New York Times Current History The European War From The Beginning To March Part 3

First, that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat, or Federal Council, is firm in the opinion formulated at the meeting held yesterday that it would be wiser for the Emperor not to express views affecting the relations of the empire with other countries except through his responsible Ministers. This expression, derives weight from the fact that the Governments of Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Saxony were represented on the committee.

Second, that the entire Reichstag a.s.sented to the declarations made by the speakers on Tuesday that the Emperor had exceeded his const.i.tutional prerogatives in private discussion with foreigners concerning Germany's att.i.tude on controverted questions.

Third, that the feeling of the people at large on this matter was accurately indicated by the press of the country.

The Kaiser's reply was published on the same date in the Reichsanzeiger, in the form of a communication, which read:

During today's audience granted to the Imperial Chancellor, his Majesty, the Emperor and King, listened for several hours to a report by Prince von Bulow. The Imperial Chancellor described the feeling and its causes among the German people in connection with the article published in The Daily Telegraph. He also explained the position he had taken during the course of the debates and interpellations on this subject in the Reichstag. His Majesty the Emperor received the statements and explanations with great earnestness, and then expressed his will as follows:

"Heedless of the exaggerations of public criticism, which are regarded by him as incorrect, his Majesty perceives that his princ.i.p.al imperial task is to insure the stability of the policies of the empire, under the guardianship of const.i.tutional responsibilities. In conformity therewith, his Majesty the Emperor approves the Chancellor's utterances in the Reichstag, and a.s.sures Prince von Bulow of his continued confidence."

WILHELM II.'S LETTER TO LORD TWEEDMOUTH.

Published by The Morning Post of London, Oct. 30, 1914.

The subjoined letter written to the late Lord Tweedmouth by the German Emperor is made public for the first time. It is a literal transcript of the original doc.u.ment in which occur a few slight errors in spelling.

The existence of the doc.u.ment was first made known to the public by the military correspondent of The Times, who published a letter on the subject on March 6, 1908, but its contents were not divulged.

The significance of the letter can be understood only in the light of the naval and political situation six years ago. During the preceding year, 1907, The Hague Conference, ostensibly convened in the interests of international peace, had resolved itself into a committee to determine how to diminish the severities of war. There was a section of opinion in this country which was persuaded that the only method of seeking peace was to reduce the navy and army. At the same time the Imperial German Navy was making swift and steady progress, and its menace to British supremacy aroused considerable alarm in this country.

Although the British Navy held superiority over the German Navy in ships not of the dreadnought type, the balance in dreadnoughts was virtually even.

Dreadnought Supremacy.

It was stated in Parliament that in the year 1916 Germany, according to her naval law, would have thirty-six dreadnoughts, a number which would involve the building by this country of forty-four such vessels in the same period, toward which the Government was only providing two in the current year. It was also stated that in the year 1911 Germany would possess thirteen dreadnoughts and Great Britain only twelve, which statement was founded upon reasonable a.s.sumptions. Could Germany reckon upon the continuance of such a relative position, the advantage to her would be very great.

It was at this critical moment that the German Emperor indited his letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty, which is printed below. When the fact became known there was a good deal of public feeling aroused both in this country and abroad. Lord Tweedmouth stated that the letter was a private letter and purely personal. Prince von Bulow informed the Reichstag that the letter was of both a private and political character, adding some remarks concerning the "purely defensive character of our naval programme which," said the Chancellor, "cannot be emphasized too frequently."

The German Foreign Office officially announced that "in his letter the Emperor merely corrected certain erroneous views prevalent in England regarding the development of the German fleet."

Readers are now in a position to judge for themselves the accuracy of these statements. It should be remembered that the reduced navy estimates of 1908-9 were followed by national alarm and the publication of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford's shipbuilding programme and large increase in estimates of the following year. Here is the letter:

The Kaiser's Letter.

Berlin, 14th-2, 1908.

My Dear Lord Tweedmouth--May I intrude on your precious time and ask for a few moments' attention to these lines I venture to submit to you? I see by the daily papers and reviews that a battle royal is being fought about the needs of the navy. I therefore venture to furnish you with some information anent the German naval programme, which it seems is being quoted by all parties to further their ends by trying to frighten peaceable British taxpayers with it as a bogy.

During my last pleasant visit to your hospitable sh.o.r.es I tried to make your authorities understand what the drift of German naval policy is, but I am afraid that my explanations have been either misunderstood or not believed, because I see "German danger" and "German challenge to British naval supremacy" constantly quoted in different articles. This phrase, if not repudiated or corrected, sown broadcast over the country and daily dinned into British ears, might in the end create the most deplorable results.

I therefore deem it advisable, as Admiral of the Fleet, to lay some facts before you to enable you to see clearly that it is absolutely nonsensical and untrue that the German naval bill is to provide a navy meant as a challenge to British naval supremacy. The German fleet is built against n.o.body at all; it is solely built for Germany's needs in relation with that country's rapidly growing trade. The German naval bill was sanctioned by the Imperial Parliament and published ten years ago, and may be had at any large bookseller's. There is nothing surprising, secret, or underhand in it, and every reader may study the whole course mapped out for the development of the German Navy with the greatest ease.

Thirty to Forty Battleships in 1920.

The law is being adhered to, and provides for about thirty to forty ships of the line in 1920. The number of ships fixed by the bill included the fleet then actually in commission, notwithstanding its material being already old and far surpa.s.sed by contemporary types.

In other foreign navies the extraordinary rapidity with which improvements were introduced in types of battleships, armaments, and armor made the fleet in commission obsolete before the building programme providing additions to it was half finished.

The obsolete fleet had to be struck off the list, thus leaving a gap, lowering the number of ships below the standard prescribed by the bill. This gap was stopped by using the finished ships to replace the obsolete ones instead of being added to them as originally intended. Therefore, instead of steadily increasing the standing fleet by regular additions it came to a wholesale rebuilding of the entire German Navy. Our actual programme in course of execution is practically only the exchange of old material for new, but not an addition to the number of units originally laid down by the bill of ten years ago, which is being adhered to.

It seems to me that the main fault in the discussions going on in the papers is the permanent ventilating of so-called two to three or more power standard and then only exemplifying on one power, which is invariably Germany. It is fair to suppose that each nation builds and commissions its navy according to its needs and not only with regard to the programme of other countries. Therefore, it would be the simplest thing for England to say: "I have a world-wide empire and the greatest trade of the world, and to protect them I must have so and so many battleships, cruisers, &c., as are necessary to guarantee the supremacy of the sea to me, and they shall, accordingly, be built and manned."

That is the absolute right of your country, and n.o.body anywhere would lose a word about it, and whether it be 60 or 90 or 100 battleships, that would make no difference and certainly no change in the German naval bill. May the numbers be as you think fit, everybody here would understand it, but the people would be very thankful over here if at last Germany was left out of the discussion, for it is very galling to the Germans to see their country continually held up as the sole danger and menace to Great Britain by the whole press of the different contending parties, considering that other countries are building, too, and there are even larger fleets than the German.

Fears German Retaliation.

Doubtless, when party faction runs high there is often a lamentable lack of discrimination in the choice of weapons, but I really must protest that the German naval programme should be only one for her exclusive use, or that such a poisoned view should be forged as a German challenge to British supremacy of the sea. If permanently used mischief may be created at home, and the injured feeling engendering the wish for retaliation in the circle of the German Naval League as a representative of the nation which would influence public opinion and place the Government in a very disagreeable position by trying to force it to change its programme through undue pressure, difficult to ignore.

In a letter which Lord Esher caused to be published a short time ago he wrote that every German, from the Emperor down to the last man, wished for the downfall of Sir John Fisher. Now I am at a loss to tell whether the supervision of the foundations and drains of royal palaces is apt to qualify somebody for the judgment of naval affairs in general. As far as regards German affairs, the phrase is a piece of unmitigated balderdash, and has created immense merriment in the circles of those here who know. But I venture to think that such things ought not to be written by people who are high placed, as they are liable to hurt public feelings over here.

Of course I need not a.s.sure you that n.o.body here dreams of wishing to influence Great Britain in the choice of those to whom she means to give the direction of her navy or to disturb them in the fulfillment of their n.o.ble task. It is expected that the choice will always fall on the best and ablest, and their deeds will be followed with interest and admiration by their brother officers in the German Navy.

It is, therefore, preposterous to infer that the German authorities work for or against persons in official positions in foreign countries. It is as ridiculous as it is untrue, and I hereby repudiate such calumny. Besides, to my humble notion, this perpetual quoting of the German danger is utterly unworthy of the great British Nation, with its world-wide empire and mighty navy.

There is something nearly ludicrous about it. The foreigners in other countries might easily conclude that Germans must be an exceptionally strong lot, as they seem to be able to strike terror into the hearts of the British, who are five times their superiors.

I hope your Lordship will read these lines with kind consideration.

They are written by one who is an ardent admirer of your splendid navy, who wishes it all success, and who hopes that its ensign may ever wave on the same side as the German Navy's, and by one who is proud to wear a British naval uniform of Admiral of the Fleet, which was conferred on him by the late great Queen of blessed memory.

Once more the German naval bill is not aimed at England and is not a challenge to British supremacy of the sea, which will remain unchallenged for generations to come. Let us all remember the warning Admiral Sir John Fisher gave to his hearers in November, when so cleverly he cautioned them not to get scared by using the admirable phrase "if Eve had not always kept her eye on the apple she would not have eaten it, and we should not now be bothered with clothes."

I remain yours truly,

WILLIAM I. R., Admiral of the Fleet.

Attacks Kaiser's Veracity.

The Morning Post, commenting on the letter of the Kaiser, says:

It is not usual for an Emperor to address a Minister of a foreign country with reference to the affairs of his department. It is a fact that it is not done. Lord Tweedmouth said the letter was a private letter. The German Chancellor, Prince von Bulow, said the letter partook of both a private and a political character. The fact remains that it involved an extraordinary breach of etiquette.

There is no reflection cast upon the late Lord Tweedmouth. No one can help receiving a letter from an Emperor if that monarch condescends to dispatch it. Few persons, perhaps, could help being influenced, albeit unconsciously influenced, by the perusal of such an epistle.

Perhaps the German Emperor reflected upon that psychological contingency; for to what conclusion is the whole tenor of the letter directed? That the German Navy existed solely for purposes of defense in case of aggression and for the protection of German commerce, and that it was no part of German policy, and never had been, to menace the sea power of Britain.

Now turn to the notorious preamble of the German navy law of 1900, which in his letter the Emperor cites as a guarantee of good faith.

It is there stated that the German Navy must be made so powerful that it would be dangerous for any nation, even the strongest maritime nation, to attack it.

If that is not a challenge, what is? Had it not been in terms a challenge the preamble would surely have run that it was not the intention to make the German Navy so strong that the strongest naval power could not attack it without danger to that power.