agreed upon.

A Sudden Decision.

It must also be a.s.sumed that the Belgian Government knew toward the end of July at the latest that the war between Germany and France was probable and the march of Germans through Belgium very possible.

If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it may be a.s.sumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the marching through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest. In doing so the Belgian people would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood.

On Aug. 3 the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help by France as follows:

We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circ.u.mstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think necessary to take.--(British "White Paper" No. 151.)

One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of the war against Germany before the eyes of the world. The Amba.s.sador in Brussels received the following orders:

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in their power and that his Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France.--(British "White Paper" No. 155.)

Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break loose against Germany. Without the intervention of England in Brussels the events in Belgium, one may safely a.s.sert, would have taken an entirely different course, which would have been far more favorable to Belgium.

But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war against Germany. Even on the 31st of July Grey had spoken of the violation of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor. On Aug. 1 he declined to promise Prince Lichnowsky England's neutrality, even if Germany would not violate Belgium's neutrality. On Aug. 4, however, the Belgian question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain the moral fabric of the world and to draw the sword.

This suddenly became the new development, which was still lacking for Grey in order to justify this war before public opinion in England.

Another English Advantage.

And something else was secured by the drawing of Belgium into the war by the British Government, which had decided to make war on Germany for entirely different reasons: the thankful part of the protector of the weak and the oppressed.

As an English diplomat, when Russia was mobilizing, openly stated, the interests of his country in Servia were nil, so for Grey even Belgium, immediately before the break with Germany, was not decisive. However, when England had irrevocably decided to enter the war it stepped out before the limelight of the world as the champion of--the small nations.

[02] Recently a book ent.i.tled "Why We Make War," in defense of Great Britain, appeared at Oxford, as the authors of which "Members of the Faculty for Modern History in Oxford" are mentioned. This work undertakes, on the ground of the official publications, to whitewash Grey's policy, and of course incidentally the Russian policy. All together this publication, parading in the gown of science, is contradicted by our own presentation of the facts; it may be mentioned also that this work contains in part positive untruths. Thus it states on Page 70 (retranslation):

No diplomatic pressure whatever was exerted [by Germany] on Vienna, which, under the protection of Berlin, was permitted to do with Servia as she liked.

Grey's own words contradict this a.s.sertion.

[03] In the aforementioned book of the Oxford historians there is stated on Page 69 (retranslation):

This mediation [namely, Grey's mediation proposition] had already been accepted, by Russia on July 25th.

We have shown in the foregoing that the Russian Government did in no manner subscribe to the conference plan in binding terms. As an additional proof, a part of Buchanan's dispatch of the 25th may be mentioned:

He [Sazonof] would like to see the question placed on international footing.... If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It would be possible in his opinion that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.--(British "White Paper" No. 17.)

Hence, not if England, but only if Servia would propose arbitration by the powers, Mr. Sazonof was willing! The most amusing part of this is that the Russian Minister himself considers such a proposition on the part of Servia merely as "possible"; evidently it would have appeared as a great condescension on the part of the Government at Belgrade if it, standing on the same basis as Austria-Hungary, would appear before a European tribunal! For us there is no additional proof necessary that a mediation conference, which for Austria was not acceptable even when proposed by England, would be unthinkable if the move for such came from Servia. In expressing such an idea. Mr. Sazonof proved that it was his intention to bring war about.

[04] The book, which appeared at Oxford, "Why We Are at War," mentioned previously states on Page 27 (retranslation):

That such a plan [the marching through Luxemburg and Belgium] had been taken into consideration by the Germans has been known in England generally for several years; and it has also been generally accepted that the attempt to carry out this plan would bring about the active resistance of the British armed forces: one a.s.sumed that these would be given the task of a.s.sisting the left wing of the French, which would have to resist German advance from Belgian territory.

"Truth About Germany"

Attested by Thirty-four German Dignitaries.[05]

Board of Editors.

Paul Dehn, Schriftsteller, Berlin.