New York Times Current History The European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 Part 8

The first paper contains a letter to the British Amba.s.sador in Berlin concerning the Austro-Servian relations. Is it not probable that Sir Edward Grey's attention was called to this question by his Amba.s.sador in Vienna? Where is his letter? Or, if Sir Edward thought of it himself, why did he not mention his conversation also to Sir M. de Bunsen in Vienna? Where is this note? Are we to a.s.sume that Sir M. de Bunsen made his first report on July 23, although Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin had an interesting report to make a day earlier?

We can thus go through the whole British "White Paper" and discover the omission of many interesting doc.u.ments.

No. 38 is a letter from Sir Rennell Rodd in Rome, dated on July 23 and received on July 27. He had no doubt sent also a telegram. What did it contain, and why was it not published under the date of its arrival instead of the letter which had been delayed in transit?

Where Is No. 28?

In No. 29 Sir Edward Grey refers in a telegram to Sir R. Rodd to what "I had said to the German Amba.s.sador." Such a reference could have a meaning for Sir R. Rodd only if he had been informed of this conversation. There is no dispatch printed in the "White Paper"

containing this information. Possibly it was so entwined with other instructions, which Sir Edward Grey did not care to have known, that it could not be published. Was it perhaps sent to the printer first as No.

28, and removed at the last moment when it was too late to change the subsequent numbers? Or, if this a.s.sumption is wrong, what was printed originally as No. 28? Where is No. 28? There are other omissions, and one especially noteworthy one between Nos. 80 and 106 which will be discussed later.

Viewed in this light, the English "White Paper" loses much of the value of a complete record, which it has had in the eyes of many. There is absolutely no reason to doubt the accuracy of those dispatches which have been printed, but it becomes inc.u.mbent upon the searcher after the truth to inquire whether the existence of unprinted (in the case of the German "White Paper" Mr. Beck uses the term "suppressed") papers may not at times alter the interpretation which should be given to those that are printed.

Since we have no published records anywhere concerning the advice given to Italy by the Allies, and the gradual steps leading up to Italy's decision to remain neutral; nor any hint as to the day when her decision was communicated to England and the other powers, it would be futile to speculate on this subject. Since, however, the Queen of Italy and the wife of the Commander in Chief of the Russian forces are sisters, and since it was in the interest of the Allies to keep Italy neutral, it is not unreasonable to a.s.sume that an exchange of opinion took place between Italy and the Allies concerning the conditions under which Italy would remain neutral.

If the actual opening of hostilities could be so managed that Germany could be called the aggressor, then Italy probably declared that she would not enter the war. This is a very important phase of the case, and the omission from Sir Edward Grey's "White Paper" of all dispatches dealing with Italian neutrality is much to be regretted.

Since we are dealing with the Italian dispatches here, it may be advisable to consider at once all the communications which are published as having pa.s.sed between Sir Edward Grey and the British Amba.s.sador, Sir Rennell Rodd, in Rome. They are numbered 19, (perhaps 28,) 29, 35, 36, 38, 49, 57, 63, 64, 80, 81, 86, 92, 100, and 106, of which the important numbers are 38, 57, 64, 80, and 86.

On July 23 Sir Edward Grey was informed that "the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success." (No. 38.)

Austria, in other words, believed that to let the murder of her heir-apparent pa.s.s unpunished would have meant a deathblow to her prestige, and consequently, as any one familiar with her conditions will agree, to her existence. Russia, on the other hand, on July 25 said (see No. 17, report from Sir G. Buchanan) that she could not "allow (note the word) Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war."

These two dispatches to Sir Edward Grey tell the whole story in a nutsh.e.l.l. Austria believed, rightly or wrongly, that it was a question of life or death for her, while Russia claimed the right of preventing Austria from becoming the predominate power in the Balkans, and actually threatened war. Russia did not claim to be concerned with the justice of Austria's demands on Servia.

No such definite word of Russia's intention was sent to Germany, for on July 26 Sir M. de Bunsen reported Germany's confident belief that "Russia will keep quiet during the chastis.e.m.e.nt of Servia." (No. 32.)

On the next day Sir Rennell Rodd reports from Rome (No. 57) that the Minister of Foreign Affairs believes that "if Servia will even now accept it (the Austrian note) Austria will be satisfied" and refrain from a punitive war. He, moreover, believes--and this is very important--that Servia may be induced to accept the note in its entirety on the advice of the four powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone. Since Italy was to be one of the four powers, the Minister's belief was doubtless based on accurate information. There is then as late as July 27 no claim made by Servia that Austria's demands are unreasonable. She only hates to yield to Austria alone. Austria, in the meanwhile, (No. 57,) repeats her a.s.surance that she demands no territorial sacrifices from Servia.

On the next day, July 28, Sir Rennell Rodd reports (No. 64) that "Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note, if some explanation were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene." Austria, on her part, had explained that "the co-operation of the Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have willfully misinterpreted this." (No. 64.)

From these reports it appears that the differences between Austria and Servia were on the way to a solution. Austria claimed that her demands were just, and Servia did not deny this. Austria further claimed that her prestige, her very existence, demanded the prompt compliance with her requests by Servia. She explained in a satisfactory way the one point on which Servia had taken exceptions, and Servia was on the point of complying, and would have complied, if the powers had been willing to let her do so. Such a conclusion of the incident would have strengthened Austria's prestige and a.s.sured the punishment of the murderers of Serajevo.

Russia's Remark About Austria.

The reason why Servia was not allowed to submit was Russia's remark, quoted above, that she would not "allow" Austria to become the predominant power in the Balkans. It was, therefore, Russia's task to prevent Servia from accepting Austria's note. Since war was her alternative, baldly stated to England from the first, she had to do three things--first, to secure as many allies as possible; secondly, to weaken her enemies, preferably by detaching from them Italy, and, thirdly, to get as much of a start in her mobilization as possible.

The treaties between Russia, France, and Great Britain, unlike those between Germany, Austria, and Italy, have never been published. Whatever their wording may be, Russia was at first apparently not absolutely sure of the support of France, (No. 17,) and France, it would seem, was unwilling to tempt fate without the help of England. That England should be willing to join such a combination for such a cause seemed so preposterous to Germany that she did not believe it. Without England no France, without France no war, for alone Russia could not measure herself against Austria. Austria would not have attacked her of her own free will, but if Russia had attacked Austria, the whole world knew from the published treaties that Germany was bound to come to the a.s.sistance of her ally. It would have been two against one, and the two could have waited until Russia had finished her c.u.mbersome mobilization. For even if she had her whole army of many million men on the frontier, Austria and Germany together were strong enough to stem her advance.

Russia's only chance, therefore, when Servia was on the point of yielding, and Austria had almost re-established her prestige, was to secure the help of France, but this meant also the promise of England.

The demands made on England by Russia, some of which are quoted in the "White Paper," are too well known to deserve repet.i.tion. This was the chief thing that counted, to get England's promise. The next was to detach Italy from her allies, (but of this there are no doc.u.ments available,) and the third to gain time for her mobilization. All the other suggestions and counter-suggestions which fill the English "White Paper" are insignificant, as soon as the fundamental positions of Austria and Russia are understood.

Germany has claimed that England promised her support to Russia and France on July 30, or in the night of July 29, and, to prove it, has published the letter from the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, printed in translation in THE NEW YORK TIMES on Oct. 7. This letter, which has not been officially denied by the Allies, states that the promise of England's support gave the Russian war party the upper hand and resulted in the order of complete mobilization.

English "White Paper's" Testimony.

Strangely enough, and doubtless by an oversight, the English "White Paper" contains two dispatches (Nos. 80 and 106) which seem to confirm the accuracy of M. de l'Escaille's statement, viz., that England promised the Russian-French combination her support.

On July 29 Sir Rennell Rodd wrote to Sir Edward Grey (No. 80) that the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs had told him "there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect."

In a later dispatch of the same day (No. 86) he deprecates Russia's partial mobilization, which he fears has spoiled the chances of Germany's exerting any pressure on Austria.

But on the next day, July 30, these remarkable words occur: "He [the Italian Minister] had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us." (No. 106.)

Readers of the "White Paper" will look in vain for an explanation of such a change of heart on Germany's part. What does "now" mean in the last letter? And why does Germany seem "convinced" that England will act with Russia--if not that she has heard of the promise mentioned by M. de l'Escaille, as given early on July 30 or late the 29th? The dates agree, and unless Sir Edward Grey publishes further papers to explain the change that had taken place between July 29 and July 30 one seems forced to accept this explanation.

What is Germany's att.i.tude? Does she rush into war? Not at all, for she is "most anxious to avoid issue" with England. (No. 106.) Germany knew that Russia had begun to mobilize. Every day, every hour counted; for against the ma.s.ses of Russia she had only her greater speed to match.

She knew that England had gone over to Russia, although she was probably hoping that the alliance between the Saxon and the Slav was not yet irrefragable. Still, the prospects were dark. But in spite of this the efforts were renewed to see what could be done in Vienna.

The famous exchange of telegrams between royalty began in the evening of July 29; and here it is wise to halt for a moment. On July 30 the Czar telegraphed to the Emperor in reply to the Emperor's expression of regret that Russia should be mobilizing, as follows: "The military measures in force now were decreed five days ago." That is, according to the Czar, the Russian mobilization had begun on July 25. On July 27, however, the Russian Minister of War, M. Suchomlinow, had declared to the German Military Attache "on his word of honor" that no mobilization order had been issued. July 25, however, it will be remembered, was the day on which Sir G. Buchanan had reported from St. Petersburg that Russia will "face all risks of war" if she can feel sure of the support of France.

On July 31 Russia mobilized her entire army, which led to Germany's ultimatum that Russia demobilize within twelve hours. No reply was received to the request, and orders for the mobilization of the German Army were issued at 5:15 P.M., Aug. 1, after the German Amba.s.sador in St. Petersburg had been instructed to declare that, owing to the continued mobilization of the Russian Army, a state of war existed between the two countries.

Kaiser Tried to Keep Peace.

In order to understand this step one should read the book "La France Victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain," ("France Victorious in the Next War,") by Col. Arthur Boucher, published in 1911. Col. Boucher has stated the case baldly and so simply that every one can understand it.

In substance his argument is this: "Alone France has no chance, but together with Russia she will win against Germany. Suppose the three countries are beginning mobilization on the same day. Germany finishes first, France second, and Russia last. Germany must leave some of her troops on her eastern frontier, the rest she throws against France. All France has to do is to hold them for a few days. [Col. Boucher mentions the exact number of days. This book is not at hand, and the writer prefers not to quote from memory.] Then Russia comes into play, more German troops will be needed in the East, the French proceed to an attack on their weakened enemy, and La France sera victorieuse."

Everything hinges on just a couple of days or so. A couple of days! And how much of a start had Russia? She had begun on July 25; on July 27 definite news of the Russian mobilization was reported in Berlin, although the Minister of War denied it "on his honor." On July 30 England was understood to have promised her support to Russia, and the Czar acknowledged that Russia had been mobilizing for the past five days. Five days! And Col. Boucher, expressing the opinion of military experts, had counted on victory on a much smaller margin!

Do the Judges of the Supreme Court of Civilization realize the almost super-human efforts in the interest of peace made by the German Emperor?

Russia has a start of five days, and on July 31 a start of six days. Can we not hear all the military leaders imploring the Emperor not to hesitate any longer? But in the interest of peace the Emperor delays. He has kept the peace for Germany through the almost thirty years of his reign. He prays to his G.o.d, in Whom he has placed his trust through all his upright life, with a fervor which has often brought him ridicule.

Also, he still believes in England, and hopes through her efforts to be able to keep the peace. He waits another day. A start of seven days for Russia! The odds against Germany have grown tremendously. At last he orders mobilization. For a longer delay he would not have been able to answer to his country. As it is, there are many people who blame him severely for having waited so long.

But William II. was right, for when the world will begin to realize the agonies through which he must have pa.s.sed during these days of waiting, and the sacrifices he made in his effort to preserve peace, it will judge Germany rightly, and call the Emperor the great prince of peace that he is.

But, it has been said, why did he not avoid war, either by forcing Austria to yield to Russia, or, if she refused, by withdrawing from her?

In common with the whole of Germany, he probably felt that Austria's position was right. Servia herself, as has been seen above, did not claim that she was unjustly treated, whatever outsiders thought of Austria's demands; and Austria was fully justified by past events in believing that it was with her a question of life and death. Should Germany sacrifice her faithful friend under such circ.u.mstances, and for what? For the arrogance of Russia, who would not "allow" her to re-establish her prestige in a righteous cause? The word "righteous" is used advisedly, because in the early stages of the controversy n.o.body, not even Russia nor Servia herself, denied the justice of Austria's demands. The writer is informed that even the liberal English press found no fault with the course taken by Austria, although it commented adversely on the language used in the note.

What would have been the result of peace bought by Germany at such a cost? It would have alienated her only faithful friend without laying the foundations for a lasting friendship with her opponents. This at least was Germany's honest belief. She may have been wrong. History more probably will call her right. To desert Austria might have postponed the war, but when it would have come Germany would have stood alone, and, worse, she would have lost her self-respect.

This claim may sound strange in the ears of those who have just witnessed and will never forget the suffering of that beautiful little country, Belgium. They hold that, since Germany invaded Belgium, it is Germany who broke a treaty and who is to blame.

Mr. Beck considers this to be so self-evident that he deems it unnecessary to advance any proof. He quotes the Chancellor's speech, and, moving for a quick verdict, declares his motion of guilty carried.

The matter, however, is not quite so simple for the man who is seeking for the whole truth. Let us look at the facts.

Belgium was a neutral country, just as any country has the right to declare itself neutral, with this difference: that in 1839 she had promised to five powers--Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia--that she would remain perpetually neutral. These five powers in their turn had promised to guarantee her neutrality. She was, however, a sovereign State, and as such had the undoubted right to cease being neutral whenever she chose by abrogating the Treaty of 1839. If the other high contracting parties did not agree with her, it was their right to try to coerce Belgium to keep to her pledges, although this would undoubtedly have been an infringement of her sovereignty.

The Treaty of 1839 contains the word "perpetual," but so does the treaty between France and Germany, in which Alsace and Lorraine are ceded by France to be perpetually an integral part of the German Empire. Does this mean that France, if the Allies should win, could not retake these provinces? n.o.body probably will believe this.

The Treaty of 1839 was a treaty just like the Treaty of 1871, with this difference, that the latter treaty was concluded between two powers, and the earlier one between five powers on one side and Belgium and Holland on the other. This gave certain rights to all the signatory powers, any one of whom had the right to feel itself sufficiently aggrieved to go to war if any other power disregarded the treaty.

Rights of Neutrals.