Maxims and Opinions of Field-Marshal His Grace the Duke of Wellington Part 7

_Dispatch, Aug. 22, 1806._

_Distinction between Civil and Military Responsibility._

There is a great distinction of duty between military and civil inferior situations. If, in a civil officer, the inferior differs materially from the superior, he ought to resign, but in military appointments, it is the duty of the inferior officer to a.s.sist his commander in the mode in which that commander may deem his services most advantageous.

_Defence of his conduct with regard to the Convention of Cintra. House of Commons, Feb. 21, 1809._

_Rapidity of the French Retreats accounted for._

It is obvious, that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and everything which can strengthen it, and can enable it to act together as a body; and abandons all those who are ent.i.tled to its protection, but add to its weight and impede its progress;[4] it must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed, with any prospect of being overtaken by an army which has not made the same sacrifice.

[Footnote 4: Alluding to the rapidity of the French retreat.]

_Dispatch, May 18, 1809._

I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure.[5]

[Footnote 5: Referring to their habits of plunder.]

_Dispatch, May 31, 1809._

_Inefficiency of Spanish Officers._

Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army, and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures which it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I cannot say they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away, and a.s.sembling again in a state of nature.

_Dispatch, Aug. 1809._

_Terrorism and Force, not Enthusiasm, enabled the French Revolutionary Armies to conquer._

People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French through their revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which have nearly conquered the world; but if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was the instrument which brought forward those great resources under the system of terror which first stopped the allies; and that a perseverance in the same system of applying every individual and every description of property to the service of the army, by force, has since conquered Europe.

_Dispatch, Aug. 25, 1809._

_The Spaniards and Portuguese want the true spirit of Soldiers._

We are mistaken if we believe that what these Portuguese and Spanish armies require is discipline, properly so called. They want the habits and spirit of soldiers--the habits of command on one side, and of obedience on the other--mutual confidence between officers and men; and above all, a determination in superiors to obey the spirit of the orders they receive, let what will be the consequence, and the spirit to tell the true cause if they do not.

_Dispatch, Sept. 8, 1809._

_Importance of good understanding between Negotiating Parties._

Half the business of the world, particularly that of our country, is done by accommodation, and by the parties understanding each other, but when rights are claimed they must be resisted, if there are no grounds for them; when appeal must be made to higher powers there can be no accommodation, and much valuable time is lost in reference which ought to be spent in action.

_Dispatch, Sept. 20, 1809._

_Popular a.s.semblies unmanageable._

I acknowledge that I have a great dislike to a new popular a.s.sembly; even our own ancient one would be quite unmanageable, and in three days, would ruin us, if the present generation had not before its eyes the example of the French revolution; and if there were not certain rules and orders for its guidance and government, the knowledge and use of which render safe, and successfully direct, its proceedings.

_Dispatch, Sept. 22, 1809._

_Distracted State of Spain._

I declare that if I were in Buonaparte's situation, I should leave the English and the Cortes to settle Spain in the best manner they could; and I should entertain very little doubt but that in a very short s.p.a.ce of time Spain must fall into the hands of France. At the same time I must agree with you in thinking that affairs are now in so desperate a situation that they cannot be worse; that there is a real want of men of common capacity in Spain, in whose hands any form of government, intended for vigorous action, could be placed with any hope that their powers could he used to the public advantage; and that the Cortes, with all their faults, and the dangers attendant upon such an a.s.sembly, will have at least this advantage, that they will have the confidence of the country, and the prejudices of their countrymen of the lower cla.s.s in our favour, and against France; the remark being perfectly well founded, that there is no prejudice or jealousy of us any where in Spain excepting by the government.

But in order to enjoy common safety under such an a.s.sembly as the Spanish Cortes, the rules and orders for their proceedings and internal government ought to be well defined, and to be, if possible, a part of the const.i.tution of the a.s.sembly. Great care should also be taken in their formation to protect them from the effects of popular fury in the place of their sitting; but still with all these precautions I should prefer a wise Bourbon, if we could find one, for a regent, to the Cortes.

_Dispatch, Sept. 22, 1809._

Whatever may be eventually the fate of Spain, Portugal must be a military country.

_Dispatch, Sept. 24, 1809._

_Military Value of an Armed and Friendly People._

In respect to the army and armament of the people in Spain and Portugal, there is no man more aware than I am of the advantage to be derived from these measures; and if I had not reflected well upon the subject, my experience of the war in Portugal and in Spain--(in Portugal, where the people are in some degree armed and arrayed; and in Spain, where they are not)--would have shewn me the advantage which an army has against the enemy when the people are armed and arrayed, and are on its side in the contest. But reflection, and, above all, experience have shewn me the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of view; and I only beg that those who have to contend with the French, will not be diverted from the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training regular bodies, by any notion that the people, when armed and arrayed, will be of, I will not say any, but of much use to them.

_Dispatch, Oct. 11, 1809._

_Difficulties in the Peninsular War. The Battle of Talavera._

You will have heard of all that has pa.s.sed in this country, and I will not therefore trouble you with a repet.i.tion of the story. The battle of Talevera was certainly the hardest fought of modern days, and the most glorious in its results to our troops. Each side engaged lost a quarter of their numbers.

It is lamentable that, owing to the miserable inefficiency of the Spaniards, to their want of exertion, and the deficiency of numbers, even, of the allies, much more of discipline and every other military quality, when compared with the enemy in the Peninsula, the glory of the action is the only benefit we have derived from it. But that is a solid and substantial benefit, of which we have derived some good consequences already; for, strange to say, I have contrived with the little British army to keep everything in check since the month of August last; and if the Spaniards had not contrived, by their own folly and against my entreaties and remonstrances, to lose an army in La Mancha about a fortnight ago, I think we might have brought them through the contest; as it is, however, I do not despair. I have in hand a most difficult task, from which I may not extricate myself; but I must not shrink from it, I command an unanimous army; I draw well with all the authorities in Spain and Portugal; and I believe I have the good wishes of the whole world. In such circ.u.mstances, one may fail, but it would be dishonourable to shrink from the task.

_Letter to Col. Malcome, Dec. 3, 1809._