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The people and their rulers talked loudly of liberty, but each was anxious to sacrifice as little as possible to maintain it and to devolve on his neighbor the expense, dangers, and privations of the struggle.
In consequence of this dilatory spirit, when the troops left their winter quarters in the month of June (1781), and encamped at Peekskill, the army under Washington did not amount to 5,000 men. This force was so much inferior to what had been contemplated when the plan of operations was agreed on at Wethersfield that it became doubtful whether it would be expedient to adhere to that plan. But the deficiency of the American force was in some measure compensated by the arrival at Boston of a reinforcement of 1,500 men to the army under Rochambeau.
The hope of terminating the war in the course of the campaign encouraged the States to make some exertions. Small as was their military force it was difficult to find subsistence for the troops, and even after the army had taken the field there was reason to apprehend that it would be obliged to abandon the objects of the campaign for want of provisions.
It was at that critical juncture of American affairs that the finances of the Union were entrusted to Robert Morris, a member of Congress for Pennsylvania, a man of considerable capital and of much sagacity and mercantile enterprise. He, as we have already seen, extensively pledged his personal credit for articles of the first necessity to the army, and, by an honorable fulfillment of his engagements, did much to restore public credit and confidence. It was owing mainly to his exertions that the active and decisive operations of the campaign were not greatly impeded or entirely defeated by want of subsistence to the army and of the means of transporting military stores.
By his plan of a national bank, already referred to, Mr. Morris rendered still more important service. Its notes were to be received as cash into the treasuries of the several States, and also as an equivalent for the necessaries which the States were bound to provide for the army. In this way, and by a liberal and judicious application of his own resources, an individual afforded the supplies which government was unable to furnish.
The French troops, under Rochambeau, marched from Newport and Boston toward the Hudson. Both in quarters and on the route their behavior was exemplary, and gained the respect and good will of the inhabitants.
Toward the end of June (1781) Washington put his army in motion, and, learning that a royal detachment had pa.s.sed into the Jerseys, he formed a plan to surprise the British posts on the north end of York Island, but it did not succeed, and General Lincoln, who commanded the Americans, being attacked by a strong British party, a sharp conflict ensued. Washington marched with his main body to support his detachment, but on his advance the British retired into their works at Kingsbridge.
Rochambeau, then on his march to join Washington, detached the Duke de Lauzun with a body of men to support the attack, who advanced with his troops within supporting distance, but the British had retreated before they could be brought into action.
Having failed in his design of surprising the British posts Washington withdrew to Valentine's Hill, and afterward to Dobb's Ferry. While encamped there, on the 6th of July (1781), the van of the long-expected French reinforcements under Rochambeau was seen winding down the neighboring heights. The arrival of these friendly strangers elevated the minds of the Americans, who received them with sincere congratulations. Washington labored, by personal attentions, to conciliate the good will of his allies, and used all the means in his power to prevent those mutual jealousies and irritations which frequently prevail between troops of different nations serving in the same army. An attack on New York was still meditated, and every exertion made to prepare for its execution, but with the determination, if it should prove impracticable, vigorously to prosecute some more attainable object. [1]
On the evening of the 21st of July (1781), the greater part of the American, and part of the French troops, left their encampment, and marching rapidly during the night, appeared in order of battle before the British works at Kingsbridge, at 4 next morning. Washington and Rochambeau, with the general officers and engineers, viewed the British lines in their whole extent from right to left, and the same was again done next morning. But, on the afternoon of the 23d they returned to their former encampment without having made any attempt on the British works.
At that time the new levies arrived slowly in the American camp, and many of those who were sent were mere boys utterly unfit for active service. The several States discovered much backwardness in complying with the requisitions of Congress, so that there was reason to apprehend that the number of troops necessary for besieging New York could not be procured. This made Washington turn his thoughts more seriously to the southward than he had hitherto done, but all his movements confirmed Clinton in the belief that an attack on New York was in contemplation.
As the British Commander-in-Chief, however, at that time received about 3,000 troops from Europe, he thought himself able to defend his post without withdrawing any part of the force from Virginia. Therefore he countermanded the requisition which he had before sent to Cornwallis for part of the troops under his command. The troops were embarked before the arrival of the counter order, and of their embarkation Lafayette sent notice to Washington. On the reception of new instructions, however, as formerly mentioned they were relanded and remained in Virginia.
No great operation could be undertaken against the British armies so long as their navy had undisputed command of the coast and of the great navigable rivers. Washington, as we have seen, had already, through Colonel Laurens, made an earnest application to the court of France for such a fleet as might be capable of keeping in check the British navy in those seas and of affording effectual a.s.sistance to the land forces.
That application was not unsuccessful, and towards the middle of the month of August the agreeable information was received of the approach of a powerful French fleet to the American coast.
Early in March (1781) the Count de Gra.s.se had sailed from Brest with twenty-five ships-of-the-line, five of which were destined for the East, and twenty for the West Indies. After an indecisive encounter in the Straits of St. Lucie with Sir Samuel Hood, whom Sir George Rodney, the British admiral in the West Indies had detached to intercept him, Count de Gra.s.se formed a junction with the ships of his sovereign on that station and had a fleet superior to that of the British in the West Indies. De Gra.s.se gave the Americans notice that he would visit their coast in the month of August and take his station in Chesapeake Bay, but that his continuance there could only be of short duration. This dispatch at once determined Washington's resolution with respect to the main point of attack, and as it was necessary that the projected operation should be accomplished within a very limited time prompt decision and indefatigable exertion were indispensable. Though it was now finally resolved that Virginia should be the grand scene of action, yet it was prudent to conceal till the last moment this determination from Sir Henry Clinton, and still to maintain the appearance of threatening New York.
The defense of the strong posts on the Hudson or North river was entrusted to General Heath who was instructed to protect the adjacent country as far as he was able, and for that purpose a respectable force was put under his command. Every preparation of which circ.u.mstances admitted was made to facilitate the march to the southward. Washington was to take the command of the expedition and to employ in it all the French troops and a strong detachment of the American army.
On the 19th of August (1781) a considerable corps was ordered to cross the Hudson at Dobbs' Ferry and to take a position between Springfield and Chatham, where they were directed to cover some bakehouses which it was rumored were to be immediately constructed in the vicinity of those places in order to encourage the belief that there the troops intended to establish a permanent post. On the 20th and 21st the main body of the Americans pa.s.sed the river at King's ferry, but the French made a longer circuit and did not complete the pa.s.sage till the 25th. Desirous of concealing his object as long as possible, Washington continued his march some time in such a direction as still to keep up the appearance of threatening New York. When concealment was no longer practicable he marched southward with the utmost celerity. His movements had been of such a doubtful nature that Sir Henry Clinton, it is said, was not fully convinced of his real destination till he had crossed the Delaware.
Great exertions had been made to procure funds for putting the army in motion, but, after exhausting every other resource, Washington was obliged to have recourse to Rochambeau for a supply of cash, which he received. [2]
On the 2d and 3d of September (1781) the combined American and French armies pa.s.sed through Philadelphia, where they were received with ringing of bells, firing of guns, bonfires, illuminations, and every demonstration of joy. Meanwhile Count de Gra.s.se, with 3,000 troops on board, sailed from Cape Francois with a valuable fleet of merchantmen, which he conducted out of danger, and then steered for Chesapeake Bay with twenty-eight sail-of-the-line and several frigates. Toward the end of August (1781) he cast anchor just within the capes, extending across from Cape Henry to the middle ground. There an officer from Lafayette waited on the count, and gave him full information concerning the posture of affairs in Virginia, and the intended plan of operations against the British army in that State.
Cornwallis was diligently fortifying himself at York and Gloucester.
Lafayette was in a position on James river to prevent his escape into North Carolina, and the combined army was hastening southward to attack him. In order to cooperate against Cornwallis De Gra.s.se detached four ships-of-the-line and some frigates to block up the entrance of York river, and to carry the land forces which he had brought with him, under the Marquis de St. Simon, to Lafayette's camp. The rest of his fleet remained at the entrance of the bay.
Sir George Rodney, who commanded the British fleet in the West Indies, was not ignorant that the count intended to sail for America, but knowing that the merchant vessel which he convoyed from Cape Francois were loaded with valuable cargoes the British admiral believed that he would send the greater part of his fleet along with them to Europe and would visit the American coast with a small squadron only.
Accordingly, Rodney detached Sir Samuel Hood with fourteen sail-of-the-line to America as a sufficient force to counteract the operations of the French in that quarter. Admiral Hood reached the capes of Virginia on the 25th of August (1781), a few days before de Gra.s.se entered the bay and finding no enemy there sailed for Sandy Hook, where he arrived on the 28th of August.
Admiral Graves, who had succeeded Admiral Arbuthnot in the command of the British fleet on the American station, was then lying at New York with seven sail-of-the-line; but two of his ships had been damaged in a cruise near Boston and were under repair. At the same time that Admiral Hood gave information of the expected arrival of de Gra.s.se on the American coast, notice was received of the sailing of de Barras with his fleet from Newport. Admiral Graves, therefore, without waiting for his two ships which were under repair, put to sea on the 31st of August with nineteen sail-of-the-line and steered to the southward.
On reaching the capes of the Chesapeake, early on the morning of the 5th of September (1781), he discovered the French fleet, consisting of twenty-four ships-of-the-line, lying at anchor in the entrance of the bay. Neither admiral had any previous knowledge of the vicinity of the other till the fleets were actually seen. The British stretched into the bay and soon as Count de Gra.s.se ascertained their hostile character he ordered his ships to slip their cables, form the line as they could come up without regard to their specified stations and put to sea. The British fleet entering the bay and the French leaving it, they were necessarily sailing in different directions, but Admiral Graves put his ships on the same tack with the French and about four in the afternoon a battle began between the van and centre of the fleets which continued till night. Both sustained considerable damage. The fleets continued in sight of each other for five days, but de Gra.s.se's object was not to fight unless to cover Chesapeake Bay, and Admiral Graves, owing to the inferiority of his force and the crippled state of several of his ships, was unable to compel him to renew the engagement.
On the 10th (September, 1781), de Gra.s.se bore away for the Chesapeake and anch.o.r.ed within the capes next day when he had the satisfaction to find that Admiral de Barras with his fleet from Newport and fourteen transports laden with heavy artillery and other military stores for carrying on a siege had safely arrived during his absence. That officer sailed from Newport on the 25th of August, and making a long circuit to avoid the British, entered the bay while the contending fleets were at sea. Admiral Graves followed the French fleet to the Chesapeake, but on arriving there he found the entrance guarded by a force with which he was unable to contend. He then sailed for New York and left de Gra.s.se in the undisputed possession of the bay.
While these naval operations were going on the land forces were not less actively employed in the prosecution of their respective purposes. The immediate aim of Washington was to overwhelm Cornwallis and his army at Yorktown; that of Clinton, to rescue him from his grasp. As soon as Clinton was convinced of Washington's intention of proceeding to the southward with a view to bring him back, he employed the infamous traitor Arnold, with a sufficient naval and military force, on an expedition against New London. The "parricide," as Jefferson calls him, had not the slightest objection to fill his pockets with the plunder of his native State. He pa.s.sed from Long Island and on the forenoon of the 6th of September (1781) landed his troops on both sides of the harbor; those on the New London side being under his own immediate orders and those on the Groton side commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre. As the works at New London were very imperfect, no vigorous resistance was there made, and the place was taken possession of with little loss. But Fort Griswold, on the Groton side, was in a more finished state and the small garrison made a desperate defense. The British entered the fort at the point of the bayonet.
Col. William Ledyard, brother of the celebrated traveler, commanded the fort. Colonel Eyre and Major Montgomery having fallen in the a.s.sault, the command had devolved on Major Bromfield, a New Jersey Tory. After the works had been carried, Ledyard ordered his men to lay down their arms. Bromfield called out, "Who commands in this fort?" Ledyard advanced and presenting his sword, replied, "I did, but you do now."
Bromfield seized the sword and ran Ledyard through the body. This was the signal for an indiscriminate ma.s.sacre of a greater part of the garrison by the Tories, refugees, and Hessians, of which the army of Arnold was very appropriately composed. Seventy were killed and thirty-five desperately wounded. The enemy lost 2 officers and 46 men killed, 8 officers and 135 soldiers wounded. Few Americans had fallen before the British entered the works.
The loss sustained by the Americans at New London was great, but that predatory incursion had no effect in diverting Washington from his purpose or in r.e.t.a.r.ding his march southward. From Philadelphia the allied armies pursued their route, partly to the head of Elk river, which falls into the northern extremity of Chesapeake Bay, and partly to Baltimore, at which places they embarked on board transports furnished by the French fleet, and the last division of them landed at Williamsburgh on the 25th of September (1781). Washington, Rochambeau, and their attendants proceeded to the same place by land, and reached it ten days before the troops. Virginia had suffered extremely in the course of the campaign; the inhabitants were clamorous for the appearance of Washington in his native State, and hailed his arrival with acclamations of joy.
Washington and Rochambeau immediately repaired on board de Gra.s.se's ship in order to concert a joint plan of operations against Cornwallis.
De Gra.s.se, convinced that every exertion would be made to relieve his lordship, and being told that Admiral Digby had arrived at New York with a reinforcement of six ships-of-the-line, expected to be attacked by a force little inferior to his own, and, deeming the station which he then occupied unfavorable to a naval engagement, he was strongly inclined to leave the bay and to meet the enemy in the open sea. Washington, fully aware of all the casualties which might occur to prevent his return and to defeat the previous arrangements, used every argument to dissuade the French admiral from his purpose, and prevailed with him to remain in the bay.
As de Gra.s.se could continue only a short time on that station, every exertion was made to proceed against Cornwallis at Yorktown. Opposite Yorktown is Gloucester point, which projects considerably into the river, the breadth of which at that place does not exceed a mile.
Cornwallis had taken possession of both these places and diligently fortified them. The communication between them was commanded by his batteries and by some ships-of-war which lay in the river under cover of his guns. The main body of his army was encamped near Yorktown, beyond some outer redoubts and field works calculated to r.e.t.a.r.d the approach of an enemy. Colonel Tarleton, with six or seven hundred men, occupied Gloucester point.
The combined army, amounting to upwards of 11,000 men, exclusive of the Virginia militia, under the command of the patriotic Governor Nelson, was a.s.sembled in the vicinity of Williamsburgh, and on the morning of the 28th of September (1781), marched by different routes toward Yorktown. About midday the heads of the columns reached the ground a.s.signed them, and, after driving in the outposts and some cavalry, encamped for the night. The next day was employed in viewing the British works and in arranging the plan of attack. At the same time that the combined army encamped before Yorktown the French fleet anch.o.r.ed at the mouth of the river and completely prevented the British from escaping by water as well as from receiving supplies or reinforcements in that way.
The legion of Lauzun and a brigade of militia, amounting to upwards of 4,000 men, commanded by the French general de Choise, were sent across the river to watch Gloucester Point and to enclose the British on that side.
On the 30th (September, 1781) Yorktown was invested. The French troops formed the left wing of the combined army, extending from the river above the town to a mora.s.s in front of it; the Americans composed the right wing and occupied the ground between the mora.s.s and the river below the town. Till the 6th of October the besieging army was a.s.siduously employed in disembarking its heavy artillery and military stores and in conveying them to camp from the landing place in James river, a distance of six miles. On the night of the 6th the first parallel was begun, under the direction of General du Portail, the chief engineer, 600 yards from the British works. The night was dark, rainy, and well adapted for such a service; and in the course of it the besiegers did not lose a man. Their operations seem not to have been suspected by the besieged till daylight disclosed them in the morning, when the trenches were so far advanced as in a good measure to cover the workmen from the fire of the garrison. By the afternoon of the 9th the batteries were completed, notwithstanding the most strenuous opposition from the besieged, and immediately opened on the town. From that time an incessant cannonade was kept up, and the continual discharge of shot and sh.e.l.ls from twenty-four and eighteen pounders and ten-inch mortars, damaged the unfinished works on the left of the town, silenced the guns mounted on them and occasioned a considerable loss of men. Some of the shot and sh.e.l.ls from the batteries pa.s.sed over the town, reached the shipping in the harbor, and set on fire the Charon of forty-four guns and three large transports, which were entirely consumed.
"From the bank of the river," says Dr. Thacher, "I had a fine view of this splendid conflagration. The ships were enwrapped in a torrent of fire, which, spreading with vivid brightness among the combustible rigging and running with amazing rapidity to the tops of the several masts, while all around was thunder and lightning from our numerous cannon and mortars, and in the darkness of night presented one of the most sublime and magnificent spectacles that can be imagined. Some of our sh.e.l.ls, overreaching the town, are seen to fall into the river, and bursting, throw up columns of water, like the spouting of the monsters of the deep."
On the night of the 11th (October, 1781), the besiegers, laboring with indefatigable perseverance, began their second parallel, 300 yards nearer the British works than the first; and the three succeeding days were a.s.siduously employed in completing it.
During that interval the fire of the garrison was more destructive than at any other period of the siege. The men in the trenches were particularly annoyed by two redoubts toward the left of the British works, and about 200 yards in front of them. Of these it was necessary to gain possession, and on the 14th preparations were made to carry them both by storm. In order to avail himself of the spirit of emulation which existed between the troops of the two nations, and to avoid any cause of jealousy to either, Washington committed the attack of the one redoubt to the French and that of the other to the Americans. The latter were commanded by Lafayette, attended by Col. Alexander Hamilton, who led the advance, and the former by the Baron de Viomenil.
On the evening of the 14th, as soon as it was dark, the parties marched to the a.s.sault with unloaded arms. The redoubt which the Americans under Lafayette attacked was defended by a major, some inferior officers, and forty-five privates. The a.s.sailants advanced with such rapidity, without returning a shot to the heavy fire with which they were received, that in a few minutes they were in possession of the work, having had 8 men killed and 7 officers and 25 men wounded in the attack. Eight British privates were killed; Major Campbell, a captain, an ensign, and seventeen privates were made prisoners. The rest escaped. Although the Americans were highly exasperated by the recent ma.s.sacre of their countrymen in Fort Griswold by Arnold's detachment, yet not a man of the British was injured after resistance ceased. Retaliation had been talked of but was not exercised. [3]
The French advanced with equal courage, but not with equal rapidity. The American soldiers had removed the abattis themselves. The French waited for the sappers to remove them according to military rule. While thus waiting a message was brought from Lafayette to Viomenil, informing him that he was in his redoubt, and wished to know where the baron was.
"Tell the marquis," replied Viomenil, "that I am not in mine, but will be in five minutes." The abattis being removed, the redoubt was carried in very nearly the time prescribed by the baron. There were 120 men in this redoubt, of whom 18 were killed and 42 taken prisoners; the rest made their escape. The French lost nearly 100 men killed or wounded.
During the night these two redoubts were included in the second parallel, and, in the course of next day, some howitzers were placed on them, which, in the afternoon, opened on the besieged.
"During the a.s.sault," says Dr. Thacher, "the British kept up an incessant firing of cannon and musketry from their whole line. His Excellency, General Washington, Generals Lincoln and Knox, with their aids, having dismounted, were standing in an exposed situation, waiting the result. Colonel Cobb, one of Washington's aids, solicitous for his safety, said to his Excellency, 'Sir, you are too much exposed here; had you not better step a little back?' 'Colonel Cobb,' replied his Excellency, 'if you are afraid, you have liberty to step back.'
"Cornwallis and his garrison had done all that brave men could do to defend their post. But the industry of Laurens, and to each and all the officers and men, are above expression. Not one gun was fired, and the ardor of the troops did not give time for the sappers to derange the abattis; and owing to the conduct of the commanders and the bravery of the men, the redoubt was stormed with uncommon rapidity."
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the besiegers was persevering and their approaches rapid. The condition of the British was becoming desperate. In every quarter their works were torn to pieces by the fire of the a.s.sailants. The batteries already playing upon them had nearly silenced all their guns, and the second parallel was about to open on them, which in a few hours would render the place untenable.
Owing to the weakness of his garrison, occasioned by sickness and the fire of the besiegers, Cornwallis could not spare large sallying parties, but, in the present distressing crisis, he resolved to make every effort to impede the progress of the besiegers, and to preserve his post to the last extremity. For this purpose, a little before daybreak on the morning of the 16th of October (1781), about 350 men, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Abercrombie, sallied out against two batteries, which seemed in the greatest state of forwardness. They attacked with great impetuosity, killed or wounded a considerable number of the French troops, who had charge of the works, spiked eleven guns, and returned with little loss. This exploit was of no permanent advantage to the garrison, for the guns, having been hastily spiked, were soon again rendered fit for service.
About 4 in the afternoon of the 16th of October, several batteries of the second parallel opened on the garrison, and it was obvious that, in the course of next day, all the batteries of that parallel, mounting a most formidable artillery, would be ready to play on the town. The shattered works of the garrison were in no condition to sustain such a tremendous fire. In the whole front which was attacked the British could not show a single gun, and their sh.e.l.ls were nearly exhausted. In this extremity Cornwallis formed the desperate resolution of crossing the river during the night with his effective force and attempting to escape to the northward. His plan was to leave behind his sick, baggage, and all enc.u.mbrances; to attack de Choise, who commanded on the Gloucester side, with his whole force; to mount his own infantry, partly with the hostile cavalry which he had no doubt of seizing, and partly with such horses as he might find by the way; to hasten toward the fords of the great rivers in the upper country, and then, turning northward, to pa.s.s through Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Jerseys, and join the army at New York. The plan was hazardous, and presented little prospect of success; but in the forlorn circ.u.mstances of the garrison anything that offered a glimpse of hope was reckoned preferable to the humiliation of an immediate surrender.
In prosecution of this perilous enterprise the light infantry, most of the guards, and a part of the Twenty-third regiment embarked in boats, pa.s.sed the river, and landed at Gloucester point before midnight.
A storm then arose, which rendered the return of the boats and the transportation of the rest of the troops equally impracticable. In that divided state of the British forces the morning of the 17th of October (1781) dawned, when the batteries of the combined armies opened on the garrison at Yorktown. As the attempt to escape was entirely defeated by the storm, the troops that had been carried to Gloucester point were brought back in the course of the forenoon without much loss, though the pa.s.sage was exposed to the artillery of the besiegers. The British works were in ruins, the garrison was weakened by disease and death, and exhausted by incessant fatigue. Every ray of hope was extinguished. It would have been madness any longer to attempt to defend the post and to expose the brave garrison to the danger of an a.s.sault, which would soon have been made on the place.
At 10 in the forenoon of the 17th Cornwallis sent a flag of truce with a letter to Washington, proposing a cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours, in order to give time to adjust terms for the surrender of the forts at Yorktown and Gloucester point. To this letter Washington immediately returned an answer, expressing his ardent desire to spare the further effusion of blood and his readiness to listen to such terms as were admissible, but that he could not consent to lose time in fruitless negotiations, and desired that, previous to the meeting of commissioners, his lordship's proposals should be transmitted in writing, for which purpose a suspension of hostilities for two hours should be granted.
The terms offered by Cornwallis, although not all deemed admissible, were such as induced the opinion that no great difficulty would occur in adjusting the conditions of capitulation, and the suspension of hostilities was continued through the night. Meanwhile, in order to avoid the delay of useless discussion, Washington drew up and transmitted to Cornwallis such articles as he was willing to grant, informing his lordship that, if he approved of them, commissioners might be immediately appointed to reduce them to form. Accordingly, Viscount Noailles and Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, whose father was then a prisoner in the Tower of London, on the 18th met Colonel Dundas and Major Ross of the British army at Moore's house, in the rear of the first parallel. They prepared a rough draft, but were unable definitively to arrange the terms of capitulation.
The draught was to be submitted to Cornwallis, but Washington, resolved to admit of no delay, directed the articles to be transcribed; and, on the morning of the 19th, sent them to his lordship, with a letter expressing his expectation that they would be signed by 11 and that the garrison would march out at 2 in the afternoon. [4] Finding that no better terms could be obtained, Cornwallis submitted to a painful necessity, and, on the 19th of October, surrendered the posts of Yorktown and Gloucester point to the combined armies of America and France, on condition that his troops should receive the same honors of war which had been granted to the garrison of Charleston when it surrendered to Sir Henry Clinton. The army, artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public stores of every description were surrendered to Washington; the ships in the harbor and the seamen to Count de Gra.s.se.
Cornwallis wished to obtain permission for his European troops to return home, on condition of not serving against America, France, or their allies during the war, but this was refused, and it was agreed that they should remain prisoners of war in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, accompanied by a due proportion of officers for their protection and government. The British general was also desirous of securing from punishment such Americans as had joined the royal standard, but this was refused, on the plea that it was a point which belonged to the civil authority and on which the military power was not competent to decide.
But the end was gained in an indirect way, for Cornwallis was permitted to send the Bonetta sloop-of-war unsearched to New York, with dispatches to the Commander-in-Chief and to put on board as many soldiers as he thought proper, to be accounted for in any subsequent exchange. This was understood to be a tacit permission to send off the most obnoxious of the Americans, which was accordingly done.