Neptune's Inferno_ The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal Part 8

Defeated on the ground and stalemated in the air, Admiral Yamamoto was enacting an ambitious plan to hammer down on Guadalca.n.a.l from the sea. Goto's defeat at the hands of Norman Scott was a small setback. The rest of the big push he was preparing against the island continued on schedule. As Scott was finishing his sc.r.a.pe with Goto's cruisers, two j.a.panese battleships, the Kongo Kongo and and Haruna, Haruna, were pressing down through the Slot toward their objective: bombarding Henderson Field. were pressing down through the Slot toward their objective: bombarding Henderson Field.

NEAR MIDNIGHT ON October 13, the warning horn mounted in Henderson Field's j.a.panese-built paG.o.da tower began sounding its forlorn, winding wail. A single-engine plane was heard overhead, and lightning was seen to flash. For half a second the gra.s.sy plain around the airfield's perimeter was visible in bright relief. Then everything was black again. None of these events was remarkable. Nuisance artillery fire and petty air raids were nightly occurrences. An officer with the Marine intelligence section, Thayer Soule, lay in his bunk counting off the interval from flash to thunder. Hearing the drone of the j.a.panese aircraft overhead, he thought, October 13, the warning horn mounted in Henderson Field's j.a.panese-built paG.o.da tower began sounding its forlorn, winding wail. A single-engine plane was heard overhead, and lightning was seen to flash. For half a second the gra.s.sy plain around the airfield's perimeter was visible in bright relief. Then everything was black again. None of these events was remarkable. Nuisance artillery fire and petty air raids were nightly occurrences. An officer with the Marine intelligence section, Thayer Soule, lay in his bunk counting off the interval from flash to thunder. Hearing the drone of the j.a.panese aircraft overhead, he thought, d.a.m.n that plane, keeping us awake. d.a.m.n that plane, keeping us awake.

Then an escalation, and the arrival of a waking nightmare: "Outside, a thousand rockets burst in the sky. The tent snapped taut. The blast blew me from my bunk. I groped for my shoes. This was a shoes-off night, the major had said. The light died out in a shower of sparks. Somebody shouted, 'Star sh.e.l.l!' Another crushing blast! A heavy salvo landed on the other side of the ridge. Trees snapped. Men up there cascaded off the cliff. Major Mather in pajamas. We hit the hole and sat, eleven of us, in a nine-foot-square hole."

The alert to Condition Red sounded. Henderson Field's defenders poured from their mosquito-netted tents into a battlefield of biting malarial insects. On instinct and reflex, a thousand combat-seasoned men were racing for cover.

A gunner's mate a.s.signed to the Naval Operating Base, Bill Kennedy, recalled the night of October 13 the way everyone would, as a terrifying holocaust. "The exploding gunfire from the ship was so loud and the concussion so great that we were literally blown out of our bunks. Shaving mirrors and what little gla.s.s we had around was broken. Running from tent to foxhole was like running a new kind of obstacle course; when a salvo was fired, the concussion threw you to the ground. Then when you got up, the concussion from the exploding salvo on the airstrip threw you down again."

The unseen ships that were hitting them were unnervingly close to sh.o.r.e. The trajectory of their gunfire was tellingly flat. The marines could feel on their skin the heat of the projectiles ripping by overhead, tr.i.m.m.i.n.g the fronds from the tops of palm trees and blowing coconuts loose from their high groves. Fear paralyzed even the most proven veterans. "The air was filled with a bedlam of sound: the screaming of sh.e.l.ls, the dull roar of cannonading off sh.o.r.e, the whine of shrapnel, the thud of palm trees as they were severed and hit the ground, and in the lulls from the big noises, the ceaseless sifting of dirt into the foxhole."

Soule scrambled into a shelter roofed with logs and steel plates and sandbags, smartly sited in the defilade of a ridge. "Our single light bulb swayed as salvos shook the ground.... Wham! Another salvo close by, then silence. There we sat-the colonel, the major, all of us-sitting on palm-log seats, staring at the too-low ceiling. n.o.body spoke.... The plane was overhead now, and there was that flash again, red and fiery. I saw it out of the corner of my eye. Let's see. Count to twenty-eight. We waited and counted. My knees wouldn't stop shaking.... The earth heaved. Heavy pieces thudded on the roof. My stomach caved in. My head swam. The light went out. Or was I blind? I choked on the dust now thick in the air. We all coughed, gasped, coughed again, and sat there dazed."

Someone tried to light a lamp. The phone rang and someone moved to answer it. "Again the earth heaved. The roof bounced. The steel plates rang. One of the logs cracked but didn't give. Dirt crashed into the entrance behind me. A tinkle of gla.s.s got through the blast. I smelled kerosene. Because we were in the center of the impact area, there was no whine, no shriek, no sound like a train, just the blast. It came all at once-the noise, the punch of wind, the dust. I guess we all blacked out."

The terrible march of the naval bombardment proceeded away from them now, having spared neither enlisted man nor general officer. No sh.e.l.ling they had ever taken came close to this. j.a.panese field artillerymen suffered from a serious shortage of ammunition that limited their output to less than a dozen rounds per day. Many of their guns were worn from prior service in China and Manchuria. Their Navy was another story. The battleships' enormous guns were well maintained and well within their range. The Marine fighter ace Joe Foss found himself seized physically by the experience. "It seemed as if all the props had been kicked from under the sky and we were crushed underneath," he said. One salvo came perilously close to decapitating the leadership of the 1st Marine Division, knocking Arch Vandegrift himself to the dirt in his shelter.

Then, somewhere offsh.o.r.e, fire was checked. The great armored turrets were brought in to the centerline, hoists stopped, and rudders turned so that the marauders could escape the coming of daylight. Morning revealed the results of the bombardment. In the foxholes and tents and covered pits around Henderson Field, forty-one men lay dead.

Littering the torn earth were hundreds of small tubes. The length of a finger, an inch in diameter, they were innocuous enough when inspected up close. Packed in large projectiles and showered in from a few miles out to sea, designed to fall at a certain angle and burst at the height of a telephone pole, their incendiary and fragmentation payloads dismembered aircraft and men within a wide radius of the airfield and its dispersal areas. The storm over the airfield played havoc with the camp and its infrastructure.

"Daylight disclosed what we had feared but dared not say," Soule remembered. Tent camps shredded, gear ruined, and large holes scooped from the ground all across the encampment. "Atop our shelter were two big pieces of shrapnel, three inches thick, two feet long. Two men could barely lift them. A little jigsaw work showed that they were parts of one sh.e.l.l fourteen inches in diameter! Whole salvos had landed around us. The airfield had been clobbered." Just one of the coast.w.a.tcher station's three aerial masts remained standing, an Australian coast.w.a.tcher named MacKenzie wrote, "but luckily the teleradio transmitting aerial, in falling, had caught up in the head of a palm. We called 20J for a test report on our signal strength and readability. The answer came back at once: 'Seems much improved. Have you been making adjustments?'"

Still, the raking that the battleships Kongo Kongo and and Haruna Haruna delivered that night was no laughing matter. Until then, young marines had learned to strut with disregard for the j.a.panese howitzers hidden in the hills. Their sh.e.l.ls seldom reached the airfield. A journalist a.s.signed to the area wrote, "The Marines at the airport treat its sh.e.l.ls the way city-wise pedestrians treat taxicabs-with caution, but without nervousness." But these same men were thunderstruck by the heavier throw-weight of fourteen-inch guns. It wasn't the weight of steel that got under their skin. "It was the hopelessness, the feeling that n.o.body gave a curse whether we lived or died," said Lieutenant Commander John E. Lawrence, one of the Cactus Air Force's air combat information officers. "It soaked into you until you couldn't trust your own mind. You'd brief a pilot, and no sooner had he taken off than you'd get frantic, wondering if you'd forgotten to tell him some trivial thing that might become the indispensable factor in saving his life." The physical and emotional penetrations of the 973 large-caliber projectiles would be felt for a long time to come. Some would call this bombardment "All h.e.l.l's Eve." It was the heaviest and most concentrated artillery sh.e.l.ling a fighting man had to that time ever endured. delivered that night was no laughing matter. Until then, young marines had learned to strut with disregard for the j.a.panese howitzers hidden in the hills. Their sh.e.l.ls seldom reached the airfield. A journalist a.s.signed to the area wrote, "The Marines at the airport treat its sh.e.l.ls the way city-wise pedestrians treat taxicabs-with caution, but without nervousness." But these same men were thunderstruck by the heavier throw-weight of fourteen-inch guns. It wasn't the weight of steel that got under their skin. "It was the hopelessness, the feeling that n.o.body gave a curse whether we lived or died," said Lieutenant Commander John E. Lawrence, one of the Cactus Air Force's air combat information officers. "It soaked into you until you couldn't trust your own mind. You'd brief a pilot, and no sooner had he taken off than you'd get frantic, wondering if you'd forgotten to tell him some trivial thing that might become the indispensable factor in saving his life." The physical and emotional penetrations of the 973 large-caliber projectiles would be felt for a long time to come. Some would call this bombardment "All h.e.l.l's Eve." It was the heaviest and most concentrated artillery sh.e.l.ling a fighting man had to that time ever endured.

The use of battleships in direct support of the Army was a rare departure from the typical Imperial j.a.panese Navy way. Guided by its old doctrine of seeing a decisive battle against the enemy fleet, it preferred to h.o.a.rd its heavy combatants until they could be loosed for the lethal, war-ending blow. Rear Admiral Takeo Kurita had protested his orders to bring the two 762-foot-long monsters into Savo Sound so vehemently that Yamamoto had to threaten to lead the mission himself before he finally relented.

Covered by fighters flying from Buin, an airfield south of Bougainville, the battleships arrived in an audacious gamble. And it paid off. Up in smoke went all of Henderson Field's Avenger torpedo bombers, a dozen of its forty-two fighter aircraft, and all but seven of its thirty-nine dive-bombers, along with nearly all of its aviation fuel. The only defense offered by the U.S. Navy that night consisted of four PT boats sortieing from Tulagi and skirmishing fruitlessly with Kurita's destroyer screen. The mighty Washington Washington was not far away, having just escorted a convoy carrying Army reinforcements to a point just south of San Cristobal. In the company of the was not far away, having just escorted a convoy carrying Army reinforcements to a point just south of San Cristobal. In the company of the Atlanta Atlanta and two destroyers, she parted ways with the convoy on the evening of October 12, and was en route south to Espiritu Santo when Kurita's biggies came calling. and two destroyers, she parted ways with the convoy on the evening of October 12, and was en route south to Espiritu Santo when Kurita's biggies came calling.

The j.a.panese tide was so high, their appet.i.te for bombarding U.S. sh.o.r.e targets so strong, that even Espiritu Santo was not safe. On the morning of October 14, a j.a.panese submarine surfaced off Segond Channel and opened up on the airfield with its deck gun. That day Yamamoto declared Henderson Field "suppressed."

In the days following Admiral Scott's return to base after the Battle of Cape Esperance, U.S. naval forces were largely powerless to challenge what seemed an unceasing tide of j.a.panese ships. Pilots of American patrol planes were reporting more enemy vessels carving southerly wakes. On the morning of the fourteenth, two groups were spotted heading toward the island. One was especially foreboding: a force of six troop transports escorted by destroyers. The other was a pair of heavy cruisers and an escort of two destroyers.

The only available U.S. carrier, the Hornet, Hornet, was far from the theater of action, fueling northwest of New Caledonia. The was far from the theater of action, fueling northwest of New Caledonia. The Washington Washington and the and the Atlanta Atlanta were en route south, a day from reaching Espiritu Santo. were en route south, a day from reaching Espiritu Santo.

On Guadalca.n.a.l, a lieutenant colonel from the headquarters of the Marine air commander on Guadalca.n.a.l, General Roy Geiger, paid a visit to one of his squadrons and described a dire and potentially disastrous situation. In the midst of intermittent j.a.panese artillery fire from the hills, he told them, "We don't know whether we'll be able to hold the field or not." He said another task force of enemy warships and troop transports was headed their way. "We have enough gasoline for one mission against them. Load your airplanes with bombs and go out with the dive-bombers." If on their return to base they landed in the midst of a pitched battle against newly landed j.a.panese troops, the pilots were told they would no longer have the luxury of fighting with wing-mounted machine guns, thousands of feet above their targets. "After the gas is gone we'll have to let the ground troops take over," he said. "Then your officers and men will attach themselves to some infantry outfit. Good luck and goodbye."

As instructed, the pilots flew off under the bright South Seas sun. As it turned out, speeches were speeches and their momentous mission was no Hollywood film. Planting a thousand-pound bomb with a delayed-action fuze into a speeding, veering destroyer was difficult even for a pilot who was not strung out after sleepless weeks of air attacks and artillery bombardment. Though even a near miss that fell seventy-five feet away could inflict damage, the Dauntless dive-bomber pilots, flying in pickup squads that sometimes numbered as few as two to four planes, were seldom effective. The two waves of air attacks the Cactus Air Force sent out on the fourteenth damaged only a single enemy destroyer. Meanwhile, the six heavily laden j.a.panese transports, with major elements of the Combined Fleet standing off far to the east, plunged toward Guadalca.n.a.l.

ON THE AFTERNOON OF October 14, Ghormley informed Nimitz that the j.a.panese transports would land on the island that night, that enemy carriers and cruisers were on the move, and that he had no carriers to intercept. October 14, Ghormley informed Nimitz that the j.a.panese transports would land on the island that night, that enemy carriers and cruisers were on the move, and that he had no carriers to intercept. "THE SITUATION IS CRITICAL AND ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS MUST BE STOPPED IF OUR POSITION IN CACTUS IS TO BE HELD." "THE SITUATION IS CRITICAL AND ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS MUST BE STOPPED IF OUR POSITION IN CACTUS IS TO BE HELD."

That night, the defenders of Henderson Field were given no peace for rest. Admiral Mikawa, in his flagship Chokai, Chokai, with the heavy cruiser with the heavy cruiser Kinugasa, Kinugasa, accompanied a convoy to its unloading point off Ta.s.safaronga, then detached the two cruisers to roam off Henderson Field. As the transports anch.o.r.ed offsh.o.r.e and began disgorging troops to the beach, the two cruisers lit up the sound for the second consecutive night, firing more than seven hundred eight-inch sh.e.l.ls into the airfield without challenge. accompanied a convoy to its unloading point off Ta.s.safaronga, then detached the two cruisers to roam off Henderson Field. As the transports anch.o.r.ed offsh.o.r.e and began disgorging troops to the beach, the two cruisers lit up the sound for the second consecutive night, firing more than seven hundred eight-inch sh.e.l.ls into the airfield without challenge.

At dawn, the unloading of j.a.panese transports continued within plain sight of the besieged Marine detachment but outside the range of their artillery. The Cactus Air Force cobbled together an attack from available aircraft, fueled by dribbles of remnant aviation gasoline salvaged or brought in to the airdrome via emergency means, and damaged three of the transports badly enough that their captains chose to beach them. Protected by an umbrella of fighter planes from Nagumo's carriers, the j.a.panese beachmasters still unloaded forty-five hundred men and two-thirds of their cargo and supplies from the grounded ships.

The tenacity of the j.a.panese reinforcement effort and the power of its air cover compelled Ghormley to turn back one of his own convoys, scheduled to arrive that morning. On the morning of October 16, he ordered three tugs towing barges loaded with urgently needed gasoline to reverse course and leave the area. The destroyer that accompanied them, the Meredith Meredith-she towed a barge as well-was sent forward to Guadalca.n.a.l, only to be set upon by planes from the Zuikaku Zuikaku and quickly sunk. Her survivors, adrift for three days, lost well over two hundred of their company to sharks. and quickly sunk. Her survivors, adrift for three days, lost well over two hundred of their company to sharks.

The success of the enemy landings underscored an undeniable truth. In the words of the coast.w.a.tcher MacKenzie, "It became immediately obvious that to hold Guadalca.n.a.l it was essential for the U.S. Navy to gain control of the sea." Looking at his roster of ships after the Cape Esperance battle, Nimitz wrote to King, "SECURITY [OF] OUR POSITION CACTUS DEPENDS UPON ADDITIONAL FORCES NOT NOW IN SIGHT." "SECURITY [OF] OUR POSITION CACTUS DEPENDS UPON ADDITIONAL FORCES NOT NOW IN SIGHT." Vandegrift's marines, he noted, had taken a heavy pounding from air and sea and Vandegrift's marines, he noted, had taken a heavy pounding from air and sea and "CANNOT REMAIN EFFECTIVE INDEFINITELY UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS." "CANNOT REMAIN EFFECTIVE INDEFINITELY UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS."

Despite the victory, Yamamoto, too, was feeling the despair of attrition. "I have resigned myself to spending the whole of my remaining life in the next one hundred days," he wrote to a friend.

Nimitz wrote, "It now appears that we are unable to control the sea in the Guadalca.n.a.l area. Thus our supply of the positions will only be done at great expense to us. The situation is not hopeless, but it is certainly critical." As if to underscore his point, on the night of the fifteenth the heavy cruisers Maya Maya and and Myoko Myoko arrived off Lunga Point unopposed and turned loose on Henderson Field with more than a thousand sh.e.l.ls. After this, the third consecutive night of naval bombardment, the Cactus Air Force found itself in possession of just nine Wildcats, eleven Dauntlesses, seven Airacobras, and no Avenger torpedo bombers-barely a third of its previous strength. Though the fuel needs of this diminished contingent weren't what they once were, there was a desperate shortage of avgas as well. Rear Admiral Fitch, the new commander of SOPAC land-based air forces, delivered a grim a.s.sessment to Ghormley. The Marines, Fitch wrote, arrived off Lunga Point unopposed and turned loose on Henderson Field with more than a thousand sh.e.l.ls. After this, the third consecutive night of naval bombardment, the Cactus Air Force found itself in possession of just nine Wildcats, eleven Dauntlesses, seven Airacobras, and no Avenger torpedo bombers-barely a third of its previous strength. Though the fuel needs of this diminished contingent weren't what they once were, there was a desperate shortage of avgas as well. Rear Admiral Fitch, the new commander of SOPAC land-based air forces, delivered a grim a.s.sessment to Ghormley. The Marines, Fitch wrote, "CAN USE NO MORE AIRCRAFT UNTIL THE AVGAS SITUATION IMPROVES AND UNTIL DESTRUCTIVE ENEMY FIRE ON AIRFIELD FROM BOTH LAND AND SEA IS HALTED. SO LONG AS ENEMY SHIPS PATROL THE SEA AREA OFF LUNGA DAY AND NIGHT I CANNOT SEE HOW [DESTROYERS OR BARGES] CAN BE BROUGHT IN WITH REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND UNTIL THIS IS CHANGED, THE AVGAS SITUATION CANNOT BE IMPROVED TO ANY EXTENT. OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS NOW LIMITED TO STRIKES FROM b.u.t.tON [ESPIRITU SANTO]." "CAN USE NO MORE AIRCRAFT UNTIL THE AVGAS SITUATION IMPROVES AND UNTIL DESTRUCTIVE ENEMY FIRE ON AIRFIELD FROM BOTH LAND AND SEA IS HALTED. SO LONG AS ENEMY SHIPS PATROL THE SEA AREA OFF LUNGA DAY AND NIGHT I CANNOT SEE HOW [DESTROYERS OR BARGES] CAN BE BROUGHT IN WITH REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND UNTIL THIS IS CHANGED, THE AVGAS SITUATION CANNOT BE IMPROVED TO ANY EXTENT. OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS NOW LIMITED TO STRIKES FROM b.u.t.tON [ESPIRITU SANTO]."

The delivery of fuel would proceed on the backs of some unlikely beasts of burden: submarines, barges towed by tugboats, and cargo planes. Ground crews picked through the skeletal remains of the planes destroyed in the bombardment to drain the last of their tanks.

With the service fleet, submarine force, and cargo aviators extending themselves to help supply the island, it was easy for the riflemen to wonder about the combat fleet. "The j.a.ps have the run of the waters around Guadalca.n.a.l," Marine intelligence officer Herbert Merillat wrote in his diary on October 15. "Where is our Navy, everyone wants to know. I still have confidence in them, and feel sure they are doing something to counter this threat. If not, we are lost." Surveying the gra.s.sy expanse of the Fighter One airstrip, half a mile from Henderson Field, General Geiger said to one of his squadron commanders, "I don't think we have a G.o.dd.a.m.n Navy."

20.

The Weight of a War AFTER THE GREAT CARRIER DUELS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR, the obituary of the surface fleet had been prematurely written. Even if Scott's victory did nothing to stop the earth-shattering bombardment that swallowed Henderson Field the next night-he parried the jab, but never saw the roundhouse coming-he had put a dent in the notion of j.a.panese invincibility and given some swagger to the American light forces.

Admiral Ghormley's conservatism would continue to keep the battleship Washington Washington chained to a carrier task force. But the chained to a carrier task force. But the Atlanta, Atlanta, which was designed for a defensive role in a carrier task force, was now thrown into Scott's fighting line with her eight destroyer-sized turrets. which was designed for a defensive role in a carrier task force, was now thrown into Scott's fighting line with her eight destroyer-sized turrets.

The Atlanta Atlanta's men understood the practical tradecraft of combat. The ship's newsletter contained exhortations on various matters of fighting efficiency. During gunnery operations: cotton in the ears. At night on deck: all cigarettes out. At battle stations: watertight doors shut. When a sailor had nothing else to do, he could make a mental map of the locations of fire extinguishers. If your six hundred shipmates all improved the way they performed a single small task, the collective benefit could be large.

Lloyd Mustin, the deputy boss of the guns, knew what the score was against the j.a.panese fleet. He vented to his diary, "Call it what you will, their navy is exercising every function of control of the sea and every single resultant advantage is accruing to them.... The usual indecision, fear of a surface fight, trying once more to do it all by plane in the teeth of steadily repeated proofs that it couldn't be done that way, has now brought us to this. We are forced into a surface fight." The officers of Samuel Jenkins's ship took every opportunity to learn from what their counterparts in the San Francisco San Francisco and the and the Salt Lake City Salt Lake City had experienced against the j.a.panese. had experienced against the j.a.panese. What does it look like when everybody opens fire? What range do you pick them up with the radar? What speeds are they using? What are their reactions? What does it look like when everybody opens fire? What range do you pick them up with the radar? What speeds are they using? What are their reactions? Mustin said, "There were lots of lessons to be learned, and we sought them out eagerly and got the information." Mustin said, "There were lots of lessons to be learned, and we sought them out eagerly and got the information."

The Atlanta Atlanta had spent the first half of October steaming with Willis Lee's flagship, the had spent the first half of October steaming with Willis Lee's flagship, the Washington, Washington, in defense of the in defense of the Hornet Hornet task force, the only carrier in the theater. When Lee was around, Mustin noticed, the air vibrated differently. "He was the perfect example of an officer who made sure everyone knew what he wanted done." This knowledge clarified people's purpose and gave shape to their plans. task force, the only carrier in the theater. When Lee was around, Mustin noticed, the air vibrated differently. "He was the perfect example of an officer who made sure everyone knew what he wanted done." This knowledge clarified people's purpose and gave shape to their plans.

Mustin had the kind of garrulous personality that recommended him for liaison work. The Atlanta Atlanta's exec, Commander Dallas Emory, sent him over to the Washington Washington to share stories with her unbloodied gunnery department about the carrier battle in the eastern Solomons and the surface battle off Savo. Mustin found the to share stories with her unbloodied gunnery department about the carrier battle in the eastern Solomons and the surface battle off Savo. Mustin found the Washington Washington's crew "magnificently trained with just a gorgeous morale," in part because of the intensity of their recent deployment to the Atlantic. There the possibility of an encounter with the German battleship Tirpitz Tirpitz had concentrated their minds. In offset gunnery exercises with the had concentrated their minds. In offset gunnery exercises with the Atlanta, Atlanta, the the Washington Washington put on a show. put on a show.

With the battleship firing from thirty-five thousand yards, far over the horizon and out of sight except for the top of her mast, Mustin stationed himself on the Atlanta Atlanta's fantail with an apparatus to measure and report where the battleship's projectiles landed. When the Washington Washington let loose, a gout of yellow-brown muzzle smoke would blot the horizon. Then, after a certain lapse of time, came a crash of heavy sh.e.l.ls in the sea, followed by a supersonic crack and the rippling roll of the guns from below the horizon. The sh.e.l.ls landed smack in the middle of the let loose, a gout of yellow-brown muzzle smoke would blot the horizon. Then, after a certain lapse of time, came a crash of heavy sh.e.l.ls in the sea, followed by a supersonic crack and the rippling roll of the guns from below the horizon. The sh.e.l.ls landed smack in the middle of the Atlanta Atlanta's wake, raising columns of seawater, closely cl.u.s.tered. Mustin knew the discipline that underlay not only the accuracy but also the tightness of the pattern. Willis Lee and Captain Glenn B. Davis knew what they were doing. "They didn't come down over and short. They came down right on, meaning that the Washington Washington's battery was beautifully aligned and beautifully calibrated. Those 2,700-pound armor-piercing projectiles were going to be very bad news for anybody they were ever aimed at."

The men on Henderson Field no doubt would have pa.s.sed the night of October 1314 very differently had the Navy's leadership been willing to turn loose the Washington Washington from convoy escort and send her into Savo Sound. from convoy escort and send her into Savo Sound.

EVER SINCE HE RETURNED from his visit to SOPAC in early October, Chester Nimitz had fretted over the type of leadership being exercised by his old friend Bob Ghormley. Nimitz had put a sunny face on things for the benefit of the press, telling from his visit to SOPAC in early October, Chester Nimitz had fretted over the type of leadership being exercised by his old friend Bob Ghormley. Nimitz had put a sunny face on things for the benefit of the press, telling The New York Times, The New York Times, "The j.a.panese must not be underestimated. They are brave, resourceful and, for the most part, experienced fighters. But now they are meeting people with those same characteristics and are suffering losses accordingly." His real feelings were reserved for private conversations with staff. What troubled Nimitz most was something that General Arnold had noted: The closer one got to the fighting front, the higher the level of confidence one found. Defeatism was nowhere more p.r.o.nounced than in the rear areas. "The j.a.panese must not be underestimated. They are brave, resourceful and, for the most part, experienced fighters. But now they are meeting people with those same characteristics and are suffering losses accordingly." His real feelings were reserved for private conversations with staff. What troubled Nimitz most was something that General Arnold had noted: The closer one got to the fighting front, the higher the level of confidence one found. Defeatism was nowhere more p.r.o.nounced than in the rear areas.

When Hanson Baldwin flew into the theater in late September, the New York Times New York Times man received a powerful impression of Ghormley. "He was almost despairing. He was heavily overworked and he said, 'This is a shoestring operation, we haven't got enough of anything. We're just hanging on by our teeth.' He was very frank about this. Here was a time when you needed tough, hard, almost ruthless men. He was a miscast, in my opinion. He should never have been in that job. He was a superb planner and he should have been kept as a planner, but I don't think he was a good operator.... The staff didn't share these impressions entirely, but they were becoming infected. So the whole thing was very unpleasant." man received a powerful impression of Ghormley. "He was almost despairing. He was heavily overworked and he said, 'This is a shoestring operation, we haven't got enough of anything. We're just hanging on by our teeth.' He was very frank about this. Here was a time when you needed tough, hard, almost ruthless men. He was a miscast, in my opinion. He should never have been in that job. He was a superb planner and he should have been kept as a planner, but I don't think he was a good operator.... The staff didn't share these impressions entirely, but they were becoming infected. So the whole thing was very unpleasant."

One of the few failures of leadership that Admiral Nimitz might be accused of was his failure to make sure Ghormley exerted personal command over his South Pacific naval forces. Admiral King's original directive to Nimitz had stated, "a.s.sume you will make Ghormley Task Force commander at least for Task One [the seizure of Tulagi and Guadalca.n.a.l], which he should command in person in the operating area." Though it was far from clear exactly what this should have meant, it was initially interpreted to be the New CaledoniaNew Hebrides area. Ghormley never ventured north of Noumea.

In these difficult days, Ghormley summoned one of his operations staff, Lieutenant Charles W. Weaver, and asked him to start keeping a personal log of events. As Weaver explained, "I think he had a premonition then that he was going to have to make an accounting later."

In the early hours of October 16, General Vandegrift radioed Ghormley as follows: "THE SITUATION DEMANDS TWO URGENT AND IMMEDIATE STEPS: A: TAKE AND MAINTAIN CONTROL OF SEA AREA ADJACENT TO CACTUS TO PREVENT FURTHER ENEMY LANDINGS AND ENEMY BOMBARDMENT SUCH AS THIS FORCE HAS TAKEN FOR THE LAST 3 NIGHTS. B: REINFORCEMENT OF GROUND FORCES BY AT LEAST 1 DIVISION IN ORDER THAT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS MAY BE INITIATED TO DESTROY HOSTILE FORCE NOW ON CACTUS." "THE SITUATION DEMANDS TWO URGENT AND IMMEDIATE STEPS: A: TAKE AND MAINTAIN CONTROL OF SEA AREA ADJACENT TO CACTUS TO PREVENT FURTHER ENEMY LANDINGS AND ENEMY BOMBARDMENT SUCH AS THIS FORCE HAS TAKEN FOR THE LAST 3 NIGHTS. B: REINFORCEMENT OF GROUND FORCES BY AT LEAST 1 DIVISION IN ORDER THAT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS MAY BE INITIATED TO DESTROY HOSTILE FORCE NOW ON CACTUS."

Ghormley read the message and a few hours later sent a dispatch to Nimitz, King, and all the ships under his command, informing them that part B of the request, which would have stripped area bases of their small garrisons, was not possible with the current troop levels in the theater. "URGENTLY NEED THIS AREA 1 ADDITIONAL ARMY INFANTRY DIVISION. PRESENT FORCES.... INSUFFICIENT TO GARRISON PRESENT BASES AND THEREFORE OBVIOUSLY INADEQUATE [TO] SUPPORT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. HAVE NEITHER ON HAND NOR IN SIGHT SUFFICIENT FORCES TO RENDER CACTUS SECURE AGAINST PRESENT INFILTRATION TACTICS."

The next message Ghormley sent to Nimitz would be the final straw. Referring to aircraft sighting reports from Canberra indicating the presence of a j.a.panese aircraft carrier west of the Santa Cruz Islands, he wrote, "THIS APPEARS TO BE ALL OUT ENEMY EFFORT AGAINST CACTUS POSSIBLY OTHER POSITIONS ALSO. MY FORCES TOTALLY INADEQUATE [TO] MEET SITUATION. URGENTLY REQUEST ALL AVIATION REINFORCEMENT POSSIBLE."

Lieutenant Ernest Eller was with Nimitz at Pacific Fleet headquarters on the night this message arrived. The mood was already tense. Nimitz was preparing, among other things, to inform his commander in the Aleutians that his roster of warships was to be stripped to fulfill the "overwhelming need for strength in SoPac." His intelligence section, fresh from predicting one of the j.a.panese bombardments of Henderson Field, learned from radio intercepts that two enemy carriers were close by, north of the island. Eller called it "one of the few times that I really saw Admiral Nimitz excited, emotionally. He wasn't demonstrative. But you could see it in his face and his eyes."

Late one night Eller overheard a discussion that began behind the closed doors to Nimitz's office and suddenly swelled and spilled out into the hall. Some members of Nimitz's staff were speaking to their boss in vehement tones. "The situation looked very dark on Guadalca.n.a.l. It looked like the j.a.panese were about to overrun the airfield," Eller said. "We'd had heavy ship losses. I guess it was toward midnight. I was still in the office working and came out to listen." Nimitz's staff, it seemed, was on the verge of insurrection.

There was a sense that the fleet was laboring under a hesitating, pa.s.sive hand. As Nimitz's intelligence officer, Edwin T. Layton, wrote, "It was evident to all of us at Pearl that Ghormley was faltering. His actions-or lack of them-had abdicated command of the sea to the enemy." That difficult reality put Nimitz in a bind. Though "it was obvious that [Nimitz] felt that Ghormley had handed over command of the sea to the j.a.panese," Nimitz told his staff that he wouldn't tolerate gloom and defeatism. He certainly didn't like their suggestion that Ghormley be relieved. This last recommendation, he said with uncharacteristic overstatement, was "mutiny."

In fact, the possibility of Ghormley's relief had come up at staff meetings as early as the first week of September. There were concerns about his health; candidates for his replacement were discussed. Nimitz was said to prefer Kelly Turner for the job, but a certain stigma had attached to the commander of the amphibious force following the early losses in his cruiser force.1 At the time, Nimitz deflected the conversation, saying he would visit Noumea himself and check on Ghormley's condition. Now, after long consideration of the style of his leadership and the content of his dispatches, Nimitz concluded not only that Ghormley was "too immersed in detail and not sufficiently bold and aggressive at the right times," but that he was on the verge of an actual nervous breakdown. Nimitz was no clinician, but he was a perceptive reader of people. If his conclusion was too stark for him to record in its own day, many years later he would state this opinion in no uncertain terms. At the time, Nimitz deflected the conversation, saying he would visit Noumea himself and check on Ghormley's condition. Now, after long consideration of the style of his leadership and the content of his dispatches, Nimitz concluded not only that Ghormley was "too immersed in detail and not sufficiently bold and aggressive at the right times," but that he was on the verge of an actual nervous breakdown. Nimitz was no clinician, but he was a perceptive reader of people. If his conclusion was too stark for him to record in its own day, many years later he would state this opinion in no uncertain terms.

A few days after Nimitz had decried their "mutiny," Layton and some other staffers decided they needed to see their commander in chief again to press their earlier recommendation. Though the admiral was preparing himself for bed, he agreed to see them for five minutes. "We wasted no time spelling out what was on our minds," Layton wrote. "The situation was so grave that he could not allow any thought of kindness or sympathy for a brother officer to stand in the way. Nimitz thanked us. He said he understood entirely why we had spoken so frankly. There was no further discussion of the painful issue."

Nimitz had burdened Ghormley with his complete and unfaltering trust. It was painful to see his friend waver under it. Nimitz suffered a sleepless night on October 15 before notifying King of his doubts about his SOPAC commander the next morning. "IN VIEW GHORMLEY'S [LATEST DISPATCH] AND OTHER INDICATIONS INCLUDING SOME NOTED DURING MY VISIT I HAVE UNDER CONSIDERATION HIS RELIEF BY HALSEY AT EARLIEST PRACTICABLE TIME. REQUEST YOUR COMMENT."

"It was a sore mental struggle and the decision was not reached until after hours of anguished consideration," Nimitz wrote Catherine. "I feel better now that it has been done. I am very fond of G. and hope I have not made a life enemy. I believe not. The interest of the nation transcends private interests."

When Nimitz's message was decoded in Washington that afternoon, the COMINCH was preoccupied arguing with General Arnold about fifteen groups of Army planes that King believed had been earmarked for the Pacific. His terse reply seemed more like a response to a recommendation than an exchange of views on a tentative idea. Addressed to Nimitz marked, "Personal and Secret / Most Secret," it contained a single operative word: "APPROVED." With that, Robert L. Ghormley's career as a leader in the war zone was over.

AFTER SCOTT'S VICTORY at Cape Esperance, the Navy made its first public release of details about the sea battles of the previous two months. The public hungered for news of the war's first American-led offensive. A dispatch went out detailing Scott's victory over Goto. With this good news cushioning the blow, it also acknowledged the defeat at Savo Island. On his visit to Henderson Field, Hanson Baldwin of at Cape Esperance, the Navy made its first public release of details about the sea battles of the previous two months. The public hungered for news of the war's first American-led offensive. A dispatch went out detailing Scott's victory over Goto. With this good news cushioning the blow, it also acknowledged the defeat at Savo Island. On his visit to Henderson Field, Hanson Baldwin of The New York Times The New York Times had sniffed out the latter story, as well as the torpedoing of the had sniffed out the latter story, as well as the torpedoing of the North Carolina. North Carolina. Though he itched to file stories, he saw a larger need. American readers certainly deserved to know the truth about Savo. The question was whether it put sailors at risk in the continuing fight. Baldwin wrote a series of stories, including an account of Savo as he had learned it on the beaches of Guadalca.n.a.l and the decks of warships. His eventual accounts withheld the number of ships sunk, their names, and the vulnerabilities that resulted in their loss. "I fudged this very carefully because I realized it was very important that the j.a.ps not know exactly how damaged we were." Though he itched to file stories, he saw a larger need. American readers certainly deserved to know the truth about Savo. The question was whether it put sailors at risk in the continuing fight. Baldwin wrote a series of stories, including an account of Savo as he had learned it on the beaches of Guadalca.n.a.l and the decks of warships. His eventual accounts withheld the number of ships sunk, their names, and the vulnerabilities that resulted in their loss. "I fudged this very carefully because I realized it was very important that the j.a.ps not know exactly how damaged we were."

At Espiritu Santo, Norman Scott's healthy ships scavenged from the wounded. The Salt Lake City, Salt Lake City, still seeping water through stressed rivets, and the still seeping water through stressed rivets, and the Boise, Boise, damaged to within three degrees of her life, were ordered home for repair. Before leaving for Noumea on October 15, the two cruisers gave up the dregs of their magazines to the damaged to within three degrees of her life, were ordered home for repair. Before leaving for Noumea on October 15, the two cruisers gave up the dregs of their magazines to the San Francisco San Francisco and the and the Helena, Helena, respectively. The admiral himself visited a hospital ship and paid tribute in the sickbay. "Not once during the entire visit was I answered with a grumble or a bellyache or a whine, but invariably with a grin or at least with an attempt at one," Scott wrote to his wife, Marjorie, at their home in Washington. "Sometimes the answer would be low, and I would lean well over to make the conversation easier going. It might take a few seconds, and then I would hear, 'I'm doing pretty well, thank you, sir.' One like that, and your heart goes right out to him. It is the custom in the Navy to remove one's cap in the sick bay. Mine will always be off to those men." respectively. The admiral himself visited a hospital ship and paid tribute in the sickbay. "Not once during the entire visit was I answered with a grumble or a bellyache or a whine, but invariably with a grin or at least with an attempt at one," Scott wrote to his wife, Marjorie, at their home in Washington. "Sometimes the answer would be low, and I would lean well over to make the conversation easier going. It might take a few seconds, and then I would hear, 'I'm doing pretty well, thank you, sir.' One like that, and your heart goes right out to him. It is the custom in the Navy to remove one's cap in the sick bay. Mine will always be off to those men."

Scott doffed his cap, too, to his old friend of a quarter century, Bob Ghormley. "Dear Ghorm," he wrote him, "Going back to our old days of friendship-twenty-four years-I do not feel like saying that I am sorry about this situation of yours. That doesn't express it. It seems to me, if what you say is literally true, that the change was inevitable. I doubt if many people can really appreciate the endless difficulties you ran up against, beginning with the Cactus show before the 1st of August, when you came into the South Pacific. It is too much to expect that you would not run into a dead end eventually.

"Now that you have sc.r.a.pped a good sc.r.a.p give the guilty ones one more good stiff punch-where it will do our mail the most good.

"If and when you reach Washington please phone Mrs. Scott. We will both appreciate it.

"Best luck as ever, Sincerely, Norm."

AMONG GHORMLEY'S LAST ACTS as theater commander was to order the still-viable ships of Task Force 64 back into the fray for Savo Sound. The as theater commander was to order the still-viable ships of Task Force 64 back into the fray for Savo Sound. The San Francisco, Helena, San Francisco, Helena, and and Atlanta, Atlanta, joined by the heavy cruiser joined by the heavy cruiser Chester Chester and eight destroyers, refueled and departed at daybreak escorted by six destroyers. This powerful squadron was soon augmented by a true heavyweight. The 44,500-ton battleship and eight destroyers, refueled and departed at daybreak escorted by six destroyers. This powerful squadron was soon augmented by a true heavyweight. The 44,500-ton battleship Washington, Washington, Admiral Lee's flagship, joined them under way. Plans had been drawn up for the Admiral Lee's flagship, joined them under way. Plans had been drawn up for the Atlanta Atlanta to go as well, but she received other last-minute orders. She drew an a.s.signment to bombard j.a.panese positions off Lunga Point, in support of infantry operating behind enemy lines. When Captain Jenkins's ship arrived on station, Marine officers motored out to her with field maps marked with j.a.panese troop areas and supply dumps. In just under two hours the to go as well, but she received other last-minute orders. She drew an a.s.signment to bombard j.a.panese positions off Lunga Point, in support of infantry operating behind enemy lines. When Captain Jenkins's ship arrived on station, Marine officers motored out to her with field maps marked with j.a.panese troop areas and supply dumps. In just under two hours the Atlanta Atlanta liberally salted the jungles of northern Guadalca.n.a.l with quick-fuzed anti-personnel projectiles that detonated on impact with treetops or the ground; with timed sh.e.l.ls that sprayed airbursts across the jungle and fields; and with star sh.e.l.ls that coughed burning magnesium that stuck to and scalded everything it touched. By the end of it, the antiaircraft cruiser's decks fore and aft were blocked by piles of empty bra.s.s sh.e.l.l cases, more than four thousand of them all told. liberally salted the jungles of northern Guadalca.n.a.l with quick-fuzed anti-personnel projectiles that detonated on impact with treetops or the ground; with timed sh.e.l.ls that sprayed airbursts across the jungle and fields; and with star sh.e.l.ls that coughed burning magnesium that stuck to and scalded everything it touched. By the end of it, the antiaircraft cruiser's decks fore and aft were blocked by piles of empty bra.s.s sh.e.l.l cases, more than four thousand of them all told.

The crew gave the visiting marines cigarettes and parted as brothers in arms. "They were just delighted at what we had done, and as far as they were concerned it didn't matter whether we hit one single j.a.p in there or not," Mustin said. "It had let the j.a.ps know that there were other people to contend with than just the few marines on the island."

1 The notion would arise that the defeat at Savo was the reason for Ghormley's removal. Ghormley had no hand in the tactical dispositions that night. The notion would arise that the defeat at Savo was the reason for Ghormley's removal. Ghormley had no hand in the tactical dispositions that night.

21.

Enter Fighting WHEN ADMIRAL HALSEY BOARDED A BIG CORONADO FLYING BOAT on October 16 and took off from Pearl Harbor, bound for Noumea, his orders were to take command of the task force that included his old ship, the on October 16 and took off from Pearl Harbor, bound for Noumea, his orders were to take command of the task force that included his old ship, the Enterprise, Enterprise, now fully repaired and ready to rejoin the fight. With him in the four-engine aircraft was Nimitz's chief of staff, Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, who was under orders to inspect conditions at headquarters and report to his boss on, among other things, the readiness for command of one William F. Halsey, Jr. The hero of the early-1942 carrier attacks on the Marshall and Gilbert islands as well as the Doolittle raid in April, Halsey had missed the chance to serve in the Battle of Midway because of a viral skin condition: herpes zoster, or shingles, a malady that was thought to have a psychosomatic component. Before he saddled him with a theater command, Nimitz wanted rea.s.surance that Halsey could be depended on to reenter the war as his old effective self. now fully repaired and ready to rejoin the fight. With him in the four-engine aircraft was Nimitz's chief of staff, Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, who was under orders to inspect conditions at headquarters and report to his boss on, among other things, the readiness for command of one William F. Halsey, Jr. The hero of the early-1942 carrier attacks on the Marshall and Gilbert islands as well as the Doolittle raid in April, Halsey had missed the chance to serve in the Battle of Midway because of a viral skin condition: herpes zoster, or shingles, a malady that was thought to have a psychosomatic component. Before he saddled him with a theater command, Nimitz wanted rea.s.surance that Halsey could be depended on to reenter the war as his old effective self.

Gauging Halsey's mood and temperament on the flight, Spruance liked what he saw and reported it to Nimitz. And so the final piece of Nimitz's command reorganization was set into place. When Halsey's flying boat touched down in Noumea's glistening harbor on the afternoon of October 18, a whaleboat came alongside. Admiral Ghormley's flag lieutenant stepped out, saluted, and handed Halsey a sealed envelope. Opening it, he found another sealed envelope. Inside was a memo from Nimitz.

"You will take command of the South Pacific Area and the South Pacific Forces immediately," it read.

The first words the "utterly surprised" admiral spoke in response were, "This is the hottest potato they ever handed me!" When Halsey boarded the Argonne Argonne and finally located his old friend and Naval Academy football teammate in a cramped cl.u.s.ter of steel compartments, hot and oppressive, he understood right away the need for his relief. Ghormley, to Halsey's eye, was "burdened beyond my own personal capacity," swamped in reports and data and plans, a.s.sisted by a single staffer in the ma.s.sive task of overseeing operations. "I have always insisted on comfortable offices and quarters for my staff," Halsey would write. "Their day's work is so long, their schedule so irregular, the strain so intense, that I am determined for them to work in whatever ease is available." Why were the headquarters so meager? Ghormley told Halsey he had been unable to find s.p.a.ce ash.o.r.e. The French, it seemed, had been intransigent. and finally located his old friend and Naval Academy football teammate in a cramped cl.u.s.ter of steel compartments, hot and oppressive, he understood right away the need for his relief. Ghormley, to Halsey's eye, was "burdened beyond my own personal capacity," swamped in reports and data and plans, a.s.sisted by a single staffer in the ma.s.sive task of overseeing operations. "I have always insisted on comfortable offices and quarters for my staff," Halsey would write. "Their day's work is so long, their schedule so irregular, the strain so intense, that I am determined for them to work in whatever ease is available." Why were the headquarters so meager? Ghormley told Halsey he had been unable to find s.p.a.ce ash.o.r.e. The French, it seemed, had been intransigent.

The day before Halsey's plane splashed down in Noumea harbor, Ghormley received notice from Nimitz that Halsey was en route to relieve him. Ghormley acquainted Halsey with the facilities of his operations before taking his leave and boarding a plane for Pearl Harbor, then on to Washington.

The word that a new boss was in town pa.s.sed quickly through the loudspeakers of every ship in SOPAC, and from tent to Quonset hut to tent ash.o.r.e. Halsey's arrival was electric. Ed Hooper, an a.s.sistant gunnery officer in the battleship Washington, Washington, said, "We were absolutely elated when we heard the news. It was a shot of adrenaline for the whole command; things had been getting pretty wishy-washy down there." Even the junior officers had been fidgeting under the absence of inspiring leadership. "During wartime it's important how the leadership, starting with the Chief of Naval Operations, gets a message across to everybody in every ship, submarine, airplane and sh.o.r.e station. You need to hear it said that this is an extraordinary moment in your life and in the life of the country, and that you're not going to let it down," the said, "We were absolutely elated when we heard the news. It was a shot of adrenaline for the whole command; things had been getting pretty wishy-washy down there." Even the junior officers had been fidgeting under the absence of inspiring leadership. "During wartime it's important how the leadership, starting with the Chief of Naval Operations, gets a message across to everybody in every ship, submarine, airplane and sh.o.r.e station. You need to hear it said that this is an extraordinary moment in your life and in the life of the country, and that you're not going to let it down," the Atlanta Atlanta's Robert Graff said. "Until that day, we had received no such message."

When Halsey had taken the Enterprise Enterprise to sea in late 1941, he issued Battle Order Number One, which read: "The to sea in late 1941, he issued Battle Order Number One, which read: "The Enterprise Enterprise is now operating under war conditions.... Pilots will sink anything they sight." The declaration was unremarkable except for the fact that it was issued more than a week before the strike on Pearl Harbor. When Halsey was barely into his twenties, his Annapolis cla.s.smates referred to him as "A real old salt. Looks like a figurehead of Neptune." His men liked his style. He had once said he was perfectly willing to divide the Pacific Ocean with j.a.pan. "We would take the top; j.a.pan would take the bottom." is now operating under war conditions.... Pilots will sink anything they sight." The declaration was unremarkable except for the fact that it was issued more than a week before the strike on Pearl Harbor. When Halsey was barely into his twenties, his Annapolis cla.s.smates referred to him as "A real old salt. Looks like a figurehead of Neptune." His men liked his style. He had once said he was perfectly willing to divide the Pacific Ocean with j.a.pan. "We would take the top; j.a.pan would take the bottom."

From a seagoing family, Halsey had sailed with Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet as an ensign on the battleship Kansas. Kansas. While that experience had taught him to appreciate the symbolism of naval power, he did not generally speak the language of the diplomat. "He was a fighting man, sans fancy tr.i.m.m.i.n.gs," the journalist Joe James Custer wrote. "He slipped in deftly, and he hit and he hurt. He was adept and clever, and he packed a terrific wallop: he was the Jack Dempsey of the Pacific raiders, he poled the j.a.ps for a goal, and he swung from the floor." While that experience had taught him to appreciate the symbolism of naval power, he did not generally speak the language of the diplomat. "He was a fighting man, sans fancy tr.i.m.m.i.n.gs," the journalist Joe James Custer wrote. "He slipped in deftly, and he hit and he hurt. He was adept and clever, and he packed a terrific wallop: he was the Jack Dempsey of the Pacific raiders, he poled the j.a.ps for a goal, and he swung from the floor."

Back in January, commanding the Enterprise Enterprise during the raid on j.a.pan's Marshall Islands bases, he taunted the base commander over the radio: "From the American admiral in charge of the striking force, to the j.a.panese admiral on the Marshall Islands. It is a pleasure to thank you for having your patrol plane not sight my force." Halsey's public tauntings of the j.a.panese were so aggressive and frequent that a rumor spread that they had vowed to capture him and torture him to death. His colleagues Aubrey Fitch and William Calhoun reportedly embraced and gleefully spread this rumor. Sometimes when they saw Halsey they would mimic stirring a large cauldron, intoning, during the raid on j.a.pan's Marshall Islands bases, he taunted the base commander over the radio: "From the American admiral in charge of the striking force, to the j.a.panese admiral on the Marshall Islands. It is a pleasure to thank you for having your patrol plane not sight my force." Halsey's public tauntings of the j.a.panese were so aggressive and frequent that a rumor spread that they had vowed to capture him and torture him to death. His colleagues Aubrey Fitch and William Calhoun reportedly embraced and gleefully spread this rumor. Sometimes when they saw Halsey they would mimic stirring a large cauldron, intoning, "Boiling oil...!" "Boiling oil...!" Halsey's inevitable reply-"You go to h.e.l.l!" Halsey's inevitable reply-"You go to h.e.l.l!"

Halsey was neither a genius nor even a working scholar in any academic or technical field, but he had a quality of brilliance that may have been even more important in a combat capacity. He was, it was said, "brilliant in common sense." He knew that battles and wars were won not princ.i.p.ally with well-drafted paperwork or subtle diplomacy or high materials and engineering ratings aboard ship, but by something quite simple and direct: placing ordnance on target. He knew, working backward from there, that the quality of the mind and spirit of the men distributing that ordnance was at least as important as the mechanical state of the weapons themselves. And he knew that small and simple acts, trivial in themselves but intangibly powerful, raised and perfected that quality; sometimes those things were as prosaic as showing up and listening to people.

In the new South Pacific headquarters, a culture of informality reigned. Halsey rejected the new gray uniforms mandated by Washington. He favored working khakis. "The officers and chiefs of my command are wholly at liberty to wear the d.a.m.n things-if, that is, they are so lacking in naval courtesy and have such limited intelligence as to prefer dressing differently from the commander of the force," he wrote. Halsey's approach to dress wasn't dogmatic or dictatorial. A verse graced a plaque in the front hall of the headquarters: "COMPLETE WITH BLACK TIE / YOU DO LOOK TERRIFIC, / BUT TAKE IT OFF HERE: / THIS IS STILL SOUTH PACIFIC!" "COMPLETE WITH BLACK TIE / YOU DO LOOK TERRIFIC, / BUT TAKE IT OFF HERE: / THIS IS STILL SOUTH PACIFIC!"

The casual ethos helped promote something else Halsey thought important: eliminating the distinctions among the services. His men were not marines or sailors or soldiers, but warriors of the South Pacific Fighting Forces. Halsey's all-service esprit de guerre esprit de guerre was relentlessly practical. Interservice tribalism was always costly, and all costs paid to the enemy's cause. Halsey wasn't shy about drawing from the Department of the Army's budget. Under the principle of a united SOPAC team, he drew in Army welders, electricians, and mechanics to service the fleet-and asked that the cooperation be loudly touted. "I would like to see it widely advertised that the army is helping us here. I have never seen anything like the spirit there is in this neck of the woods. It is a real United States service." was relentlessly practical. Interservice tribalism was always costly, and all costs paid to the enemy's cause. Halsey wasn't shy about drawing from the Department of the Army's budget. Under the principle of a united SOPAC team, he drew in Army welders, electricians, and mechanics to service the fleet-and asked that the cooperation be loudly touted. "I would like to see it widely advertised that the army is helping us here. I have never seen anything like the spirit there is in this neck of the woods. It is a real United States service."

Taking in the breadth of his duties, Halsey quickly sympathized with his predecessor. "As I dug into my new job, I realized that the tremendous burden of responsibility that Bob Ghormley had been carrying was far beyond my own capacity." No matter how brilliant or hardworking a man was, he couldn't do it himself. Halsey would lean on his staff. "There's a lot to be done," he told them. "Look around, see what it is, and do it." Halsey had once begged off from an a.s.signment to command the Norfolk Navy Yard. His reasoning, as he told the Navy's personnel chief at the time, Chester Nimitz, was that he didn't feel suited to administering an industrial establishment. That, of course, was precisely what he had signed on for now.

Halsey continued Ghormley's effort to clear the cargo logjam at Noumea. He expanded the plan to increase covered storage from 200,000 square feet to a million, then brought in hardware for a new 160-by-600-foot pier and tools to equip three new construction battalions. Since forceful leadership always seemed to be in short supply, he asked for a captain or commander from the Civil Engineer Corps to command the Seabees. "The maximum possible urgency must be a.s.signed to the development of this base," he wrote King's office. When Halsey invoked urgency and immediacy, he did it not in complaint but in affirmation, on behalf of specific tasks and challenges. The long memorandum he sent to Nimitz demanding more of everything (above all "tankers and more tankers and more tankers") was detailed and straightforward but did not suggest "or else disaster will follow," as Ghormley's sometimes did. "You are well aware of our needs and this is not offered in complaint or as an excuse but just to keep the pot boiling," he wrote to Nimitz.

His manner of securing a new headquarters from the French administration at Noumea reflected his action-minded personal ethos. One day he sent his intelligence officer, Marine Colonel Julian P. Brown, to discuss his headquarters accommodations with the Free French governor. Wearing his best dress uniform, pinned with decorations dating to the First World War, Brown presented himself and began pressing the case for a new American facility ash.o.r.e. When the governor asked, "What do we get in exchange?" Brown replied with the same ordnance-on-target forthrightness that Halsey was known for, if with some uncharacteristic sobriety: "We will continue to protect you as we have always done." This somehow failed to impress the governor, who in grand diplomatic fashion took the matter under advis.e.m.e.nt. It required little more of such treatment before Halsey went volcanic. He rode ash.o.r.e with a contingent of marines, marched to the headquarters of Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, the surly haut commissaire, haut commissaire, posted the U.S. colors, and, finding the Frenchman absent, took over his office and set out his guard. For his personal quarters, Halsey seized the former j.a.panese consul's residence, a brick house with a view of the harbor. As construction battalions broke ground for new recreational facilities-until then strictly forbidden by the Free French-it was clear whose well-being Halsey was committed to, and whose loyalty he was out to win. posted the U.S. colors, and, finding the Frenchman absent, took over his office and set out his guard. For his personal quarters, Halsey seized the former j.a.panese consul's residence, a brick house with a view of the harbor. As construction battalions broke ground for new recreational facilities-until then strictly forbidden by the Free French-it was clear whose well-being Halsey was committed to, and whose loyalty he was out to win.

AS HALSEY WAS taking SOPAC's reins in Noumea, U.S. naval intelligence concluded that Admiral Yamamoto had a.s.sumed direct command of j.a.panese naval forces in the area. On October 19, radio snoopers noted something else that seemed ominous: High-precedence traffic had dropped to a level suggesting that the Combined Fleet was in "the final period of adjustment and preparation for action on a major scale." The nightly runs of the Tokyo Express through the Slot had boosted the j.a.p