Infantry Drill Regulations, United States Army, 1911 Part 28

Straight to the front by the firing line and supports after repulsing the enemy's attack and demoralizing him with pursuing fire.

Or, by the troops in rear of the firing line when the enemy has reached the defensive position and is in disorder.

516. Minor counterattacks are sometimes necessary in order to drive the enemy from important positions gained by him.

_DELAYING ACTION._

517. When a position is taken merely to delay the enemy and to withdraw before becoming closely engaged, the important considerations are:

The enemy should be forced to deploy early. The field of fire should therefore be good at distances from 500 to 1,200 yards or more; a good field of fire at close range is not necessary.

The ground in rear of the position should favor the withdrawal of the firing line by screening the troops from the enemy's view and fire as soon as the position is vacated.

518. A thin firing line using much ammunition will generally answer the purpose. Supports are needed chiefly to protect the flanks.

The reserve should be posted well in rear to a.s.sist in the withdrawal of the firing line.

519. Artillery is especially valuable to a delaying force.

MEETING ENGAGEMENTS.

520. Meeting engagements are characterized by the necessity for hasty reconnaissance, or the almost total absence of reconnaissance; by the necessity for rapid deployment, frequently under fire; and usually by the absence of trenches or other artificial cover. These conditions give further advantages to the offensive.

521. The whole situation will usually indicate beforehand the proper general action to be taken on meeting the enemy.

522. Little fresh information can be expected. The boldness, initiative, and determination of the commander must be relied upon.

523. A meeting engagement affords an ideal opportunity to the commander who has intuition and quick decision and who is willing to take long chances. His opponent is likely to be overcautious.

524. The amount of information that the commander is warranted in awaiting before taking final action depends entirely upon his mission.

One situation may demand a blind attack; another may demand rapid, partial deployment for attack, but careful and time-consuming reconnaissance before the attack is launched.

525. A great advantage accrues to the side which can deploy the faster. The advantage of a close-order formation, favoring rapid deployment, becomes more p.r.o.nounced with the size of the force.

526. The first troops to deploy will be able to attack with longer firing lines and weaker supports than are required in the ordinary case. But if the enemy succeeds in deploying a strong, defensive line, the attack must be strengthened accordingly before it is wasted.

527. If the situation warrants the advance, the leading troops seek to deploy faster than the enemy, to reach his flanks, check his deployment, and get information. In any event, they seek to cover the deployment of their own troops in rear--especially the artillery--and to seize important ground.

528. The commander of a long column which meets the enemy should be with the advance guard to receive information promptly and to reconnoiter. If he decides to fight, the advance guard must hold the enemy while the commander formulates a plan of action, issues the necessary orders, and deploys the main body. Meantime, the column should be closing up, either in ma.s.s or to form line of columns, so that the deployment, when determined upon, may be made more promptly.

529. The action of the advance guard, prior to the receipt of orders, depends upon the situation. Whether to attack determinedly or only as a feint, or to a.s.sume the defensive, depends upon the strength of the advance guard, the terrain, the character of the hostile force encountered, and the mission and intentions of the commander of the whole.

530. If the enemy is beforehand or more aggressive, or if the advance guard is too weak, it may be necessary to put elements of the main body into action as fast as they arrive, in order to check him. This method should be avoided; it prevents the formation and execution of a definite plan and compels piecemeal action. The best results are obtained when the main body is used as a whole.

WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION.

531. The withdrawal of a defeated force can generally be effected only at a heavy cost. When it is no longer possible to give the action a favorable turn and the necessity for withdrawal arises, every effort must be made to place distance and a rear guard between the enemy and the defeated troops.

532. Artillery gives especially valuable a.s.sistance in the withdrawal.

The long-range fire of machine guns should also be employed. Cavalry a.s.sists the withdrawal by charging the pursuing troops or by taking flank positions and using fire action.

533. If an intact reserve remains it should be placed in a covering position, preferably on a flank, to check the pursuit and thus enable the defeated troops to withdraw beyond reach of hostile fire.

The covering position of the reserve should be at some distance from the main action, but close enough to bring the withdrawing troops quickly under the protection of its fire. It should have a good field of fire at effective and long ranges and should facilitate its own safe and timely withdrawal.

534. If the general line is divided, by terrain or by organization, into two or more parts, the firing line of the part in the least danger from pursuit should be withdrawn first. A continuous firing line, whose parts are dependent upon one another for fire support, should be withdrawn as a whole, retiring by echelon at the beginning of the withdrawal. Every effort must be made to restore the organizations, regain control, and form column of march as soon as the troops are beyond the reach of hostile fire.

As fast as possible without delaying the march, companies, and the larger units should be re-formed, so that the command will again be well in hand.

535. The commander of the whole, having given orders for withdrawal, should go to the rear, select a rendezvous point, and devote himself to the reorganization of his command.

The rendezvous point is selected with regard to the natural channels of movement approximately straight to the rear. It should be distant from the battle field and should facilitate the gathering and protection of the command.

SUMMARY.

536. 1. Avoid combats that offer no chance of victory or other valuable results.

2. Make every effort for the success of the general plan and avoid spectacular plays that have no bearing on the general result.

3. Have a definite plan and carry it out vigorously. Do not vacillate.

4. Do not attempt complicated maneuvers.

5. Keep the command in hand; avoid undue extension and dispersion.

6. Study the ground and direct the advance in such a way as to take advantage of all available cover and thereby diminish losses.

7. Never deploy until the purpose and the proper direction are known.

8. Deploy enough men for the immediate task in hand; hold out the rest and avoid undue haste in committing them to the action.

9. Flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the terrain.

10. In a decisive action, gain and keep fire superiority.

11. Keep up reconnaissance.

12. Use the reserve, but not until needed or a very favorable opportunity for its use presents itself. Keep some reserve as long as practicable.