Moral Theology Part 51

(b) Natural self-love is that necessary desire which each one has for his own good, happiness, existence, etc. (II Cor., v. 4), or any desire for reasonable self-improvement that is not prompted by a supernatural love of G.o.d. This love is stronger than love for another, for it implies not merely union, but unity. It is not friendship, but the root of friendship, for one is said to be friendly towards another when one holds him as another self.

(c) Supernatural self-love is that love which one has for G.o.d, and consequently for self as a friend of G.o.d.

1137. If by "self" we understand the substance and nature of man, as composed of soul and body, then both good and bad understand aright the meaning of self and desire its preservation. But if by "self" we mean princ.i.p.ally the inward man and secondarily the outward man (II Cor., iv. 16), then only the good understand what self is, and have a true love for it, whereas the wicked hate their own souls (Ps. x. 6). For the five marks of true friendship are shown to the inner man by the good, to the outward man by the sinner: (a) the good are solicitous for the life of the soul, the wicked for that of the body; (b) the good desire spiritual treasures for the soul, the wicked carnal delights for the body; (c) the good labor to provide for the needs of the soul, the wicked work only for the needs of the body; (d) the good are pleased to converse with their souls, finding there thoughts of past, present and future good things to delight them, while the wicked seek to distract themselves from wholesome thought by pleasure; (e) the good are at peace with their souls, whereas the wicked are troubled by conscience.

1138. Supernatural love of self, which pertains to charity, extends not only to the soul, but also to the body; for (a) according to its nature, the body is good, since it is from G.o.d and may be employed for His service (Rom., vi. 13), and hence it may be loved out of charity with the love of desire on account of the honor it may give to G.o.d and the service it may render in good works; (b) according to grace, the body is capable of sharing in secondary beat.i.tude, through glorification with the soul, and hence it may be loved with charity and with the love of benevolence, inasmuch as we desire for it a share in beat.i.tude: "We would not be unclothed, but clothed over, that that which is mortal may be swallowed up by life" (II Cor., v. 4); (e) according to the consequences of sin that are in it, the body is a drag on the soul, or a hindrance to it, and one should not love but rather desire the removal of its imperfections. Hence, St. Paul desired to be freed from the body (Rom., vii. 24; Philip,, i. 23), and the Saints have shown their hatred of the body's corruption by the mortifications to which they subjected it (John, xii. 25).

1139. Love of neighbor is of three kinds: (a) sinful love, which is all love that is excessive, irregulated, or directed to what is evil in others; (b) natural love, which is all love that is attracted by some excellence of a human or created kind, such as knowledge or skill; (c) supernatural love, which is that by which one is drawn towards another on account of the divine in him, such as his gifts of grace and of heavenly calling.

1140. Hence, it seems that there is no such thing as a special and distinct virtue of human friendship. (a) Thus, friendships of utility or of pleasure are clearly not virtues, since they are not caused by attraction towards moral good. (b) Virtuous friendships are the consequences of virtues rather than virtues, for the attraction one has for one's friend arises from the attraction for the virtue one sees in him. Thus, friendship for another because he is not the slave of pa.s.sion, is an exercise of the virtue of temperance. (c) Supernatural friendships are not distinct from the virtue of charity, for the gifts and graces which evoke them are partic.i.p.ations of G.o.d's goodness, which is the object of charity.

1141. The neighbors whom we are to love according to charity are all those who can have with us the relation of supernatural friendship, that is, all rational creatures. (a) Hence, the Angels are objects of this love, and in the resurrection men will be fellow-citizens with them (Heb., xii, 22); (b) our fellow-men are objects of this love, for they also are called to the heavenly companionship (ibid., 23).

1142. Charity for Sinners.--Should we love with charity those who are sinners and enemies of G.o.d? (a) If we consider sinners precisely as enemies of G.o.d, we may not love them, for their sin is an evil, an offense to G.o.d and a hurt to themselves. On the contrary, we should hate even in those who are nearest to us whatever is opposed to love of G.o.d (Luke, xiv. 26). (b) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of G.o.d, we may not love them with charity or as friends, if they are demons or lost souls; for in their case fellowship with us in beat.i.tude is out of the question. We may, however, love their nature out of charity towards G.o.d, desiring that it be preserved by Him for His glory. (c) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of G.o.d, we may love them with charity or as friends, if they are still in the present life; for we should wish that G.o.d may be glorified in them by their conversion and salvation. The commandment of love of neighbor was not restricted to loving the just.

1143. If sinners be considered precisely as they are enemies of G.o.d, is it lawful to hate them and wish evil to them? (a) It is lawful to hate the evil that is in sinners, but not their persons. He who hates their sin, loves themselves, for their sin is against their own interests. In this way the Psalmist hated sinners (Ps. cxviii. 113, cx.x.xviii. 32).

(b) It is lawful to wish that punishment overtake sinners, if one is actuated, not by a spirit of malevolence, but by love of justice (Ps.

lvii. 11; Wis., i. 13; Ps. x. 8). It is also lawful to wish that the sinfulness that is in them may be destroyed, that they themselves may be saved. In this sense we may understand some of the imprecations that are met in scripture (Ps. ciii. 35). Thus, a judge sentences a criminal, not because he hates the man before him, but because he wishes to reform him, or to protect society, or to do an act of justice.

1144. The evils of punishment or of destruction of sin are in a broader view not evils, but goods. But the following punishments may not be desired: (a) that anyone living lose his soul and be condemned to h.e.l.l, for charity requires that we desire the salvation of sinners; (b) that a sinner be punished by blindness of heart and go from bad to worse. He who wishes sin approves of the offense to G.o.d; but it does not seem unlawful to wish that G.o.d permit a person to fall into sin, as a means to a spiritual awakening.

1145. a.s.sociation with Sinners.--(a) It is never lawful to a.s.sociate with sinners in their sins, for thus one becomes a sharer in their guilt. Hence, St. Paul says: "Go out from among them and be ye separate" (II Cor., vi. 17). (b) It is not lawful to a.s.sociate with sinners even in matters indifferent or good, if one is weak and apt to be led away by them into sin (see 258 sqq.). (c) It is lawful to a.s.sociate with sinners in things not forbidden, if one is not endangered, and if one aims to convert them to better ways. Thus, our Lord ate with sinners, because He came to call them to repentance (Matt., ix. 10-13).

1146. Friendship with Sinners.-(a) If this means that we like and dislike the same things as the sinners, it is an evil friendship, and it should be discontinued; (b) if it means that we seek to bring the sinner to imitate our good likes and dislikes, the friendship pertains to charity (Jer, xv. 19).

1147. Should one continue to show signs of special regard to a friend who has taken to ways of sin? (a) As long as there is hope of betterment, one should not deny the other the benefits of friendship.

If it would be wrong to desert a friend because he was perishing from starvation, much more would it be wrong to desert him because he was perishing morally. (b) But if all hope of betterment has gone, one should give up a companionship which is not profitable to either party, and may prove harmful.

1148. Charity towards Enemies.--Enemies can be considered in two senses: precisely as enemies, or precisely as human beings destined for beat.i.tude. (a) If considered as enemies, they are not to be loved with charity--that is, it should be displeasing to us that they are enemies and opposed to us, for it would be contrary to charity to love in a neighbor that which is evil in him. (b) If considered as human beings, enemies should be loved with charity--that is, their nature created by G.o.d and capable of receiving grace and glory should be pleasing to us, for love of G.o.d should make us love all that belongs to Him, even that which is not well disposed towards ourselves.

1149. The precept of love of enemies did not originate with the law of Christ. (a) It pertains to the natural law, for (i) it follows from the natural principle: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,"

and (ii) it was known by natural reason (e.g., Plato and Cicero knew it). (b) Love of enemies was commanded in the Old Law, being the second great commandment of that law (Matt., xxii. 39), and was taught in various Old Testament books (Lev., xix. 17, 18; Exod., xxiii 4, 5; Prov., xxi. 21, 22). (c) It was renewed by Christ, who corrected the false interpretation of Leviticus, xix. 18, given by the scribes and Pharisees, who taught: "Thou shalt love thy friend and hate thy enemy."

In the Sermon on the Mount our Lord declares: "I say to you: Love your enemies: do good to them that hate you: that you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven" (Matt., v. 44, 45).

1150. The following examples of love of one's enemies are found in the Bible: (a) in the Old Testament, Joseph forgave his brethren who had sold him into Egypt, David spared the life of his persecutor Saul and wept over the ungrateful Absalom, and Moses prayed for the people who had rebelled against him; (b) in the New Testament our Lord mourned over Jerusalem which had rejected Him, and on the Cross prayed for His enemies.

1151. What kind of love must we entertain for enemies?

(a) A general love of enemies is that which extends to all neighbors for the love of G.o.d, no exception being made as regards enemies. This kind of love is required. Example: Caius makes an act of love in which he declares his love for his neighbor, but mentions no names. t.i.tus makes this act of love: "I love all except Caius." The act of love made by Caius is sufficient, that of t.i.tus is insufficient.

(b) A special love of enemies is that which extends to them in particular, not as included in the human race or the community, but as individuals, as when one expressly mentions the name of an enemy in his act of love. This kind of love of enemies is not required at all times.

1152. Is there an obligation of special love of enemies? (a) In cases of necessity (e.g., when the omission of a special love would bring on hate), one is bound to special love. (b) Outside of cases of necessity, one is bound to be willing to love an enemy in particular, if the necessity should arise. (c) Outside of necessity, one is not bound to love an enemy in particular, for it is impossible to give such attention even to all those who are not enemies. But to give an enemy more love than is required is a sign of perfect charity.

1153. The principles just given as to internal love of enemies apply also to external love, or to the signs by which internal love is manifested. For St. John says: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth" (I John, iii. 18).

(a) Hence, it is not lawful to deny to an enemy the common signs of charity (i.e., such benefits as are bestowed on his community or cla.s.s as a whole), for to do so would be to signify a desire for revenge (Lev., xix. 18). Consequently, he who excludes his enemies from prayers offered for his neighbor sins against charity.

(b) In cases of necessity, as when an enemy is in great need as to life, fame, fortune or salvation, one is bound to show special signs of charity, such as salutation, conversation, a.s.sistance, etc. Thus, we are told: "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he be thirsty, give him to drink" (Prov., xxv. 21).

(c) Outside of cases of necessity, one is bound to be ready to a.s.sist an enemy, should there be need.

(d) Outside of necessity, one is not bound actually to manifest particular love for an enemy, by speaking to him, trading with him, visiting him, etc. Hence, David, although he had pardoned Absalom, would not meet him (II Kings, xiv. 24). To confer special benefits on an enemy when there is no obligation is a counsel of perfection: "Do good to those that hate you" (Matt., v. 24). This heaps coals of fire upon the head of the enemy, curing him by the salutary pain of repentance, and so overcomes evil by good (Rom., xii. 20, 21).

1154. The common signs of charity are not limited to those that are shown to all mankind, but include also such as are usually shown by one Christian to another Christian, by one citizen to a fellow-citizen, by a relative to a relative, etc. Thus, to make a social call, though it would be a sign of special regard in the case of one not a relative, might be only a common sign of charity in the case of a relative.

(a) Hence, it is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that are customarily shown to all men. Example: t.i.tus dislikes Balbus, and therefore refuses to sell to him, does not return his salutations, speaks to all others in company, while ignoring Balbus, and will not even answer if Balbus addresses him.

(b) It is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that are commonly shown to all those to whom one is similarly related. Examples: Claudia calls on her other children frequently and makes them presents, but she keeps away from one daughter, even when the latter is sick and poor and she is calling next door. Semp.r.o.nius habitually invites to his house for family festivities all his relatives except his brother.

(c) It is against charity to deny to an enemy some benefit not commonly shown, but which one has bestowed out of liberality on the group to which the latter belongs. In such a case a special sign of charity becomes common. Example: t.i.tus prepares a banquet for a neighboring inst.i.tution, and purposely sends no invitation to two members whom he dislikes.

1155. The rule that common signs of charity must be shown does not apply, if some higher or more urgent duty requires that they be omitted: however, internal charity must persist all the while.

(a) Thus, by reason of charity owed to self or to the better interests of an offender, one should at times omit the common signs of charity.

Examples: Caius avoids Balbus, with whom he has had a quarrel, because he knows well that Balbus is seeking some pretext to get revenge. t.i.tus has a surly way of speaking, and his mother, in order to cure him, does not answer until he has spoken civilly.

(b) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should sometimes be denied as a punishment. Examples: Claudia punishes her children, when they are disobedient, by refusing them for a time privileges given the other children. For the same reason she refuses to call on a daughter who ran away from home and married a worthless fellow.

(c) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should be refused, when this is required for the protection of one's own rights. Example: t.i.tus goes about defaming Semp.r.o.nius and his family, but appears very affable when he meets Semp.r.o.nius; the latter knows all this, and hence is very cool with t.i.tus, to show that the injuries are not held as light.

1156. The following are the rules for judging whether (apart from scandal to others) sin has been committed through refusal of the signs of charity:

(a) If internally there is hatred (i.e., a contempt for one's neighbor, as if he were unworthy of common charity), or malevolence (i.e., a will to exercise spite), then one is guilty of grave uncharitableness, unless the smallness of the matter makes it only a venial sin.

(b) If externally the denial of charity is such that in the judgment of a prudent man it indicates real hatred, and the injured party perceives this and is scandalized or hurt thereby, the sin of uncharitableness is committed, even though there be no internal hatred. The gravity depends on the scandal or offense caused the other party. Example: Claudius and Balbus, once very friendly, have had a disagreement. Now, when Claudius sees Balbus coming in his direction, he turns off by a side street, not to show hatred, but to avoid a meeting. If Balbus does not know this, or does not care, no sin--or at most only a venial sin--is committed; but if Balbus is deeply wounded or scandalized by this conduct, Claudius sins seriously against charity.

1157. Refusal of Greetings.--(a) To refuse to exchange a bow or salutation (such as "Good morning") indicates a want of charity, when such mutual courtesy is expected according to custom; not, however, when custom does not require it, Example: In Balba's office the girls employed usually salute one another on arrival and departure, but Balba never salutes t.i.tia, and hence is regarded as her enemy. On Caius'

street the neighbors are of a very mixed kind, and it is not customary to speak to everybody. Hence, the fact that Caius never salutes certain neighbors, whom he dislikes, does not signify any uncharitableness on his part.

(b) To refuse to salute another first, where custom expects this, is a mark of uncharity, unless one has a sufficient excuse. Examples: Claudius has a grudge against Semp.r.o.nius, an elderly man who is much his senior, and says he will never salute him as others do. t.i.tus refuses to greet Balbus, his acquaintance, when they meet, because in the past Balbus has treated his greetings with contempt, and shows that he does not care to notice t.i.tus.

(c) To refuse to return a salutation sincerely given indicates a want of charity.

1158. The Order of Charity.--Charity not only requires that we love G.o.d, ourselves, and our neighbors, but it also obliges us to love these objects according to a certain order, some being preferred to others.

(a) G.o.d must be loved above all, more than self (Matt, xvi. 24), more than father and mother (Matt., x. 37; Luke, xiv. 26), for He is the common good of all, and the source of all good.

(b) Other things being equal, one should love self more than one's neighbor, for the love of self is the model for the love of neighbor (Matt., xxii. 39), and nature itself inclines to this in accordance with the saying: "Charity begins at home."

(c) Among neighbors those should be loved more who have more of a claim on account of their greater nearness to G.o.d or to ourselves.

1159. Love can become greater in two ways: (a) objectively, when the person loved is esteemed as of greater worth, or has more t.i.tles to affection, or has a more enduring right to be loved; (b) subjectively, when the person loving is more touched and moved in his feelings, even though the object be not more amiable in itself.

1160. The Character of our Love of G.o.d.--(a) It must be supreme objectively, since He is infinite perfection and has the highest of all claims on our love. Hence, one should be disposed to suffer any loss rather than abandon G.o.d. (b) It must be supreme subjectively, in our desire, that is, realizing that G.o.d is the highest good, we should at least wish to give Him the utmost of our fervor and ardor. (c) It need not be supreme subjectively, in fact; for we are not always masters of our feelings, and things that are nearer to us affect us more than those that are more important, but remote from sense. Hence, it is not against charity that one should be more moved sensibly at the thought of a dear human friend than at the thought of G.o.d, provided the will places G.o.d above all.

1161. Regarding the love of G.o.d for the sake of reward, we must note: (a) If there is question of the eternal reward, one may love and serve G.o.d for the sake of reward, provided one makes the reward the end of one's service, but not the end of G.o.d; for salvation is really the end of our faith (I Pet., i. 9), but G.o.d is the end of all, and He is to be preferred to all. This love of G.o.d for the sake of reward coexists with charity, for one may love a friend for his own sake, and at the same time expect benefits from the friendship, provided the love of benevolence is uppermost. (b) If there is question of a temporal reward, one may love and serve G.o.d for the sake of the reward, not in the sense that spiritual things are made a means and temporal things their end, but in the sense that one hopes one's service of G.o.d will be so blessed that one will have health, strength and opportunity, so as to be enabled to continue and progress in that service.

1162. Regarding the love of self (i.e., of the inner man, or our spiritual nature), we should note: (a) Objectively, one esteems others who are higher in sanct.i.ty than oneself (e.g., the Blessed Virgin), as more worthy of love. But one may desire for self according to charity such progress in virtue that one will pa.s.s some others who are now better than oneself; for the virtue of charity is given us that we may perfect ourselves. (b) Subjectively, one holds self as being nearer than other persons, and thus loves oneself with a greater intensity.