Life and Times of Washington Part 4

When daylight discovered this work three galleys and a floating battery were ordered to attack it and the garrison surrendered. While the boats were bringing off the prisoners, a large column of British troops were seen marching into the fortress, upon which the attack on it was renewed, but without success, and two attempts made by Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to storm it failed. [1]

In a few nights works were completed on the high ground of Province Island, which enfiladed the princ.i.p.al battery of Fort Mifflin, and rendered it necessary to throw up some cover on the platform to protect the men who worked the guns.

The aid expected from the Jersey militia was not received. "a.s.sure yourself," said Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, in a letter pressing earnestly for a reinforcement of Continental troops, "that no dependence is to be put on the militia; whatever men your Excellency determines on sending, no time is to be lost." The garrison of Fort Mifflin was now reduced to 156 effectives, and that of Red Bank did not much exceed 200.

In consequence of these representations Washington ordered Col.

Christopher Greene, of Rhode Island, with his regiment, to Red Bank, and Lieut.-Col. John Greene, of Virginia, with about 200 men, to Fort Mifflin.

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine Admiral Howe had sailed for the Delaware, where he expected to arrive in time to meet and cooperate with the army in and about Philadelphia. But the winds were so unfavorable, and the navigation of the Bay of Delaware so difficult, that his van did not get into the river until the 4th of October. The ships of war and transports which followed came up from the 6th to the 8th, and anch.o.r.ed from New Castle to Reddy Island.

The frigates, in advance of the fleet, had not yet succeeded in their endeavors to effect a pa.s.sage through the lower double row of _chevaux-de-frise_. Though no longer protected by the fort at Billingsport, they were defended by the water force above, and the work was found more difficult than had been expected. It was not until the middle of October that the impediments were so far removed as to afford a narrow and intricate pa.s.sage through them. In the meantime the fire from the Pennsylvania sh.o.r.e had not produced all the effect expected from it, and it was perceived that greater exertions would be necessary for the reduction of the works than could safely be made in the present relative situation of the armies. Under this impression, General Howe, soon after the return of the American army to its former camp on the Skippack, withdrew his troops from Germantown into Philadelphia, as preparatory to a combined attack by land and water on Forts Mercer and Mifflin.

After effecting a pa.s.sage through the works sunk in the river at Billingsport, other difficulties still remained to be encountered by the ships of war. Several rows of _chevaux-de-frise_ had been sunk about half a mile below Mud Island, which were protected by the guns of the forts, as well as by the movable water force. To silence these works, therefore, was a necessary preliminary to the removal of these obstructions in the channel.

On the 21st of October (1777) a detachment of Hessians, amounting to 1,200 men, commanded by Col. Count Donop, crossed the Delaware at Philadelphia with orders to storm Fort Mercer, at Red Bank. The fortifications consisted of extensive outer works, within which was an entrenchment eight or nine feet high, boarded and fraized. Late in the evening of the 22d Count Donop appeared before the fort and attacked it with great intrepidity. It was defended with equal resolution by the brave garrison of Rhode Island Continentals, under command of Col.

Christopher Greene. The outer works being too extensive to be manned by the troops in the fort, were used only to gall the a.s.sailants while advancing. On their near approach the garrison retired within the inner entrenchment, whence they poured upon the Hessians a heavy and destructive fire. Colonel Donop received a mortal wound, and Lieutenant-Colonel Mengerode, the second in command, fell about the same time. [2]

Lieutenant-Colonel Linsing, the oldest remaining officer, drew off his troops and returned next day to Philadelphia. The loss of the a.s.sailants was estimated by the Americans at 400 men. The garrison was reinforced from Fort Mifflin, and aided by the galleys which flanked the Hessians in their advance and retreat. The American loss, in killed and wounded, amounted to only thirty-two men.

The ships having been ordered to cooperate with Count Donop, the Augusta, with four smaller vessels, pa.s.sed the lower line of _chevaux-de-frise_, opposite to Billingsport, and lay above it, waiting until the a.s.sault should be made on the fort. The flood tide setting in about the time the attack commenced they moved with it up the river.

The obstructions sunk in the Delaware had in some degree changed its channel, in consequence of which the Augusta and the Merlin grounded a considerable distance below the second line of _chevaux-de-frise_, and a strong wind from the north so checked the rising of the tide that these vessels could not be floated by the flood. Their situation, however, was not discerned that evening, as the frigates which were able to approach the fort, and the batteries from the Pennsylvania sh.o.r.e, kept up an incessant fire on the garrison, till night put an end to the cannonade.

Early next morning it was recommenced in the hope that, under its cover, the Augusta and the Merlin might be got off. The Americans, on discovering their situation, sent four fire ships against them, but without effect. Meanwhile a warm cannonade took place on both sides, in the course of which the Augusta took fire, and it was found impracticable to extinguish the flames. Most of the men were taken out, the frigates withdrawn, and the Merlin set on fire, after which the Augusta blew up, and a few of the crew were lost in her.

This repulse inspired Congress with flattering hopes for the permanent defense of the posts on the Delaware. That body expressed its high sense of the merits of Colonel Greene, of Rhode Island, who had commanded in Fort Mercer; of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of Maryland, who had commanded in Fort Mifflin; and of Commodore Hazlewood, who commanded the galleys; and presented a sword to each of these officers, as a mark of the estimation in which their services were held.

The situation of these forts was far from justifying this confidence of their being defensible. That on Mud Island had been unskillfully constructed and required at least 800 men fully to man the lines. The island is about half a mile long. Fort Mifflin was placed at the lower end, having its princ.i.p.al fortifications in front for the purpose of repelling ships coming up the river. The defenses in the rear consisted only of a ditch and palisade, protected by two blockhouses, the upper story of one of which had been destroyed in the late cannonade. Above the fort were two batteries opposing those constructed by the British on Province and Carpenter's Islands, which were separated from Mud Island only by a narrow pa.s.sage between 400 and 500 yards wide.

The garrison of Fort Mifflin consisted of only 300 Continental troops, who were worn down with fatigue and incessant watching, under the constant apprehension of being attacked from Province Island, from Philadelphia, and from the ships below.

Having failed in every attempt to draw the militia of New Jersey to the Delaware, Washington determined to strengthen the garrison by further drafts from his army. Three hundred Pennsylvania militia were detached to be divided between the two forts, and a few days afterward General Varnum was ordered, with his brigade, to take a position above Woodbury, near Red Bank, and to relieve and reinforce the garrisons of both forts as far as his strength would permit. Washington hoped that the appearance of so respectable a Continental force might encourage the militia to a.s.semble in greater numbers.

Aware of the advantage to result from a victory over the British army while separated from the fleet, Washington had been uniformly determined to risk much to gain one. He had, therefore, after the battle of Germantown, continued to watch a.s.siduously for an opportunity to attack his enemy once more to advantage. The circ.u.mspect caution of General Howe afforded none. After the repulse at Red Bank his measures were slow but certain, and were calculated to insure the possession of the forts without exposing his troops to the hazard of an a.s.sault.

In this state of things intelligence was received of the successful termination of the northern campaign, in consequence of which great part of the troops who had been employed against Burgoyne, might be drawn to the aid of the army in Pennsylvania. But Washington had just grounds to apprehend that before these reinforcements could arrive Howe would gain possession of the forts and remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Delaware. This apprehension furnished a strong motive for vigorous attempts to relieve Fort Mifflin. But the relative force of the armies, the difficulty of acting offensively against Philadelphia, and, above all, the reflection that a defeat might disable him from meeting his enemy in the field even after the arrival of the troops expected from the north, determined Washington not to hazard a second attack under existing circ.u.mstances.

To expedite the reinforcements for which he waited, Washington dispatched Colonel Hamilton to General Gates, with directions to represent to him the condition of the armies in Pennsylvania, and to urge him, if he contemplated no other service of more importance, immediately to send the regiments of Ma.s.sachusetts and New Hampshire to aid the army of the middle department. These orders were not peremptory, because it was possible that some other object (as the capture of New York) still more interesting than the expulsion of General Howe from Philadelphia might be contemplated by Gates; and Washington meant not to interfere with the accomplishment of such object.

On reaching General Putnam, Colonel Hamilton found that a considerable part of the northern army had joined that officer, but that Gates had detained four brigades at Albany for an expedition intended to be made in the winter against Ticonderoga. Having made such arrangements with Putnam as he supposed would secure the immediate march of a large body of Continental troops from that station, Colonel Hamilton proceeded to Albany for the purpose of remonstrating with General Gates against retaining so large and valuable a part of the army unemployed at a time when the most imminent danger threatened the vitals of the country.

Gates was by no means disposed to part with his troops. He could not believe that an expedition then preparing at New York was designed to reinforce General Howe; and insisted that, should the troops then embarked at that place, instead of proceeding to the Delaware, make a sudden movement up the Hudson, it would be in their power, should Albany be left defenseless, to destroy the valuable a.r.s.enal which had been there erected, and the military stores captured with Burgoyne, which had been chiefly deposited in that town.

Having, after repeated remonstrances, obtained an order directing three brigades to the Delaware, Hamilton hastened back to Putnam and found the troops which had been ordered to join Washington, still at Peekskill.

The detachment from New York had suggested to Putnam the possibility of taking that place; and he does not appear to have made very great exertions to divest himself of a force he deemed necessary for an object, the accomplishment of which would give so much splendor to his military character. In addition to this circ.u.mstance, an opinion had gained ground among the soldiers that their share of service for the campaign had been performed, and that it was time for them to go into winter quarters. Great discontents, too, prevailed concerning their pay, which the government had permitted to be more than six months in arrear; and in Poor's brigade a mutiny broke out in the course of which a soldier who was run through the body by his captain, shot the captain dead before he expired. Colonel Hamilton came in time to borrow money from the Governor, George Clinton, of New York, to put the troops in motion; and they proceeded by brigades to the Delaware. But these several delays r.e.t.a.r.ded their arrival until the contest for the forts on that river was terminated.

The preparations of Sir William Howe being completed, a large battery on Province Island of twenty-four and thirty-two pounders and two howitzers of eight inches each opened, early in the morning of the 10th of November, upon Fort Mifflin, at the distance of 500 yards, and kept up an incessant fire for several successive days. The blockhouses were reduced to a heap of ruins; the palisades were beaten down, and most of the guns dismounted and otherwise disabled. The barracks were battered in every part, so that the troops could not remain in them. They were under the necessity of working and watching the whole night to repair the damages of the day, and to guard against a storm, of which they were in perpetual apprehension. If, in the days, a few moments were allowed for repose, it was taken on the wet earth, which, in consequence of heavy rains, had become a soft mud. The garrison was relieved by General Varnum every forty-eight hours, but his brigade was so weak that half the men were constantly on duty.

Colonel Smith was decidedly of opinion, and General Varnum concurred with him, that the garrison could not repel an a.s.sault, and ought to be withdrawn; but Washington still cherished the hope that the place might be maintained until he should be reinforced from the northern army.

Believing that an a.s.sault would not be attempted until the works were battered down, he recommended that the whole night should be employed in making repairs. His orders were that the place should be defended to the last extremity; and never were orders more faithfully executed.

Several of the garrison were killed and among them Captain Treat, a gallant officer, who commanded the artillery. Colonel Smith received a contusion on his hip and arm which compelled him to give up the command and retire to Red Bank. Major Fleury, a French officer of distinguished merit, who served as engineer, reported to Washington that, although the blockhouses were beaten down, all the guns in them, except two, disabled, and several breaches made in the walls, the place was still defensible; but the garrison was so unequal to the numbers required by the extent of the lines, and was so dispirited by watching, fatigue, and constant exposure to the cold rains, which were almost incessant, that he dreaded the event of an attempt to carry the place by storm. Fresh troops were ordered to their relief from Varnum's brigade, and the command was taken, first by Colonel Russell, and afterward by Major Thayer. The artillery, commanded by Captain Lee, continued to be well served. The besiegers were several times thrown into confusion, and a floating battery, which opened on the morning of the 14th, was silenced in the course of the day.

The defense being unexpectedly obstinate, the a.s.sailants brought up their ships (November 15, 1777) as far as the obstructions in the river permitted and added their fire to that of the batteries, which was the more fatal as the cover for the troops had been greatly impaired. The brave garrison, however, still maintained their ground with unshaken firmness. In the midst of this stubborn conflict, the Vigilant and a sloop-of-war were brought up the inner channel, between Mud and Province Islands, which had, un.o.bserved by the besieged, been deepened by the current in consequence of the obstructions in the main channel, and, taking a station within 100 yards of the works, not only kept up a destructive cannonade, but threw hand-grenades into them, while the musketeers from the round-top of the Vigilant killed every man that appeared on the platform.

Major Thayer applied to the Commodore to remove these vessels, and he ordered six galleys on the service, but, after reconnoitering their situation, the galleys returned without attempting anything. Their report was that these ships were so covered by the batteries on Province Island as to be una.s.sailable.

It was now apparent to all that the fort could be no longer defended.

The works were in ruins. The position of the Vigilant rendered any further continuance on the island a prodigal and useless waste of human life; and on the 16th, about 11 at night, the garrison was withdrawn.

A second attempt was made to drive the vessels from their stations, with a determination, should it succeed, to repossess the island, but the galleys effected nothing, and a detachment from Province Island soon occupied the ground which had been abandoned.

The day after, receiving intelligence of the evacuation of Fort Mifflin, Washington deputed Generals De Kalb and Knox to confer with General Varnum and the officers at Fort Mercer on the practicability of continuing to defend the obstructions in the channel, to report thereon, and to state the force which would be necessary for that purpose. Their report was in favor of continuing the defense. A council of the navy officers had already been called by the Commodore in pursuance of a request of the Commander-in-Chief, made before the evacuation had taken place, who were unanimously of opinion that it would be impracticable for the fleet, after the loss of the island, to maintain its station or to a.s.sist in preventing the _chevaux-de-frise_ from being weighed by the ships of the enemy.

General Howe had now completed a line of defense from the Schuylkill to the Delaware, and a reinforcement from New York had arrived at Chester.

These two circ.u.mstances enabled him to form an army in the Jerseys, sufficient for the reduction of Fort Mercer, without weakening himself so much in Philadelphia as to put his lines in hazard. Still, deeming it of the utmost importance to open the navigation of the Delaware completely, he detached Lord Cornwallis, about 1 in the morning of the 17th (1777), with a strong body of troops to Chester. From that place his lordship crossed over to Billingsport, where he was joined by the reinforcement from New York.

Washington received immediate intelligence of the march of this detachment, which he communicated to General Varnum, with orders that Fort Mercer should be defended to the last extremity. With a view to military operations in that quarter he ordered one division of the army to cross the river at Burlington, and dispatched expresses to the northern troops who were marching on by brigades, directing them to move down the Delaware on its northern side until they should receive further orders.

General Greene was selected for this expedition. A hope was entertained that he would be able not only to protect Fort Mercer, but to obtain some decisive advantage over Lord Cornwallis, as the situation of the fort, which his lordship could not invest without placing himself between Timber and Manto creeks, would expose the a.s.sailants to great peril from a respectable force in their rear. But, before Greene could cross the Delaware, Cornwallis approached with an army rendered more powerful than had been expected by the junction of the reinforcement from New York, and Fort Mercer was evacuated. A few of the smaller galleys escaped up the river, and the others were burnt by their crews.

Washington still hoped to recover much of what had been lost. A victory would restore the Jersey sh.o.r.e, and this object was deemed so important that General Greene's instructions indicated the expectation that he would be in a condition to fight Cornwallis.

Greene feared the reproach of avoiding an action less than the just censure of sacrificing the real interests of his country by engaging the enemy on disadvantageous terms. The numbers of the British exceeded his, even counting his militia as regulars, and he determined to wait for Glover's brigade, which was marching from the north. Before its arrival, Cornwallis took post on Gloucester point, a point of land making deep into the Delaware, which was entirely under cover of the guns of the ships, from which place he was embarking his baggage and the provisions he had collected for Philadelphia.

Believing that Cornwallis would immediately follow the magazines he had collected, and that the purpose of Howe was, with his united forces, to attack the American army while divided, General Washington ordered Greene to re-cross the Delaware and join the army.

Thus, after one continued struggle of more than six weeks, in which the Continental troops displayed great military virtues, the army in Philadelphia secured itself in the possession of that city by opening a free communication with the fleet.

While Lord Cornwallis was in Jersey, and General Greene on the Delaware above him, the reinforcements from the north being received, an attack on Philadelphia was strongly pressed by several officers high in rank, and was, in some measure, urged by that torrent of public opinion, which, if not resisted by a very firm mind, overwhelms the judgment, and by controlling measures not well comprehended may frequently produce, especially in military transactions, the most disastrous effects. The officers who advised this measure were Lord Stirling, Generals Wayne, Scott, and Woodford. The considerations urged upon Washington in its support were: That the army was now in greater force than he could expect it to be at any future time; that being joined by the troops who had conquered Burgoyne, his own reputation, the reputation of his army, the opinion of Congress and of the nation required some decisive blow on his part; and that the rapid depreciation of the paper currency, by which the resources for carrying on the war were dried up, rendered indispensable some grand effort to bring it to a speedy termination.

Washington reconnoitered the enemy's lines with great care and took into serious consideration the plan of attack proposed. The plan proposed was that General Greene should embark 2,000 men at Dunks' ferry, and descending the Delaware in the night land in the town just before day, attack the enemy in the rear, and take possession of the bridge over the Schuylkill; that a strong corps should march down on the west side of that river, occupy the heights enfilading the works of the enemy, and open a brisk cannonade upon them, while a detachment from it should march down to the bridge and attack in front at the same instant that the party descending the river should commence its a.s.sault on the rear.

Not only the Commander-in-Chief, but some of his best officers--those who could not be impelled by the clamors of the ill-informed to ruin the public interests--were opposed to this mad enterprise. The two armies, they said, were now nearly equal in point of numbers, and the detachment under Lord Cornwallis could not be supposed to have so weakened Sir William Howe as to compensate for the advantages of his position. His right was covered by the Delaware, his left by the Schuylkill, his rear by the junction of those two rivers, as well as by the city of Philadelphia, and his front by a line of redoubts extending from river to river and connected by an abatis and by circular works. It would be indispensably necessary to carry all these redoubts, since to leave a part of them to play on the rear of the columns while engaged in front with the enemy in Philadelphia would be extremely hazardous. Supposing the redoubts carried and the British army driven into the town, yet all military men were agreed on the great peril of storming a town. The streets would be defended by an artillery greatly superior to that of the Americans, which would attack in front, while the brick houses would be lined with musketeers, whose fire must thin the ranks of the a.s.sailants.

A part of the plan, on the successful execution of which the whole depended, was that the British rear should be surprised by the corps descending the Delaware. This would require the concurrence of too many favorable circ.u.mstances to be calculated on with any confidence. As the position of General Greene was known, it could not be supposed that Sir William Howe would be inattentive to him. It was probable that not even his embarkation would be made unnoticed, but it was presuming a degree of negligence which ought not to be a.s.sumed to suppose that he could descend the river to Philadelphia undiscovered. So soon as his movement should be observed, the whole plan would be comprehended, since it would never be conjectured that Greene was to attack singly.

If the attack in front should fail, which was not even improbable, the total loss of the 2,000 men in the rear must follow, and General Howe would maintain his superiority through the winter.

The situation did not require these desperate measures. The British general would be compelled to risk a battle on equal terms or to manifest a conscious inferiority to the American army. The depreciation of paper money was the inevitable consequence of immense emissions without corresponding taxes. It was by removing the cause, not by sacrificing the army, that this evil was to be corrected.

Washington possessed too much discernment to be dazzled by the false brilliant presented by those who urged the necessity of storming Philadelphia in order to throw l.u.s.tre round his own fame and that of his army, and too much firmness of temper, too much virtue and real patriotism to be diverted from a purpose believed to be right, by the clamors of faction or the discontents of ignorance. Disregarding the importunities of mistaken friends, the malignant insinuations of enemies, and the expectations of the ill-informed, he persevered in his resolution to make no attempt on Philadelphia. He saved his army and was able to keep the field in the face of his enemy, while the clamor of the moment wasted in air and was forgotten.

About this time Washington learnt, by a letter from General Greene, that his young friend Lafayette, although hardly recovered from the wound received at Brandywine, had signalized his spirit and courage by an attack on Cornwallis' picket guard at Gloucester point, below Philadelphia. "The Marquis," writes Greene, "with about 400 militia and the rifle corps, attacked the enemy's picket last evening, killed about 20, wounded many more, and took about 20 prisoners. The Marquis is charmed with the spirited behavior of the militia and rifle corps; they drove the enemy about half a mile and kept the ground till dark. The enemy's picket consisted of about 300 and were reinforced during the skirmish. The Marquis is determined to be in the way of danger."

The following letter to Washington, cited by Sparks, contains Lafayette's own account of this affair: "After having spent the most part of the day in making myself well acquainted with the certainty of the enemy's motions, I came pretty late into the Gloucester road between the two creeks. I had 10 light horse, almost 150 riflemen, and 2 pickets of militia. Colonel Armand, Colonel Laumoy, and the Chevaliers Duplessis and Gimat were the Frenchmen with me. A scout of my men, under Duplessis, went to ascertain how near to Gloucester were the enemy's first pickets, and they found at the distance of two miles and a half from that place a strong post of 350 Hessians, with field pieces, and they engaged immediately. As my little reconnoitering party were all in fine spirits I supported them. We pushed the Hessians more than half a mile from the place where their main body had been and we made them run very fast. British reinforcements came twice to them, but, very far from recovering their ground, they always retreated. The darkness of the night prevented us from pursuing our advantage. After standing on the ground we had gained, I ordered them to return very slowly to Haddonfield."

The Marquis had only one man killed and six wounded. "I take the greatest pleasure," he added, "in letting you know that the conduct of our soldiers was above all praise. I never saw men so merry, so spirited, and so desirous to go on to the enemy, whatever force they might have, as that same small party in this little fight."

Washington, in a letter to Congress dated November 26, 1777, mentions this affair with commendation, and suggests, as he had repeatedly done before, Lafayette's appointment to one of the vacant divisions of the army, and on the same day that this letter was received Congress voted that such an appointment would be agreeable to them. Three days afterward Washington placed Lafayette in command of the division of General Stephen, who had been dismissed from the army for having been intoxicated, to the great injury of the public service, on the eventful day of the battle of Germantown. We shall see that this appointment, by enabling Lafayette to act occasionally on a separate command, afforded him the opportunity of rendering essential service to the cause of independence.

On the 27th of November (1777), the Board of War was increased from three to five members, viz.: General Mifflin, formerly aide to Washington and recently quartermaster-general; Joseph Trumbull, Richard Peters, Col. Timothy Pickering, of Ma.s.sachusetts, and General Gates.