Independent Bohemia Part 5

"The Police Directorate ordered first that such articles should appear on the same day in all papers and in the same wording, but recognising the stupidity of such an action, they compelled only one journal to publish them and the others had to 'quote' from them.

"Preventive censorship was established and a number of articles were pa.s.sed by the censor for publication in Czech papers only when proofs were supplied that the articles had already appeared in some other journal in Austria. _Independent articles or reports were not allowed to be published_. The _Narodni Listy_ was treated with special spite by the censorship.

"_Almost ninety important journals were suppressed by the government_, the majority of them without any apparent reason or justification.

_The Suppression of Czech School and National Literature_

"Words, sentences or whole paragraphs in school books were found objectionable, since they were alleged to propagate Pan-Slavism and to encourage in the pupils hostile feelings against Austria's allies.

According to the official ideas about Austrian patriotism, purely educational paragraphs were considered as wanting in patriotic feeling; not only literary but also historical paragraphs were 'corrected,' and official advice was issued as to how to write handbooks on patriotic lines on special subjects, as for instance on natural history, physics, geometry, etc. The foundations of all knowledge to be supplied to the pupils in the public schools had to reflect the spirit of the world war.

"Numerous folk-songs with absolutely no political tendency in them were confiscated, merely because they expressed the Czech national spirit.

All songs were suppressed which mentioned the word Slav--'The Slav Linden Tree'--the army or the Allies. Even if the publishers offered to publish new editions without the objectionable songs they were not allowed to do so, and were asked to put in more 'loyal songs' and to replace melancholy songs with cheerful ones.

"In every secondary school a zealous library revision was started and many books were removed, so that these libraries lost all their value for the students. The Czech youth must not know the princ.i.p.al works either of their own or foreign literature. Certain libraries had to be deprived of some hundreds of books. All this happened at a time when the discussions here and abroad were taking place about the importance of raising the standard of knowledge of the educated cla.s.ses.

"The opening of Czech minority schools has been postponed since the beginning of 1914. Consequently the Czech School Society must keep them up and pay the expenses in connection with them, amounting to a loss of more than two million kronen up till now. On the other hand, many German schools have been established in Bohemia.

"The steps which are being taken against Czech schools in Lower Austria, especially in Vienna, are not only contrary to the standing laws but also to the decisions of the ministry concerned.

"We conclude by asking:

"Are the above facts of systematic persecution of the Czech nation during the war known to your Excellency?

"Is your Excellency prepared to investigate them thoroughly?

"Is your Excellency prepared to stop the persecution of the Czech nation and the wrongs suffered by us through these proceedings?

"_In Vienna, June_ 6, 1917."

[Footnote 1: For the full text of this doc.u.ment see Dr. Benes' _Bohemia's Case for Independence_.]

V

HOW THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS AT HOME a.s.sISTED THE ALLIES

From the foregoing chapters it is clear that by continuous misrule and by the attempt to reduce the Czecho-Slovak nation to impotence through terrorism and extermination during this war, the Habsburgs have created a gulf between themselves and their Czecho-Slovak subjects which can never again be bridged over. Realising this, and seeing that since Austria has voluntarily sold herself to Berlin their only hope for a better future lies in the destruction of the political system called Austria-Hungary, the Czecho-Slovaks have from the beginning staked their all on the victory of the Entente, towards which they have contributed with all possible means at their disposal.

1. Since they could not think of revolting, the Czecho-Slovaks at home tried to paralyse the power of Austria in every way. Not only individuals but also Czech banks and other inst.i.tutions refused to subscribe to the war loans. Their newspapers published official reports with reluctance, and between the lines laid stress on news unfavourable to Austria so as to keep up the spirit of the people. Czech peasants refused to give up provisions, and thus the Czechs, who already before the war boycotted German goods, accelerated the present economic and financial ruin of Austria.

2. Politically, too, they contributed to the internal confusion of the Dual Monarchy, and to-day their opposition forms a real menace to the existence of Austria. Czech political leaders unanimously refused to sign any declaration of loyalty to Austria, and they never issued a single protest against Professor Masaryk and his political and military action abroad. On several occasions they even publicly expressed their sympathies and approval of this action. For nearly three years they prevented the opening of the Austrian Parliament which would have been to their prejudice. Only after the Russian Revolution, when Austria began to totter and her rulers were apprehensive lest events in Russia should have a repercussion in the Dual Monarchy, did the Czechs decide to speak out and exerted pressure to bring about the opening of the Reichsrat, where they boldly declared their programme, revealed Austria's rule of terror during the first three years of war, and by their firm opposition, which they by and by induced the Poles and Yugoslavs to imitate, they brought about a permanent political deadlock, menacing Austria's very existence internally and weakening her resistance externally.

3. But the most important a.s.sistance the Czechs rendered to the Allies was their refusal to fight for Austria.

Out of 70,000 prisoners taken by Serbia during the first months of the war, 35,000 were Czechs. Of these, 24,000 perished during the Serbian retreat, and 8000 died of typhoid fever and cholera at Asinara. The remaining 3000 were transferred to France and voluntarily joined the Czecho-Slovak army.

Over 300,000 Czecho-Slovaks surrendered voluntarily to Russia whom they regarded as their liberator. Unfortunately the old regime in Russia did not always show much understanding of their aspirations. They were scattered over Siberia, cut off from the outer world, and often abandoned to the ill-treatment of German and Magyar officers. It is estimated that over thirty thousand of them perished from starvation. It was only after great efforts, after the Russian Revolution, and especially when Professor Masaryk himself went to Russia, that the Czecho-Slovak National Council succeeded in organising a great part of them into an army. Finally, when Austria desired to strike a death-blow at Italy in 1918, and began again to employ Slav troops, she failed again, and this failure was once more to a large extent caused by the disaffection of her Slav troops, as is proved by the Austrian official statements. Indeed, whenever Austria relied solely on her own troops she was always beaten, even by the "contemptible" Serbians.

The Czechs and other Slavs have greatly contributed to these defeats by their pa.s.sive resistance. It was only the intervention of German troops which saved Austria from an utter collapse in 1915, and which prevented the Czechs from completing their aim of entirely disorganising the military power of Austria. Slav regiments have since then been intermixed with German and Magyar troops. The Slavs receive their ammunition only at the front, where they are placed in the foremost ranks with Germans or Magyars behind them, so that they are exposed to a double fire if they attempt to surrender. Nevertheless, up to 1916 some 350,000 Czechs out of a total of 600,000 in the Austrian army surrendered to the Allies.

4. From the very beginning of the war Czech soldiers showed their real feelings. They were driven to fight against the Russians and Serbs who were their brothers by race and their sincere and devoted friends. They were driven to fight for that hated Austria which had trampled their liberties underfoot for centuries past, and for a cause which they detested from the bottom of their hearts. They were driven to fight in the interests of their German and Magyar enemies against their Slav brothers and friends under terrible circ.u.mstances.

In September, 1914, the 8th Czech Regiment refused to go to the front until threatened by the German troops. The 11th Czech Regiment of Pisek refused to march against Serbia and was decimated. The 36th Regiment revolted in the barracks and was ma.s.sacred by German troops. The 88th Regiment, which made an unsuccessful attempt to surrender to Russia, was shot down by the Magyar Honveds. A similar fate befell the 13th and 72nd Slovak Regiments.

On the other hand, many Czech troops succeeded in surrendering. The 35th Regiment of Pilsen went over to the Russians in a body half-an-hour after arriving at the front. Soon after, the 28th Regiment of Prague surrendered _en ma.s.se_, having been "fetched" by the Czechs fighting on the Russian side. Immediately afterwards the Austrian commander-in-chief issued an order of the day in which he declared.

"On April 3, 1915, almost the whole of the 28th Regiment surrendered without fighting to a single enemy battalion.... This disgraceful act not only destroys the reputation of this regiment, but necessitates its name being struck off the list of our army corps, until new deeds of heroism retrieve its character. His Apostolic Majesty has accordingly ordered the dissolution of this regiment, and the deposition of its banners in the army museum."

And indeed "new deeds of heroism" did follow. A fresh battalion was founded composed of Czech youths who were sent to the Isonzo front and exposed in a dangerous position to deadly artillery fire. Almost the whole battalion was thus unscrupulously wiped out. Only eighteen of them survived. This was followed by a new imperial order saying that the disgrace of the 28th Regiment was "atoned for" by the "sacrifice" of this regiment on the Isonzo.

As regards Italy, over 20,000 Czechs surrendered voluntarily on the Italian front up to 1917, and 7000 during the last offensive on the Piave in June, 1918. Of recent cases we need mention only the "treachery of Carzano,"

where, on September 18, 1917, some Czech officers went over to the Italians, communicated to them the Austrian plans of campaign and led them against the Austrians whose front was thus successfully broken through.

This incident was not the only one of its kind. It has been repeated several times by Czech officers whenever they found an opportunity of going over to the Italians. During the offensive of June, 1918, the Austrian press openly attributed the Austrian failure to "Czech treachery,"

a.s.serting that the plan of the offensive was communicated to the Italian headquarters staff by Czecho-Slovak officers. This the Austrian military authorities themselves admitted later, when they published the following official statement, which appeared in the German press on July 28:

"On the morning of June 15, we started a vigorous offensive on the whole front between the Tyrolese mountains and the Adriatic, with a power that can be attained only by complete co-operation of all the units and with an accurate execution and a common and uniform action.

But, just at the beginning of the attack, it became apparent that the enemy were making a counter-attack according to a well-defined plan, as in the case of a projected vigorous offensive. It was also found out that the enemy was perfectly aware of the extent, the day and the hour of our attack. The intended surprise, so important for the success of an offensive, has thus failed. In due course Italy also obtained, from doc.u.ments which some deserters handed to the Italian high command, information which gave her a sufficiently precise idea of our dispositions. English, French and Italian officers and men captured by us declare unanimously that their regiments were advised on the evening of June 14 that the Austrian offensive would start at two o'clock on the following morning.

"The exact time of the beginning of our offensive must have been betrayed by _Yugoslav and Czech deserters_. The enemy took steps against the bombardment by means of gas, which was expected. These steps later proved insufficient. As an example we may mention only the following facts: The battalion of bersaglieri received, at 3.20 on June 14, a quant.i.ty of ammunition at 72 to 240 cartridges per man. The Pinerolo Brigade took up fighting position at 2 o'clock at night. An order, captured late on July 14, said: 'According to reports received, the enemy will commence early on June 15 their bombardment preparations for attack. At midnight hot coffee and meat conserves will be distributed. The troops will remain awake, armed and prepared to use their gas-masks.'

"For some time now the Italian command have tried to disorganise our troops by high treasonable propaganda. In the Italian prisoners-of-war camps the Slavs are persuaded by promises and corruption to enlist in the Czecho-Slovak army. This is done in a way prohibited by law. Their ignorance of the international situation and their lack of news from home, partly caused by Italian censorship, are exploited by means of propaganda without scruples. An order of the 5th Italian Army Corps (1658 Prot. R. J.) of May 14, 1918, refers to active propaganda by Czecho-Slovak volunteers with the object of disorganising the Austro-Hungarian army. The Italian military authorities on their part deceive the Czecho-Slovaks by telling them of the continuous disorders and insurrections in Bohemia. In the above-mentioned order it is a.s.serted that in the corps to which it is addressed, as well as in other corps, some attempts of the Czecho-Slovak elements have been successful in causing confusion among enemy ranks. _Some of our Czecho-Slovak soldiers deserted and went over to the Italians_. Others remained in touch with them and declared themselves ready to stay in our positions as a source of ferment for future insurrections. Although the high treason miscarried owing to the heroic resistance which our troops, without distinction of nationality, offered to the enemy, it is nevertheless true that some elements succ.u.mbed to the treacherous enemy propaganda.

"The gunner Rudolf Paprikar, of the machine gun section, according to reports of the 8th Army Corps jumped off the river bank into the Piave below Villa Jacur and swam across under danger of being drowned. He betrayed the position, strength and composition of his sector, and through observation and spying, he acquired some valuable information by which our projected attack against Montello was disclosed. Further, he revealed to the enemy some very secret preparations for the crossing of the river Piave, and also supplied him with plans of the organisation of troops, battery positions, etc.

"The princ.i.p.al part in the treachery is attributed by the Italian high command, not without reason, to Lieutenant Karel Stiny of an infantry regiment, who deserted near Narenta. It appears from the detailed Italian official report in which his statements are embodied, that he betrayed all our preparations on the Piave and provided the enemy with a great deal of most important information. Let us mention further that Stiny in his mendacious statements to the Italian command about the Austro-Hungarian situation at the front and in the interior, followed the line of all traitors in order to appear in a favourable light. It is characteristic that in his declaration about our offensive he said that many Austro-Hungarian troops would have surrendered if it had not been for the German and Bulgarian bayonets behind their backs.

"_It is proved by various doc.u.ments to what extent the Czechs have forgotten their honour and duty_. By breaking their oath to Austria and her emperor and king, they have also forgotten all those who were with them at the front, and they are responsible for the blood of our patriots and the sufferings of our prisoners in Italy. The false glory which is attributed to them by the Italian command, who have lost all sense of the immorality of these proceedings, cannot efface the eternal crime which history always attaches to the names of traitors."

5. We could give many proofs of the great service the Czecho-Slovaks rendered the Allies by their surrenders. But for our purpose it will be sufficient to quote only some more admissions of the Germans and Magyars themselves.

Count Tisza admitted that Czech troops could not be relied upon, and Count Windischgratz stated that the chief of staff dare not use them except when mixed with Magyars and Germans.

Deputy Urmanczy declared in the Budapest Parliament on September 5, 1916, that during the first encounters with Rumania, a Czech regiment retired without the slightest resistance, provided themselves with provisions, entered a train and disappeared. The men went over to Rumania. He blamed the Czechs for the Austrian reverse in Transylvania.

On June 22, 1917, when the case of deputy Klofac was discussed by the Immunity Committee of the Reichsrat, General von Georgi, Austrian Minister for Home Defence, according to the Czech organ _Pozor_ of June 24, described

"... the conditions prevailing in the army, especially the behaviour of certain Czech regiments, and brought forward all the material which had been collected against the Czechs since the outbreak of the war, and which had been used against them. He referred to the 28th and 36th Regiments as well as to eight other Czech regiments which had voluntarily surrendered to the Russians. He mentioned also that Czech officers, not only those in reserve but also those on active service, including some of the highest ranks of the staff, surrendered to the enemy; in one instance fourteen officers with a staff officer thus surrendered. Czech soldiers in the Russian and French armies, as well as in other enemy armies, are fighting for the Entente and const.i.tute legions and battalions of their own. The total number of Czechs in the enemy armies exceeds 60,000. In the prisoners' camps in the enemy countries, non-German prisoners were invited to join the enemy's ranks.

Czech legions and battalions are composed almost entirely of former prisoners of war. The minister further went on to describe the propaganda of the Czechs abroad, the activity of Czech committees in enemy and neutral countries, especially in Russia and Switzerland. He also mentioned the case of Pavlu, a Czech soldier, who in a Russian newspaper described how he penetrated the Austrian trenches in the uniform of an Austrian officer, annihilated the occupants and after a successful scouting reconnaissance returned to the Russian ranks. The minister described the att.i.tude of the 'Sokols' and the Czech teachers.

The tenor of his speech was that Klofac is responsible for the anti-Austrian feeling of the Czech nation and that therefore he should not be released."

When the Russian offensive of July, 1917, started, Herr Hummer, member of the Austrian Reichsrat, addressed the following interpellation to the Austrian Minister for Home Defence:

"Is the Austrian Minister for Home Defence aware that in one of the early engagements of the new Russian offensive, the 19th Austrian Infantry Division, which consists almost entirely of Czecho-Slovaks and other Slavs, openly sided with the enemies of Austria by refusing to fight against the Russians and by surrendering as soon as an opportunity offered itself?"

The most interesting doc.u.ment in regard to the att.i.tude of Czecho-Slovaks during the war is the interpellation of ninety German Nationalist deputies (Schurf, Langenhahn, Wedra, Richter, Kittinger and others), of which we possess a copy. It contains 420 large-size printed pages, and it is therefore impossible for us to give a detailed account of it. The chapters of this interpellation have the following headings:

1. The dangers of Pan-Slavistic propaganda.

2. The situation at the outbreak of the war.

3. Motives for the arrest of Kramar.