New York Times Current History The European War From The Beginning To March Part 8

I.

THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION.

In a public speech, delivered Sept. 19, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lloyd George, according to the report of The Westminster Gazette, which may be considered as his organ, characterized the quarrel between Germany and Russia in the picturesque manner which this statesman prefers, as follows:

GERMANY--I insist that you stand aside with crossed arms while Austria strangles your little brother, (Servia.)

RUSSIA--Just you touch this little fellow and I will tear your ramshackle empire limb from limb.

We will not waste words in considering the flippant form here used in a discussion of an unspeakably b.l.o.o.d.y and world-historic conflict. But this expression in very pregnant form makes Russia appear in the light in which the London powers-that-be desire to show the empire of the Czar to the British people, viz., in the role of the n.o.ble-hearted protector of persecuted innocence, while Germany, supporting and egging on Austria-Hungary, is shown as morally responsible for the war.

Cites English Doc.u.ments.

This, also, is the chain of thought in the speech of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on Aug. 4. Translations of this speech have been spread by the British Government in neutral countries in hundreds of thousands of copies under the t.i.tle: "The Power Responsible for War Is Germany."

Now, we claim that the British "White Paper" itself furnishes irrefutable proof that not Germany, which up to the last moment offered the hand of mediation, but Russia is responsible for the war, and that the Foreign Office at London was fully cognizant of this fact.

Furthermore, the "White Paper" shows that England's claim that she entered this war solely as a protector of the small nations is a fable.

The doc.u.ments reproduced in the "White Paper" do not begin until July 20, and only a few introductory dispatches before the 24th are given.

The first of the very important reports of the British Amba.s.sador at St.

Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, to the Secretary of State, Grey, is dated on that day; on the same day the note addressed by Austria-Hungary to the Servian Government had been brought to the knowledge of the European Cabinets, and the British Amba.s.sador conferred with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, over this matter. The French Minister also took part in this conference. When the latter and M.

Sazonof, in the most insistent way, tried to prove to Buchanan that England, together with Russia and France, must a.s.sume a threatening att.i.tude toward Austria-Hungary and Germany, the British Amba.s.sador replied:

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.--(British "White Paper" No. 6.)

The British Amba.s.sador thereupon asked the question whether Russia was thinking of eventually declaring war on Austria. The following was the answer:

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question....

The dispatch continues:

French Amba.s.sador and M. Sazonof both continue to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments.... (British "White Paper" No. 6.)

This shows plainly that the Russian mobilization must have been planned even before July 24, for otherwise M. Sazonof could not have spoken of the necessity of carrying it through.

It is furthermore very remarkable that the Russian Minister on this early day spoke of the mobilization in general and not of the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary.

Finally we find that the British Government was fully informed at the very latest on July 24--it may have had before it previous doc.u.ments, but they are not contained in the "White Paper"--concerning Russian mobilization and thereby the development of Russian and French politics that had to be antic.i.p.ated.

Russian Aggression.

Had there been any doubts concerning these matters on the part of the British Government, the continual urging of Russian and French diplomatists must have made things plain. Russia's aggressive policy, and not the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, which did not come until five days later, led to the European war. Servia meant so little to England, although England traditionally poses as a protector of small nations, that the British Amba.s.sador in St. Petersburg was able to describe England's interest in the kingdom on the Save as "nil." Only later, after the beginning of the war, England warmed up to Servia, and in the aforementioned speech Mr. Lloyd George found the most hearty tones in speaking of the heroic fight of this "little nation," although he was obliged to admit simultaneously that its' history is not untainted.

On the day following that conversation, on July 25, the British Amba.s.sador had another talk with M. Sasonof, during the course of which he felt obliged to express to the Russian Government a serious warning concerning its mobilization.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace his Excellency a.s.sured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her att.i.tude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into war....

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once! His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He a.s.sured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.--(British "White Paper" No. 17.)

A more convincing contradiction of the claim that Germany fell upon unexpectant Russia can hardly be imagined. Sazonof's conversation with the British Amba.s.sador shows that Russia had decided from the beginning to bring about the war, unless Austria would subject itself to Russia's dictation.

Now, Russia was not alone concerned about Servia, but from its viewpoint Austria-Hungary must not maintain the preponderant position in the Balkans.

Sure of French help, Russia was determined to work against this. The reports of the British representative do not suggest with a word that Germany was responsible for the war; on the contrary, Sir Buchanan again, on his own account, warned the Russian Government to keep aloof from military measures, in his conversation with M. Sazonof on July 27, although the "White Paper" does not show that he had received any instructions by Sir Edward Grey.

His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circ.u.mstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.--(British "White Paper," No, 44.)

Just as its own Amba.s.sador in Petersburg pointed out to the British Government the dangers of Russian mobilization, England did not lack German warnings. On July 28 the British Amba.s.sador in Berlin, Sir E.

Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with the Imperial Chancellor:

... but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the South, he thought the situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circ.u.mstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result Russia would be entirely responsible.--(British "White Paper" No. 71.)

In a telegram of Mr. Goschen's of July 30, reporting a conversation with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, it is stated:

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France.--(British "White Paper"

No. 98.)

The British Government has added a few further publications to its "White Paper." Among these is a report of the hitherto British Amba.s.sador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The doc.u.ment is dated Sept.

1; that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war. The tendency of this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to greater extent than Austria-Hungary in trying to sow dissension between the two allies.

Amba.s.sador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through its ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations promising success then going on between Vienna and Petersburg. In this report it is stated:

(Retranslated.) M. Schebeko [the Russian Amba.s.sador at Vienna] on July 28th attempted to induce the Austrian Government to authorize Count Scapary to continue negotiations which he had been carrying on with M. Sazonof and which appeared very promising. Count Berchtold on this day declined, but two days later, July 30th, although Russia then had already started partial mobilization against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again in the most courteous manner and gave his consent to continuation of the pour parleurs.... On Aug. 1st M. Schebeko informed me that Austria was ready to submit to mediation those parts of its note to Servia which appeared to be irreconcilable to the independence of Servia.... Unfortunately these pour parleurs in St. Petersburg and Vienna were suddenly broken off by the quarrel being removed to the more dangerous territory of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany on July 31 stepped between the two with its double ultimatum addressed to St. Petersburg and Paris.... A delay of a few days in all probability would have spared Europe one of the greatest wars in history.

On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was solely the result of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain peace, which fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence.

These negotiations, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as is made to appear. The Austrian version of it is found in the Vienna Fremdenblatt of Sept. 25, 1914. There the most important spots of Bunsen's report, that Austria-Hungary had been ready to moderate several points of its note to Servia, are mentioned, as follows:

As we are told by a well-informed source, these a.s.sertions do not at all correspond to the facts; furthermore, from the very nature of the steps undertaken by the dual monarchy in Belgrade, this would have been entirely inconceivable.

A glance at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his consent to a continuation of the exchange of thought in Petersburg; the latter, therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night from July 30 to 31 the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against Germany was ordered in Petersburg, finally making impossible the continuation of the last German attempt at mediation in Vienna.

The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval England allowed to pa.s.s unused in Petersburg, the war would have broken out a few days sooner.

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions and tendency of which was brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.

On July 24 the Russian Government declared, in an official communique, it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian conflict.

Germany's Hand Forced.

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, a.s.sured the German Military Attache upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German "White Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian mobilization arrived in quick succession.

On the 29th mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army was ordered. Even as late as 2 P.M. on the 31st, however, (German "White Paper," Page 18, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint,) the Czar telegraphed the Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his pledge as far away from desiring war.