John Redmond's Last Years Part 9

Redmond could not have seen either of these letters, but those two trains of thought were blended in his speech--which was less a speech than a supreme action. It was the utterance of a man who has a vision and who, acting in the light of it, seeks to embody the vision in a living reality.

Mr. Bonar Law followed Sir Edward Grey with a few brief sentences of whole-hearted support. Then Redmond rose, and a hush of expectation went over the house. I can see it now, the crowded benches and the erect, solid figure with the ma.s.sive hawk-visaged head thrown back, standing squarely at the top of the gangway. While he spoke, as during Sir Edward Grey's speech, the cheering broke out first intermittently and scattered over the House, then grew gradually universal. Sitting about me were Tory members whom I did not know; I heard their e.j.a.c.u.l.a.t.i.o.ns of bewilderment, approval and delight. But in the main body of the Unionists behind the front Opposition bench papers were being waved, and when Redmond sat down many of these men stood up to cheer him. In five minutes he had changed the whole atmosphere of domestic politics in regard to the main issue of controversy.--Here is the speech:

"I hope the House will not think me impertinent to intervene in the debate, but I am moved to do so a great deal by that sentence in the speech of the Foreign Secretary in which he said that the one bright spot in the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland. Sir, in past time, when this Empire has been engaged in these terrible enterprises, it is true that it would be the utmost affectation and folly on my part to deny that the sympathies of Nationalist Ireland, for reasons deep down in the centuries of history, have been estranged from this country.

But allow me to say that what has occurred in recent years has altered the situation completely. I must not touch upon any controversial topic, but this I may be allowed to say--that a wider knowledge of the real facts of Irish history has altered the view of the democracy of this country towards the Irish question, and I honestly believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in every trial and danger with which she is faced.

"There is a possibility of history repeating itself. The House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the disastrous American War, when it might be said that the military force of this country was almost at its lowest ebb, the sh.o.r.es of Ireland were threatened with invasion.

Then a hundred thousand Irish Volunteers sprang into existence for the purpose of defending those sh.o.r.es. At first, however--and how sad is the reading of the history of those days! no Catholic was allowed to be enrolled in that body of Volunteers; yet from the first day the Catholics of the South and West subscribed their money and sent it for the army of their Protestant fellow-countrymen. Ideas widened as time went on, and finally the Catholics of the South were armed and enrolled as brothers-in-arms with their fellow-countrymen. May history repeat itself! To-day there are in Ireland two large bodies of Volunteers, one of which has sprung into existence in the North and another in the South. I say to the Government that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. Ireland will be defended by her armed sons from invasion, and for that purpose the armed Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulster men. Is it too much to hope that out of this situation a result may spring which will be good, not merely for the Empire, but for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation? Whilst Irishmen are in favour of peace and would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors of war, whilst we will make any possible sacrifice for that purpose, still, if the necessity is forced upon this country, we offer this to the Government of the day: They may take their troops away, and if it is allowed to us, in comradeship with our brothers in the North, we will ourselves defend the sh.o.r.es of Ireland."

It needed no gift of prophecy to be certain that such a speech would be popular in the House of Commons, and many Unionists that day were almost aggrieved that Sir Edward Carson had not risen at once to reply to the offer in the same spirit. They did not realize the difficulty of the Ulster leader's position. To admit and welcome the unity of Ireland was to give away Ulster's case. To accept the Nationalist leader's utterance as sincere, still more to a.s.sume that Ireland as a whole would endorse it, was to weaken, if not to give away, Ulster's best argument, and from that hour to the end of the war Sir Edward Carson was most loyal to Ulster's interests.

Further, it is conceivable that by some who cheered it the speech may have been misunderstood. Yet it is not probable that many who heard Redmond believed that in order to serve England he was flinging away Ireland's national claim, to the successful furtherance of which his whole life had been devoted. The Unionist party as a whole certainly understood that to accept Redmond's offer in the spirit in which it was made meant accepting the principle of Home Rule: and on that afternoon in August they were not unready to accept it. They felt, for the speech made them feel, that a great thing had happened. Yet they might well be pardoned for some scepticism as to how the utterance might be taken in Ireland, and how it would issue in action. A famous Nationalist said some ten days later: "When I read the speech in the paper, I was filled with dismay. Now I recognize that it was a great stroke of statesmanship which I should never have had the courage to advise."

Redmond's instinct had been right. He trusted in the appeal to national pride and to the sense of national unity. Ireland was perfectly willing, and he knew it, to give loyal friendship to England on the basis of freedom. But the test of freedom had now come to be the right to bear arms, and this was a proposal that Ireland should undertake her own defence. Ireland was sick of the talk of civil war, and this was a proposal that Ulstermen and the rest should make common cause. It was an appeal addressed by an instinct, which was no less subtle than it was n.o.ble, to what was most responsive in the best qualities of Irishmen.

None the less it was a statesman's utterance addressed to a people politically quick-minded; Ireland saw as well as Redmond himself that what stood in the way of Ireland's national aspiration was the opposition of one section of Irishmen. To that extent, and to that extent only, was the speech political in its purpose. Whatever made for common action made for unity; and whatever made for unity made for Home Rule. That is the key to Redmond's att.i.tude throughout the war--perhaps also to Sir Edward Carson's.

II

The response from Nationalist Ireland had not long to be waited for--although the inquest on the victims of the Bachelor's Walk tragedy was in progress on the very day when Redmond's speech appeared in the Press. Waterford Corporation instantly endorsed their member's utterance, and throughout the week similar resolutions were pa.s.sed all over the country, Unionist members of these bodies joining in to second the proposals. In Cork, the City Council had before it a resolution condemning the Government for its attempt to disarm the Irish Volunteers, and calling for stringent penalties on the offenders in the Bachelor's Walk affair: the resolution was withdrawn and one of hearty support to Redmond's att.i.tude adopted.

Yet Irish opinion did not go so far as Mr. William O'Brien, who proposed the complete dropping of the Home Rule Bill till after the war, in order to bring about a genuine national unity. The action of the Offaly corps of Volunteers, for instance, was typical. They agreed to offer their services gladly on two conditions: first, that the Home Rule Bill should go on the Statute Book; secondly, that the Volunteers should be subsidized and equipped by Government.

But it was a.s.sumed in Ireland that no question arose about the safety of the Bill, and people gave themselves to the new emotion. Troops were cheered everywhere at stations and on the quays: National Volunteers and local bands turned out to see them off. Even the battalion of King's Own Scottish Borderers, which had been confined to barracks since the events of July 26th, was cheered like the rest as it marched down to the transports ready for it.[3]

This was the att.i.tude of the general populace. Broadly speaking, Redmond's speech pleased the people. It was welcomed by generous-minded men in another cla.s.s, who responded at once in the same spirit. Lord Monteagle wrote: "Mr. Redmond has risen n.o.bly to the occasion"; Lord Bessborough, that he trusted all the Unionists in the South would at once join the Irish Volunteers. The Marquis of Headfort, the Earls of Fingall and of Desart, Lord Powerscourt, Lord Langford, all chimed in with offers of help. Mr. George Taaffe wrote: "I thank G.o.d from the bottom of my heart that to-day we stand united Ireland." In county Wexford sixty young Protestants came in a body to join up, led by a very Tory squire.

It should be clearly noted that while Redmond's aim was to make this Ireland's war, in which Irishmen should serve together without distinction of North or South, all that he asked of the land in his speech of August 4th was that the Volunteers should undertake duties of home defence. This was precisely what Sir Edward Carson had asked of Ulster. On August 14th, in a letter to the Press, the commander of a Fermanagh battalion of Ulster Volunteers wrote: "No one will be asked to serve outside Ulster until Sir Edward Carson notifies that he is satisfied with the att.i.tude of the Government with regard to the Home Rule Bill and Ulster."

Redmond neither could nor did ask any man to serve outside Ireland till he was satisfied with the Government's att.i.tude in regard to Home Rule.

In the first days of the war, however, the critical question for him was to know how his offer of a.s.sistance from the Volunteers would be accepted by the Government, and at the outset all promised favourably.

On August 8th a telegram was sent to the Lord-Lieutenant:

"His Majesty's Government recognize with deep grat.i.tude the loyal help which Ireland has offered in this grave hour. They hope to announce as soon as possible arrangements by which this offer can be made use of to the fullest possible extent."

That unquestionably represented the mind of Mr. Asquith and his civilian colleagues. But a new power had transformed the Cabinet. Lord Kitchener, refusing to accept the post of Commander in Chief, had insisted on becoming Secretary of State for War.

No one is likely to underestimate Lord Kitchener's value at that hour.

But probably no one now will dispute that the political control which this soldier obtained was excessive and was dangerous. Years of fierce faction had shaken the public confidence in politicians, and a soldier was traditionally above and beyond politics. But in Lord Kitchener's case the soldier was certainly remote from and below the regions of statesmanship. Narrow, domineering, and obstinate, he was a difficult colleague for anyone; and for a Prime Minister with so easy a temper as Mr. Asquith he was not a colleague but a master. He claimed to be supreme in all matters relating to the Army, and in such a war this came near to covering the whole field of government. It most certainly covered the question of dealing with the Irish Volunteers and with the Ulster Volunteers, which meant in reality the whole question of Ireland.

Immediately on Lord Kitchener's appointment Redmond had an interview with him. Redmond's report was that he had been most friendly--and most limited in his expectations. "Get me five thousand men, and I will say 'Thank you,'" he had said. "Get me ten thousand, and I will take off my hat to you." Yet the very smallness of the estimate should have been a note of warning to us; it indicated a cynical view of Ireland's response to Redmond's public declaration.

On the question of the Volunteers he made friendly promises. As the Sirdar in Egypt he had been used to giving fair words to native chiefs.

There is not the least reason to suppose that Lord Kitchener would have felt bound to show Redmond his real mind.

The truth was that Lord Kitchener held in respect to Ireland the traditional opinions of the British Army. n.o.body could blame the professional soldier for dislike and distrust of Irish Nationalist politicians generally; but when at such a crisis a professional soldier, by no means conspicuous for breadth of mind, came to hold such a position as Lord Kitchener seized, the result was certain to be disastrous for Irish policy unless Liberal statesmanship exercised a strong control over him. Neither Mr. Asquith nor Mr. Birrell was likely to do this.

Two views were taken of the proposal to encourage and utilize the Irish Volunteers. The first view was that Volunteers of any kind were a superfluous enc.u.mbrance at a moment when the supreme need was for men in the actual fighting-line; that encouragement of Volunteers gave an excuse for shirking war; and further, that Volunteers outside the State's control were a danger; that the danger was increased when there were two rival Volunteer forces which might fly at each other's throats; and that it was a matter for satisfaction that one of these forces should be very greatly inferior to the other in point of arms and equipment, so that considerations of prudence would lessen the chance of collision. This satisfaction was greatly heightened by the reflection that the armed force was thoroughly loyal to the Empire and could be trusted to a.s.sist troops in the case of any attack upon the Empire begun by the other--a contingency which should always be taken into account.

This line of thought was certainly Lord Kitchener's. He had no distrust of Irish soldiers in ordinary regiments; no professional soldier ever had. But he had a deep distrust of a purely Irish military organization under Irish control. At the back of Lord Kitchener's mind was the determination "I will not arm enemies." This was the very negation and the ant.i.thesis of the second view, which was Redmond's.

Redmond's aim was to win the war, no less than Lord Kitchener's. But if Lord Kitchener realized more clearly than other men in power how far-reaching would be the need for troops, Redmond realized also far more than the men in power how vital would be the need for America. He saw from the first, knowing the English-speaking world far more widely than perhaps any member of the Government, that the Irish trouble could not limit its influence to Ireland only. Greater forces could be conciliated for war purposes by reconciliation with Ireland--by bringing Ireland heart and soul into the war--than the equivalent of many regiments. Yet even from the narrower aspect of finding men, he regarded the same policy as essential. He a.s.sumed that recruiting in Ireland must always be voluntary--at any rate a matter for Ireland's own decision: the question was how to get most troops. Knowing Ireland, he recognized how complete was the estrangement of its population from the idea of ordinary enlistment. The bulk of the population were on the land, and in Ireland, as in Great Britain, "gone for a soldier" was a word of disgrace for a farmer's son. More than that, the political organization of which he was head had inculcated an att.i.tude of aloofness from the Army because it was the Army which held Ireland by force. Enlistment had been discouraged, on the principle that from a military point of view Ireland was regarded as a conquered country. A test case had arisen over the Territorial Act, which was not extended to Ireland, any more than the Volunteer Acts had been. We had voted against Lord Haldane's Bill on the express ground that it put Ireland into this status of inferiority and withheld from Irishmen that right to arm and drill which was pressed upon Englishmen as a patriotic duty. We had explicitly declared then in 1907 that our influence should and must be used against enlistment.

These facts of history had not merely produced in Ireland an att.i.tude of mind hostile to the idea, so to say, of the British Army as an inst.i.tution, though the individual soldier had always been at least as popular as anyone else. They had produced a population extraordinarily unfamiliar with the idea of armament. The old Volunteers and the Territorials had at least conveyed to all ranks of society in Great Britain the possibility of joining a military organization while remaining an ordinary citizen. In the imagination of Ireland, either you were a soldier or you were not; and if you were a soldier, you belonged to an exceptional cla.s.s, remote from ordinary existence. To cross that line was a far greater step to contemplate with us than in England.

Redmond reckoned, and reckoned rightly, that to bring Irishmen together in military formations, learning the art of war, was the best way to combat this disinclination to enter the Army--this feeling that enlistment meant doing something "out of the way," something contrary to usage and tradition. He reckoned that the att.i.tude of Nationalist Ireland would alter towards a Government which put arms in their hands on their own terms; and that with a great war on foot a temper of adventure and emulation would very soon draw young men flocking to the ranks in which they could see the reality of war. That was Redmond's policy and it was the statesman's. Nationalist Ireland was perfectly ready to adopt the ideals which moved the British Empire at home and overseas in the war: but first the British Empire must show that it respected the ideals of Nationalist Ireland. The Empire's statesmen did so: the British democracy did so: but Lord Kitchener stood in the way.

From Ulster, it was clear that immediate cordial co-operation could not be antic.i.p.ated. Yet Redmond had implicit faith in the ultimate effect of comradeship in danger, and here we know he was right. He was to pay a heavy price in blood for the seal set upon that bond; but in the end the seal was set. For the moment, Ulster as a whole was sullen and distrustful. Feeling that to admit the good faith of Nationalists jeopardized their own political cause, they belittled what in the interests of the common weal it would have been wise even to over-value.

At the outset "An Ulster Volunteer" wrote to the papers "Let us all unite as a solid nation"; but such an utterance was exceptional. Hardly less exceptional was the line taken by "An Officer of National Volunteers" who wrote, "If the necessity arose to-morrow and the word went out from Headquarters, the National Volunteers would be prepared to fight to the very death in defending the homes and liberties of France and England." "For Ireland Only" was a motto much inculcated in those days among the Irish Volunteers. Suspicion on the one side bred estrangement on the other; and every hour lost increased the mischief.

Moreover, in spite of the generous action taken by outstanding individuals, the general ma.s.s of Unionist opinion was grudging and uncordial. A friend who was then closely in touch with it described to me the att.i.tude of Dublin clubs: "They were almost sorry Redmond had done the right thing." Such men were part of Ireland, and all Ireland was remote from war. For them, now as always, Home Rule was the paramount consideration, and none could deny that the prospects for Home Rule were immensely improved by Redmond's action. In these days, when an end of the conflict was expected in three months, when every check to the Germans was magnified out of all reason, there was no sense of the relative value of issues. Everywhere in Unionist society and in the Irish Unionist Press there was ungenerous and unfriendly criticism which did much harm.

Two things could have checked these forces for evil. The first would have been an immediate decision to make Home Rule law. This would have put an end to the pestilent growth of suspicion among Nationalists, and it would have enabled Redmond to launch at once his appeal for soldiers.

The other would have been a decision to make good the pledge contained in the Government's message to Lord Aberdeen and to accept in some practical way the offered service of the Volunteers.

The latter of these courses involved no controversy with Ulster, and to it Redmond first addressed himself. He made constant appeals in private to Ministers; he was angry and disappointed over the delay: and after a week he thought it necessary to raise the matter in the House. He asked the Prime Minister whether British Territorials were to be sent to Ireland to replace the troops which had been withdrawn--a step which would have been equivalent to a rejection of his offer. On this point he received satisfaction; Territorials would not be sent. He asked then if the Prime Minister could not say at once what steps would be taken to arm and equip the Volunteers. Mr. Asquith's reply emphasized the great difficulty which stood in the way. "I do not say," he added, "that it is insuperable." The first part was the voice of Lord Kitchener; the second, the voice of the Government which had sent the telegram of August 8th.

In the War Office the desire to give the National Volunteers as far as possible what they wanted did not exist, and the Government, who had that desire, had not the determination to enforce it. Such a position can never be for long concealed. Let it be remembered, too, that all through these days there was proceeding in Dublin a public inquiry into the events of the Howth gun-running and the affray at Bachelor's Walk, and some measure of Redmond's difficulties may be obtained.

Nevertheless, his policy was winning: and when Parliament rose for an adjournment, he spent his first Sunday in Ireland motoring to Maryborough, where he inspected a great muster of Volunteers, and was able to speak to them with gladness of the response to his appeal.

"From every part of Ireland I have had a.s.surances from the Irish Volunteers that they are ready to fulfil this duty: and from every part--perhaps better and happier still--evidences of a desire on the part of men who in the past have been divided from us to come in at this hour of danger."

He told his audience how a battalion of that famous regiment, the Inniskilling Fusiliers, had been escorted through the town of Enniskillen, in which Orange and Green have always been equally and sharply divided, by combined bodies of the Irish and Ulster Volunteer Forces. Then turning to the question of equipment, and reminding them that the proclamation against importing arms had been withdrawn, he announced that he had secured several thousand rifles to distribute.[4]

He went on then to pledge himself--it must be said with characteristic overconfidence--as to the intentions of the Government: "The Government--which has withdrawn its troops from Ireland and which has refused to send English Territorials to take their place--is about to arm, equip and drill a large number of Irish Volunteers." Very soon, he told them, every man in the force would have a rifle--and this involved a grave responsibility, and the need for discipline in the work which was laid upon them.

"I wish them G.o.d-speed with their work. It is the holiest work that men can undertake, to maintain the freedom and the rights and to uphold the peace, the order and safety of their own nation. You ought to be proud--you, the sons and the grandsons of men who were shot down for daring to arm themselves--you ought to be proud that you have lived to see the day when with the good will of the democracy of England you are arming yourselves in the light of heaven."

The note of exultation in this pa.s.sage rings again and again through his utterances. He saw, or thought he saw, the symbol of achieved liberty in the muster of young men, ready to take up the sword, and no longer branded with the name of felons for so doing. Nor was he alone in his rejoicing. The host at that meeting was a great Irish landlord, Colonel Sir Hutcheson Poe. He, upon reading Redmond's speech of August 4th had written to the Press saying that since he was too old to serve he was taking steps to arm and equip a hundred National Volunteers. Now, in Redmond's presence, addressing a body of the Volunteers, he told them what he thought of Redmond's action.

"That five minutes' speech did more to compose our differences, to unite all Irishmen in a bond of friendship and good will, than could have been accomplished by years of agitation or by a conference, however well-intentioned it might be."

That was a notable tribute from one of the eight men who formed the historic Land Conference of 1902; and Sir Hutcheson Poe was not the man to rest on complimentary expressions. He set to work at once to promote a memorial praying for joint action between Ulster and the Irish Volunteers and for settlement of the political question which alone prevented such action.

Unhappily, this was not easy of accomplishment. When the House rea.s.sembled after its adjournment of a fortnight, negotiations were resumed, with the result that on August 31st the Prime Minister asked for a fresh adjournment for ten days, at the end of which time the Government hoped to be able to produce satisfactory proposals as to the Irish and Welsh Bills. Redmond felt himself obliged to enter a protest.

It had been agreed that the circ.u.mstances of the war should not be allowed to inflict political injury on any party in the House; and he would give the friendliest consideration to any proposal for giving to the Opposition what they might have gained by a discussion on the Amending Bill.

"But we must emphatically say that any proposal which would have the effect of depriving us of the enactment of the Irish measure--and I presume I may say the same with reference to the Welsh measure--an enactment to which we were ent.i.tled practically automatically when the circ.u.mstances of the war arose, would do infinite mischief, and would be warmly resented by us.

"Just let me say one word more. There has arisen in Ireland the greatest opportunity that has ever arisen in the history of the connection between the two countries for a thorough reconciliation between the people of Ireland and the people of this country. There is to-day, I venture to say, a feeling of friendliness to this country, and a desire to join hands in supporting the interests of this country such as were never to be found in the past; and I do say with all respect, that it would be not only a folly, but a crime, if that opportunity were in any degree marred or wasted by any action which this country might take. I ask this House--and I ask all sections of the House--to take such a course as will enable me to go back to Ireland to translate into vigorous action the spirit of the words I used here a few days ago."

An angry scene followed. Mr. Balfour asked whether "it was possible decently to introduce subjects of acute discussion in present circ.u.mstances"--in other words, whether all mention of Home Rule must not be postponed till after the war. This provoked hot debate, checked only by a strong appeal from the Prime Minister. But the general effect was not rea.s.suring to Ireland. The contrast with the Tsar's prompt grant of autonomy to Poland was sharply drawn. n.o.body rated high the chances of an amicable agreement. On September 4th Sir Edward Carson outlined his views in Belfast. Home Rule "will never be law in our country." But "in the interests of the State and of the Empire we will postpone active measures." This indicated sufficiently that in his judgment the Bill might become law, and that they would not be encouraged to set up immediate resistance. The Prime Minister, as chief Minister of the nation, must be supported in the war at all costs.

Next day, renewing at Coleraine his appeal for recruits, he said:

"We are not going to abate one jot or t.i.ttle of our opposition to Home Rule, and when you come back from serving your country you will be just as determined as you will find us at home."

This was the answer to Redmond's proposal of fraternization. Clearly Sir Edward Carson had made up his mind that he could not prevent the pa.s.sage of the Bill, and he decided upon the strongest course, which was to advocate unlimited support to the war. Any other course would have been ruinous to his cause, which depended always upon a profession of the extremest loyalty. Yet only a strong man, confident in his leadership, could have taken this line at a moment when Ulstermen were about to feel that all their preparations were wasted and that the game had been won against them by a paralysing chance.

Before the House rea.s.sembled there was a meeting at the Carlton Club; a report communicated to the Press attributed these words to Sir Edward Carson--they are typical of the tone of the time: