Modern Economic Problems Part 20

(e) Taxes may be levied on selected agencies of industry or on the process of _business_; such are business taxes, licenses, taxes on investment in business, and corporation taxes. These burdens are diffused and rest eventually on some income, rarely to be ascertained exactly.

-- 10. #Defective tax "systems."# The actual tax laws of each division of government in a country combine the various forms in different proportions. Most of the federal taxes are from tariff duties and from internal revenues; the latter include a variety of special business and property taxes and, since 1913, the federal income tax. The largest receipts of states, of counties, and of minor divisions are from property taxes, some special but most of them general in form.

Among the various states a wide diversity is found. Some use the general property tax for all the divisions (state and local), while others (several of the Northern states and California) have separated the sources of state and local taxation, taxing corporations for state purposes, and most other forms of wealth for local purposes. Some states, particularly those of the South, make large use of licenses and taxes on business both for state and local purposes. The tax laws of many states have been much modified of late and are still in process of change. It is only in a loose sense that one can speak of the tax "system" of any state, made up as it is of so many diverse elements, each used to tap in some independent way some source of private income for public purposes. Every tax "system" has grown up more or less accidentally, guided by no more of a general principle than the advice of the cynical old statesman--so to pluck the feathers of the goose that it will squawk as little as possible. Thus, everywhere, the existing situation must be largely accounted for by custom and ignorance, by the weakness of some cla.s.ses and the undue influence of other cla.s.ses, rather than by clearly thought out principles soundly administered.

-- 11. #Various standards of justice suggested.# There have not been lacking earnest attempts to arrive at some general principles. Many standards have been suggested to measure the distribution of the burden of taxation, such as benefit, equality, and ability. Each of these terms is capable of various interpretations which have changed from time to time. The benefit derived by any citizen from most of the public services evidently cannot be measured with exactness. The standard of equality cannot be applied in any literal sense to strong and weak, to rich and poor. It is possible, however, to interpret equality with reference not to objective goods, but to the psychic sacrifice occasioned by taxation. Ability is of many kinds and may be differently understood. Some think ability to bear taxation is "in exact proportion to the money income"; others believe that it increases at a greater rate than money income, and favor, therefore, progressive taxation, that is, higher rates on the larger incomes.

-- 12. #Social welfare as the aim.# The conflicting interests of the various cla.s.ses of taxpayers in each period are to some degree softened by the prevailing public opinion, sometimes called the social conscience, and taxes are adjusted according to a vaguely held ideal of the social welfare. Social expediency, more or less broadly interpreted, determines who shall be taxed and what social results are to be sought. The exemptions from taxation in feudal times were great and, viewed from our standpoint, were inequitable, for the upper cla.s.ses escaped while the peasants bore most of the burdens. The landlords and n.o.bility, who were a.s.sumed to be performing important social functions, generally had outgrown their usefulness in the period preceding the French Revolution, which swept away many of these abuses.

Exemptions from taxation are granted liberally in most states to-day on some kinds of wealth and to some cla.s.ses of citizens, because of their supposed relations to the public interest. Real estate and equipment devoted to educational, religious, and charitable purposes, the homes of priests and ministers, homesteads purchased with pension money, as well as all public lands, buildings, and equipment are exempt.

The social interest requires that taxes be both elastic and productive, so that the needs of the government shall be amply provided for. The harmonizing of these needs in the laws of taxation requires a high degree of wisdom, of foresight, and of integrity in the legislator and in the citizen. No hard-and-fast rule for the apportioning of taxes can be laid down. The decision must be made in each generation by the public opinion as to what is most expedient for the general welfare.

-- 13. #Principles of administration.# Whatever forms of taxes are adopted, whether on property or income, whether at proportional or at progressive rates, their justice and expediency depend largely on their administration. Principle and practice in this, as in most affairs, may go far apart. The administration of taxation should be economical, certain, and uniform. Some laws are more easily and economically executed than others. The time of collection should be as convenient as possible for the citizen, and the mode of payment should be the most simple. The utmost certainty is desirable as to the time, method of payment, and amount. Taxation that, in its principle, is variable, shifting, or dependent on personal whim and favoritism, is despotism. But the greatest evils, in practice, result from the failures in a.s.sessment. The a.s.sessment of taxes has to be intrusted to men with fallible judgment, imperfect knowledge, and selfish interests. The a.s.sessor is as near a despot as any agent of popular government to-day. Not infrequently men of proved incapacity in every private business they have attempted are, for partizan or corrupt reasons, selected as a.s.sessors, and are given the power of pa.s.sing judgment on the value of millions of dollars' worth of property. Under the circ.u.mstances, evils are to be expected, and they occur. The small owner often is crushed under the unequal a.s.sessment while the large owner comes lightly off. Political friends are favored, political foes are made to suffer. Even the most honest and capable of a.s.sessors find in the imperfections of the tax laws[6] an insuperable obstacle to even-handed justice.

-- 14. #Shifting and incidence.# The person paying a tax into the public treasury is not always the one whose income is reduced in the long run. This is most clearly seen in the case of taxes paid by middlemen. In most cases the final and regular burden of the tax is distributed over a number of incomes. The pa.s.sing on of the burden is called the _shifting_ of the tax; the final location of the burden is called the _incidence_ of the tax. The lawmaker cannot tell exactly where the weight will fall. The principles of value give some guidance in the inquiry, but the workings of the principle are difficult to follow.

Consider a situation where certain taxes have been for some time levied. They have become a part of the general adjustment of prices.

If paid by any one in business they may be looked upon as a deduction from the gross proceeds or product of the business, prior to cost, or as a part of cost.[7] In either case every one choosing that business does so in the light of this fact. Unless the business promises to yield as good incomes (wages, profits) as other lines, the number engaging in it, and the output, must diminish and thus the price of the product rise, or the cost of the factors fall, or both in some proportion. The tax on any durative agent or on any established business thus becomes incorporated after a time in its price and in the prices of the products, and any purchaser pays a price based on the net income remaining to the owner of the wealth after the tax is paid. Viewed in this way, taxes are seen to be borne to some extent by every one, by those who do not as well as by those who do actually meet the tax-collector face to face. The citizen with no taxable property is affected, far more than he realizes, by extravagance of government and by inequities in taxation, for the effects of most taxes are diffused so that every self-sustaining member of the community has some share in them.

-- 15. #Taxes as costs.# Now if a new tax is levied, or an old tax changed in amount or in its incidence, it becomes a new influence in industry. Some occupations are made more attractive, others less so.

Some places are made more, others less, desirable to live in.

Property thus fluctuates in value, and investments become more or less remunerative. If the new tax reduces the net income of any productive agent, it reduces likewise its value, which is but the capitalization of its net rental. If taxes are taken off of factories and put upon farm rents, factories rise and farms fall in value in the hands of their owners. The immediate change in value is much greater than the annual tax, for if five dollars is to be taken permanently from the annual rental of the farm, nearly one hundred dollars is taken at once from its selling value when the prevailing yield on investment is 5 per cent. The rate of adjustment varies greatly under different conditions, and the inflow and the outflow of labor and capital are more or less rapid in the various industries.

Taxes that enterprisers are unable to shift to others are reckoned by them as a part of their costs of production whenever the conditions of compet.i.tion and of subst.i.tution make it possible to do so. Every new tax that curtails the supply of any necessary agent must raise the price of the products and cause more or less of the tax to fall upon the consumers. In the Civil War an increase in the tax on whisky increased its selling price, and distillers who owned stocks on which a smaller tax had already been paid reaped profits of millions of dollars. When the tax on tea was increased in England, all dealers that had acc.u.mulated a stock before the law went into effect were gainers. Every change in taxation inevitably affects, either favorably or unfavorably, many interests. The chance to antic.i.p.ate a change in tax laws or to get, from those in power, information of a proposed change, makes speculation possible and political corruption profitable.

The fact that a change in taxation is a disturbing element in price is not to be deemed insignificant merely because "all comes out right in the end." Every change in taxation is an element of uncertainty in business and increases the fortunes of some men at the expense of others. Hence no considerable change should be made without good reasons in its favor. The older taxes have the virtue of stability, but in many cases they have grown out of harmony with the industrial conditions. While, therefore, from time to time there is a real need of a reform in the tax system, it should not be undertaken without recognizing the many and complex interests involved.

[Footnote 1: Meaning here not a certain political party, but a principle of social action.]

[Footnote 2: The total debts of the _national_ governments of the world just before the outbreak of the great war in 1914 were estimated at about $44,000,000,000. (These figures include the debts of the separate states in the federal unions of Australia and the German Empire, and the separate debts of European colonial governments, but not those of the states of the United States, and in no case including the debts of minor divisions, the total figures for which are not to be had.) The new debts created by the war give already more than double the foregoing total.]

[Footnote 3: The special a.s.sessment is thus in its nature, in part a private investment. The plan, of special a.s.sessments could easily be applied in many more cases than is done at present.]

[Footnote 4: There are border-line cases where it is difficult to decide whether a particular payment to the government in the form of a fee, price for service (as water rates, etc.), and special a.s.sessment (as for street paving) is in the legal sense a tax or not. Some courts have, for example, decided that for certain purposes a special a.s.sessment is to be called a tax, and in certain other cases it is not to be if this would defeat the evident and just intention of the legislature.]

[Footnote 5: The figures do not include returns from incorporated places having a population of less than 2500 where the poll taxes may be a considerable sum.]

[Footnote 6: Particularly the difficulties noted in the next chapter, sees. 2-5.]

[Footnote 7: See Vol. I, p. 374.]

CHAPTER 17

PROPERTY AND CORPORATION TAXES

-- 1. Importance of taxation as a public question. -- 2. The general property tax; nature and difficulty. -- 3. Ambiguity of the term "property." -- 4. Various temporizing policies. -- 5. A consistent policy of wealth-taxation. -- 6. Needed reform of a.s.sessment. -- 7. Separation of state and local taxation. -- 8. Federal taxation of merchandise in commerce. -- 9. The proposal of the single tax on land values. -- 10.

Various reforms in land taxation. -- 11. Difficulties in taxing corporations. -- 12. Special taxes on banks. -- 13. Special taxes on insurance. -- 14. Special taxes on transportation. -- 15. Alternative policies of corporate taxation. -- 16. General plan for corporate taxation.

-- 1. #Importance of taxation as a public question.# The discussion of taxation has accompanied the growth of free government in England and America from the time of Magna Charta. The control of the public purse has been found to give the key to political power, and therefore it has frequently become the occasion of conflict between the monarch and the people. But in our own national history since the adoption of the Const.i.tution, taxation has not had a leading place in politics except in the one aspect of the tariff. The const.i.tutional question of states' rights long absorbed most of the interest of citizens and of legislators. But with the quickened attention of the public to economic questions, the problem of taxation became of increasing importance.

It has come to be recognized that taxation can be made to play, and is bound to play, a leading part as an agency in the distribution of wealth, and thus it is the center of much of the ardent controversy regarding social reform. Ultimately, almost every proposal of social change and betterment involves some cost. The question then must be answered. Who is to receive the benefits and upon whom and how shall new taxes be levied to pay the cost? Further, it is often urged that this result of taxation in redistributing incomes is in itself (or can be made) a virtue; and some even see in tax reform the answer to the largest social questions of our time. We are now to take up a few of the more important problems of taxation, to see the difficulties, and to suggest the direction in which their solution is to be sought. The tariff having been already separately considered, the chief kinds of taxes we have here to treat are property taxes, general and special, and inheritance and income taxes.

-- 2. #The general property tax; nature and difficulty.# The rates both of a.s.sessment and of levy of the general property tax are uniform and equal in proportion to the value of all (or nearly all) property in the taxing district.[1] There are always some exceptions of certain kinds of property, or of the property of certain persons, or of property and things put to certain uses--public, educational, religious, and charitable in their nature.

The federal government levies no general property tax, but the other branches of government[2] receive about three-fifths of all their revenues from it.

At first view nothing would seem to be simpler and juster in principle than such a plan of taxation, but those who have most carefully studied its practical operation, almost with one accord, p.r.o.nounce it to be "a dismal failure." The chief reason a.s.signed for this failure has been that the a.s.sessment of the tax is imperfect and incomplete.

The usual thought is that if all property could be a.s.sessed the plan would be excellent. Undoubtedly the difficulty of just a.s.sessment has its part in the weakness of the tax, but back of, and more important than this, is an inherent fallacy in the apparently simple principle of the tax.

-- 3. #Ambiguity of the term "property."# Unfortunately, the word property is applied, even by the most competent courts, both to the intangible right of ownership (the fundamental meaning) and to the concrete thing that is owned, the source of the income.[3] But evidently the value of the right to the income yielded by a house, for example, is merely the value of the house. The value of the _property in the one sense_ (the abstract ownership, the intangible right) is merely a reflection of the value of the _property in the other sense_ (the concrete wealth). There are not here two independent bodies of economic wealth. Whatever value belongs to the one is subtracted from the other. Nor is it rational to take the paper doc.u.ment called a deed (which is but the evidence of ownership) and call it tangible property having a value in addition to the house itself. Yet, in fact, all these confusions are constantly made in taxation. The term "intangible personal property" is applied to such things as mercantile credits, promissory notes, bonds--in general to the right to collect sums from another person, whether these rights arise out of sales or of loans--and all are treated as parts of taxable property. Sometimes the evidences of indebtedness, the promissory notes or the mortgage papers, are even called tangible property, the same term that is applied to land, houses, and machinery. By universal practice supported by a long line of court decisions, these rights (whether evidenced by paper or not) are made subject to taxation, except as by piecemeal legislation certain grudging exceptions have been made.

These views and this practice are supported by the popular desire to tax money-lenders. The result is "double taxation" of many sources of income. This involves a burden that is ruinous in some cases, both to borrowers and to lenders, and that tempts in all cases to the evasion of the tax.

Take, for example, a house a.s.sessed at $10,000 which is owned free of debt and which has a rental value of $600. At the rate of 1.5 per cent the tax paid would be $150. Now if the owner borrows $8000 he is still taxable $150 on the full value of the house, and the lender nearly everywhere is taxable $120 on the amount of his mortgage. The total tax payable out of the one source of income, the house, is then $270.

The same a.n.a.lysis will show that any credit is but a contractual claim upon some other source of income which is, or should have been, already taxed.

If one person owns all the capital-value invested in a specific piece of wealth, no attempt is made to tax both the capital and the wealth; but if it happens that two or more persons share the capital-value invested in the same wealth, the attempt is made to tax as a unit the full value of the wealth and, in addition, some part of the capital also. It is, however, easy in most cases to conceal this "intangible property" from the a.s.sessor's eyes, and a comparatively small amount of it is ever taxed. This means inequality and hardship in the operation of the tax and, as a result, unceasing temptation to perjury by the taxpayer and to favoritism and graft by public officials.

-- 4. #Various temporizing policies.# The general property tax in practice is unjust and demoralizing. What, then, shall be done about it? Various policies have been followed. One has been to declare that the law would be good if it could be enforced, but that as in practice it cannot be, the best thing is to go on as before, catching a few "tax dodgers," and letting the rest go. Another policy is to hire "tax ferrets," paying them large commissions to discover cases where intangible property of this sort has been concealed from the a.s.sessors. This method, no matter how stringently applied, has never reached more than a small proportion of the cases, and becomes a potent agency of political favoritism and corruption.

Another policy is to maintain the general principle, but to make exceptions here and there. Usually the exceptions are made just at those points where the law would with earnest effort be most easily enforceable, and therefore where it has become most inconvenient. As a result of these changes the state laws display a bewildering and illogical variety. By const.i.tutional interpretation, United States notes and federal bonds are exempt from state and local taxation; generally, by state law, building and loan a.s.sociation and savings-bank loans are exempt as, in a majority of states, are state and munic.i.p.al bonds if held within the state. In at least eight states, bonds of the state are exempt, but those of the munic.i.p.alities are taxable, while in a few states the reverse is the case. In several states both kinds of bonds when issued after specified dates, are exempt, but in Ohio state bonds are exempt only if issued prior to 1913. All but seven of the forty-eight states, however, attempt to tax the resident holders of state and munic.i.p.al bonds of other states; but the exceptional states are those in which most of the investors in this cla.s.s of securities reside. In many cases private debts receivable are allowed to be offset against debts payable. In some states mortgages on real estate are exempted or (in Ma.s.sachusetts) treated as an interest in the real estate. Rarely mortgages are exempted up to a certain amount (in Indiana, to $700, the purpose being to tempt the borrower to reveal the name of the lender).

Sometimes a special mortgage registration tax, payable but once (in New York 1/2 of 1 per cent) is levied, and otherwise mortgages are free from taxation. Small as this rate is, the fiscal yield of mortgage taxation under this plan exceeds that under the general property tax.

By the overlapping of these laws, so contradictory in principle, it may happen that securities held by taxpayers residing in other states than those of the issue are taxable two or three or more times; but few if any loans of this kind are made except by those evading all taxation.

-- 5. #A consistent policy of wealth taxation.# These exceptions still leave the law in its general principles as to the taxation of intangible property illogical and unjust. A solution can be found only by abandoning the ambiguous legal concept of property, and making use of economic concepts. A consistent tax law might take either wealth or capital as the basis of a.s.sessment, but not sometimes the one and sometimes the other. Wealth is an impersonal basis of taxation; each piece of wealth might be taxed once as a unit no matter how the ownership were divided. Or the other alternative might be chosen.

Capital would be a personal basis of taxation; each person's capital might be taxed no matter from what sources the incomes were derived (the concrete wealth, of course, then being left untaxed).

The wealth basis is much nearer to the present general property tax as actually administered. The a.s.sessment of general tangible wealth would undoubtedly be more easily done than would that of individual capitals, and likewise be both easier and juster than the present inconsistent policy. Tangible things are comparatively easy to find, measure, and evaluate where they are, and if they are all taxed it is evidently the same as if all the capital values based upon them were taxed in the owners' hands. The various equitable claims of different owners in one source of income could be left to adjust themselves through shifting, mainly in the choice of investments, once the plan had become generally applied.

-- 6. #Needed reform of a.s.sessment.# The a.s.sessment of the present general property tax is notoriously inefficient and unjust. The root of most of the present evils (other than those above discussed) is the method of local election of a.s.sessors, which usually is by townships, but in some cases by counties. The local a.s.sessor's estimate of value is used as a basis for taxation not only for his district but for the larger units (county and state). Thus every local a.s.sessor is tempted by the conflict of interests not only among the taxpayers in the district which elects him, but by the conflict of interests between his district as a whole and other districts. The lower the ratio of a.s.sessment to true valuation in any township compared with that of the other tax districts, the smaller the proportion of county and state taxes that the people of the district have to pay. Willingness to under-a.s.sess property often becomes thus the chief virtue of an a.s.sessor in the eyes of his political const.i.tuents. This has led in many cases to absurd undera.s.sessment, which boards of equalization have proved powerless to remedy in any great measure. A sounder plan would be general state a.s.sessment, with a permanent expert board of commissioners employing a corps of state a.s.sessors under the merit system of appointment. This plan has as yet been applied only to a.s.sessment of railroads and some other public-service corporations.

-- 7. #Separation of state and local taxation.# For the reason just indicated the failure of the general property tax has been most conspicuous where it is used as a basis for state taxation. This has led some financial students to advocate the plan of separation of state and local taxation. This means the a.s.signment of certain sources of revenue (such as corporations and the liquor business) primarily or exclusively to the state, leaving all real estate and the general property of non-corporate persons to be taxed by the counties and minor divisions under the general property tax. The plan has been increasingly applied in New York, until, in 1906, it became almost complete. In 1910 the plan was adopted in California; and it is largely used in New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, and to a small extent in some other states. An efficient state a.s.sessment of general wealth would accomplish most of the advantages claimed for this plan, while avoiding some of its dangers.

-- 8. #Federal taxation of merchandise and acts in commerce.# Tariff and internal revenue duties const.i.tute the two chief revenues of the federal government. Both of these are mainly taxes on wealth. Unlike the general property taxes they are not levied upon the main body of wealth held in possession, but almost entirely upon articles of merchandise and upon acts in course of trade. Stamps on receipts, checks, deeds, bills of sale, and licenses on the sale of liquor and tobacco are taxes on business acts which are necessary to the acquisition, use, or expenditure of wealth. Goods imported are taxed at the time of entering the country; domestic products such as cigars, spirituous or malt liquors, playing cards, and (at times) matches, pig iron, and other products, are taxed usually at the time of exit from the factory. It has already been shown that when the tariff duty prevents the importation of foreign goods and by raising the price encourages domestic manufacture of the article, there is virtually taxation of the consumer to subsidize the private manufacturer. A system of properly adjusted compensatory duties (tariffs and internal duties combined) which would prevent tariff duties from having any prohibitive effect whatever could, in a great country like ours, be made to produce any revenues desired. Such a system, combined with the federal income tax, seems destined to be the chief dependence for the national government.

-- 9. #Proposal of the single tax on land values.# Besides the general property tax there are found in the country as a whole a large number of special property taxes. Some of these have been introduced as subst.i.tutes for the general property tax; such is the special taxation (above referred to) of mortgages, and bonds. Other special property taxes have been introduced because they were believed to be good in themselves; such are special franchise taxes on corporations and some kinds of taxes on land.

The special taxation of land, or of land values, has been strongly urged by Henry George and his followers since the publication of the remarkable book "Progress and Poverty" in 1879. The doctrine there set forth is that the state should "appropriate land rent by taxation,"

should "tax land values, irrespective of improvements." It is maintained that "a single tax" of this kind would be quite sufficient for all the purposes of government. The main arguments adduced for this plan may be reduced to three propositions: first, private property in land is essentially unjust, because land is made by nature, not by men; second, the plan would make a.s.sessment simple and certain by limiting it to the unimproved land, and making unnecessary the more difficult a.s.sessment both of tangible improvements and of intangible personal property; and third, it would work a marvelous reform in social conditions, abolishing poverty and greatly increasing production.

It is impossible within our limits of s.p.a.ce to discuss this proposal further than to indicate that: (1) It a.s.sumes an untenable theory of property.[4] (2) It overlooks the difficulty of distinguishing the value of the land "irrespective of improvements," from that of the land as it actually is, a difficulty especially great in the case of agricultural land.[5] The difficulty is present even in the case of urban land when the improvements of filling, draining, and leveling have become incorporated with the site.[6] (3) The plan ignores the stimulus (motivating force) which private ownership has given and still gives to the maintenance and fuller productive use of land.

Nowhere has production thriven where the state was the universal landlord.