Moral Theology Part 73

PART II

SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY (Continued)

Question II

THE DUTIES OF ALL CLa.s.sES OF MEN (THE MORAL VIRTUES)

1626. After the theological virtues, which offer to G.o.d the services of faith, hope and charity, and which direct man to his Last End, follow the cardinal or moral virtues, which perfect the actions and pa.s.sions of man, and make of them means for tending to the Last End. Of these four virtues (prudence, justice, fort.i.tude and temperance), prudence is ranked first, as being the director of the others.

Art. 1: THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 47-56.)

1627. Definition.--All the definitions of prudence are in substantial agreement, and from them we may formulate a detailed definition as follows: "Prudence is the virtue that consults well about the means to be used for leading a good life and applies the knowledge acquired through consultation to particular contingencies as they arise."

(a) Thus, prudence consults well, for its office is to study ways and means to right conduct, and to arrive at a sound judgment in spite of various uncertainties or unknown factors. Of the two practical virtues of the intellect, namely, art and prudence, the former deals with the application of right reason to cases in which there are, for the most part, certain and determinate ways of arriving at the end in view (e.g., the rules of logic or grammar, the methods of music or sculpture); while the latter has to do with the application of right reason to cases in which the ways of obtaining the end in view are not certain or determinate (i.e., the infinitely varied questions of lawfulness or unlawfulness that present themselves in concrete and particular situations).

(b) Prudence studies the means to a good life; and hence we do not consider a man as generally prudent, if he consults well for this or that particular good end, but not for the general end of leading a good life. Nevertheless, prudence falls short of the Gift of Wisdom, for prudence is concerned with human good, wisdom with divine good.

(c) Prudence applies knowledge to the direction of conduct, for the purpose of the practical virtues of the intellect is to guide the activities and productions of man according to the light of right reason. It should be noted, however, that whereas the application of knowledge is intrinsic to prudence, it is extrinsic to art; for prudence includes in its very essence a determination of the will to goodness, but not so art. Hence, a painter is not the less skilled in his profession if he voluntarily fails to exercise it or exercises it badly, but a person skilled in moral science is imprudent if voluntarily he fails to use his knowledge or uses it amiss. The sin against art is not to know; the sin against prudence is either not to know what one should know or not to apply rightly what one does know.

1628. The Objects of the Act of Prudence.--(a) Prudence is concerned, not with speculative truth (i.e., with those things that are known for the sake of knowledge), but with practical truth (i.e., with those things that are known for the sake of use). It aims, not to investigate and discover what is the nature of virtue, but to guide man so that he may become virtuous and practise virtue. It should be noted, however, that the acts of the speculative reason, although they do not belong to prudence itself, are like other acts subject to the direction of prudence; for in pursuing speculative studies one should use good judgment as to the subjects to be considered, the time, place, manner, etc., of study.

(b) Prudence is not concerned with necessary truths and first principles of morality, but with their application to contingent and particular cases, just as a physician is called on to cure, not a universal or abstract man, but the particular and individual man before him. But since one cannot well apply that of which one is ignorant, the prudent man must be acquainted both with the general rules of right living and with the particular things to which his knowledge is to be applied. He lacks prudence, therefore, who from vincible ignorance does not know a general principle (e.g., that too much drink is bad), or a case to which that principle should be applied (e.g., that the quant.i.ty of drink before one is too much).

1629. It is customary to distinguish a twofold object of a virtue, namely, the material object (i.e., the kind of activity the virtue perfects, whether in the field of knowledge, or of action, or of production) and the formal object (i.e., the special viewpoint of goodness from which the material object is considered).

(a) The material object of prudence embraces individual human actions performed under choice and freely (_agibilia_). (b) The formal object of prudence is the right deliberation, decision, and direction (_recta ratio_) to be given to human actions, with a view to the observance of the golden mean.

1630. Necessity of Cert.i.tude.--Prudence, being an intellectual virtue, must have certainty (see on the Certain Conscience, 640 sqq.). But with regard to particular contingencies (e.g., whether Balbus ought to marry Caia) there are various kinds of certainty.

(a) There is the certainty of knowledge based on a generalization from experience of what happens in the majority of cases (e.g., that persons well mated by reason of birth, age, dispositions, etc., marry successfully). This kind of certainty belongs to moral science.

(b) There is also a certainty of knowledge based on the indications in a particular case (e.g., that Balbus and Caia appear to have congenial dispositions and a mutual affection that will make their marriage a success). This is the certainty of opinion, and while it may suffice as a rule for conscience (see the Systems of Conscience, 672 sqq.), events do not always verify its predictions. Hence it is said: "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain" (Wis., ix. 14).

(c) There is finally the certainty of practical truth, which consists in harmony with a good will. This is the certainty that is proper to prudence, for this virtue is not a matter of reason alone. Hence, even though a matter properly decided on should not take place or should fail of the purpose intended (e.g., if the marriage of Balbus and Caia is prevented or turns out badly), it remains that prudence was not deceived in its decision, for that decision when made was according to right reason and a good will (see 578).

1631. Relation of Prudence to the Other Moral Virtues.--(a) Prudence does not direct the moral virtues to their own proper ends; for the knowledge of those ends comes from synteresis, or moral understanding (i.e., the natural perception of the first principles of right and wrong), while the inclination to those ends is from the moral virtues themselves. Prudence does not deal with first principles, nor is it an inclination towards particular ends. Hence, it is the intellectual virtue of synteresis that directs the moral virtues through the dictate that right reason must be followed, that moderation must be observed, that the pa.s.sions of anger, pleasure, sorrow, etc., must be so regulated that both extremes of excess and defect will be avoided.

(b) Prudence directs the moral virtues to the ways and means by which their ends are to be attained; for the regulation of things particular and variable, such as ways and means, pertains to prudence. Synteresis is concerned with necessary principles, and the moral virtues give a uniform and steady inclination to follow the mean of right reason, but neither the one nor the other can indicate how principles are to be applied or how inclinations are to be put in practice. Hence, it is the work of moral science to determine what or how much anger, pleasure, sorrow, etc., is moderate for the average case; but prudence has to decide this for a particular case here and now (see on Conscience, 575). Without prudence bravery becomes foolhardiness, temperance degenerates into fanaticism, and mercy changes to weakness.

1632. Prudence, indeed, directs the acts of all the virtues, ruling the virtues inferior to it (i.e., art and the moral virtues), and serving the virtues that are its superiors (i.e., the speculative intellectual virtues and the theological virtues).

(a) Thus, in exercising the intellectual virtues through study, contemplation, art, etc., one would go sadly astray if one did not consult prudence as to the time, manner, and method of performing these acts. Hence, a housewife who spent too much time in meditation would neglect her domestic duties.

(b) In exercising the theological virtues, through acts of faith, hope, and charity, there is also need of prudence, for it is not possible to continue in these acts without interruption, since there are times when other acts of virtue have to be attended to, and also times for repose.

Thus, a person who goes about giving alms to the poor at hours when he is supposed to be at work for which he receives pay, is not prudent in his charity, since he does not choose the right time to exercise it.

1633. The Exercise of Prudence.--The acts that belong to prudence are those that one needs in order to direct one's conduct to that moderation which is the end of virtue. They are three: deliberation, decision, direction.

(a) Hence, in the first place, prudence takes counsel on, and deliberates about, the ways and means; (b) after ways and means have been discovered, it pa.s.ses judgment (see 575) on their suitability (e.g., that rest.i.tution should be made at such a time, in such a way, in such an amount, etc., or that moderation in eating and drinking requires that this or that amount be taken, that this or that kind of food be avoided, etc.); (c) finally, but chiefly, prudence gives the command that what has been decided on be carried out, whether this be the quest of certain things that are advantageous or the avoidance of certain things that are dangerous.

1634. Qualities of Prudence.--The qualities that should characterize prudence are carefulness and confidence.

(a) Carefulness is a watchful attention given to deliberation and judgment enabling one to act with readiness and decision when the moment for action has arrived. Its necessity for prudence is clear, for one does not counsel or judge well unless one has a matter at heart, is anxious about its success, and devotes to it serious study and vigilance; nor does one direct well if there is hesitation and delay instead of promptness in performing what has been decided on. In a word, one should be quick in execution, but slow in deliberation. Hence the admonition of St. Peter to be prudent, and to be attentive to prayer as a preparation for a good life and for the judgment (I Peter, iv. 7). An example of carefulness is St. Paul, who was solicitous about all his churches (I Cor., xi. 28), ever inquiring about their condition, their progress, their needs, etc.

(b) Confidence, as a quality of prudence, is a reliance on judgments carefully formed which excludes worries and undue hesitations. This is necessary as a balance to carefulness; for while it is true that absolute certainty is not to be expected in forming decisions about courses of action (the future event and also many present things bearing on it being unknown to us), it is also true that overcarefulness blinds the judgment and paralyzes decision. In the character of Hamlet Shakespeare pictures the man who is imprudent through excess of caution.

1635. The Parts or Kinds of Prudence.--As the divisions of parts correspond with the divisions of wholes, we should note that there are three kinds of wholes: a subjective, an integral, and a potestative whole.

(a) A subjective whole is one that is present as to its entire essence and all its power in each of the parts. This kind of whole is found in the genus, each of whose species partakes of the entire nature and energy included in the generic concept, just as the mode of being and of acting expressed by the term "animal" is found fully in dogs, cats, horses, and so on with the other kinds of animals.

(b) An integral whole is one that is not present in all its fullness either of essence or of power in the single parts. This kind of whole is found in a finished composite made up of heterogeneous units, such as a house; for neither walls, nor roof, nor foundation, nor any other single portion of the building is a complete house or has all the uses of a house, but if any one of them is lacking the house is not integral or complete.

(c) A potestative whole is one that is present in all its essence, but not in all its power in each single part. This kind of whole is exemplified in an active principle functioning through diverse faculties, such as the soul which thinks, wills, perceives, accomplishes by means of mind, will, sense, and bodily organs. The soul is present in its entirety in each of these, since it is a simple substance, but in one it exercises one power, in another a different power, in none of them all its powers.

1636. It is customary to speak also of the integral, subjective and potestative parts of a moral virtue. (a) Thus, the quasi-integral parts of a virtue are those functions without which its act is not perfectly performed; and with which it is more perfect. (b) The subjective parts are the species into which the virtue is divided. (e) The quasi-potestative parts are certain subsidiary or annexed virtues which have to do with the secondary acts of a princ.i.p.al virtue, as not having the full efficacy of the latter.

1637. Integral Parts of Prudence.--The integral parts of prudence, considered as a cognitive virtue or as an index of the right means, are those acts which enable one to have knowledge and to acquire knowledge.

(a) Thus, the acts requisite for the possession of knowledge about ways and means are the memory of the past and the understanding of the present situation. (b) The acts requisite for the acquisition of new knowledge are docility, by which one learns from others, and quickness of perception, by which one discovers for oneself.

1638. The integral parts of prudence, considered as an operative or a preceptive virtue--that is, as the counsellor and director of life and behavior--are the acts without which one cannot make good use of knowledge as applied to conduct.

(a) Thus, knowledge of general principles must be applied to particular affairs, and this supposes that one knows how to reason correctly, how to infer the particular from the general, how to put facts together.

Even those who are not skilled dialecticians have a certain amount of natural logic, and are able to make good use of data or premises in drawing conclusions about their obligations, and thus to make a prudent application of what they know.

(b) Knowledge gained through deliberation has to be effectually made use of; that is, the reason must impose its judgment carefully formed, must determine the line of action to be followed, must properly dispose the means in view of the end. This requires that a person should so direct his future acts as means to the end he has in view that they will be good in themselves (foresight or providence) and in their circ.u.mstances (circ.u.mspection), and that he will be guarded against external impediments that might hinder him, steering clear of both Scylla and Charybdis (caution): "The prudent man considereth his steps"

(Prov., xiv. 15). Examples: t.i.tus wishes to help the poor, and decides on certain methods of raising the money that are dishonest and disedifying. Balbus wishes to induce Caius to go to church, and therefore shows him marks of friendship, not reflecting that these acts of friendship, on account of the character of Caius, will arouse only haughtiness or suspicion. Claudius, in order to practise mortification, resolves on a fast, but also makes up his mind to visit certain friends who will try to make him break his resolution. Semp.r.o.nius resolves to provide well for his family and also for certain deserving charities, but he fails to insure his property, to invest his money well and to make a will, with the result that neither his family nor the poor are provided for as he had intended. t.i.tus lacked foresight, Balbus was not circ.u.mspect, Claudius and Semp.r.o.nius were incautious.

1639. The Subjective Parts or Species of Prudence.--Prudence in general is the right direction of human actions to their ends; and hence there will be as many different kinds of prudence as there are different kinds of ends of human actions. But the division of ends will be into the particular good of the individual and the common good of the mult.i.tude, and thus there are the two species of individual or personal prudence and social prudence.

(a) Individual prudence is the right management of his own acts by the individual, with a view to his personal uprightness.

(b) Social prudence is the right management of the acts of others or of self, with a view to the general welfare of a society.

1640. Social prudence in turn is subdivided in accordance with the two cla.s.ses of society, the perfect and the imperfect, into political and domestic prudence. (a) Political prudence is the right administration of the affairs of a larger mult.i.tude, such as the State. (b) Domestic prudence is the right administration of the affairs of the family.

1641. Political prudence, according to usage, often has or may bear an unfavorable and evil signification. Hence, as we are considering now the virtue of prudence, we should remark that political prudence here is something very different from political methods or practices that are wise in evil, but not in good, though often called prudent (see 1651, 1674 sqq.). Examples: (a) Evil forms of government, such as tyranny, oligarchy, or mob rule, cannot be said to have the virtue of political prudence, no matter how successful they may seem, for they do not rule in the interests of the people at large, and this interest is the very beginning and end of true social prudence. (b) Evil practices in the regulation of government or of political parties--such as employment of foul means to maintain the interests of the State, corruption, bribery, intimidation, used for the purpose of winning the election of a ticket or candidate--cannot be honored with the name of prudence, but should rather be called Machiavellism and dishonest politics.

1642. Prudence exercised for the benefit of the nation as a whole should be found, not only in rulers, but also in private citizens. We may distinguish, then, the following kinds of prudence:

(a) in those who conduct the affairs of the nation there should be governmental prudence or statesmanship. Of rulers prudence in the highest degree is expected; for the chief function of prudence is to direct actions, and the heads of States must direct not only their own actions but those of great bodies of men. Scripture speaks of prudence and justice as the two virtues that are especially needed in a prince (Jer., xxiii. 5);