Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato Part 5

With respect to the faults which I may have committed in this translation (for I am not vain enough to suppose it is without fault), I might plead as an excuse, that the whole of it has been executed amidst severe endurance from bodily infirmity and indigent circ.u.mstances; and that a very considerable part of it was accomplished amidst other ills of no common magnitude, and other labors inimical to such an undertaking. But whatever may be my errors, I will not fly to calamity for an apology. Let it be my excuse that the mistakes I may have committed in lesser particulars, have arisen from my eagerness to seize and promulgate those great truths in the philosophy and theology of Plato, which though they have been concealed for ages in oblivion, have a subsistence coeval with the universe, and will again be restored, and flourish for very extended periods, through all the infinite revolutions of time.

In the next place, it is necessary to speak concerning the qualifications requisite in a legitimate student of the philosophy of Plato, previous to which I shall just notice the absurdity of supposing that a mere knowledge of the Greek tongue, however great that knowledge may be, is alone sufficient to the understanding the sublime doctrines of Plato; for a man might as well think that he can understand Archimedes without a knowledge of the elements of geometry, merely because he can read him in the original. Those who entertain such an idle opinion, would do well to meditate on the profound observation of Herac.l.i.tus, "that polymathy does not teach intellect," ([Greek: Polymathic noon ou didaskei]).

By a legitimate student, then, of the Platonic philosophy, I mean one who, both from nature and education, is properly qualified for such an arduous undertaking; that is one who possesses a naturally good disposition; is sagacious and acute, and is inflamed with an ardent desire for the acquisition of wisdom and truth; who from his childhood has been well instructed in the mathematical disciplines; who, besides this, has spent whole days, and frequently the greater part of the night, in profound meditation; and, like one triumphantly sailing over a raging sea, or skillfully piercing through an army of foes, has successfully encountered an hostile mult.i.tude of doubts;--in short, who has never considered wisdom as a thing of trifling estimation and easy access, but as that which cannot be obtained without the most generous and severe endurance, and the intrinsic worth of which surpa.s.ses all corporeal good, far more than the ocean the fleeting bubble which floats on its surface.

To such as are dest.i.tute of these requisites, who make the study of words their sole employment, and the pursuit of wisdom but at best a secondary thing, who expect to be wise by desultory application for an hour or two in a day, after the fatigues of business, after mixing with the base mult.i.tude of mankind, laughing with the gay affecting airs of gravity with the serious, tacitly a.s.senting to every man's opinion, however absurd, and winking at folly however shameful and base--to such as these--and, alas! the world is full of such--the sublimest truths must appear to be nothing more than jargon and reverie, the dreams of a distempered imagination, or the ebullitions of fanatical faith.

But all this is by no means wonderful, if we consider that two-fold ignorance is the disease of the many. For they are not only ignorant with respect to the sublimest knowledge, but they are even ignorant of their ignorance. Hence they never suspect their want of understanding, but immediately reject a doctrine which appears at first sight absurd, because it is too splendid for their bat-like eyes to behold. Or if they even yield their a.s.sent to its truth, their very a.s.sent is the result of the same most dreadful disease of the soul. For they will fancy, says Plato, that they understand the highest truths, when the very contrary is really the case. I earnestly therefore entreat men of this description, not to meddle with any of the profound speculations of the Platonic philosophy, for it is more dangerous to urge them to such an employment, than to advise them to follow their sordid avocations with unwearied a.s.siduity, and toil for wealth with increasing alacrity and vigor; as they will by this means give free scope to the base habits of their soul, and sooner suffer that punishment which in such as these must always precede mental illumination, and be the inevitable consequence of guilt.

It is well said indeed by Lysis, the Pythagorean, that to inculcate liberal speculations and discourses to those whose morals are turbid and confused, is just as absurd as to pour pure and transparent water into a deep well full of mire and clay; for he who does this will only disturb the mud, and cause the pure water to become defiled. The woods of such, as the same author beautifully observes, (that is the irrational or corporeal life), in which these dire pa.s.sions are nourished, must first be purified with fire and sword, and every kind of instrument (that is, through preparatory disciplines, and the political virtues), and reason must be freed from its slavery to the affections, before any thing useful can be planted in these savage haunts.

Let not such then presume to explore the regions of Platonic philosophy.

The land is too pure to admit the sordid and the base. The road which conducts to it is too intricate to be discovered by the unskillful and stupid, and the journey is too long and laborious to be accomplished by the effeminate and the timid, by the slave of pa.s.sion and the dupe of opinion, by the lover of sense and the despiser of truth. The dangers and difficulties in the undertaking are such as can be sustained by none but the most hardy and accomplished adventurers; and he who begins the journey without the strength of Hercules, or the wisdom and patience of Ulysses, must be destroyed by the wild beasts of the forest, or perish in the storms of the ocean; must suffer trans.m.u.tation into a beast through the magic power of Circe, or be exiled for life by the detaining charm of Calypso; and in short must descend into Hades, and wander in its darkness, without emerging from thence to the bright regions of the morning, or be ruined by the deadly melody of the Syren's song. To the most skillful traveler, who pursues the right road with an ardor which no toils can abate, with a vigilance which no weariness can surprise into negligence, and with virtue which no temptations can seduce, it exhibits for many years the appearance of the Ithaca of Ulysses, or the flying Italy of AEneas; for we no sooner gain a glimpse of the pleasing land which is to be the end of our journey, than it is suddenly ravished from our view, and we still find ourselves at a distance from the beloved coast, exposed to the fury of a stormy sea of doubts.

Abandon then, ye groveling souls, the fruitless design! Pursue with avidity the beaten road which leads to popular honors and sordid gain, but relinquish all thoughts of a voyage for which you are totally unprepared. Do you not perceive what a length of sea separates you from the royal coast? A sea,

Huge, horrid, vast, where scarce in safety sails The best built ship, though Jove inspire the gales.

And may we not very justly ask you, similar to the interrogation of Calypso,

What ships have you, what sailors to convey, What oars to cut the long laborious way?

I shall only observe further, that the life of Plato, by Olympiodorus, was prefixed to this translation, in preference to that by Diogenes Laertius, because the former is the production of a most eminent Platonist, and the latter of a mere historian, who indiscriminately gave to the public whatever anecdotes he found in other authors. If the reader combines this short sketch of the life of Plato with what that philosopher says of himself in his 7th Epistle, he will be in possession of the most important particulars about him that can be obtained at present.

EXPLANATIONS OF CERTAIN PLATONIC TERMS

As some apology may be thought necessary for having introduced certain unusual words of Greek origin, I shall only observe, that, as all arts and sciences have certain appropriate terms peculiar to themselves, philosophy, which is the art of arts, and science of sciences, as being the mistress of both, has certainly a prior and a far superior claim to this privilege. I have not, however, introduced, I believe, any of these terms without at the same time sufficiently explaining them; but, lest the contrary should have taken place, the following explanation of all such terms as I have been able to recollect, and also of common words used by Platonists in a peculiar sense, is subjoined for the information of the reader.

Anagogic, [Greek: anagogikos]. Leading on high.

Demiurgus, [Greek: demiourgos]. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe.

Dianoetia. This word is derived from [Greek: dianoia], or that power of the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect. Plato is so uncommonly accurate in his diction, that this word is very seldom used by him in any other than its primary sense.

The Divine, [Greek: to Theion], is being subsisting in conjunction with the one. For all things, except the one, viz. essence, life, and intellect, are considered by Plato as suspended from and secondary to the G.o.ds. For the G.o.ds do not subsist in, but prior to, these, which they also produce and connect, but are not characterized by these. In many places, however, Plato calls the partic.i.p.ants of the G.o.ds by the names of the G.o.ds. For not only the Athenian Guest in the Laws, but also Socrates in the Phaedrus, calls a divine soul a G.o.d. "For," says he, "all the horses and charioteers of the G.o.ds are good," &c. And afterwards, still more clearly, he adds, "And this is the life of the G.o.ds." And not only this, but he also denominates those nature G.o.ds that are always united to the G.o.ds, and which, in conjunction with them, give completion to one series. He also frequently calls daemons G.o.ds, though, according to essence, they are secondary to and subsist about the G.o.ds. For in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, and other dialogues, he extends the appellation of G.o.ds as far as the daemons. And what is still more paradoxical than all this, he does not refuse to call some men G.o.ds; as, for instance, the Elean Guest in the Sophista. From all this, therefore, we must infer that with respect to the word G.o.d, one thing which is thus denominated is simply deity; another is so according to union; a third, according to partic.i.p.ation; a fourth, according to contact; and a fifth, according to similitude. Thus every superessential nature is primarily a G.o.d; but every intellectual nature is so according to union. And again, every divine soul is a G.o.d according to partic.i.p.ation; but divine daemons are G.o.ds according to contact with the G.o.ds; and the souls of men obtain this appellation through similitude. Each of these, however, except the first, is as we have said, rather divine than a G.o.d; for the Athenian Guest in the Laws, calls intellect itself divine. But that which is divine is secondary to the first deity, in the same manner as the united is to the one; that which is intellectual to intellect; and that which is animated to soul. Indeed, things more uniform and simple always precede, and the series of beings ends in the one itself.

Doxastic. This word is derived from doxa, opinion, and signifies that which is apprehended by opinion, or that power which is the extremity of the rational soul. This power knows the universal in particulars, as that every man is a rational animal; but it knows not the dioti, or why a thing is, but only the oti, or that it is.

The Eternal, [Greek: To aionion], that which has a never-ending subsistence, without any connection with time; or, as Plotinus profoundly defines it, infinite life at once total and full.

That which is generated, [Greek: to geneton]. That which has not the whole of its essence or energy subsisting at once without temporal dispersion.

Generation, [Greek: genesis]. An essence composite and multiform, and conjoined with time. This is the proper signification of the word; but it is used symbolically by Plato, and also by theologists more ancient than Plato, for the sake of indication. For as Proclus beautifully observes (in MS. Comment in Parmenidem), "Fables call the ineffable unfolding into light through causes, generation." "Hence," he adds in the Orphic writings, the first cause is denominated time; for where there is generation, according to its proper signification, there also there is time."

A Guest, [Greek: Xenos]. This word, in its more ample signification in the Greek, denotes a stranger, but properly implies one who receives another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the following dialogues, therefore, wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a Xenos, I have translated this word guest, as being more conformable to the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so many guests. Hence in the Timaeus, the persons of that dialogue are expressly spoken of as guests.

Hyparxis, [Greek: uparxis]. The first principle or foundation, as it were, of the essence of a thing. Hence also, it is the summit of essence.

Idiom, [Greek: Idioma]. The characteristic peculiarity of a thing.

The Immortal, [Greek: To athanaton]. According to Plato, there are many orders of immortality, pervading from on high to the last of things; and the ultimate echo, as it were, of immorality is seen in the perpetuity of the mundane wholes, which according to the doctrine of the Elean Guest in the Politicus, they partic.i.p.ate from the Father of the universe. For both the being and the life of every body depend on another cause; since body is not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself.

But the immortality of partial souls, such as ours, is more manifest and more perfect than this of the perpetual bodies in the universe; as is evident from the many demonstrations which are given of it in the Phaedo, and in the 10th book of the Republic. For the immortality of partial souls has a more princ.i.p.al subsistence, as possessing in itself the cause of eternal permanency. But prior to both these is the immortality of daemons; for these neither verge to mortality, nor are they filled with the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. More venerable, however, than these, and essentially transcending them, is the immortality of divine souls, which are primarily self-motive, and contain the fountains and principles of the life which is attributed about bodies, and through which bodies partic.i.p.ate of renewed immortality. And prior to all these is the immortality of the G.o.ds: for Diotima in the Banquet does not ascribe an immortality of this kind to demons. Hence such an immortality as this is separate and exempt from wholes. For, together with the immortality of the G.o.ds, eternity subsists, which is the fountain of all immortality and life, as well that life which is perpetual, as that which is dissipated into nonent.i.ty. In short, therefore, the divine immortal is that which is generative and connective of perpetual life. For it is not immortal, as partic.i.p.ating of life, but as supplying divine life, and deifying life itself.

Impartic.i.p.able, [Greek: To amethekton]. That which is not consubsistent with an inferior nature. Thus impartic.i.p.able intellect is an intellect which is not consubsistent with soul.

Intellectual Projection, [Greek: noera epibole]. As the perception of intellect is immediate, being a darting forth, as it were, directly to its proper objects, this direct intuition is expressed by the term projection.

The Intelligible, [Greek: To noeton]. This word in Plato and Platonic writers has a various signification: for, in the first place, whatever is exempt from sensibles, and has its essence separate from them, is said to be intelligible, and in this sense soul is intelligible. In the second place, intellect, which is prior to soul, is intelligible. In the third place, that which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes intelligence and is essentially perfective of it, is called intelligible; and this is the intelligible which Timaeus in Plato places in the order of a paradigm, prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy.

But beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is defined according to divine union and hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of desire to intellect, as giving perfection to and containing it, and as the completion of being. The highest intelligible, therefore, is that which is the hyparxis of the G.o.ds; the second, that which is true being, and the first essence; the third, intellect, and all intellectual life; and the fourth, the order belonging to soul.

Logismos, reasoning. When applied to divinity as by Plato in the Timaeus, signifies a distributive cause of things.

On account of which; with reference to which; through which; according to which, from which; or in which; viz. [Greek: di o, uph' ou, di ou, kath'

o, ex ou]. By the first of these terms, Plato is accustomed to denominate the final cause; by the second the paradigmatic; by the third, the demiurgic; by the fourth, the instrumental; by the fifth, form; and by the sixth, matter.

Orectic. This word is derived from [Greek: orexis], appet.i.te.

Paradigm, [Greek: paradeigma]. A pattern, or that with reference to which a thing is made.

The perpetual, [Greek: to aidion]. That which subsists forever, but through a connection with time.

A Politician, [Greek: politikos]. This word, as Mr. Sydenham justly observes in his notes in the Rivals, is of a very large and extensive import as used by Plato, and the other ancient writers on politics: for it includes all those statesmen or politicians in aristocracies and democracies, who were, either for life, or for a certain time, invested with the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto belonging. See the Politicus.

Prudence, [Greek: Phronesis]. This word frequently means in Plato and Platonic writers, the habit of discerning what is good in all moral actions, and frequently signifies intelligence, or intellectual Perception. The following admirable explanation of this word is given by Jamblichus Prudence having a precedaneous subsistence, receives its generation from a pure and perfect intellect. Hence it looks to intellect itself, is perfected by it, and has this as the measure and most beautiful paradigm of all its energies. If also we have any communion with the G.o.ds, it is especially effected by this virtue; and through this we are in the highest degree a.s.similated to them. The knowledge too of such things as are good, profitable, and beautiful, and of the contraries to these, is obtained by this virtue; and the judgment and correction of works proper to be done are by this directed. And in short it is a certain governing leader of men, and of the whole arrangement of their nature; and referring cities and houses, and the particular life, of every one to a divine paradigm, it forms them according to the best similitude; obliterating some things and purifying others. So that prudence renders its possessors similar to divinity. Jamblic. apud.

Stob. p. 141.

Psychical, [Greek: psychikos]. Pertaining to soul.

Science. This word is sometimes defined by Plato to be that which a.s.signs the causes of things; sometimes to be that the subjects of which have a perfectly stable essence; and together with this, he conjoins the a.s.signation of cause from reasoning. Sometimes again he defines it to be that the principles of which are not hypotheses; and, according to this definition, he a.s.serts that there is one science which ascends as far as to the principle of things. For this science considers that which is truly the principle as unhypothetic, has for its subject true being, and produces its reasonings from cause. According to the second definition, he calls dianoetic knowledge science; but according to the first alone, he a.s.signs to physiology the appellation of science.

The telestic art. The art pertaining to mystic ceremonies.

Theurgic. This word is derived from [Greek: Theourgia], or that religious operation which deifies him by whom it is performed as much as is possible to man.

Truth, [Greek: aletheia]. Plato, following ancient theologists, considers truth multifariously. Hence, according to his doctrine, the highest truth is characterized by unity, and is the light proceeding from the good, which imparts purity, as he says in the Philebus, and union, as he says in the Republic, to intelligibles. The truth which is next to this in dignity is that which proceeds from intelligibles, and illuminates the intellectual orders, and which an essence unfigured, uncolored, and without contact, first receives, where also the plain of truth is situated, as it is written in the Phaedrus. The third kind of truth is, that which is connascent with souls, and which through intelligence comes into contact with true being. For the psychical light is the third, from the intelligible; intellectual deriving its plenitude from intelligible light, and the psychical from the intellectual. And the last kind of truth is that which is full of error and inaccuracy through sense, and the instability of its object. For a material nature is perpetually flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide even for a moment.

The following beautiful description of the third kind of truth, or that which subsists in souls, is given by Jamblichus: "Truth, as the name implies, makest a conversion about the G.o.ds and their incorporeal energy; but, doxastic imitation, which, as Plato says, is fabricative of images, wanders about that which is deprived of divinity and is dark. And the former indeed receives its perfection in intelligible and divine forms, and real beings which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence; but the latter looks to that which is formless, and non-being, and which has a various subsistence; and, about this it's visive power is blunted. The former contemplates that which is, but the latter a.s.sumes such a form as appears to the many. Hence the former a.s.sociates with intellect, and increases the intellectual nature which we contain; but the latter, from looking to that which always seems to be, hunts after folly and deceives." Jamblic. apud Stob. p. 136.

The unical, [Greek: to niaion]. That which is characterized by unity.