New York Times Current History The European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 Part 37

The ruthless methods of a Bismarck are no longer of this age. They are too odious, and the human conscience revolts at them. What a preposterous idea, in this twentieth century, to compel by force millions of people to renounce their traditions and even their language! If Great Britain had followed the same method in dealing with the French Canadians, instead of loyal subjects she would have made rebels of them all.

It is neither right nor just nor truthful to say that Germany has done her best during the last four decades to heal the wounds struck by her to French national pride. On the contrary, Germany's att.i.tude has been all along one of studied provocation; and if the instances already mentioned are not sufficient, many others could be added.

Germany abetted French colonial expansion. Well, by what right should she have opposed it? And if she yielded to France in Morocco, it was only after France had given Germany part of her African possessions rather than go to war with her.

It will be news to the world to be informed that there can be no reasonable doubt that the people of Alsace-Lorraine have been gradually settling down to willing co-operation with the German administration.

Certainly such a statement is in violent contradiction with all we hear and read and know of the state of mind, the feelings, and aspirations of the inhabitants of those two provinces.

To argue that the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is not a vital necessity to France; that without these provinces she has recovered her prosperity and her prestige, and that it is mere illusion to think that the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine would add to her glory is pure sophistry. It is just as if you said to a man whom you had robbed of some valuable property: "What does it matter? You are just as well off without it." Yes, Prof. Larson did voice the sentiment of the vast majority of his countrymen when he stated that France could not and would not recognize the treaty of Frankfurt. If I have an enemy who takes me by surprise and with revolver leveled at my head compels me to sign a paper by which I despoil myself to his advantage, what is the validity of such a doc.u.ment?

That is the way that all Frenchmen of all cla.s.ses look upon the treaty of Frankfurt, wrung from them under duress.

The term "revanche" is a slogan. It simply typifies in one word the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but it does not carry with it the idea of willfully laying waste the enemy's country, burning and pillaging, shooting inoffensive non-combatants, and cleaning banks of all the gold they contain.

Another statement which is misleading in Prof. Francke's article is the one which refers to the "growing menace from France," in which he speaks of the increasing armament that has been going on in that country since 1912. But what is called in Germany "the menace from France" is called in the latter country "the menace from Germany." Who started these enormous armaments? Each time Germany increased her army France was forced to do the same; and when France recently increased from two to three years the duration of military service, it was her only way of meeting Germany's increase of 500,000 men.

The attempt to change the roles and present France to the world as the aggressor, or even as premeditating an attack upon Germany, is futile.

It is a strange and yet not uncommon psychological fact that the hate of the conqueror is often greater than that of the conquered; and it is German, not French, hate which has forced Germany into this savage war.

France had recovered too rapidly from her disasters; she was too rich; her colonies were too vast and too prosperous; she must be crushed. What right had she to have large colonies when Germany, the superior nation, had none worth mentioning? There you have the key to the Kaiser's repeated provocations and to his final attack.

In regard to England and Russia, the writer will simply confine himself to the statement that if the German Imperial Government can produce as clean a bill of health as the "White Paper" of the British Foreign Office, just published, it will do more to convince American public opinion of the justice of its cause than anything that has yet been written in the press by Germans and their sympathizers.

R.L. SANDERSON.

Yale University, New Haven, Conn., Sept. 5, 1914.

In Defense of Austria

By Baron L. Hengelmuller.

Late Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador to the United States.

_The following letter was written by Baron Hengelmuller to Col. Theodore Roosevelt._

ABBAZIA, Sept. 25, 1914.

My Dear Mr. Roosevelt:

Our correspondence has suffered a long interruption. Your last letter was from July of last year. I do not know whether you ever received my answer, by which I thanked you for your preface to my book. You were in Arizona when I wrote it, and soon after your return you started for Brazil. At the occasion of your son's wedding I sent him a telegram to Madrid, but I had no chance to write to you because I had no information with regard to the length of your stay and your whereabouts in Europe.

Now I write to you at the time of a most momentous crisis in the world's history, and I do so impelled by the desire to talk with you about my country's cause and to win your just and fair appreciation for the same.

I wish I could address my appeal to the American people, but having no standing and no opportunity to do so, I address it to you as to one of America's most ill.u.s.trious citizens with whom it has been my privilege to entertain during many years the most friendly relations.

Since the outbreak of the war our communications with America are slow and irregular. In the beginning they were nil. From the end of July to the middle of August we received neither letters, telegrams, nor papers.

I suppose it was the same with you concerning direct news from us. Our adversaries had the field all for themselves and they seem to have made the most of it. To judge from what I have learned since and from what I could glean in our papers, the New York press seem to have written about us and Germany very much in the same tone and spirit as they did about you during your last Presidential campaign. I have seen it stated that The Outlook published an article in which Austro-Hungary was accused of having brought about the war through her greed of conquest and the overbearing arrogance of her behavior toward Servia. I do not know whether I cite correctly, as I have not seen the article, and I am aware that you have severed your connection with The Outlook after your return from Brazil. I only mention the statement as an ill.u.s.tration of what I have said above, for if a review of the standing of The Outlook opens its columns to such a glaringly false accusation the daily papers have certainly not lagged behind.

It is natural that our adversaries should be anxious to win the sympathies of the American people. So are we. But it is not for this purpose that I now write to you. Sympathy is a sentiment and, as a rule, not to be won by argument. What I want to discuss with you are the causes of this war and the issues at stake.

The Cause of the War.

Undoubtedly the war broke out over our conflict with Servia, but this conflict was not of our seeking. We had no wish of aggrandizement or extension of power at the expense of Servia, but Servia covets territory which belongs to us, and for years has pursued her ends by the most nefarious and criminal means. The a.s.sa.s.sination of our heir to the crown and his consort was not an isolated fact, but only the most glaring link in a long chain of plotting and agitating against us. This att.i.tude of Servia toward us dates back to the day when the gang of officers who murdered their own King came to power, and when it became their policy to keep a hold over their own people by exciting their ambitions against us. This policy reached its first climax when we declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we had occupied and developed for thirty years. You were in office then, and the events of the time are familiar to you. The crisis ended then by Servia's formal acknowledgment that our annexation violated none of her rights, and by her promise to cultivate henceforth correct and friendly relations with us. This promise was not kept. The plotting continued, lies were disseminated about a pretended oppression of our South Slav population, and a.s.sociations were formed for the purpose of stirring them to discontent and if possible to treason.

Things came to a second climax with the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The plot for this crime was hatched in Servia, the bombs and revolvers for its execution were furnished there, and Servian officers instructed the murder candidates in their use. At last we could stand it no longer. What we wanted from Servia was the punishment of the plotters and accomplices and a guarantee for normal relations in the future. This was the object of our ultimatum. Servia made a show of complying with some of our demands, but in reality her answer was evasive.

These facts are exposed and authenticated in the note which we sent to the powers after having presented our ultimatum in Belgrade and in the memorandum which accompanied it. I do not know whether the American papers published these doc.u.ments at the time. Today they are outstripped by greater events, but for the just appreciation of our proceedings in regard to Servia they are indispensable.

In reality, however, our conflict with Servia was not the cause of the great war now raging, but only the spark which brought the overloaded powder barrel to explosion. Who talks of Servia today, and who believes that France, England, and j.a.pan are making war on Germany and on us because of Servia? The war broke out because Russia decided to shield Servia against the consequences of her provocations and because, owing to preconcerted arrangements, the situation in Europe was such that the action of one great power was bound to bring all or nearly all the others into the field. And again those preconcerted arrangements were the outcome of a ma.s.s of pent-up pa.s.sions, of hatred, envy, and jealousy, the like of which--all Hague conferences and pacific unions notwithstanding--the world has never seen before.

We are fully aware of the danger which threatened us from Russia when we formulated our demands in Belgrade. Russia's population is three times as large as ours and it was not with a light heart that our Emperor-King took his final resolution. But our national honor and our very existence as a self-respecting power were at stake. We could not hesitate. Now we are in a struggle for life or death and we mean to carry it through with full confidence in the rightfulness of our cause and in the force of our arms. In one respect events have already belied the calculations of our enemies, who counted on internal dissensions within our own borders. I am happy to say that Croatians, Slovenes, and a large majority of our own Servians are fighting in our ranks with the same valor and enthusiasm as Czechs, Rumanians, Poles, Magyars, and Germans.

But why did Russia decide to a.s.sail us? During the whole nineteenth century she has shown herself a very shifty and unreliable protectress of Servia. She made use of the smaller country when it suited her own aggressive purposes against others, and she dropped it whenever it served her ends. It was so at the time of the Turkish war of 1877 and of the Berlin Congress, and it remained so until with the advent of the present dynasty Servia offered a sure prospect of becoming and remaining a permanent tool in Russia's hands and a thorn in our flesh.

Russia is an aggressive power. For 200 years she has extended her dominions at the cost of Sweden first, of Poland and Turkey afterward.

Now she thinks our turn has come. Finding us to be in the way of her ultimate aims in the Balkan Peninsula, she began to regard us as her enemy. For years the propaganda for undermining the bases of our empire has been carried on in the name of Pan-Slavism. It seems that she judged that now the time had come to draw the consequences and to bring things to a final issue. With what result remains to be seen.

Germany Bound to Aid Austria.

By the terms of our treaty of alliance Germany was bound to come to our a.s.sistance if we were attacked by Russia. There was no secrecy about that treaty. Its text had been made public long ago and its purely defensive character brought to the knowledge of the world. No more than we did Germany entertain hostile intentions or nourish hostile feelings against Russia. There were no clashing interests to excite the first, no historical reminiscences to justify the second. If it is otherwise in Russia, it is because her present leaders find German power in the way of their conquering aspirations against us. Germany, true to her obligations, hastened to our side when she saw us menaced, and when she declared war she did it because she had positive information that in spite of formal and solemn a.s.surances to the contrary Russia mobilization was proceeding.

The terms of the Franco-Russian alliance have never been made public.

Whether it was concluded merely for defensive or also for offensive purposes, and whether France was obliged by her treaty to draw the sword in the present case, remains therefore a matter of surmise. But there is no mystery about the feelings of France with regard to Germany, and no doubt about the greed for revenge which during the last forty-four years has swayed the overwhelming majority of her people and been the dominant factor of her foreign policy. It was for this object that she entered into her alliances and agreements, and it is for this cause that she is fighting now.

It is simple hypocrisy to talk about German aggressiveness against France. France stood in no danger of being attacked by Germany if she had chosen to remain neutral in the latter's war with Russia. Asked whether she would do so, she replied that her actions would be guided by her interests. The meaning of this reply was clear, and left Germany no choice. The formal declaration of war became then a mere matter of political and military convenience, and has no bearing on the moral issue of the case.

But why has England plunged into this war? Officially and to the world at large she has explained her resolution by Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, and in the royal message to Parliament it was solemnly declared that England could not stand by and pa.s.sively tolerate such a breach of international law and obligations.

No Austrian can read this declaration otherwise than with a mournful smile. Its futility has been exposed by the question which Englishmen of standing and renown have put to their Government, viz., whether they would equally have declared war on France if that violation of neutrality had first come from her side. In face of this question having remained unanswered, and in face of what has come to light since about French preparations in Belgium, there is no need to expiate on this subject. All that there is to be said about it has been said by the German Chancellor in open session of the Reichstag, and all that may be added is the remark that, considering England's history and what she did before Copenhagen in 1807, she of all nations should be the last to put on airs of moral indignation over the application of the principle that in time of war "salus reipublicae suprema lex est."

The existence of a convention binding England to France in case of war has--as far as I know--never been admitted officially by England. As I see now from manifestations of Englishmen disapproving of their country's partic.i.p.ation in the war, the belief exists nevertheless that such a convention had been concluded. But whether England's declaration of war was the consequence of previously entered obligations or the outcome of present free initiative, the main fact remains that in the last resort it sprang from jealousy of Germany's growing sea power and commercial prosperity. This feeling was the dominant factor in English foreign policy, just as greed for revenge was in France. It was the propelling power for the agreements which England has made and for others which she endeavored but did not succeed in bringing about.

England claims the dominion over the seas as her native right, and, what is more, she holds it. Her t.i.tle is no better and no worse than that of the Romans when they conquered the world, or of the Turkish Sultans in the days of their power. Like them, she has succeeded in making good her claim. For three centuries the nations of Continental Europe have been hating, fighting, and devastating each other for the sake of strips of frontier land and a shadowy balance of power. These centuries were England's opportunity, and she has made the most of it. That she should mean to keep what she has and hold to her maritime supremacy as to the apple of her eye is natural. Whether it is for the benefit of mankind that it should be so, and whether the world in general would not be better off if there existed a balance of power on sea as well as on land, does not enter into the present discussion. What is more to the purpose is that in reality England's sea power stood in no danger at all. To any thinking and fair-minded observer it must be clear that Germany, hemmed in by hostile neighbors in the east and west, and obliged, therefore, to keep up her armaments on land, would not have been able to threaten England's maritime superiority for generations to come. If the issue has been thrown into the balance, it has been done so by England's own doing.

But it is not only the nascent German Navy that excited the distrust and envy of England. German colonies and every trading German vessel seem equally to have become thorns in English eyes. The wish to sweep those vessels from off the seas, to destroy all German ports, in one word, to down Germany, has long been nourished and lately openly avowed in England. Norman Angell's theories about the great illusion of the profitability of modern warfare seem to have made mighty small impression on his countrymen.

Russian l.u.s.t of conquest, French greed of revenge, and English envy were the forces at work in the European powder magazine. The Servian spark ignited it, but the explosion was bound to come sooner or later. What alone could have stopped it would have been England's stepping out of the conspiracy. That she did not do so, in fact became its really directing power, will forever remain a blot on her history.

About j.a.pan's motives and methods I do not think it necessary to write.

American public opinion will hardly need any enlightenment on this subject. America forced j.a.pan out of the isolation in which she had lived during centuries. I hope the day may not come when she will wish that she had not done so.

The issues of the war stand in relation to its causes and the same attempts have been made to distort and falsify them in the eyes of the American public. I have seen it stated in a New York paper that this war is a fight between civilization and barbarism, and I have seen a member of the present English Cabinet quoted as having said that the issue was one between militarism and freedom, civilization and freedom standing, of course, in both cases on the side of our enemies.