Kant's Theory of Knowledge Part 5

There seems, indeed, one way of avoiding this consequence, viz. to suppose that for Kant it was an absolute starting-point, which nothing would have caused him to abandon, that only those judgements of which we apprehend the necessity are true. It would, of course, follow that geometricians would be unable to apprehend the necessity of geometrical judgements, and therefore to make such judgements, until they had discovered that things as spatial were only phenomena. It would not be enough that they should think that the phenomenal or non-phenomenal character of things as spatial must be left an open question for the theory of knowledge to decide. In this way the necessity of admitting the illusory character of geometry would be avoided. The remedy, however, is at least as bad as the disease.

For it would imply that geometry must be preceded by a theory of knowledge, which is palpably contrary to fact. Nor could Kant accept it; for he avowedly bases his theory of knowledge, i. e. his view that objects as spatial are phenomena, upon the truth of geometry; this procedure would be circular if the making of true geometrical judgements was allowed to require the prior adoption of his theory of knowledge.

The third difficulty is the most fundamental. Kant's conclusion (and also, of course, his argument) presupposes the validity of the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves. If, then, this distinction should prove untenable in principle, Kant's conclusion with regard to s.p.a.ce must fail on general grounds, and it will even have been unnecessary to consider his arguments for it. The importance of the issue, however, requires that it should be considered in a separate chapter.

NOTE to page 47.

The argument is not affected by the contention that, while the totality of s.p.a.ces is infinite, the totality of colours or, at any rate, the totality of instances of some other characteristic of objects is finite; for this difference will involve no difference in respect of perception and conception. In both cases the apprehension that there is a totality will be reached in the same way, i. e. through the _conception_ of the characteristic in general, and the apprehension in the one case that the totality is infinite and in the other that it is finite will depend on the apprehension of the special nature of the characteristic in question.

CHAPTER IV

PHENOMENA AND THINGS IN THEMSELVES

The distinction between phenomena and things in themselves can be best approached by considering Kant's formulation of the alternative views of the nature of s.p.a.ce and time. "What are s.p.a.ce and time? Are they real existences? Or are they merely determinations or relations of things, such, however, as would also belong to them in themselves, even if they were not perceived, or are they attached to the form of perception only, and consequently to the subjective nature of our mind, without which these predicates can never be attributed to any thing?"[1]

[1] B. 37, M. 23.

Of these three alternatives, the first can be ignored. It is opposed to the second, and is the view that s.p.a.ce and time are things rather than relations between things. This opposition falls within the first member of the wider opposition between things as they are in themselves and things as they are as perceived, and Kant, and indeed any one, would allow that if s.p.a.ce and time belong to things as they are in themselves and not to things only as perceived, they are relations between things rather than things. The real issue, therefore, lies between the second and third alternatives. Are s.p.a.ce and time relations between things which belong to them both in themselves and also as perceived by us, or are they relations which belong to things only as perceived?

To this question we may at once reply that, inasmuch as it involves an impossible ant.i.thesis, it is wholly unreal. The thought of a property or a relation which belongs to things as perceived involves a contradiction. To take Plato's example, suppose that we are looking at a straight stick, partially immersed in water. If we have not previously seen the stick, and are ignorant of the laws of refraction, we say that the stick is bent. If, however, we learn the effect of refraction, and observe the stick from several positions, we alter our a.s.sertion. We say that the stick is not really bent, but only looks or appears bent to us. But, if we reflect at all, we do not express our meaning by saying that the stick _is_ bent to us as perceiving, though not in reality.[2] The word 'is' essentially relates to what really is. If, therefore, the phrase 'to us as perceiving' involves an opposition to the phrase 'in reality', as it must if it is to be a real qualification of 'is', it cannot rightly be added to the word 'is'. To put the matter more explicitly, the a.s.sertion that something _is_ so and so implies that it is so and so in itself, whether it be perceived or not, and therefore the a.s.sertion that something is so and so to us as perceiving, though not in itself, is a contradiction in terms. The phrase 'to us as perceiving', as a restriction upon the word 'is', merely takes back the precise meaning of the word 'is'.

That to which the phrase can be added is not the word 'is', but the word 'looks' or 'appears'. We can rightly say that the stick looks or appears bent to us as perceiving. But even then the addition only helps to make explicit the essential meaning of 'appears', for 'appears' really means 'appears to us', and 'as perceiving' only repeats the meaning of 'appears' from the side of the perceiving subject as opposed to that of the object perceived. The essential point, however, is thereby brought out that the phrase 'to us as perceiving' essentially relates not to what a thing is, but to what it looks or appears to us.

[2] Similarly, we do not say--if we mean what we say--of a man who is colour blind that an object which others call blue _is_ pink to him or to his perception, but that it _looks_ pink to him.

What, then, is the proper statement of Kant's view that s.p.a.ce is a determination of things only as they appear to us, and not as they are in themselves? It should be said that things are not in reality spatial, but only look or appear spatial to us. It should not be said that they _are_ spatial for our perception, though not in themselves.

Thus the view properly stated implies that s.p.a.ce is an illusion, inasmuch as it is not a real property of things at all. This implication, however, is precisely the conclusion which Kant wishes to avoid. He takes infinite trouble to explain that he does not hold s.p.a.ce and time to be illusions.[3] Though _transcendentally ideal_ (i. e. though they do not belong to things in themselves), they are _empirically real_. In other words, s.p.a.ce and time are real relations of _something_, though not of things in themselves.

[3] B. 44, 52, 53-4, 62-3, 69-70; M. 27, 31-2, 37-8, 41-2; _Prol._, -- 13, Remark iii.

How, then, does Kant obtain something of which s.p.a.ce and time can be regarded as really relations? He reaches it by a transition which at first sight seems harmless. In stating the fact of perception he subst.i.tutes for the a.s.sertion that things appear so and so to us the a.s.sertion that things produce appearances in us. In this way, instead of an a.s.sertion which relates to the thing and states what it is not but only appears, he obtains an a.s.sertion which introduces a second reality distinct from the thing, viz. an appearance or phenomenon, and thereby he gains something other than the thing to which s.p.a.ce can be attached as a real predicate. He thus gains something in respect of which, with regard to spatial relations we can be said to have _knowledge_ and not illusion. For the position now is that s.p.a.ce, though not a property of things in themselves, _is_ a property of phenomena or appearances; in other words, that while things in themselves are not spatial, phenomena and appearances _are_ spatial.

As evidence of this transition, it is enough to point out that, while he states the _problem_ in the form 'Are things in themselves spatial or are they only spatial as appearing to us?'[4] he usually states the _conclusion_ in the form 's.p.a.ce is the form of phenomena', i. e.

phenomena are spatial. A transition is thereby implied from 'things as appearing' to 'appearances'. At the same time, it is clear that Kant is not aware of the transition, but considers the expressions equivalent, or, in other words, fails to distinguish them. For both modes of stating the conclusion are to be found even in the same sentence. "This predicate [s.p.a.ce] is applied to things only in so far as they appear to us, i. e. are objects of sensibility [i. e.

phenomena]."[5] Again, the common phrase 'things as phenomena' implies the same confusion. Moreover, if Kant had realized that the transition was more than one of phraseology he must have seen that it was necessary to recast his argument.

[4] This is Kant's way of putting the question which should be expressed by asking, 'Are things spatial, or do they only look spatial?'

[5] B. 43, M. 26. Cf. _Prol._, -- 9 fin. with -- 10 init.

It may be said, then, that Kant is compelled to end with a different distinction from that with which he begins. He begins with the distinction between things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to us, the distinction relating to one and the same reality regarded from two different points of view. He ends with the distinction between two different realities, things-in-themselves,[6]

external to, in the sense of independent of, the mind, and phenomena or appearances within it. Yet if his _argument_ is to be valid, the two distinctions should be identical, for it is the first distinction to which the argument appeals.[7] In fact, we find him expressing what is to him the same distinction now in the one way and now in the other as the context requires.

[6] It should be noticed that 'things-in-themselves' and 'things as they are in themselves' have a different meaning.

[7] Cf. p. 55 and ff.

The final form of Kant's conclusion, then, is that while things in themselves are not, or, at least, cannot be known to be spatial, 'phenomena,' or the appearances produced in us by things in themselves, are spatial. Unfortunately, the conclusion in this form is no more successful than it is in the former form, that things are spatial only as perceived. Expressed by the formula 'phenomena are spatial', it has, no doubt, a certain plausibility; for the word 'phenomena' to some extent conceals the essentially mental character of what is a.s.serted to be spatial. But the plausibility disappears on the subst.i.tution of 'appearances'--the true equivalent of Kant's _Erscheinungen_--for 'phenomena'. Just as it is absurd to describe the fact that the stick only looks bent by saying that, while the stick is not bent, the appearance which it produces is bent, so it is, even on the face of it, nonsense to say that while things are not spatial, the appearances which they produce in us are spatial. For an 'appearance', being necessarily something mental, cannot possibly be said to be extended. Moreover, it is really an abuse of the term 'appearance' to speak of appearances _produced by_ things, for this phrase implies a false severance of the appearance from the things which appear. If there are 'appearances' at all, they are appearances _of_ things and not appearances _produced by_ them. The importance of the distinction lies in the difference of implication. To speak of appearances produced by things is to imply that the object of perception is merely something mental, viz. an appearance. Consequently, access to a non-mental reality is excluded; for a perception of which the object is something belonging to the mind's own being cannot justify an inference to something beyond the mind, and the result is inevitably solipsism. On the other hand, the phrase 'appearances of things', whatever defects it may have, at least implies that it is a non-mental reality which appears, and therefore that in perception we are in direct relation to it; the phrase, therefore, does not imply from the very beginning that the apprehension of a non-mental reality is impossible.

The objection will probably be raised that this criticism is much too summary. We do, it will be said, distinguish in ordinary consciousness between appearance and reality. Consequently there must be some form in which Kant's distinction between things in themselves and phenomena and the conclusion based upon it are justified. Moreover, Kant's reiterated a.s.sertion that his view does not imply that s.p.a.ce is an illusion, and that the distinction between the real and the illusory is possible _within_ phenomena, requires us to consider more closely whether Kant may not after all be ent.i.tled to hold that s.p.a.ce is not an illusion.[8]

[8] Cf. p. 93 and ff.

This objection is, of course, reasonable. No one can satisfy himself of the justice of the above criticisms until he has considered the real nature of the distinction between appearance and reality. This distinction must, therefore, be a.n.a.lysed. But before this is done it is necessary, in order to discover the real issue, to formulate the lines on which Kant may be defended. 'The reality,' it may be urged, 'which ideally we wish to know must be admitted to exist _in itself_, in the sense of independently of the perception, and consequently its nature must be admitted to be independent of perception. Ideally, then, our desire is to know things[9] as they are in themselves, a desire sufficiently expressed by the a.s.sertion that we desire to know things, for to know them is to know them as they are, i. e. as they are independently of perception. Again, since the reality which we desire to know consists of individuals, and since the apprehension of an individual implies perception, knowledge of reality requires perception. If in perception we apprehended reality as it is, no difficulty would arise. But we do not, for we are compelled to distinguish what things are, and what they look or appear; and what they appear essentially relates to perception. We perceive them as they look or appear and, therefore, not as they are, for what they look and what they are are _ex hypothesi_ distinguished. And this fact const.i.tutes a fatal obstacle to knowledge in general. We cannot know anything as it _is_. At least the negative side of Kant's position must be justified. We never can know things as they are in themselves.

What then do we know? Two alternative answers may be given. It may be held that the positive side of Kant's position, though indefensible in the form that we know things as they appear to us, is valid in the form that we know what things look or appear. This, no doubt, implies that our ordinary beliefs about reality are illusory, for what things look is _ex hypothesi_ different from what they are. But the implication does not const.i.tute an important departure from Kant's view. For in any case only that is knowledge proper which relates to things as they are, and therefore the supposed knowledge of things as they appear may be discarded without serious loss. On the other hand, it may be held that the positive side of Kant's position can be vindicated in the form that, while we do not know things in themselves,[10] we do know the appearances which they produce in us.

It is true that this view involves the difficulty of maintaining that appearances are spatial, but the difficulty is not insuperable.

Moreover, in this form the doctrine has the advantage that, unlike the former, it does not imply that the knowledge which we have is only of illusions, for instead of implying that our knowledge is merely knowledge of what things look but really are not, it implies that we know the real nature of realities of another kind, viz. of appearances. Again, in this form of the view, it may be possible to vindicate Kant's doctrine that the distinction between the real and the illusory is tenable within what we know, for it may be possible to distinguish within appearances between a 'real' appearance[11] and an 'illusory' appearance.[12]'

[9] 'Things' is subst.i.tuted for 'the reality which we believe to exist independently of perception' in order to conform to Kant's language. The subst.i.tution, of course, has the implication--which Kant took for granted--that the reality consists of a plurality of individuals.

[10] 'Things in themselves' has here to be subst.i.tuted for 'things as they are in themselves' in the statement of the negative side of the position, in order to express the proper ant.i.thesis, which is now that between two things, the one known and the other unknown, and not that between two points of view from which one and the same thing is known and not known respectively.

[11] _Erscheinung._

[12] _Schein._

An implication of this defence should be noticed. The issue relates to the nature of s.p.a.ce[13], and may be stated in terms of it. For, since s.p.a.ce is a presupposition of all other properties which the non-philosophical consciousness attributes to physical things, it makes no difference whether we say that things _only appear_ heavy, hard, in motion, &c., or whether we say that things _only appear_ spatial. In the same way it is a matter of indifference whether we say that, though things are not heavy, hard, &c., their appearances are so, or whether we say that, though things are not spatial, their appearances are so. The issue, then, concerns the possibility of maintaining either that things only appear spatial, or that the appearances which they produce are spatial, while the things themselves are not, or, at least cannot be known to be, spatial.

[13] We might add time also; but, for a reason which will appear later (p. 139), it can be neglected.

The tenability of these alternative positions has to be considered apart from the argument of the _Aesthetic_, for this, as we have seen, breaks down. At the outset it is important to realize that these positions are the product of philosophical reflection, and const.i.tute general theories of knowledge. As has been pointed out, the distinction between appearance and reality first arises in our ordinary or scientific consciousness.[14] In this consciousness we are compelled to distinguish between appearance and reality with respect to the details of a reality which, as a whole, or, in principle, we suppose ourselves to know. Afterwards in our philosophical consciousness we come to reflect upon this distinction and to raise the question whether it is not applicable to reality as a whole. We ask with respect to knowledge in general, and not merely with respect to certain particular items of knowledge, whether we know or can know reality, and not merely appearance. The two positions just stated are alternative ways of answering the question in the negative. They are, then, philosophical views based upon a distinction found in our ordinary consciousness. Consequently, in order to decide whether the distinction will bear the superstructure placed upon it by the philosophical consciousness, it is necessary to examine the distinction as it exists in our ordinary consciousness.

[14] I. e. the consciousness for which the problems are those of science as opposed to philosophy.

The distinction is applied in our ordinary consciousness both to the primary and to the secondary qualities of matter, i. e. to the size, shape, position and motion of physical bodies, and to their colour, warmth, &c. We say, for instance, that the moon looks[15] or appears as large as the sun, though really it is much smaller. We say that railway lines, though parallel, look convergent, just as we say that the straight stick in water looks bent. We say that at sunset the sun, though really below the horizon, looks above it. Again, we say that to a person who is colour blind the colour of an object looks different to what it really is, and that the water into which we put our hand may be warmer than it appears to our touch.

[15] 'Looks' means 'appears to sight', and 'looks' is throughout used as synonymous with 'appear', where the instance under discussion relates to visual perception.

The case of the primary qualities may be considered first. Since the instances are identical in principle, and only differ in complexity, it will be sufficient to a.n.a.lyse the simplest, that of the apparent convergence of the railway lines.

Two points at once force themselves upon our notice. In the first place, we certainly suppose that we perceive the reality which we wish to know, i. e. the reality which, as we suppose, exists independently of our perception, and not an 'appearance' of it. It is, as we say, the real lines which we see. Even the term 'convergent', in the a.s.sertion that the lines look convergent, conveys this implication.

For 'convergent' is essentially a characteristic not of an appearance but of a reality, in the sense in which something independent of perception may be opposed as a reality to an 'appearance', which, as such, presupposes perception. We can say neither that an appearance is convergent, nor that the appearance of the lines is convergent. Only a reality similar to the lines, e. g. two roads, can be said to be convergent. Our ordinary thought, therefore, furnishes no ground for the view that the object of perception is not the thing, but merely an appearance of or produced by it. In the second place, the a.s.sertion that the lines _look_ convergent implies considerable knowledge of the real nature of the reality to which the a.s.sertion relates. Both the terms 'lines' and 'convergent' imply that the reality _is_ spatial.

Further, if the context is such that we mean that, while the lines look convergent, we do not know their real relation, we imply that the lines really possess some characteristic which falls within the genus to which convergence belongs, i. e. we imply that they are convergent, divergent, or parallel. If, on the other hand, the context is such that we mean that the lines only look convergent, we imply that the lines are parallel, and therefore presuppose complete knowledge in respect of the very characteristic in regard to which we state what is only appearance. The a.s.sertion, then, in respect of a primary quality, that a thing looks so and so implies knowledge of its general character as spatial, and ignorance only of a detail; and the a.s.sertion that a thing only looks or appears so and so implies knowledge of the detail in question.

Attention may now be drawn to a general difficulty which may be raised with respect to the use of the terms 'looks' and 'appears'. It may be stated thus: 'If the lines are not convergent, how is it possible even to say that they _look_ convergent? Must it not be implied that at least under _certain_ circ.u.mstances we should perceive the lines as they are? Otherwise, why should we use the words 'look' or 'appear' at all? Moreover, this implication can be pushed further; for if we maintain that we perceive the real lines, we may reasonably be asked whether we must not under _all_ circ.u.mstances perceive them as they are. It seems as though a reality cannot be perceived except as it is.' It is the view to which this difficulty gives rise which is mainly responsible for the doctrine that the object of perception is not the reality, but an appearance. Since we do distinguish between what things look and what they are, it would seem that the object of perception cannot be the thing, but only an appearance produced by it. Moreover, the doctrine gains in plausibility from the existence of certain illusions in the case of which the reality to which the illusion relates seems non-existent. For instance, if we look steadily at the flame of a candle, and then press one eyeball with a finger, we see, as we say, two candles;[16] but since _ex hypothesi_ there is only one candle, it seems that what we see must be, not the candle, but two images or appearances produced by it.

[16] Cf. Dr. Stout, on 'Things and Sensations' (_Proceedings of the British Academy_, vol. ii).

This difficulty is raised in order to draw attention to the fact that, in the case of the railway lines, where it can be met on its own ground[17], this is because, and only because, we believe s.p.a.ce to be 'real', i. e. to be a characteristic of reality, and because we understand its nature. The distinction between the actual and the apparent angle made by two straight lines presupposes a limiting case in which they coincide. If the line of sight along which we observe the point of intersection of two lines is known to be at right angles to both lines, we expect, and rightly expect, to see the angle of intersection as it is. Again, if we look at a short portion of two railway lines from a point known to be directly above them, and so distant that the effects of perspective are imperceptible, we can say that the lines look what they are, viz. parallel. Thus, from the point of view of the difficulty which has been raised, there is this justification in general for saying that two lines _look_ parallel or _look_ at right angles, that we know that in certain cases what they look is identical with what they are. In the same way, a.s.sertions of the type that the moon _looks_ as large as the sun receive justification from our knowledge that two bodies of equal size and equally distant from the observer _are_ what they look, viz. of the same size. And in both cases the justification presupposes knowledge of the reality of s.p.a.ce and also such insight into its nature as enables us to see that in certain cases there must be an ident.i.ty between what things look and what they are in respect of certain spatial relations. Again, in such cases we see that so far is it from being necessary to think that a thing must be perceived as it is, that it is not only possible but necessary to distinguish what a thing looks from what it is, and precisely in consequence of the nature of s.p.a.ce. The visual perception of spatial relations from its very nature presupposes a particular point of view. Though the perception itself cannot be spatial, it presupposes a particular point in s.p.a.ce as a standpoint or point of view,[18] and is therefore subject to conditions of perspective. This is best realized by considering the supposition that perfect visual powers would enable us to see the whole of a body at once, and that this perception would be possible if we had eyes situated all round the body. The supposition obviously breaks down through the impossibility of combining two or more points of view in one perception. But if visual perception is necessarily subject to conditions of perspective, the spatial relations of bodies can never look what they are except in the limiting case referred to.

Moreover, this distinction is perfectly intelligible, as we should expect from the necessity which we are under of drawing it. We understand perfectly why it is that bodies must, in respect of their spatial relations, look different to what they are, and we do so solely because we understand the nature of s.p.a.ce, and therefore also the conditions of perspective involved in the perception of what is spatial. It is, therefore, needless to make the a.s.sertion 'Two lines appear convergent' intelligible by converting the verb 'appears' into a substantive, viz. an 'appearance', and then making the a.s.sertion relate to an 'appearance'. For--apart from the fact that this would not achieve the desired end, since no suitable predicate could be found for the appearance--the a.s.sertion that the lines _look_ or _appear_ convergent is perfectly intelligible in itself, though not capable of being stated in terms of anything else.[19] If we generalize this result, we may say that the distinction between appearance and reality, drawn with regard to the primary qualities of bodies, throughout presupposes the reality of s.p.a.ce, and is made possible, and indeed necessary, by the nature of s.p.a.ce itself.

[17] Cf., however, p. 87 and pp. 89-91.

[18] This is, of course, not refuted by the reminder that we see with two eyes, and that these are in different places.

[19] It is important to notice that the proper formula to express what is loosely called 'an appearance' is 'A looks or appears B', and that this cannot be a.n.a.lysed into anything more simple and, in particular, into a statement about 'appearances'. Even in the case of looking at the candle, there is no need to speak of two 'appearances' or 'images'.

Before we discover the truth, the proper a.s.sertion is 'The body which we perceive looks as if it were two candles', and, after we discover the truth, the proper a.s.sertion is 'The candle looks as if it were in two places'.