Manual of Military Training Part 66

=Captain:= Corporal Smith, should the whole platoon have gone forward together, or would it have been better to advance by squads?

=Corporal Smith:= I think it should have advanced by squads.

=Captain:= No, it was all right to advance as they did. At this distance the enemy's infantry fire would not be very deadly, the platoon is well extended as skirmishers, it would take considerably longer to go forward to the next position by successive squads and we want to advance at this stage as rapidly as possible; for, the longer we took, the longer would the men be exposed to fire, and consequently the greater would be the number of casualties.

=Captain:= Sergeant Jones, why did the platoon advance at a run when moving down the slope, and begin to walk just before reaching the foot of the slope?

=Sergeant Jones:= Because the slope is exposed and it was necessary to get over it as quickly as possible. They began to walk just before reaching the foot of the slope, because they struck dead ground and were covered from the enemy's fire by the ridge in front.

=Captain:= Corporal Adams, shouldn't the platoon have halted when it reached cover, so as to give the men a rest?

=Corporal Adams:= No, sir; the men had not run very far and walking gave them sufficient rest. It would have been an unnecessary loss of time to halt.

=Captain:= Harris, why did that man run on ahead as soon as the platoon halted?

=Pvt. Harris:= So he could creep up the crest of the ridge and lie down in exactly the spot that is the best fire-position--that is, where he can just see to fire over the crest and where the enemy can not see him.

=Captain:= Yes, that's right. All the men in the platoon might not stop at the best fire-position and in the hurry and excitement of the moment the platoon commander might also fail to do so, but if a man goes forward and lies down, the whole platoon knows that they must not go beyond him. Individual men who, owing to slight undulations of ground, may not be able to fire when they halt in line with this man, can creep up until they can see. Others who, for the same reason as regards the ground, find that if they get up on a line with the man they will be unduly exposed, will halt before that time.

=Captain:= Sergeant Roberts, is it necessary for another platoon to provide covering fire during the advance of the platoon?

=Sergeant Roberts:= No sir. At this range the enemy's infantry fire would not be very effective, and it is important to husband our ammunition for the later stages of the attack.

Having asked any other questions suggested by the situation or the ground, the captain will then take the rest of the company forward over the ground covered by the platoon, halting at the place where the platoon changed its pace from a rush to a walk, so that the men can see for themselves that cover from fire has been reached. He will then move the rest of the company forward and tell them to halt and lie down in what each man considers to be the best fire-position, not necessarily adopting the same position as that chosen by the leading platoon. The platoon commanders will then go along their platoons and point out any mistakes.

The leading platoon will now join the company and another platoon will be deployed in the fire position, the platoon commander being directed to advance to the next fire-position.

As we are now about 1,000 yards from the enemy's position the question will again arise as to whether covering fire is necessary.

If the enemy's rifle fire were heavy and accurate it might be necessary, but it should be avoided if possible, on account of the expenditure of ammunition.

We will suppose that the ground falls gently towards the enemy and is very exposed to view for about 300 yards, and half this distance away there is a low bank running parallel to the front of the attack and with a small clump of three or four trees on the bank directly in front of the platoon. Four hundred yards away is the bottom of the valley covered with bushes and shrubs. On the far side the ground rises with small undulations and low foot hills to the high ground occupied by the enemy.

There appears to be no marked fire-position which will afford any cover except the bank 150 yards away. The second platoon advances in the same manner as did the first and the captain with the commanders of the remaining platoons will continue to ask questions and point out what has been done right or wrong by the leading platoon. The first question which will arise is whether the platoon can reach the fire position offered by the bank in one rush, and secondly, whether the bank is a good fire-position. A former question will again crop up as to whether the whole platoon should go forward at once or whether the advance should be made by squads.

A hundred and fifty yards is a long way to advance without a halt, and if a halt is made on such exposed ground fire must be opened. Probably three advances, each of about fifty yards, would be made, covering fire being provided by the other platoons, which will be occupying the fire-position which the leading platoon has just left. This covering fire would not endanger the leading platoon as it would be delivered from just behind the crest and the leading platoon would be over the crest and out of sight and therefore out of fire from the platoon in rear.

The selection of a fire-position during this advance would depend upon very minute folds of the ground, or very low bushes, gra.s.s, etc., which might give a certain amount of cover from view, and therefore make it difficult for the enemy to aim or range accurately. We will suppose that the leading platoon has halted to fire about fifty yards in front, the remaining platoons, in turn, should then be taken forward, examining the ground very carefully as they go, and each platoon commander asked to halt his platoon in what he considers to be the best place.

The possibility of using a scout to select a fire-position would be considered, and a fire-position selected by one platoon would be compared with that selected by another.

The third platoon would then lead during the advance to the next fire-position, and so on with the fourth platoon, if necessary, until the bank was reached. The bank will afford a good deal of material for discussion. Is it a good fire-position or is it not, should it be occupied as such or should it be avoided altogether?

If we ask an artillery officer his opinion about the matter, he will tell us that by means of the clump of trees the defenders' artillery will be able to range with absolute accuracy on that bank. The direction of the bank is parallel to their front, and therefore they can fire at any part of it for some distance right and left of the clump without materially altering their range, and if any infantry occupy the bank they can bring a very deadly fire to bear against them.

There appears to be no doubt, from an artillery point of view, that our platoon should avoid occupying it and get out of its neighborhood as rapidly as possible.

There is another drawback as regards the bank: it is some 850 yards from the enemy's position and may be expected to be under an effective rifle fire. It is no doubt a good mark for the enemy, and, now we come to the crux of the whole matter; his artillery and infantry fire might not do us much damage so long as we remain behind the bank, but they might make it very unpleasant for us directly we try to leave this cover and advance further.

Before finally deciding what to do we must consider human nature, which is entirely in favor of halting behind the bank, and if allowed to remain there long, will be opposed to leaving it. We cannot hope to gain superiority of fire over the enemy at a range of 850 yards, so that a long halt at the bank is out of the question. But it appears to be an extraordinary thing, when we are searching everywhere for cover, that we should be doubtful about occupying such good cover when we find it.

If we decide not to occupy it, the logical conclusion is that, when preparing a position for defense, we should construct a good fire-position for the attack some 850 yards away, which is the last thing we should think of doing.

There is no doubt about it, that with badly-trained troops such a fire-position would be liable to become a snare, and that if they once occupied it, there would be great difficulty in getting them forward again, and probably the attack would be brought to a standstill at a critical time.

The answer appears to be found in the simple solution of good training. We must teach our men that when they get into such positions they must use the cover afforded, but for no longer than any other fire-position, and that they must get into the habit in peace of looking upon such localities with suspicion, and with the knowledge that they are not suitable for lengthy occupation in war, if the battle is to be won.

We now come to a still more difficult question of training, namely, how far can the company get forward from the bank without being compelled to stop in order to gain superiority of fire over the defense? In war we want to get as close as possible; the moral effect on the defense is greater, our fire is more effective, and we are likely to gain our object more rapidly. In peace there is no fire to stop us, and we move forward to ridiculous positions which we could not possibly reach in war without first gaining superiority of fire.

The result of this is that we try to do the same thing when first we go to war, and we are stopped, probably much further back than we should have been if we had studied the question in peace.

Even on the most open ground we must get to within 600 yards of the enemy, and if the ground affords any cover in front, the exposed s.p.a.ce must be rushed and the more forward position gained. Having pointed out this difficulty to the company during the previous lecture, and reminded them of it on the ground, we can now extend the whole company and move forward from the bank, using covering fire and letting each platoon commander decide how far he can get to the front after a series of rushes, the company acting as a whole.

The captain can then go down the line and discuss with each platoon the position it has reached. Whilst he is doing this, the remaining platoons can be trained in fire direction and control, which should be carefully watched and criticized by the platoon commanders. One platoon, owing to the nature of the ground in front of it, can get forward further than other platoons, and this should be brought home to each platoon, so as to avoid the possibility of playing the game of follow your leader, and one platoon halting merely because another has halted.

If there is still time available, and the ground is suitable, the company can be moved to a flank to choose a similar fire-position where the ground is more favorable to an advance, and where the company could get within 300 yards of the enemy, or even less, before it would be absolutely necessary to stop in order to gain superiority of fire.

If there is still time available, and the ground is suitable, the whole operation can be carried out in the opposite direction or in some other direction, and the platoons can thus be trained to appreciate that fire-positions which are good in one place are bad in another.

=936. Defense.= Demonstrations in defense can be carried out in a similar manner, the captain explaining to the company the general line of defense to be taken up, the portion allotted to the company, and the probable direction of the enemy's attack.

The cooperation of the artillery and infantry will have been pointed out in the previous lecture: how some part of the enemy's advance will be dealt with by artillery alone, some part by both artillery and infantry, and some part by infantry alone.

This can now be pointed out to the men on the ground. Having considered the a.s.sistance provided by the artillery, the next point to decide upon is the exact position of the fire trench. The best way to proceed is to allot a certain portion of the front occupied by the company to each platoon and to let the platoon commanders take charge of the operations. The platoon commander can direct one of his squads to select a position for the trench, and that squad can lie down there. The remaining squads will then select a position in turn. If two squads select the same they can lie down together. The platoon commander will then fall in his platoon, and make them lie down in the most retired position chosen; he will ask the squad leader why the squad chose that locality in preference to any other, why they did not go ten yards further forward or ten yards further back; and he will explain to the whole platoon the advantages and disadvantages of selecting this locality. He will then move the whole platoon forward to the next position chosen by another squad and deal with that locality. Finally, he will select the position he thinks the best, giving his reasons why he has decided upon it, and place the whole platoon on it. When all the platoons have decided upon their line of defense, the captain will move the whole company in turn from the ground occupied by one platoon to that occupied by another, asking the platoon commander in each case to explain why the position was chosen in preference to any other.

He will give his decision as regards each platoon, and he will finally arrange for the position to be occupied by the whole company. One platoon, for some good reason, may have chosen a place which it would not be safe to occupy, owing to the fire of another platoon on the flank. Another platoon may have chosen a place which was very good as regards the field of fire in a direction which was already adequately defended by another platoon, but which had a bad field of fire over ground which no other platoon could fire upon. The company commander would adjust all these matters, and in the end one or more platoons might not be placed in the best position as regards their own particular front, but in the best as regards the whole company.

Having decided upon the exact site of the trenches and the general distribution of fire, the next matter to consider is the amount of clearing that is necessary, and the position and nature of any obstacles which may be required. Each platoon commander having been allotted a definite fire zone, can point out to his platoon what clearance is necessary; he can then ask each squad, as before, to choose the position for the obstacle. The company commander can then take the whole company to the position occupied by each platoon and tell the platoon commander to explain what ground they propose to clear, where they propose to place their obstacle, the material available for its construction, and in every case the reason why the decision has been arrived at. If digging is permitted, the trenches will now be constructed, and care will be taken that they are actually finished. It is far better to work overtime than to construct trenches which would be of little use in war and could not be properly defended. It is the exception rather than the rule to see trenches properly finished, fit for occupation, and capable of resisting a heavy attack. If the trenches cannot be dug the company can be taken to another part of the same position, where the ground in front is totally different, and the exercise can be repeated, the platoon and company commanders pointing out why a fire trench which was well sited in the first case would be badly sited if a similar position was selected in the second case.

=937. Outpost.= We can now turn to the method of training the company in outpost duty, making use of the same system of demonstration.

Having pointed out to the company the locality where the main body is bivouacked, the fighting position which the main body will occupy in case a heavy attack is made against the outposts, and the general line of the outposts, the company commander will indicate on the ground the extent of front which is to be guarded by his company, stating whether imaginary companies continue the position on one or both flanks. He will point out the possible avenues of approach from the direction of the enemy to that portion of the position to be occupied by the company, and state from which direction the enemy is most likely to advance and why.

The first point to decide is the number of outguards and their exact position. In war this would always be done by the company commander, but if it is desired to give the junior officers of the company some instruction in this important detail, they should be sent out before the company arrives on the ground to reconnoiter the position and make their decisions. The exact siting of the trenches for the outguards, the construction of obstacles, and the clearance of the foreground having been decided upon and the positions selected for each outguard discussed, and a definite site selected, the next question to decide is the number and position of the sentries.

The platoon commander would then take each scheme in turn, visit with the whole platoon each position selected for the sentry, and decide finally what it would be best to do, giving, as usual, his reasons.

Having decided upon the positions of the sentries, and their line of retreat, so as not to mask the fire of the outguard, the next matter to consider would be the number of patrols that are required, and the particular areas of ground that must be examined by them periodically.

The necessary trenches, obstacles, etc., would then be constructed.

Finally, the whole company should be a.s.sembled, marched to the position chosen for each outguard and the reasons for selecting the position explained by the company commander. The company should then be told off as an outpost company, and divided into outguards, supports, if any, and the necessary sentries over arms, patrols, etc., and marched to their respective posts.

If there is still time available each platoon commander can reconnoiter the ground for suitable positions for his outguards by night, take the outguards there, explain why the change of position is desirable, and direct the outguard commanders with their outguards to select positions for the sentries, following the same procedure as by day.

Although it is quite correct to select positions for night outposts during daylight, when possible, they should never be definitely occupied by the company before dark, when the forward movement could not be observed by the enemy. To practice night outposts by day is bad instruction, outguards and sentries are placed in positions which appear ridiculous to the ordinary mind, and the men get confused ideas on the subject. When it is desired to practice day and night outposts as an advanced exercise it is advisable to commence work in the afternoon, establish the day outposts, reconnoiter for the night outposts, make the change after dark and construct the necessary trenches, obstacles, etc., after dark.

It is, however, extremely important that the patrols should get to know their way about the country in front during the daylight, when possible, so that they will have some practice in recognizing land marks by night.

It frequently occurs, when training the company in outpost duties, that periods elapse during which the outguards are doing nothing.

These opportunities should be taken to instruct the men in their duties when ordered to patrol to the front, the same system of demonstration being employed. For instance, the officer or noncommissioned officer commanding a piquet can select three men, point out certain ground in front which the sentries cannot see and which must be examined by a patrol, and proceed to instruct the whole picket in the best manner of carrying out this work. We will suppose that the patrol is working by day and that the ground to be visited is behind a small hill some 500 yards in front of the sentry. The commander of the picket will then explain to the men that the first object of the patrol is to reach the ground to be examined without being seen by any hostile patrols which may be moving about in front.

Before proceeding further it is necessary for the patrol to decide upon the best line of advance. The various lines of advance will be discussed and the patrol asked to decide which they would select.