Manual of Military Training Part 71

This blank is four and a half by eight inches, including the margin on the left for binding. The back is ruled in squares and provided with scales for use in making simple sketches explanatory of the message.

It is issued by the Signal Corps in blocks of forty with duplicating sheets. The regulation envelope is three by five and one fourth inches and is printed as follows:

[Ill.u.s.tration]

MODEL MESSAGES

=980. 1. Verbal.= "Four hostile infantrymen one mile north of our camp, moving south. I will continue north."

=2. Verbal.= "About one hundred hostile infantrymen two miles north of our camp at two o'clock, marching south. Will observe them."

=3. Verbal.= "Long column of troops marching west in Sandy Creek Valley at two o'clock. Will report details later."

=4. Verbal.= "Just fired on by cavalry patrol near Baker's Pond. Will work to their rear."

=5. Written.=

Patrol from Support No 2.

Lone Hill, 26 Mch. 11, 8-15 A. M., No. 1.

C. O., Support No. 2.

See hostile troop of cavalry halted at x-roads, one mile S. of our outguards. Nothing else in sight. Will remain here in observation.

James, Corporal.

=6. Written= (very hurriedly).

Lone Hill, 8-30, No 2.

C. O., Support No. 2.

Column of about 300 hostile cavalry trotting north towards hostile troop of cavalry now halted at x-roads one mile south of our outguards. Will remain here.

James, Cpl.

=7. Written.=

Patrol from 5th Inf., S. E. corner Boling Woods, 3 Apl. 11, 2-10 P. M., No. 2.

Adjutant, 5th Inf., near Baker House.

Extreme right of hostile line ends at R. R. cut N. E. of BAKER'S POND. Entrenchments run S. from cut along crest of ridge. Line appears to be strongly held. Can see no troops in rear of line.

Will reconnoiter their rear.

Smith, Sergeant.

=8. Written= (from cavalry patrol far to front).

Patrol from Tr. B, 7th Cav., Boling, 14 June, 12, 10 A. M., No. 3.

To C. O., Tr. B, 7th Cav., S. on Chester Pike.

No traces of enemy up to this point. Telegraph operator here reports wires running north from Boling were cut somewhere at 8-30 A. M. Inhabitants appear friendly. Will proceed north.

Jones, Sergeant.

=9. Written= (from cavalry patrol far to front).

Patrol from Tr B, 7th Cav., Oxford, 8 July, 12, 10-15 A. M., No. 2.

To C. O., 1st Sq. 7th Cav., On Valley Pike, S. of York.

Bearer has canteen found in road here, marked "85 CAV.--III CORPS." Inhabitants say no enemy seen here. They appear hostile and unreliable. No telegraph operator or records remain here.

Roads good macadam. Water and haystacks plentiful. Will move rapidly on towards CHESTER.

Lewis, Sergeant.

Patrol from Support No. 3, On Ry. 3/4 mi. N. of County Road, 2 Aug. 12, 9-15 P. M., No. 1.

C. O., Support No. 2, Near Maxey House.

R. R. crosses creek here on 80-foot steel trestle. Hostile detachment is posted at N. end. Strength unknown. Creek 5 ft. deep by 60 ft. wide, with steep banks, 5 ft. high. Flows through meadow land. Scattered trees along banks. R. R. approaches each end of trestle on 10-foot fill. R. R. switch to N. E. 700 yds. S. of bridge. (See sketch on back.) I will cross creek to N. of bridge.

Brown, Corporal.

=981.= A message should be sent as soon as the enemy is first seen or reported. Of course, if the enemy is actually known to be in the vicinity and his patrols have been seen, etc., you must by all means avoid wasting your men by sending them back with information about small hostile patrols or other things you know your chief is already aware of and did not specifically tell you to hunt for.

If you have properly determined in your own mind what your mission is then you will have no trouble in deciding when to send messages. For example, suppose your orders are "To reconnoiter along that ridge and determine if the enemy is present in strength," and you sight a patrol of eight men. You would waste no time or men sending back any message about the patrol, for your mission is to find out if strong bodies of the enemy are about. But suppose that while working under the above orders you located a hostile battalion of infantry--a large body of troops. In this case you would surely send a detailed message, as your mission is to determine if the enemy was present in strength.

Again, suppose that while moving towards the ridge indicated by your chief in his orders, you saw his force suddenly and heavily fired on from a new and apparently unexpected quarter, not a great distance from you, but not on the ridge referred to. You know or believe none of your patrols are out in that neighborhood. In this case you should realize instantly, without any order, that your mission had changed and you should hasten to discover the size and position of this new enemy and send the information back to your chief, first notifying him of your intended change of direction.

Never forget your mission in the excitement of leading your own little force.

=982. Absence of the Enemy.= It is frequently just as important to send a message to your chief that the enemy is not in a certain locality as it is to report his actual whereabouts. You must determine from your mission when this is the case. For example, if you were ordered "To patrol beyond that woods and see if any hostile columns are moving in that direction," and on reaching the far side of the woods you had a good view of the country for some distance beyond, it would be very important to send a message back telling your chief that you could see, say, one-half mile beyond the woods and there was no enemy in sight. This information would be of the greatest importance to him. He might feel free to move troops immediately from that vicinity to some more dangerous place. You would then continue your reconnaissance further to the front.

Suggestions for Gaining Information About the Enemy

=983. Enemy on the March.= (=a=) The patrol should observe the march of the column from a concealed position that hostile patrols or flankers are not apt to search (avoid conspicuous places). Always try to discover if one hostile detachment is followed by another--if what can be seen appears to be an advance guard of a larger body not yet in view. The distance between the detachments, their relative size, etc., is always important.

(=b=) =Estimating Strength of Column.= The strength of a column may be estimated from the length of time it takes to pa.s.s a selected point.

As infantry in column of squads occupies half a yard per man, cavalry one yard per horse and artillery in single file twenty yards per gun or caisson (ammunition wagon), a selected point would be pa.s.sed in one minute by 175 infantry; 110 cavalry (at a walk); 200 cavalry at a trot and 5 guns or caissons. If marching in columns of twos, take one-half of the above figures.

(=c=) =Dust.= The direction of march, strength and composition (infantry, cavalry or artillery) of a column can be closely estimated from the length and character of the cloud of dust that it makes. Dust from infantry hangs low; from cavalry it is higher, disperses more quickly, and, if the cavalry moves rapidly, the upper part of the cloud is thinner; from artillery and wagons, it is of unequal height and disconnected. The effect of the wind blowing the dust must be considered.

(=d=) =Trail of Column.= Evenly trodden ground indicates infantry; prints of horseshoes mean cavalry and deep and wide wheel tracks indicate artillery. If the trail is fresh, the column pa.s.sed recently; if narrow, the troops felt secure and were marching in column of route; if broad they expected an action and were prepared to deploy. A retreating army makes a broad trail across fields, especially at the start.

Always remember that the smallest or most insignificant things, such as the number of a regiment or a discarded canteen or collar ornament, may give the most valuable information to a higher commander. For example, the markings on a discarded canteen or knapsack might prove to a general commanding an army that a certain hostile division, corps, or other force was in front of him when he thought it had not been sent into the field. The markings on the canteen would convey little or no meaning to the patrol leader, but if he realized his duty he would take care to report the facts. Cavalry patrols working far ahead of the foot troops should be most careful to observe and report on such details.