New York Times Current History The European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 Part 5

On the night of July 29 the British Amba.s.sador at Berlin was informed that the German Foreign Office "_had not had time to send an answer yet_" to the proposal that Germany suggest the form of mediation, but that the question had been referred to the Austro-Hungarian Government with a request as to "what would satisfy them."

[English "White Paper," No. 107.]

On the following day the German Amba.s.sador informed Sir Edward Grey that the German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in the region of the frontier, to promise not to advance further, while the powers endeavored to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria, but if Germany ever exercised any such pressure upon Vienna, _no evidence of it has ever been given to the world_. Certainly it was not very effective, and for the reasons mentioned it is impossible to conclude that the advice of Germany, if in good faith, would not have been followed by its weaker ally.

From all that appears in the record, Austria made no reply to this most conciliatory suggestion of England, but, in the meantime, the irrepressible Kaiser made the crisis more acute by cabling to the Czar that the mobilization of Russia to meet the mobilization of Austria was affecting his position of mediator, to which the Czar made a conciliatory reply, stating that Russia's mobilization was only for a defense against Austria.

The Czar, to put at rest any anxiety of the Kaiser as to Russia's intentions with respect to Germany, added:

"I thank you cordially for your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. _As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon._ I confide with all my faith in the grace of G.o.d, and I hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe."

What more could Russia do? If Austria continued to mobilize, why not Russia?

On this day, July 30, the German Amba.s.sador had two interviews at St.

Petersburg with Sazonof, and it was then that Sazonof drew up the following formula as a basis for peace:

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has a.s.sumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, _Russia engages to stop all military preparations_."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 60.]

At this stage King George telegraphed Prince Henry of Prussia that

"the English Government was doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparation."

The King adds a hope that the Kaiser

"will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe."

[Second German "White Paper."]

This last proposition, however, was never accepted or declined, for the impetuous Kaiser gave his twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia to demobilize, and this was an arrogant demand which no self-respecting power, much less so great a one as Russia, could possibly accept.

While this demand was in progress Sir Edward Grey was making his last attempt to preserve peace by asking Germany to sound Vienna, as he would sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Austria that they would

"undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided they did not embarra.s.s Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory."

Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Amba.s.sador that if this was not satisfactory, and if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace and Russia and France rejected it, that

"his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do with the consequences,"

which obviously meant either neutrality or actual intervention in behalf of Germany and Austria.

On the same day the British Amba.s.sador at Berlin besought the German Foreign Office to

"put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in the general interest to rea.s.sure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis."

And Sir Edward Goschen reports that the German Foreign Minister replied that last night he had

"begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter."

_Again the text of the letter in which Germany "begged" Austria to be conciliatory is not found in the record._

The excuse of Germany that the mobilization of Russia compelled it to mobilize does not justify the war. Mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but simply preparation. If Russia had the right to mobilize because Austria mobilized, Germany equally had the right to mobilize when Russia mobilized, but it does not follow that either of the three nations could justify a war to compel the other parties to demobilize. Mobilization is only a preparation against eventualities. It is the right of the sovereign State and by no code of ethics a _casus belli_. The demand of Germany that Russia could not arm to defend itself, when Austria was preparing for a possible attack on Russia, has few, if any, parallels in history for bullying effrontery. It treated Russia as an inferior, almost a va.s.sal, State.

It must be observed that, while Germany insisted that Russia should demobilize, the Kaiser offered no reciprocal promise. On his theory Germany and Austria were to be left free to complete their preparations, but Russia was to tie her own hands and leave herself "naked to her enemies." This is shown by the last telegrams which pa.s.sed between the Czar and Kaiser. The Czar telegraphed:

"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of G.o.d it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence your urgent reply."

To this the Kaiser replied:

"I thank you for your telegram. I have shown yesterday to your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.

Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from my Amba.s.sador has reached me with the reply of your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army.

An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that you, without delay, order your troops to commit, under no circ.u.mstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

This impetuous step of Germany to compel its great neighbor to desist from military preparations to defend itself came most inopportunely, for on Aug. 1 the Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador _for the first time_ declared to the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and it was then suggested that the form of the ultimatum and the questions arising thereon should be discussed in London. (Dispatch from British Amba.s.sador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey at once advised the English Amba.s.sador in Berlin of the fact, and urged that it was still possible to maintain peace

"if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war,"

[English "White Paper," No. 131.]

but the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to Russia to demobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far for retreat, and, spurred on by the arrogant Potsdam military party, he "let slip the dogs of war." After the fatal Rubicon had been crossed and the die was cast the Czar telegraphed King George:

"In this solemn hour I wish to a.s.sure you once more I have done all in my power to avert war."

Such will be the verdict of history.

The Judgment.

These are _the facts_ as shown by the record, and upon them, in my judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pa.s.s the following judgment:

1--_That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to Servia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations._

2--_That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course._

3--_That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace._

4--_That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparations._

5--_That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure to demobilize when the other powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war._

6--_That Belgium as a sovereign State has as an inherent right the power to determine when and under what conditions an alien can cross her frontiers. This right exists independently of treaties, but is, in the case of Belgium, reinforced by the Treaty of 1839 and The Hague Convention, whereby the leading European nations (including Germany) guarantee its "perpetual neutrality." The invasion of Belgium by Germany was in violation of these rights, and England only respected its own solemn covenant when, in defense of that neutrality, it declared war against Germany._

In Conclusion.

The writer of this article has reached these conclusions with reluctance, as he has a feeling of deep affection for the German people and equal admiration for their ideals and matchless progress. Even more he admires the magnificent courage with which the German Nation, beset on every hand by powerful antagonists, is now defending its prestige as a nation. The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless, this cannot alter the ethical truth, which stands apart from any considerations of nationality; nor can it affect the conclusion that the German Nation has been plunged into this abyss by its scheming statesmen and its self-centred and highly neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth century sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty G.o.d on earth, and therefore infallible.

In visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of Civilization should therefore distinguish between the military caste, headed by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the German people.