Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil Volume II Part 10

Considering our difficulties in a fair way of now being settled, I willingly undertook to conciliate the seamen, and having made the low calculation of _Rs_. 650.000 milreis--a sum scarcely one-fourth the value of the prize property--reported to the Minister of Marine the willingness of the squadron generally to accept 600,000 dollars (about .120,000) in compensation of their full rights; agreeing, moreover, to give up all claim on the Imperial Government on payment of one-half, and security for the remainder.

Notwithstanding this easy mode of arrangement, solely brought about by my personal influence with the men, not a milrea was allotted, His Majesty's ministers deliberately evading the Imperial wishes and promises. On the contrary, the more His Majesty was determined to do the squadron justice the more was the Portuguese faction in the ministry bent on frustrating the Imperial intentions--notwithstanding that, by the revolutionary proceedings in the North, the integrity of the empire was at stake. I may indeed go farther and state with great truth, that whilst His Majesty was most anxious for our speedy departure, in order to suppress the revolution at Pernambuco, his ministers were, day by day, addressing to me letters on the most insignificant subjects, with the apparent object of delaying the squadron by official frivolities, the necessity of replying to which would prevent my attention to the fulfilment of the Imperial wish. The best proof of this is the fact which will be apparent in the course of this chapter, viz.--that although the province of Pernambuco was in open revolt, the Administration contrived to delay the sailing of the squadron for _six months_ beyond the events just narrated.

On the 24th of February, the following extraordinary _portaria_ was transmitted to me by the Minister of Marine:--

Desiring to give a further testimony of the high estimation in which the Marquis of Maranha, First Admiral of the National and Imperial Armada, is held, by reason of the distinguished services which he has rendered to the state, and which it is hoped that he will continue to render for the independence of Brazil, I deem it proper to name him Commander-in-Chief of all the naval forces of the empire _during the present war_. The Supreme Military Council is hereby informed thereof, and will cause this decree to be executed.

Palace of Rio Janeiro, the 23rd of February, 1824. Third of the Independence of the Empire, with the Rubrica of His Imperial Majesty.

FRANCISCO VILLELA BARBOSA,

Secretariat of State,

27th February, 1824.

(Signed) ANASTASIO DE BRITO,

Acting Chief Secretary.

The audacity of this _portaria_--setting aside the stipulations of His Majesty and his late ministers in my commission, thus rendering it null and void without my consent--was only equalled by its hypocrisy. As a "_further testimony_ of the high estimation in which I was held,"

&c.--His Majesty's ministers were graciously pleased to annul my commission, in order that they might get rid of me at a moment's warning!

The doc.u.ment transmitted to me _did not_ bear the Rubrica of the Emperor, though falsely a.s.serted so to do. If the reader will take the trouble to compare it with my two commissions, he will agree with me in the inference that it was written by Barbosa without the Emperor's knowledge or consent, with the object of terminating my command--the Imperial patents notwithstanding, as will be evident from the expression, "_during the present war;_" the war being _already ended_ by my expulsion of the Portuguese fleet and army.

No time was lost in remonstrating against this insidious decree. After pointing out to the Minister of Marine the agreements which had been made with me by the late ministers, and ratified by the Imperial sign manual, I addressed His Excellency as follows:--

The late decree inserted in the Gazette of February 28th, instead of increasing my official rank and authority--as it professes to do--in effect circ.u.mscribes it, because _there was no limitation of time_ in the offer which I accepted from His Imperial Majesty. But by this decree, my official rank and authority are limited to the duration of the present war. Now, if I could believe that the idea of this limitation originated with his Imperial Majesty himself, I should respectfully and silently acquiesce; but being satisfied--from the gracious manner in which he has been pleased to act towards me on all occasions--that it did not so originate, I can only consider it an intimation of an opinion prevalent in the councils of the state, that myself and services can very well be done without, as soon as the independence of Brazil shall be decided or peace restored.

As no man can be expected to dedicate his professional services to a foreign country, without having a prospect of some recompence more durable than that which such a limitation as is expressed in the doc.u.ment in question seems to indicate, I am naturally led to inquire whether it is the intention of His Majesty's advisers that, on the termination of the present war, _my pay is to cease with my authority?_ or whether I am to receive any permanent reward for services, _the consequences of which will be permanent to Brazil?_ Because--if no recompence is to be received for public services --however important and lasting in their effects those services may be--it is a duty to myself and family to consider how far I am justified in farther devoting my time to a service from which so little future benefit is to be expected; a consideration the more interesting to me, in consequence of repeated solicitations from the Chilian Government to resume my rank and command in that state.

In saying thus much, you may consider me of a mercenary disposition; but I have received from Brazil _no recompence whatever_, beyond the honours conferred by His Imperial Majesty. If you will peruse the accompanying papers, you will find that when I left Chili I had disbursed of my own monies, 66,000 dollars, to keep the Chilian squadron from starving, which sum, in consequence of my leaving Chili, and accepting the offers of His Imperial Majesty, has not been repaid. This amount His Majesty and his ministers agreed to repay on my acceptance of the command; but I declined to seek reimburs.e.m.e.nt at the expense of Brazil, "unless I should perform greater services to the Empire than I had rendered to Chili; but in the event of such services being rendered to Brazil, and of Chili continuing its refusal to pay me, then--and not otherwise--I should hope for indemnification." To this stipulation the late ministers gave their a.s.sent.

It is no proof of an avaricious disposition that I at once acquiesced in the proposition of His Imperial Majesty, that 40,000 dollars only for the _Imperatrice_, which is not one-third of her value, should be apportioned to her captors.

(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHA.

I might have added that the squadron had received _no emoluments of any kind whatever_, notwithstanding the spontaneous stipulations of His Imperial Majesty to pay everything, there not being even an indication of handing over to them the 40,000 dollars awarded by His Majesty for the frigate captured at Para. On the contrary, I had been condemned in costs and damages to a great amount for having captured Portuguese vessels in pursuance of His Majesty's orders; so that had the Court of Admiralty been in a position to enforce these, I should not only be unpaid but be mulcted of a very large sum, as the price of having accepted the command of the Brazilian navy!

So far from the 40,000 dollars awarded by His Majesty for the capture of the frigate _Imperatrice_ having been paid according to the Imperial directions, I received from the Minister of Marine a letter dated February 27th, implying that the above sum--one third the value of the vessel--was when paid, to be considered as the _sole_ reward of the squadron. This violation of His Majesty's agreement was at once repudiated, and an explanatory letter from the Minister of Marine--almost as ambiguous as the former--a.s.sured me that I had misconstrued his intention, which, however, was not the case, for the 40,000 dollars were never paid.

On the 19th of March, a direct insult was offered me by Severiano da Costa, now first minister, by an intimation to attend in the Imperial chapel for the purpose of a.s.sisting at the ceremony of swearing to the Const.i.tution, but I was distinctly told that I should not be permitted to swear; the reason no doubt being, that, by a clause therein contained, military officers who swore to it, could not be dismissed without trial, and sentence of court martial; so that the not permitting me to swear--coupled with Barbosa's _portaria_ limiting my command to the duration of the war--indirectly gave power to the Administration to dismiss me at their option, whenever they might deem it expedient so to do. That such desire would arise the moment an opportunity might present itself, was certain, nor should I have waited for its expression, but from respectful attachment to His Majesty, and from the expectation of obtaining justice for the squadron, which relied on me for procuring satisfaction of their claims.

To have accepted an invitation of this public nature, under circ.u.mstances so insulting, was out of the question. I therefore joined Lady Cochrane at the island of Governador, and sent an excuse to the minister expressive of my regret at being prevented by unavoidable circ.u.mstances from sharing in the honour of the august ceremony.

In consequence of the insulting conduct of the Administration, and the impossibility of obtaining compensation for the squadron, notwithstanding His Majesty's orders to that effect, I made up my mind to quit a service in which the authority of the adverse Ministry was superior to that of the Sovereign. Accordingly, on the 20th of March, I addressed to the Minister of Marine a letter, from which the subjoined is an extract:--

If I thought that the course pursued towards me was dictated by His Imperial Majesty, it would be impossible for me to remain an hour longer in his service, and I should feel it my duty, at the earliest possible moment, to lay my commission at his feet. If I have not done so before--from the treatment which, in common with the navy, I have experienced--it has been solely from an anxious desire to promote His Majesty's real interests. Indeed, to struggle against prejudices, and at the same time against those in power, whose prepossessions are at variance with the interests of His Majesty, and the tranquillity and independence of Brazil, is a task to which I am by no means equal. I am, therefore, perfectly willing to resign the situation I hold, rather than contend against difficulties which appear to me insurmountable. I have only to add, that it will give me extreme satisfaction to find that Your Excellency is enabled to rear an effective marine out of the materials which const.i.tuted the fabric of the old marine of Portugal--or any Brazilian marine at all, without beginning on principles totally opposite to those which have been pursued since my return to this port.

(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHA.

This proffer of resignation was met by an a.s.surance that I had misconstrued both the acts and intentions of the Administration, and the expression of a hope that I would not think of abandoning Brazil for which I had done so much. The real fact was, that although the Administration was endeavouring to delay the expedition for the suppression of revolution in the North, they were afraid of its results, dreading that a _republican_ Government might be established, as was indeed imminent. It was only from a conviction of not being able to meet such an emergency, otherwise than through my instrumentality--that my resignation was not accepted.

Determined to pursue the course I had now begun, I addressed the following letter to the prime minister:--

Rio de Janeiro, March 30, 1824.

Most Excellent Sir,

The late Prime Minister, Jose Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, was pleased to express a desire that I should communicate directly with him in all extraordinary difficulties with respect to the naval service. If I have not had recourse to your Excellency until the present juncture, it has not been from any doubt of your readiness to accord me similar indulgence, but because the evils of which I had to complain were so palpable, that I conceived a remedy would--of necessity be applied in the ordinary course of things. But now that a system is adopted which must very soon bring the naval service of His Imperial Majesty to utter insignificance and ruin, I can no longer abstain from calling on your Excellency as Minister of State for the internal affairs of the empire, to interfere before it is too late.

Here follow complaints of the wretched state of the squadron--its want of repairs--the neglect of pay--the illegal imprisonment of officers for months without trial and on untenable grounds, &c. &c.

By the promises held out last year of punctuality in payment, and of other rewards, foreign officers and seamen were induced to enter the service--believing in the good faith of the Government. The result--in the short period that has elapsed--has been the complete expulsion of the enemy's forces, naval and military; all of whom would have been still in arms against the independence of Brazil, had it not been for the a.s.sistance of the foreign officers and seamen.

In the course of these important services, various captures were made and sent for adjudication to Rio de Janeiro, under the authority of His Imperial Majesty's orders to make war on the subjects and property of Portugal. The captures made in prosecution of the war were--according to the engagements under which the expedition proceeded--to be the reward of the captors in return for the benefits derived by the empire for their exertions.

Judge then, Sir, of the astonishment of the officers and seamen at finding on their return to this port eight months afterwards, that the Court of Admiralty (chiefly composed of natives of Portugal) pretended to be ignorant whether the nation was at war or peace!

Under this plea they have avoided the adjudication of the prizes--have thrown every impediment in the way of the captors--by giving sentences equally contrary to law, common sense and justice.

Great quant.i.ties of goods in the captured ships have decayed or wholly perished from lapse of time--great quant.i.ties more have been stolen--whilst whole cargoes, by the arbitrary authority of an auditor, have been given up without trial, to pretended owners, without even the decency of communication to the captors or their agents. In short, nothing has been done in furtherance of the gracious directions of His Majesty, given on the 12th ultimo, that the prize affairs should be instantly adjusted.

It is certainly a hardship to the Portuguese gentlemen in the Court of Admiralty, to be under the necessity of condemning property that belonged to their countrymen, friends, and relations; but if they have undertaken the duties of such an office, they ought not to be permitted to weigh their private feelings against their public duty--nor to bring upon the whole Government that character of bad faith, which has been so disgraceful, and has proved so injurious to all the Governments which have hitherto been established in South America.

Even the payment of wages was not made to the _Pedro Primiero_ till nearly three months after her return, when the seamen-- irritated by the evasion of their dues--had nearly all abandoned the ship; and if the crews of the _Nitherohy_ and _Carolina_ did not follow their example on their return to port, it was entirely owing to my perseverance before their arrival in procuring this tardy justice.

It was a maxim of the Emperor Napoleon, that "no events are trifling with regard to nations and sovereigns, their destinies being controlled by the most inconsiderable circ.u.mstances,"-- though circ.u.mstances which have the effect of causing the Imperial marine to be abandoned, ought not--in a national point of view--to be regarded as inconsiderable; but whether this be of importance or not, the consequences of such abandonment by men who have so faithfully performed their duty, will be far from beneficial to those short sighted and vain individuals who imagine that the employment of foreign officers is an obstacle to their own advancement.

If the present foreign officers are compelled to abandon their situations an explanation must be given of the cause, and public indignation must inevitably fall on the unreflecting heads of the prejudiced or selfish authors of such impolitic injustice.

I have heard it stated, as a motive for the delay in condemning the prizes, that the Government--in case of a treaty of peace-- might be called upon to refund the value to the original owners.

But, Sir, let me ask such wretched statesmen, what would have been the situation of Brazil, if foreign officers and seamen had refused to enter the service--as would have been the case, had no prize money been promised? In that case, it is true, the vessels in question would not have been taken--but it is equally true that the enemy's troops would not have been starved into the evacuation of Bahia, nor their squadron have been intimidated to flee from these sh.o.r.es. Military warfare would still have raged in the interior, and the hostile fleet might now have been engaged in the blockade of Rio de Janeiro itself. Would it not be infinitely better that the Government should have to pay the value of these prizes even twice over--than that such calamities should not have been averted?

But how can it be argued that the Government may be required to restore to the enemy prizes lawfully taken in war? Is it possible that the victors can be compelled to make humiliating terms with the vanquished? Certainly not--unless the means by which victory was obtained are insanely sacrificed, by permitting the squadron to go to ruin and decay. The results which have been obtained could not have been accomplished by any other measures than those adopted by the wisdom of His Imperial Majesty. Is it then justifiable, to suffer the engagements which produced such results to be evaded and set at nought? Still more monstrous--decrees have been pa.s.sed, both by the Auditor of Marine and the Court of Admiralty, to punish the captors for the execution of their duty, and by means of pains and penalties to deter them from the performance of it in future.

It is even more unjust and inconsistent, that although His Majesty's late ministers held out that ships of war were to be prize to the captors, they are now declared to be the property of the state!

Do those narrow-minded persons who prompted such a decree, imagine this to be a saving to the country? or do they expect that seamen--especially foreign seamen--will fight heartily on such terms? The power which the British navy has acquired arises from the wisdom of the government in making the interests of the officers and men identical with the interests of the state, which gives bounties and premiums even in addition to the full value of the prizes; whilst the insignificance and inefficiency of the navies of governments which adopt opposite principles, sufficiently indicate whether such liberality, or the want of it, is the best policy in maritime affairs.

Having said thus much on public matters, I shall very briefly trouble you with respect to myself, by stating that, as regards all which does not depend on the uncontrolled exercise of the Imperial functions--there has been no respect paid to the written stipulations entered into with me on accepting the command of the Brazilian navy, and that since my return from freeing the Northern provinces and uniting them to the Empire, every promise--written and verbal--has been evaded or set at nought, which facts I am prepared to prove beyond the possibility of contradiction.

My nature is not suspicious, nor did I ever become doubtful of promises and professions of friendship till after the third year of my connection with Chili--when, having swept every ship of war belonging to the enemy from the Pacific, the Chilian ministers imagined that they could dispense with my services. They had not, indeed, the candour which I have experienced here, for, after appointing me to a command without limitation as to time, _they did not publicly restrict the duration of that command to the earliest moment that they could dispense with me_. It was their plan--while openly professing kindness and grat.i.tude--to endeavour, by secret artifices, to render me odious to the public, and to transfer to me the responsibility which they themselves incurred by bringing the navy to ruin, and causing the seamen to abandon it, by withholding their pay, and even the provisions necessary for their subsistence.

As for the rest, my remonstrances against such conduct were treated in Chili just as my representations have been treated here. Like causes will ever produce similar effects; but as there was no hostile or Spanish party in the Chilian state, four years elapsed before the mischiefs could be accomplished, which, by the machinations of the Portuguese faction, have been here effected in the short s.p.a.ce of four months.

Truths are often disagreeable to those who are not in the habit of hearing them, and doubly offensive after long experience of the homage of blind obedience and subserviency. I have, nevertheless, always felt it my duty to the Governments under which I have served, not to abstain from uttering truths under any dread of offence, because I have ever been impressed with the conviction that speaking truth is not only the most honourable mode of proceeding, but that the time seldom fails to arrive when those who are warned of a wrong line of conduct feel grateful to the man--who at the risk of personal inconvenience, or even punishment--dared to apprise them of their danger.

In England--where mischiefs were heaped upon me for _opposing a ministerial vote of parliamentary thanks to an undeserving officer_--the people at once saw the propriety of my conduct, and the Government has since virtually admitted its justice. In Chili, the ministers who hated me, because they knew me to be aware of their deceitful and dishonest acts, were succeeded by others who have solicited my return. And the worthy and excellent Supreme Director (O'Higgins, whom those ministers, by their wickedness and folly, brought to ruin) found at last, and acknowledged--but too late to attend to my warnings--that I had acted towards him, in all cases, with honour and fidelity.

The error and fate of the excellent and eminent person whom I have just named--affords a proof of the folly and danger of the notion--that ministers who have forfeited the confidence of the public by breach of faith and evil acts, can be upheld by military force against public opinion, especially in Governments recently const.i.tuted. The people respected their Supreme Director; but when he marshalled his troops to uphold his evil ministers, he fell with them. Had he adopted the policy of Cromwell, and delivered to justice those who merited punishment, he would have saved himself.

Permit me to say, in conclusion, that the Ministers of His Imperial Majesty are identified with the Court of Admiralty, and with the officers whom they maintain in the different departments.