My Four Years in Germany Part 20

Of course, "rectification of the frontier" is a polite term for "annexation."

On the twenty-second of January, 1917, our President addressed the Senate; and in his address he referred to his Note of the eighteenth of December, sent to all belligerent governments. In this address he stated, referring to the reply of the Entente Powers to his Peace Note of the eighteenth of December, "We are that much nearer to the definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war."

He referred to the willingness of both contestants to discuss terms of peace, as follows: "The Central Powers united in reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement.

We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war." The President further referred to a world concert to guarantee peace in the future and said, "The present war must first be ended, but we owe it to candour and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that so far as our partic.i.p.ation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended." He said that the statesmen of both of the groups of nations at war had stated that it was not part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists, and he said that it must be implied from these a.s.surances that the peace to come must be "a peace without victory."

In the course of his address he said: "Statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland." In another place he said: "So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling toward a full development of its resources and its powers should be a.s.sured a direct outlet to the highways of the sea." Where this cannot be done by cession of territory it can no doubt be arranged by the neutralisation of direct rights of way; and he closed by proposing in effect that the nations of the world should adopt the Monroe Doctrine and that no nation should seek to explain its policy for any other nation or people.

After the receipt of the Ultimatum of January thirty-first from Germany, the Chancellor, in a conversation I had with him, referred to this Peace Note of December eighteenth and to the speech of January twenty-second.

[Ill.u.s.tration: A POSTER FROM THE CHARLEVILLE DISTRICT, SHOWING THE ALLOTMENT OF FOOD TO EACH PERSON FOR THE FIRST FIFTEEN DAYS OF MAY, 1916.]

I must say here that on my return to Germany I went very far in a.s.suring the Chancellor and other members of the Government of the President's desire to see peace established in the world; and I told them that I believed that the President was ready to go very far in the way of coercing any nation which refused a reasonable peace; but I also impressed on all the members of the Government with whom I came in contact my belief that the election had not in any way altered the policy of the President, and I warned them of the danger to our good relations if ruthless submarine warfare should be resumed.

Von Bethmann-Hollweg, however, at this interview after the thirty-first of January, said that he had been compelled to take up ruthless submarine war because it was evident that President Wilson could do nothing towards peace. He spoke particularly of the President's speech of January twenty-second and said that in that speech the President had made it plain that he considered that the answer of the Entente Powers to his Peace Note formed a basis for peace, which was a thing impossible for Germany even to consider; and said further (and this was a criticism I heard not only from him, but also from many Germans), that when the President spoke of a united and independent Poland he evidently meant to take away from Germany that part of Poland which had been incorporated in the Kingdom of Prussia and give it to this new and independent Kingdom, thereby bringing the Eastern frontier of Germany within two hours by motor from Berlin; and that, further, when the President spoke of giving each nation a highway to the sea, he meant that the German port of Dantzig should be turned over to this new State of Poland, thereby not only taking a Prussian port but cutting the extreme Eastern part of Prussia from the remainder of the country. I said that these objections appeared to me very frivolous; that the President, of course, like a clever lawyer endeavouring to gain his end, which was peace, had said that all parties were apparently agreed that there should be a peace; that if Germany were fighting a merely defensive war, as she had always claimed, she should be greatly delighted when the President declared that all the weight of America was in favor of a peace without victory, which meant, of course, that Germany should be secured from that crushing and dismemberment which Germany's statesmen had stated so often that they feared.

I said, further, that I was sure that when the President spoke of the united and independent State of Poland he had not, of course, had reference to Poland at any particular period of its history, but undoubtedly to Poland as const.i.tuted by Germany and Austria themselves; and that, in referring to the right of a nation to have access to the sea, he had in mind Russia and the Dardanelles rather than to any attempt to take a Prussian port for the benefit of Poland.

Von Bethmann-Hollweg said that one of the princ.i.p.al reasons why Germany had determined upon a resumption of ruthless submarine warfare was because of this speech of the President to the American Senate. Of course, the trouble with this feeling and the criticism of the President's speech made by the Chancellor is that the orders for the resumption of ruthless submarine warfare had been given long before the news of the speech came to Germany.

I had cabled the information collected by Commander Gherardi as to the orders given to submarines long before the date of the President's speech, and it happened that on the night after I had received the German note announcing this resumption I was taking a walk after dinner about the snow-covered streets of Berlin. In the course of this walk I met a young German woman of my acquaintance who was on intimate terms with the Crown Princess.

She was on her way on foot from the opera house, where she had been with the Crown Princess, to the underground station, for by this time, of course, taxis had become an unknown luxury in Berlin, and I joined her. I told her of the Ultimatum which, I had received at six o'clock that evening from Zimmermann and I told her that I was sure that it meant the breaking of diplomatic relations and our departure from Germany. She expressed great surprise that the submarine warfare was set to commence on the thirty-first of January and said that weeks before they had been talking over the matter at the Crown Princess's and that she had heard then that the orders had been given to commence it on the fifteenth. In any event it is certain that the orders to the submarine commanders had been given long prior to the thirty-first and probably as early as the fifteenth.

I sincerely believe that the only object of the Germans in making these peace offers was first to get the Allies, if possible, in a conference and there detach some or one of them by the offer of separate terms; or, if this scheme failed, then it was believed that the general offer and talk about peace would create a sentiment so favourable to the Germans that they might, without fear of action by the United States, resume ruthless submarine warfare against England.

A week or two before the thirty-first of January, Dr. Solf asked me if I did not think that it would be possible for the United States to permit the resumption of ruthless submarine warfare against Great Britain. He said that three months time was all that would be required to bring Great Britain to her knees and end the war. And in fact so cleverly did von Tirpitz, Grand Admiral von Meuster, the Conservatives and the enemies of the Chancellor and other advocates of submarine war carry on their propaganda that the belief was ingrained in the whole of the German nation that a resumption of this ruthless war would lead within three months to what all Germans so ardently desired--peace. It was impossible for any government to resist the popular demand for the use of this illegal means of warfare, because army and navy and people were convinced that ruthless submarine war spelled success and a glorious peace.

But this peace, of course, meant only a German peace, a peace as outlined to me by the Chancellor; a peace impossible for the Allies and even for the world to accept; a peace which would leave Germany immensely powerful and ready immediately after the war to take up a campaign against the nations of the Western hemisphere; a peace which would compel every nation, so long as German autocracy remained in the saddle, to devote its best energies, the most fruitful period of each man's life, to preparations for war.

On January thirtieth, I received a definite intimation of the coming Ultimatum the next day and, judging that the hint meant the resumption of ruthless submarine war, I telegraphed a warning to the American Amba.s.sadors and Ministers as well as to the State Department. On January thirty-first at about four o'clock in the afternoon I received from Zimmermann a short letter of which the following is a copy:

"The Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, Zimmermann, requests the honor of the visit of his Excellency, the Amba.s.sador of the United States of America, this afternoon at six o'clock in the Foreign Office, Wilhelmstra.s.se 75/76.

"Berlin, the 31st January, 1917."

Pursuant to this letter, I went to the Foreign Office at six o'clock. Zimmermann then read to me in German a note from the Imperial Government, announcing the creation of the war zones about Great Britain and France and the commencement of ruthless submarine warfare at twelve P. M. that night. I made no comment, put the note in my pocket and went back to the Emba.s.sy. It was then about seven P. M. and, of course, the note was immediately translated and despatched with all speed to America.

After the despatch of the note I had an interview with the Chancellor in which he, as I have stated above, criticised both the Peace Note of December eighteenth as not being definite enough and the speech to the Senate of January twenty-second; and further said that he believed that the situation had changed, that, in spite of what the President had said in the note before the _Suss.e.x_ settlement, he was now for peace, that he had been elected on a peace platform, and that nothing would happen.

Zimmermann at the time he delivered the note told me that this submarine warfare was a necessity for Germany, and that Germany could not hold out a year on the question of food. He further said, "Give us only two months of this kind of warfare and we shall end the war and make peace within three months."

Sat.u.r.day, February third, the President announced to Congress the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany. The news of this, of course, did not reach Berlin until the next day; and on this Sat.u.r.day afternoon Mrs. Gerard and I had an engagement to go to the theatre with Zimmermann and Mrs. Friedlaender-Fuld-Mitford, a young lady whose father is considered the richest man in Berlin, and who had been married to a young Englishman, named Mitford, a son of Lord Redesdale. Through no fault on the lady's part, there had been an annulment of this marriage; and she was occupying a floor of her own in the handsome house of her father and mother on the Pariser-Platz in Berlin. We stopped for Mrs. Mitford and took her to the theatre where we saw a very clever play, I think by Thoma, called "Die Verlorene Tochter" (The Prodigal Daughter).

Zimmermann did not come to the play but joined us later at the Friedlaender-Fuld House where we had a supper of four in Mrs.

Miiford's apartments. After supper, while I was talking to Zimmermann, he spoke of the note to America and said: "During the past month, this is what I have been doing so often at the General Headquarters with the Emperor. I often thought of telling you what was going on as I used to tell you in the old days, but I thought that you would only say that such a course would mean a break of diplomatic relations, and so I thought there was no use in telling you. But as you will see, everything will be all right. America will do nothing, for President Wilson is for peace and nothing else. Everything will go on as before. I have arranged for you to go to the Great General Headquarters and see the Kaiser next week and everything will be all right."

The next day, Sunday, we had a German who is connected with the Foreign Office and his American wife to lunch, and another German who had been in America, also connected with the Foreign Office.

Just as we were going in to lunch some one produced a copy of the "_B._Z._", the noon paper published in Berlin, which contained what seemed to be an authentic account of the breaking of diplomatic relations by America. The lunch was far from cheerful. The Germans looked very sad and said practically nothing, while I tried to make polite conversation at my end of the table.

The next day I went over to see Zimmermann, having that morning received the official despatch from Washington, and told him that I had come to demand my pa.s.sports.

Of course, Zimmermann by that time had received the news and had had time to compose himself. The American correspondents told me that when he saw them on the day before, he had at first refused to say anything and then had been rather violent in his language and had finally shown great emotion. I am sure, from everything I observed, that the break of diplomatic relations came as an intense surprise to him and to the other members of the government, and yet I cannot imagine why intelligent men should think that the United States of America had fallen so low as to bear without murmur this sudden kick in the face.

The police who had always been about our Emba.s.sy since the commencement of the war, were now greatly increased in numbers; and guarded not only the front of the house, but also the rear and the surrounding streets; but there was no demonstration whatever on the part of the people of Berlin. On Tuesday afternoon I went out for a walk, walking through most of the princ.i.p.al streets of Berlin, absolutely alone, and on my return to the Emba.s.sy I found Count Montgelas, who, with the rank of Minister, was at the head of the department which included American affairs in the Foreign Office. I asked Montgelas why I had not received my pa.s.sports, and he said that I was being kept back because the Imperial Government did not know what had happened to Count Bernstorff and that there had been rumours that the German ships in America had been confiscated by our government. I said that I was quite sure that Bernstorff was being treated with every courtesy and that the German ships had not been confiscated. I said, moreover, "I do not see why I have to disprove your idea that Bernstorff is being maltreated and the German ships confiscated. It seems to me it is for you to prove this; and, at any event, why don't you have the Swiss Government, which now represents you, cable to its Minister in Washington and get the exact facts?" He said, "Well, you know, the Swiss are not used to cabling."

He then produced a paper which was a re-affirmation of the treaty between Prussia and the United States of 1799, with some very extraordinary clauses added to it. He asked me to read this over and either to sign it or to get authority to sign it, and said that if it was not signed it would be very difficult for Americans to leave the country, particularly the American correspondents.

I read this treaty over and then said, "Of course I cannot sign this on my own responsibility and I will not cable to my government unless I can cable in cipher and give them my opinion of this doc.u.ment." He said, "That is impossible." This treaty was as follows:

Agreement between Germany and the United States of America concerning the treatment of each other's citizens and their private property after the severance of diplomatic relations.

_Article_1._

After the severance of diplomatic relations between Germany and the United States of America and in the event of the outbreak of war between the two Powers the citizens of either party and their private property in the territory of the other party shall be treated according to Article 23 of the treaty of amity and commerce between Prussia and the United States of 11 July, 1799, with the following explanatory and supplementary clauses.

_Article_2._

German merchants in the United States and American merchants in Germany shall so far as the treatment of their persons and their property is concerned be held in every respect on a par with the other persons mentioned in Article 23. Accordingly they shall even after the period provided for in Article 23 has elapsed be ent.i.tled to remain and continue their profession in the country of their residence.

Merchants as well as the other persons mentioned in Article 23 may be excluded from fortified places or other places of military importance.

_Article_3._

Germans in the United States and Americans in Germany shall be free to leave the country of their residence within the times and by the routes that shall be a.s.signed to them by the proper authorities.

The persons departing shall be ent.i.tled to take along their personal property including money, valuables and bank accounts excepting such property the exportation of which is prohibited according to general provisions.

_Article_4._

The protection of Germans in the United States and of Americans in Germany and of their property shall be guaranteed in accordance with the laws existing in the countries of either party. They shall be under no other restrictions concerning the enjoyment of their private rights and the judicial enforcement of their rights than neutral residents; they may accordingly not be transferred to concentration camps nor shall their private property be subject to sequestration or liquidation or other compulsory alienation except in cases that under the existing laws apply also to neutrals.

As a general rule, German property in the United States and American property in Germany shall not be subject to sequestration or liquidation or other compulsory alienation under other conditions than neutral property.

_Article_5._

Patent rights or other protected rights held by Germans in the United States or Americans in Germany shall not be declared void; nor shall the exercise of such rights be impeded nor shall such rights be transferred to others without the consent of the person ent.i.tled thereto; provided that regulations made exclusively in the interest of the State shall apply.

_Article_6._

Contracts made between Germans and Americans either before or after the severance of diplomatic relations, also obligations of all kinds between Germans and Americans shall not be declared cancelled, void or in suspension except under provisions applicable to neutrals.

Likewise the citizens of either party shall not be impeded in fulfilling their liabilities arising from such obligations either by injunctions or by other provisions unless these apply also to neutrals.

_Article_7._

The provisions of the sixth Hague Convention relative to the treatment of enemy merchant ships at outbreak of hostilities shall apply to the merchant vessels of either party and their cargo.

The aforesaid ships may not be forced to leave port unless at the same time they be given a pa.s.s recognised as binding by all the enemy sea powers to a home port or a port of an allied country or to another port of the country in which the ship happens to be.

_Article_8._

The regulations of chapter 3 of the eleventh Hague Convention relative to certain restrictions in the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war shall apply to the captains, officers and members of the crews of merchant ships specified in Article 7 and of such merchant ships that may be captured in the course of a possible war.