Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil Volume II Part 4

I have written to the Junta and the General commanding the military force, relative to particulars which I have felt it my duty to submit to their consideration. To you, as a professional man, I have nothing to suggest or request--but merely to express my conviction that, for the sake of humanity, you will give that professional opinion on the subject of my letters--should they be referred to you--which may be expected from a naval officer of your experience.

(Signed) COCHRANE.

The Admiral of the Portuguese Squadron.

On the 2nd of July, the whole Portuguese force, naval and military, got under weigh, and steered out--the troops being embarked in the armed transports and large merchantmen, whilst other vessels were filled with Portuguese families and their property--everything moveable being put on board--with the utmost confidence in the protection of their fleet. As only the flagship and _Maria de Gloria_ were present, we made no attempt to attack them whilst issuing from the mouth of the river, they no doubt ridiculing my warnings as communicated to the Junta and the commanding officers.

In this, however, they were mistaken; as every thing was in readiness, both on board the flagship and the _Maria de Gloria_, for immediate chase, so soon as the whole were clear of the port; though I had no intention--as they no doubt interpreted my letters--of attacking thirteen ships of war and numerous armed transports, with two ships alone, so long as they remained within the harbour; but when once out, the superior sailing qualities of these two ships would safely enable us to hara.s.s them with impunity.

As the merchant brig, _Colonel Allen_, which had conveyed us from Chili, was still with us, and as she might be made useful in looking after the prizes, I adopted her into the Brazilian navy under the name of the _Bahia_, appointing her master, Captain Haydon, to the rank of captain-lieutenant.

Whilst the Portuguese were pa.s.sing out, I wrote and despatched by the _Liberal_ schooner, the following letter to the Minister of Marine at Rio de Janeiro:--

_Pedro Primiero_, off Bahia, July 2nd, 1833.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency that the enemy's squadron have this day evacuated Bahia, their resources by sea being no longer available. Their ships of war, consisting of thirteen sail of different sizes, and many large merchantmen filled with troops, are now standing out of the bay.

It is my intention to pursue them as long as it shall appear beneficial so to do. This ship and the _Maria de Gloria_ are the only two in sight of the enemy, the _Carolina_ having been obliged to return to the Moro, in consequence of having lost a topmast, and the _Nitherohy_ not having joined. I hope in my next to be able to give you some account of the ulterior objects the enemy have in view, which, whatever they may be, I shall endeavour to frustrate.

(Signed) COCHRANE.

To the commanders of the other ships, I sent the following order on their joining the pursuit:--

It being improper to weaken the squadron, and impossible to officer and man the vessels which may fall into our hands, you are to adopt the following plan to secure them, viz. to send with the boats crews which board the enemy's vessels a sufficient number of crowbars, for the purpose of breaking up their water casks, leaving only water enough to carry them, on short allowance, into Bahia, to which port you are to order them immediately to return.

Their papers being essential to the justification of this or any other hostile act, the boarding officer will take especial care to secure them.

COCHRANE.

In addition to this, the masts of all troopships which might be boarded, were directed to be so far cut away as to prevent their escape--a written order instructing them to return forthwith to Bahia, on pain of being treated with great severity if found on any other course. Singular as the order may appear, it was in most cases obeyed, and thus the captured vessels navigated themselves into our hands.

The Portuguese squadron consisted of _Don Joa_, 74; _Const.i.tuca_,50; _Perola_, 44; _Princeza Real_,28; _Calypso_, 22; _Regeneraca_, 26; _Activa_, 22; _Dez de Fevereiro_, 26; _Audaz_, 20; _S. Gaulter_, 26; _Principe do Brazil_, 26; _Restauraca_, 26; _Canceica_, 8; with between sixty and seventy merchant vessels and transports filled with troops.

As soon as they were clear of the port, we fell upon the rearmost ships, disabling their main and mizen masts, so as to render it difficult for them to sail otherwise than before the wind, which would carry them to the Brazilian coast, and ordering them back to Bahia. The flagship and the _Maria de Gloria_ then resumed the pursuit, but the latter being employed in looking after the prizes, on the following morning we were alone amongst the enemy's convoy.

The next day, July 3rd, the _Carolina_ and _Nitherohy_ came up, as did also the _Colonel Allen_. The frigates captured a number of merchantmen mostly filled with Portuguese families--these unfortunate people finding to their cost that my warnings were not empty threats, though they had no doubt been led to ridicule the remonstrance by a misplaced confidence in the protection of their national squadron. Many prizes were taken, and as evening closed the frigates dropped out of sight with the captured vessels.

It would have been easy for the flagship also to have taken prizes, but about this I cared nothing,--my great object being to prevent the enemy from landing troops elsewhere, and with this view I determined on closely following the ships of war and transports--leaving the Brazilian frigates to exercise their own discretion in disabling the convoy. It may be considered an act of temerity for one ship of war thus to chase thirteen; but, enc.u.mbered as they were, and, as I knew, short of provisions, I felt a.s.sured of accomplishing my object.

The enemy--being greatly annoyed at our perseverance in following, and still more so at the loss of so many of the convoy--on the morning of the 4th, gave chase to the flagship with the whole squadron, endeavouring to hem her in, and at one time we were pursued so closely insh.o.r.e, that there was some danger of getting embayed, but the handling and superior sailing qualities of the _Pedro Primiero_ enabled her to out-manoeuvre them and get clear. On seeing this, the Portuguese squadron, finding further chase unavailing, gave us a broadside which did no damage, and resumed its position in the van of the convoy, to which we immediately gave chase as before, and as soon as night set in, dashed in amongst them, firing right and left till the nearest ships brought to, when they were boarded--the topmasts cut away--the rigging disabled--the arms thrown overboard--and the officers compelled to give their _parole_ not to serve against Brazil until regularly exchanged--an event not likely to happen.

Keeping well up with them on the 5th--as soon as night set in, this mode of attack was repeated, when we took a Russian vessel filled with Portuguese troops, and disabled her in like manner. Of the merchantmen within reach we took no notice, as it was impolitic to weaken the crew of the flagship by manning prizes, whilst, as we saw nothing of the remainder of the Brazilian squadron, there was no other means of preventing their escape.

The prudence of preserving the crew of the flagship entire, was now well exemplified. After taking possession of the Russian transport, at dusk, I observed half-a-dozen large ships detach themselves from the main body of the convoy, and suspecting some valid reason for the movement, immediately gave chase. Though they crowded all sail, we came up with them on the following morning, and singling out a large frigate-built ship, filled with troops, we fired upon her till she brought to. On boarding, we found her to be the _Gran Para_, containing--with the others--a division of several thousand troops, destined to maintain Portuguese authority in the province of Maranham--as, indeed, I had been informed at Bahia. The private signals and instructions of the Portuguese admiral--obtained by Flag-Lieutenant Grenfell from her captain--put me in possession of the whole arrangement, which was thus luckily frustrated.

As it was of importance not to let any of these troopships escape, Captain Grenfell was ordered to disable the _Gran Para_, cutting away her main and mizen masts, throwing the arms and ammunition overboard, taking possession of the regimental flags, and compelling the officers, as before, to give their _parole_ not to serve against Brazil. This done, the other transports were successively boarded and disabled, so far as was consistent with not leaving them positive wrecks on the water; for with my single ship, to have made prisoners of so numerous a body of troops was manifestly impossible.

The brig _Bahia_ having opportunely hove in sight, I seized four of the vessels carrying troops, and ordered Captain Haydon to convoy them to Pernambuco, to the President of which province I addressed the following letter:--

Pedro Primiero, July 7th, 1823.

ILl.u.s.tRIOUS AND EXCELLENT SIR,

The abandonment of Bahia by the enemy, in consequence of the rigours of blockade--and the capture of half of his army, ensigns, artillery, and stores, are events which you will be gratified to learn. Part of the captured officers and troops I send in for your disposal, having engaged that they shall be treated after the manner which may justly be expected from the high character of the Government of His Imperial Majesty, and the customary practice of all European states. I have to request that you will be pleased to order their disembarkation without delay.

We require seamen to finish the war. If you will be pleased to grant the bounty of 24 dollars per man, as at Rio--charging the same to the Government--you will render an essential service to your country. I do not mean Portuguese seamen--who are enemies; but able seamen of any other nation, and I need scarcely say, that from my knowledge of the character of the men, I should prefer British seamen to all others.

I shall probably have the honour of shortly making myself known to you, but that depends on circ.u.mstances over which I have no control. If we can come in, permit me to observe, that it would be conducive to the health of my crew to have ready a supply of fresh provisions and fruits, especially lemons and oranges. I hope you will excuse my freedom in mentioning these things, as the health of the men is as conducive to the interests of the empire as are the ships of war themselves.

I have the honour, &c.

COCHRANE.

Sent by the _Balia_, Captain Haydon.

By the same opportunity I despatched the following to the Minister of Marine:--

ILl.u.s.tRIOUS SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that half the enemy's army, their colours, cannon, ammunition, stores, and baggage, have been taken. We are still in pursuit, and shall endeavour to intercept the remainder of the troops, and shall then look after the ships of war, which would have been my first object, but that, in pursuing this course, the military would have escaped to occasion further hostilities against the Brazilian Empire.

Such of the enemy's colours as we have had time to take away I have the honour to transmit, and to lay them at the feet of His Imperial Majesty, and shall shortly forward the remainder.

The vessels taken are large and beautiful ships, fast sailers, and resemble, in their appearance, ships of war.

The Portuguese squadron, and other vessels armed for war, I have every reason to believe are on their route for Lisbon. I have also fully ascertained that the troopships which separated from their squadron during the night were destined for Maranham.

I have the honour, &c.

COCHRANE.

The Minister of Marine.

The pursuit was now resumed, but the weather becoming hazy, we saw nothing of the enemy till the 11th, when they appeared to have recovered the _Gran Para_. As it became calm, nothing could be done till the 14th, when we crossed the Equator in Long. 33-30, making straight for the ships of war, but finding them well together, considered it prudent to defer an attack till they should become separated.

On the 15th they continued united, giving us no opportunity for mischief, yet not venturing to attack us, though only one ship to thirteen. At 3 A.M. on the 16th, we crowded sail and went in amongst them, firing a broadside within half musket shot at one of the frigates with evident effect, as, from the damage caused, they did not return our fire. Whilst tacking to give them the other broadside, our mainsail split in two, and night setting in, we relinquished the pursuit in 5 degrees North lat.i.tude.

My object in so doing was--that as we had only taken part of the troopships destined for Maranham, it was quite possible--as that port lay to leeward--that the remainder might even yet reach their destination; and as the Portuguese authority still existed in that--as throughout all the Northern provinces--they might again be armed and equipped. The instructions of the Portuguese admiral were, moreover, that, in case of separation, they were to rendezvous at the island of Fernando de Noronha, near which they were fallen in with some days afterwards; so that there were good grounds for antic.i.p.ating the possibility of their yet reaching their original destination. Instead, therefore, of following the enemy's squadron farther, I thought we should better serve the interests of Brazil by proceeding direct to Maranham, with the double purpose of being beforehand with the enemy's troops, should the attempt be made--and, if practicable, reducing the province to the authority of the Emperor; a proceeding which, though not within my orders, was, as I conceived, nevertheless of great importance.

Accordingly, quitting the Portuguese fleet and convoy, during the obscurity of night, we made straight for Maranham.

Thus were the Northern provinces entirely rescued from the designs of this armament, which--luckily for the consolidation of the empire--I had been enabled to frustrate; so that the cause of independence became free to develop itself throughout its whole extent. It is satisfactory to record the fact, that the whole military force was captured or dispersed, and its objects averted--by a single ship--without the loss of a man on our part--or the additional cost of a dollar to the Imperial Government; though, when we left Rio de Janeiro, it was believed that such objects could only be effected by costly naval and military expeditions combined.

During this chase, as I have said, it did not appear a national object to make captures, though many were secured--as officers and seamen must have been detached for the purpose, thereby diminishing our efficiency for the annexation of those provinces where the Portuguese authority was still intact; to accomplish which--though such result was not expected by the Government--I had formed plans during the pursuit. Considering that zeal for Brazilian interests would be better shewn by expelling the enemy which remained, I therefore refrained from taking possession of many valuable ships, otherwise completely at our mercy, _though not having done so--then (previous to my experience of the Court of Admiralty) seemed_ a heavy pecuniary loss to myself, the officers, and crew. Such sacrifice should have secured us better treatment than we subsequently endured from the Administration of a country whose entire independence was thus obtained by our personal sacrifices.

The means of intimidation employed for the expulsion of the Portuguese from Bahia--the pursuit of the enemy's fleet--and the disabling of the troopships destined for Maranham--acts altogether in excess of the Imperial instructions--not only freed the Northern provinces from the enemy, but, as before stated, saved the Brazilian Government the delay, expense, and uncertainty of powerful expeditions.

These services--undertaken solely on my own responsibility--were productive of the most beneficial consequences to the future career of the Brazilian Empire, the integrity of which they secured at a blow, or it may rather be said, without a blow, for none of any magnitude was struck; the dread of the fireships and the certainty arising--from the nocturnal visit of the flagship on the 12th of June, that my plans for making use of them were completed--having determined the Portuguese Admiral to save his fleet by evacuating Bahia.