Hitler. Part 3

Whatever the pathos of these comments, they testify to Hitler's instinctive ability, singling him out from other speakers relaying a similar message, to speak in the language of his listeners, and to stir them through the pa.s.sion and however strange it might now sound to us the apparent sincerity of his idealism.

Rising attendances marked Hitler's growing success and mounting reputation as the party's star speaker. By the end of 1920 he had addressed over thirty ma.s.s meetings mostly of between 800 and 2,500 persons and spoken at many smaller internal party gatherings. In early February 1921 he would speak at the biggest meeting so far over 6,000 people in the Zircus Krone, which could accommodate the largest indoor crowds in Munich. Until mid-1921 he spoke mainly in Munich, where the propaganda and organization of the meetings would ensure a satisfactory turn-out, and where the right atmosphere was guaranteed. But, not counting the speeches made during a fortnight's visit to Austria in early October, he held ten speeches outside the city in 1920, including one in Rosenheim where the first local group of the party outside Munich had just been founded. It was largely owing to Hitler's public profile that the party membership increased sharply from 190 in January 1920 to 2,000 by the end of the year and 3,300 by August 1921. He was rapidly making himself indispensable to the movement.

VIII.

Hitler spoke from rough notes mainly a series of jotted headings with key words underlined. As a rule, a speech would last around two hours or more. In the Festsaal of the Hofbrauhaus he used a beer table on one of the long sides of the hall as his platform in order to be in the middle of the crowd a novel technique for a speaker which helped create what Hitler regarded as a special mood in that hall. The themes of his speeches varied little: the contrast of Germany's strength in a glorious past with its current weakness and national humiliation a sick state in the hands of traitors and cowards who had betrayed the Fatherland to its powerful enemies; the reasons for the collapse in a lost war unleashed by these enemies, and behind them, the Jews; betrayal and revolution brought about by criminals and Jews; English and French intentions of destroying Germany, as shown in the Treaty of Versailles the 'Peace of shame', the instrument of Germany's slavery; the exploitation of ordinary Germans by Jewish racketeers and profiteers; a cheating and corrupt government and party system presiding over economic misery, social division, political conflict, and ethical collapse; the only way to recovery contained in the points of the party's programme ruthless showdown with internal enemies and build-up of national consciousness and unity, leading to renewed strength and eventual restored greatness. The combination of traditional Bavarian dislike of the Prussians and the experience of the Raterepublik in Munich meant that Hitler's repeated onslaught on the 'Marxist' government in Berlin was certain to meet with an enthusiastic response among the still small minority of the local population drawn to his meetings.

While Hitler basically appealed to negative feelings anger, resentment, hatred there was also a 'positive' element in the proposed remedy to the proclaimed ills. However plat.i.tudinous, the appeal to restoration of liberty through national unity, the need to collaborate of 'workers of the brain and hand', the social harmony of a 'national community', and the protection of the 'little man' through the crushing of his exploiters, were, to go from the applause they invariably produced, undeniably attractive propositions to Hitler's audiences. And Hitler's own pa.s.sion and fervour successfully conveyed the message to those already predisposed to it that no other way was possible; that Germany's revival would and could be brought about; and that it lay in the power of ordinary Germans to make it happen through their own struggle, sacrifice, and will. The effect was more that of a religious revivalist meeting than a normal political gathering.

Though Hitler was invariably up-to-date in finding easy targets in the daily politics of the crisis-ridden Republic, his main themes were tediously repet.i.tive. Some, in fact, often taken for granted to be part of Hitler's allegedly unchanging ideology, were missing altogether at this stage. There was, for example, not a single mention of the need for 'living s.p.a.ce' (Lebensraum) (Lebensraum) in eastern Europe. Britain and France were the foreign-policy targets at this time. Indeed, Hitler jotted among the notes of one of his speeches, in August 1920, 'brotherhood towards the east'. Nor did he clamour for a dictatorship. Such a demand occurs only in one speech in 1920, on 27 April, in which Hitler declared that Germany needed 'a dictator who is a genius' if it were to rise up again. There was no implication that he himself was that person. Surprisingly, too, his first outright public a.s.sault on Marxism did not occur before his speech at Rosenheim on 21 July 1920 (though he had spoken on a number of occasions before this of the catastrophic effects of Bolshevism in Russia, for which he blamed the Jews). And, remarkably, even race theory where Hitler drew heavily for his ideas from well-known antisemitic tracts such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Adolf Wahrmund, and, especially, the arch-popularizer Theodor Fritsch (one of whose emphases was the alleged s.e.xual abuse of women by Jews) was explicitly treated in only one speech by Hitler during 1920. in eastern Europe. Britain and France were the foreign-policy targets at this time. Indeed, Hitler jotted among the notes of one of his speeches, in August 1920, 'brotherhood towards the east'. Nor did he clamour for a dictatorship. Such a demand occurs only in one speech in 1920, on 27 April, in which Hitler declared that Germany needed 'a dictator who is a genius' if it were to rise up again. There was no implication that he himself was that person. Surprisingly, too, his first outright public a.s.sault on Marxism did not occur before his speech at Rosenheim on 21 July 1920 (though he had spoken on a number of occasions before this of the catastrophic effects of Bolshevism in Russia, for which he blamed the Jews). And, remarkably, even race theory where Hitler drew heavily for his ideas from well-known antisemitic tracts such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Adolf Wahrmund, and, especially, the arch-popularizer Theodor Fritsch (one of whose emphases was the alleged s.e.xual abuse of women by Jews) was explicitly treated in only one speech by Hitler during 1920.

This scarcely meant, however, that Hitler neglected to attack the Jews. On the contrary: the all-devouring manic obsession with the Jews to which all else is subordinated not observable before 1919, never absent thereafter courses through almost every Hitler speech at this time. Behind all evil that had befallen or was threatening Germany stood the figure of the Jew. In speech after speech he lashed the Jews in the most vicious and barbaric language imaginable.

Genuine socialism, declared Hitler, meant to be an antisemite. Germans should be ready to enter into a pact with the devil to eradicate the evil of Jewry. But, as in his letter to Gemlich the previous autumn, he did not see emotional antisemitism as the answer. He demanded internment in concentration camps to prevent 'Jewish undermining of our people', hanging for racketeers, but ultimately, as the only solution similar to the Gemlich letter the 'removal of the Jews from our people'. The implication, as in his explicit demands with regard to Ostjuden Ostjuden (usually poor refugees from persecution in eastern Europe), was their expulsion from Germany. This was undoubtedly how it was understood. But the language itself was both terrible and implicitly genocidal in its biological similes. 'Don't think that you can combat racial tuberculosis,' he declared in August 1920, 'without seeing to it that the people is freed from the causative organ of racial tuberculosis. The impact of Jewry will never pa.s.s away, and the poisoning of the people will not end, as long as the causal agent, the Jew, is not removed from our midst.' (usually poor refugees from persecution in eastern Europe), was their expulsion from Germany. This was undoubtedly how it was understood. But the language itself was both terrible and implicitly genocidal in its biological similes. 'Don't think that you can combat racial tuberculosis,' he declared in August 1920, 'without seeing to it that the people is freed from the causative organ of racial tuberculosis. The impact of Jewry will never pa.s.s away, and the poisoning of the people will not end, as long as the causal agent, the Jew, is not removed from our midst.'

His audiences loved it. More than anything else, these attacks evoked torrents of applause and cheering. His technique beginning slowly, plenty of sarcasm, personalized attacks on named targets, then a gradual crescendo to a climax whipped his audiences into a frenzy. His speech in the Festsaal of the Hofbrauhaus on 13 August 1920 on 'Why are we Antisemites?' his only speech that year solely solely relating to the Jews and probably intended as a basic statement on the topic was interrupted fifty-eight times during its two hours' duration by ever wilder cheering from the 2,000-strong audience. To go from a report on another Hitler speech a few weeks later, the audience would have been mainly drawn from white-collar workers, the lower-middle cla.s.s, and better-off workers, with around a quarter women. relating to the Jews and probably intended as a basic statement on the topic was interrupted fifty-eight times during its two hours' duration by ever wilder cheering from the 2,000-strong audience. To go from a report on another Hitler speech a few weeks later, the audience would have been mainly drawn from white-collar workers, the lower-middle cla.s.s, and better-off workers, with around a quarter women.

At first, Hitler's antisemitic tirades were invariably linked to anti-capitalism and attacks on 'Jewish' war profiteers and racketeers, whom he blamed for exploiting the German people and causing the loss of the war and the German war dead. The influence of Gottfried Feder can be seen in the distinction Hitler drew between essentially healthy 'industrial capital' and the real evil of 'Jewish finance capital'.

There was no link with Marxism or Bolshevism at this stage. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, Hitler's antisemitism was not prompted by his anti-Bolshevism; it long predated it. There was no mention of Bolshevism in the Gemlich letter of September 1919, where the 'Jewish Question' is related to the rapacious nature of finance capital. Hitler spoke in April and again in June 1920 of Russia being destroyed by the Jews, but it was only in his Rosenheim speech on 21 July that he explicitly married the images of Marxism, Bolshevism, and the Soviet system in Russia to the brutality of Jewish rule, for which he saw Social Democracy preparing the ground in Germany. Hitler admitted in August 1920 that he knew little of the real situation in Russia. But perhaps influenced above all by Alfred Rosenberg, who came from the Baltic and had experienced the Russian Revolution at first hand, but probably also soaking up images of the horror of the Russian civil war which were filtering through to the German press he plainly became preoccupied with Bolshevik Russia in the second half of the year. The dissemination of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion Protocols of the Elders of Zion the forgery about Jewish world domination, widely read and believed in antisemitic circles at the time probably also helped to focus. .h.i.tler's attention on Russia. These images appear to have provided the catalyst to the merger of antisemitism and anti-Marxism in his 'world-view' an ident.i.ty which, once forged, never disappeared. the forgery about Jewish world domination, widely read and believed in antisemitic circles at the time probably also helped to focus. .h.i.tler's attention on Russia. These images appear to have provided the catalyst to the merger of antisemitism and anti-Marxism in his 'world-view' an ident.i.ty which, once forged, never disappeared.

IX.

Hitler's speeches put him on the political map in Munich. But he was still very much a local taste. And however much noise he made, his party was still insignificant compared with the established socialist and Catholic parties. Moreover, though it is going too far to see him as no more than the tool of powerful vested interests 'behind the scenes', without influential backers and the 'connections' they could provide his talents as a mob-agitator would not have got him very far.

Though Hitler had already signalled his intention of making a living as a political speaker, he was, in fact, until 31 March 1920 still drawing pay from the army. His first patron, Captain Mayr, continued to take a close interest in him and, if his later account can be believed, provided limited funding towards the staging of the ma.s.s meetings. At this time, Hitler was still serving both the party and the army. In January and February 1920, Mayr had 'Herr Hittler' lecturing on 'Versailles' and 'Political Parties and their Significance' in the company of distinguished Munich historians Karl Alexander von Muller and Paul Joachimsen to Reichswehr soldiers undertaking 'citizenship education courses'. In March, during the Kapp Putsch, when a short-lived armed coup had attempted to overthrow the government, forcing it to flee from the Reich capital, he sent him with Dietrich Eckart to Berlin to instruct Wolfgang Kapp on the situation in Bavaria. They arrived too late. The Right's first attempt to take over the state had already collapsed. But Mayr was undeterred. He retained both his contact with Kapp and his interest in Hitler. He still had hopes, so he told Kapp six months later, that the NSDAP which he thought of as his own creation would become the 'organization of national radicalism', the advance-guard of a future, more successful, putsch. He wrote to Kapp, now exiled in Sweden: The national workers' party must provide the basis for the strong a.s.sault-force that we are hoping for. The programme is still somewhat clumsy and also perhaps incomplete. We'll have to supplement it. Only one thing is certain: that under this banner we've already won a good number of supporters. Since July of last year I've been looking ... to strengthen the movement ... I've set up very capable young people. A Herr Hitler, for example, has become a motive force, a popular speaker of the first rank. In the Munich branch we have over 2,000 members, compared with under 100 in summer 1919.

Early in 1920, before Hitler had left the Reichswehr, Mayr had taken him along to meetings of the 'Iron Fist' club for radical nationalist officers, founded by Captain Ernst Rohm. Hitler had been introduced to Rohm by Mayr, probably the previous autumn. Interested in a variety of nationalist parties, particularly with a view to winning the workers to the nationalist cause, Rohm had attended the first meeting of the DAP addressed by Hitler on 16 October 1919 and had joined the party shortly afterwards. Now Hitler came into far closer contact with Rohm, who rapidly came to replace Mayr as the key link with the Reichswehr. Rohm had been responsible for arming the volunteers and 'civil defence' (Einwohnerwehr) units in Bavaria and had in the meantime become an important player in paramilitary politics, with excellent connections in the army, the 'patriotic a.s.sociations', and throughout the volkisch volkisch Right. He was, in fact, at this time, along with his fellow officers on the Right, far more interested in the ma.s.sive Einwohnerwehren, with a membership of over quarter of a million men, than he was in the tiny NSDAP. Even so, he provided the key contact between the NSDAP and the far larger 'patriotic a.s.sociations' and offered avenues to funding which the constantly hard-up party desperately needed. His connections proved invaluable increasingly so from 1921 onwards, when his interest in Hitler's party grew. Right. He was, in fact, at this time, along with his fellow officers on the Right, far more interested in the ma.s.sive Einwohnerwehren, with a membership of over quarter of a million men, than he was in the tiny NSDAP. Even so, he provided the key contact between the NSDAP and the far larger 'patriotic a.s.sociations' and offered avenues to funding which the constantly hard-up party desperately needed. His connections proved invaluable increasingly so from 1921 onwards, when his interest in Hitler's party grew.

Another important patron at this time was the volkisch volkisch poet and publicist Dietrich Eckart. More than twenty years older than Hitler, Eckart, who had initially made his name with a German adaptation of poet and publicist Dietrich Eckart. More than twenty years older than Hitler, Eckart, who had initially made his name with a German adaptation of Peer Gynt Peer Gynt, had not been notably successful before the war as a poet and critic. Possibly this stimulated his intense antisemitism. He became politically active in December 1918 with the publication of his antisemitic weekly Auf gut Deutsch (In Plain German) Auf gut Deutsch (In Plain German), which also featured contributions from Gottfried Feder and the young emigre from the Baltic, Alfred Rosenberg. He spoke at DAP meetings in the summer of 1919, before Hitler joined, and evidently came to regard the party's new recruit as his own protege. Hitler himself was flattered by the attention paid to him by a figure of Eckart's reputation in volkisch volkisch circles. In the early years, relations between the two were good, even close. But for Hitler, as ever, it was Eckart's usefulness that counted. As. .h.i.tler's self-importance grew, his need for Eckart declined and by 1923, the year of Eckart's death, the two had become estranged. circles. In the early years, relations between the two were good, even close. But for Hitler, as ever, it was Eckart's usefulness that counted. As. .h.i.tler's self-importance grew, his need for Eckart declined and by 1923, the year of Eckart's death, the two had become estranged.

At first, however, there could be no doubt of Eckart's value to Hitler and the NSDAP. Through his well-heeled connections, Eckart afforded the beerhall demagogue an entree into Munich 'society', opening for him the door to the salons of the wealthy and influential members of the city's bourgeoisie. And through his financial support, and that of his contacts, he was able to offer vital a.s.sistance to the financially struggling small party. Since membership fees did not remotely cover outgoings, the party was dependent upon help from outside. It came in part from the owners of Munich firms and businesses. Some aid continued to come from the Reichswehr. But Eckart's role was crucial. He arranged, for example, the funding from his friend, the Augsburg chemist and factory-owner Dr Gottfried Grandel, who also backed the periodical Auf gut Deutsch Auf gut Deutsch, for the plane that took him and Hitler to Berlin at the time of the Kapp Putsch. Grandel later served as a guarantor for the funds used to purchase the Volkischer Beobachter Volkischer Beobachter and turn it into the party's own newspaper in December 1920. and turn it into the party's own newspaper in December 1920.

To the Munich public, by 1921, Hitler was was the NSDAP. He was its voice, its representative figure, its embodiment. Asked to name the party's chairman, perhaps even politically informed citizens might have guessed wrongly. But Hitler did not want the chairmanship. Drexler offered it him on a number of occasions. Each time Hitler refused. Drexler wrote to Feder in spring 1921, stating 'that each revolutionary movement must have a dictatorial head, and therefore I also think our Hitler is the most suitable for our movement, without wanting to be pushed into the background myself'. But for Hitler, the party chairmanship meant organizational responsibility. He had this was to remain the case during the rise to power, and when he headed the German state neither apt.i.tude nor ability for organizational matters. Organization he could leave to others; propaganda mobilization of the ma.s.ses was what he was good at, and what he wanted to do. For that, and that alone, he would take responsibility. Propaganda, for Hitler, was the highest form of political activity. the NSDAP. He was its voice, its representative figure, its embodiment. Asked to name the party's chairman, perhaps even politically informed citizens might have guessed wrongly. But Hitler did not want the chairmanship. Drexler offered it him on a number of occasions. Each time Hitler refused. Drexler wrote to Feder in spring 1921, stating 'that each revolutionary movement must have a dictatorial head, and therefore I also think our Hitler is the most suitable for our movement, without wanting to be pushed into the background myself'. But for Hitler, the party chairmanship meant organizational responsibility. He had this was to remain the case during the rise to power, and when he headed the German state neither apt.i.tude nor ability for organizational matters. Organization he could leave to others; propaganda mobilization of the ma.s.ses was what he was good at, and what he wanted to do. For that, and that alone, he would take responsibility. Propaganda, for Hitler, was the highest form of political activity.

In Hitler's own conception, propaganda was the key to the nationalization of the ma.s.ses, without which there could be no national salvation. It was not that propaganda and ideology were distinctive ent.i.ties for him. They were inseparable, and reinforced each other. An idea for Hitler was useless unless it mobilized. The self-confidence he gained from the rapturous reception of his speeches a.s.sured him that his diagnosis of Germany's ills and the way to national redemption was right the only one possible. This in turn gave him the self-conviction that conveyed itself to those in his immediate entourage as well as those listening to his speeches in the beerhalls. To see himself as 'drummer' of the national cause was, therefore, for Hitler a high calling. It was why, before the middle of 1921, he preferred to be free for this role, and not to be bogged down in the organizational work which he a.s.sociated with the chairmanship of the party.

The outrage felt throughout Germany at the punitive sum of 226 thousand million Gold Marks to be paid in reparations, imposed by the Paris Conference at the end of January 1921, ensured there would be no let-up in agitation. This was the background for the biggest meeting that the NSDAP had until then staged, on 3 February in the Circus Krone. Hitler risked going ahead with the meeting at only one day's notice, and without the usual advance publicity. In a rush, the huge hall was booked and two lorries hired to drive round the city throwing out leaflets. This was another technique borrowed from the 'Marxists', and the first time the n.a.z.is had used it. Despite worries until the last minute that the hall would be half-empty and the meeting would prove a propaganda debacle, more than 6,000 turned up to hear Hitler, speaking on 'Future or Ruin', denounce the 'slavery' imposed on Germans by the Allied reparations, and castigate the weakness of the government for accepting them.

Hitler wrote that after the Zircus Krone success he increased the NSDAP's propaganda activity in Munich still further. And indeed the propaganda output was impressive. Hitler spoke at twenty-eight major meetings in Munich and twelve elsewhere (nearly all still in Bavaria), apart from several contributions to 'discussions', and seven addresses to the newly-formed SA in the latter part of the year. Between January and June he also wrote thirty-nine articles for the Volkischer Beobachter Volkischer Beobachter, and from September onwards contributed a number of pieces to the party's internal information leaflets. Of course, he had the time in which to devote himself solely to propaganda. Unlike the other members of the party leadership, he had no other occupation or interest.

Politics consumed practically his entire existence. When he was not giving speeches, or preparing them, he spent time reading. As always, much of this was the newspapers giving him regular ammunition for his scourge of Weimar politicians. He had books a lot of them popular editions on history, geography, Germanic myths, and, especially, war (including Clausewitz) on the shelves of his shabby, spa.r.s.ely-furnished room at 41 Thierschstrae, down by the Isar. But what, exactly, he read is impossible to know. His lifestyle scarcely lent itself to lengthy periods of systematic reading. He claimed, however, to have read up on his hero Frederick the Great, and pounced on the work of his rival in the volkisch volkisch camp, Otto d.i.c.kel, a 320-page treatise on camp, Otto d.i.c.kel, a 320-page treatise on Die Auferstehung des Abendlandes (The Resurrection of the Western World) Die Auferstehung des Abendlandes (The Resurrection of the Western World) immediately on its appearance in 1921 in order to be able to castigate it. immediately on its appearance in 1921 in order to be able to castigate it.

Otherwise, as it had been since the Vienna days, much of his time was spent lounging around cafes in Munich. He specially liked the Cafe Heck in Galerienstrae, his favourite. In a quiet corner of the long, narrow room of this coffee-house, frequented by Munich's solid middle cla.s.s, he could sit at his reserved table, his back to the wall, holding court among the new-found cronies that he had attracted to the NSDAP. Among those coming to form an inner circle of Hitler's a.s.sociates were the young student Rudolf He, the Baltic-Germans Alfred Rosenberg (who had worked on Eckart's periodical since 1919) and Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter (an engineer with excellent contacts to wealthy Russian emigres). Certainly by the time Putzi Hanfstaengl, the cultured part-American who became his Foreign Press Chief, came to know him, late in 1922, Hitler had a table booked every Monday evening at the old-fashioned Cafe Neumaier on the edge of the Viktualienmarkt. His regular accompaniment formed a motley crew mostly lower-middle cla.s.s, some unsavoury characters among them. Christian Weber, a former horse-dealer, who, like Hitler, invariably carried a dog-whip and relished the brawls with Communists, was one. Another was Hermann Esser, formerly Mayr's press agent, himself an excellent agitator, and an even better gutter-journalist. Max Amann, another roughneck, Hitler's former sergeant who became overlord of the n.a.z.i press empire, was also usually there, as were Ulrich Graf, Hitler's personal bodyguard, and, frequently, the 'philosophers' of the party, Gottfried Feder and Dietrich Eckart. In the long room, with its rows of benches and tables, often occupied by elderly couples, Hitler's entourage would discuss politics, or listen to his monologues on art and architecture, while eating the snacks they had brought with them and drinking their litres of beer or cups of coffee. At the end of the evening, Weber, Amann, Graf, and Lieutenant Klintzsch, a paramilitary veteran of the Kapp Putsch, would act as a bodyguard, escorting Hitler wearing the long black overcoat and trilby that 'gave him the appearance of a conspirator' back to his apartment in Thierschstrae.

Hitler scarcely cut the figure of a mainstream politician. Not surprisingly, the Bavarian establishment regarded him largely with contempt. But they could not ignore him. The old-fashioned monarchist head of the Bavarian government at the time, Minister President Gustav Ritter von Kahr, who had a.s.sumed office on 16 March 1920 following the Kapp Putsch and aimed to turn Bavaria into a 'cell of order' representing true national values, thought Hitler was a propagandist and nothing more. This was a not unjustifiable a.s.sessment at the time. But Kahr was keen to gather 'national forces' in Bavaria in protest at the 'fulfilment policy' of Reich Chancellor Wirth. And he felt certain that he could make use of Hitler, that he could control the 'impetuous Austrian'. On 14 May 1921 he invited a delegation from the NSDAP, led by Hitler, to discuss the political situation with him. It was the first meeting of the two men whose identical aim of destroying the new Weimar democracy was to link them, if fleetingly, in the ill-fated putsch of November 1923 a chequered a.s.sociation that would end with Kahr's murder in the 'Night of the Long Knives' at the end of June 1934. Whatever Kahr's disdain for Hitler, his invitation to a meeting in May 1921 amounted to recognition that the latter was now a factor in Bavarian politics, proof that he and his movement had to be taken seriously.

Rudolf He, still studying at Munich under the geopolitician Professor Karl Haushofer, introverted and idealistic, and already besotted with Hitler, was part of the delegation. Three days later, unsolicited and unprompted by Hitler, he wrote a lengthy letter to Kahr, describing Hitler's early life and eulogizing about his political aims, ideals, and skills. Hitler, he wrote, was 'an unusually decent, sincere character, full of kind-heartedness, religious, a good Catholic', with only one aim: 'the welfare of his country'. He went on to laud Hitler's self-sacrifice in this cause, how he received not a penny from the movement itself but made his living purely from the fees he received for other speeches he occasionally made.

This was the official line that Hitler himself had put out the previous September in the Volkischer Beobachter Volkischer Beobachter. It was quite disingenuous. On no more than a handful of occasions, he claimed, did he speak at nationalist meetings other than those of the NSDAP. The fees from these alone would certainly not have been enough to keep body and soul together. Rumours about his income and lifestyle were avidly taken up on the Left. Even on the volkisch volkisch Right there were remarks about him being chauffeured around Munich in a big car, and his enemies in the party raised questions about his personal financial irregularities and the amount of time the 'king of Munich' spent in an expensive lifestyle cavorting with women even women smoking cigarettes. In fact, Hitler was distinctly touchy about his financial affairs. He repeated in court in December 1921 in a libel case against the socialist Right there were remarks about him being chauffeured around Munich in a big car, and his enemies in the party raised questions about his personal financial irregularities and the amount of time the 'king of Munich' spent in an expensive lifestyle cavorting with women even women smoking cigarettes. In fact, Hitler was distinctly touchy about his financial affairs. He repeated in court in December 1921 in a libel case against the socialist Munchener Post Munchener Post that he had sought no fees from the party for sixty-five speeches delivered in Munich. But he accepted that he was 'supported in a modest way' by party members and 'occasionally' provided with meals by them. One of those who looked after him was the first 'Hitler-Mutti', Frau Hermine Hofmann, the elderly widow of a headmaster, who plied Hitler with endless offerings of cakes and turned her house at Solln on the outskirts of Munich for a while into a sort of unofficial party headquarters. A little later the Reichsbahn official Theodor Laubock founder of the Rosenheim branch of the NSDAP, but subsequently transferred to Munich and his wife saw to Hitler's well-being, and could also be called upon to put up important guests of the party. In reality, the miserable accommodation Hitler rented in Thierschstrae, and the shabby clothes he wore, belied the fact that even at this date he was not short of well-to-do party supporters. With the growth of the party and his own expanding reputation in 19223, he was able to gain new and wealthy patrons in Munich high society. that he had sought no fees from the party for sixty-five speeches delivered in Munich. But he accepted that he was 'supported in a modest way' by party members and 'occasionally' provided with meals by them. One of those who looked after him was the first 'Hitler-Mutti', Frau Hermine Hofmann, the elderly widow of a headmaster, who plied Hitler with endless offerings of cakes and turned her house at Solln on the outskirts of Munich for a while into a sort of unofficial party headquarters. A little later the Reichsbahn official Theodor Laubock founder of the Rosenheim branch of the NSDAP, but subsequently transferred to Munich and his wife saw to Hitler's well-being, and could also be called upon to put up important guests of the party. In reality, the miserable accommodation Hitler rented in Thierschstrae, and the shabby clothes he wore, belied the fact that even at this date he was not short of well-to-do party supporters. With the growth of the party and his own expanding reputation in 19223, he was able to gain new and wealthy patrons in Munich high society.

X.

The party was, however, perpetually short of money. It was on a fundraising mission in June 1921 to Berlin by Hitler, to try (in the company of the man with the contacts, Dietrich Eckart) to find backing for the ailing Volkischer Beobachter Volkischer Beobachter, that the crisis which culminated in Hitler's take-over of the party leadership unfolded.

The background was shaped by moves to merge the NSDAP with the rival German-Socialist Party, the DSP. To go from the party programmes, despite some differences of accent, the two volkisch volkisch parties had more in common than separated them. And the DSP had a following in north Germany, which the n.a.z.i Party, still scarcely more than a small local party, lacked. In itself, therefore, there was certainly an argument for joining forces. Talks about a possible merger had begun the previous August in a gathering in Salzburg, attended by Hitler, of national socialist parties from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. A number of overtures followed from the DSP leaders between then and April 1921. At a meeting in Zeitz in Thuringia at the end of March, Drexler presumably delegated by the NSDAP, but plainly in the teeth of Hitler's disapproval even agreed to tentative proposals for a merger and anathema to Hitler a move of the party headquarters to Berlin. Hitler responded with fury to Drexler's concessions, threatened to resign from the party, and succeeded 'amid unbelievable anger' in reversing the agreement reached at Zeitz. Eventually, at a meeting in Munich in mid-April, amidst great rancour and with Hitler in a towering rage, negotiations with the DSP collapsed. The DSP was in no doubt that Hitler, the 'fanatical would-be big shot', whose successes had gone to his head, was solely responsible for the NSDAP's obstructionism. Hitler, dismissive of notions of a specific political programme to be implemented, interested only in agitation and mobilization, had set his face rigidly from the outset against any possible merger. To Hitler, the similarities in programme were irrelevant. He objected to the way the DSP had rushed to set up numerous branches without solid foundations, so that the party was 'everywhere and nowhere', and to its readiness to resort to parliamentary tactics. But the real reason was a different one. Any merger was bound to threaten his supremacy in the small but tightly-knit NSDAP. parties had more in common than separated them. And the DSP had a following in north Germany, which the n.a.z.i Party, still scarcely more than a small local party, lacked. In itself, therefore, there was certainly an argument for joining forces. Talks about a possible merger had begun the previous August in a gathering in Salzburg, attended by Hitler, of national socialist parties from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. A number of overtures followed from the DSP leaders between then and April 1921. At a meeting in Zeitz in Thuringia at the end of March, Drexler presumably delegated by the NSDAP, but plainly in the teeth of Hitler's disapproval even agreed to tentative proposals for a merger and anathema to Hitler a move of the party headquarters to Berlin. Hitler responded with fury to Drexler's concessions, threatened to resign from the party, and succeeded 'amid unbelievable anger' in reversing the agreement reached at Zeitz. Eventually, at a meeting in Munich in mid-April, amidst great rancour and with Hitler in a towering rage, negotiations with the DSP collapsed. The DSP was in no doubt that Hitler, the 'fanatical would-be big shot', whose successes had gone to his head, was solely responsible for the NSDAP's obstructionism. Hitler, dismissive of notions of a specific political programme to be implemented, interested only in agitation and mobilization, had set his face rigidly from the outset against any possible merger. To Hitler, the similarities in programme were irrelevant. He objected to the way the DSP had rushed to set up numerous branches without solid foundations, so that the party was 'everywhere and nowhere', and to its readiness to resort to parliamentary tactics. But the real reason was a different one. Any merger was bound to threaten his supremacy in the small but tightly-knit NSDAP.

Though the merger with the DSP had been fended off for the time being, an even bigger threat, from Hitler's point of view, arose while he was away in Berlin. Dr Otto d.i.c.kel, who had founded in March 1921 in Augsburg another volkisch organization, the Deutsche Werkgemeinschaft, had made something of a stir on the volkisch volkisch scene with his book scene with his book Die Auferstehung des Abendlandes (The Resurrection of the Western World Die Auferstehung des Abendlandes (The Resurrection of the Western World). d.i.c.kel's mystic volkisch volkisch philosophizing was not Hitler's style, and, not surprisingly, met with the latter's contempt and angry dismissal. But some of d.i.c.kel's ideas building up a cla.s.sless community through national renewal, combating 'Jewish domination' through the struggle against 'interest slavery' bore undeniable similarities to those of both the NSDAP and the DSP. And d.i.c.kel, no less than Hitler, had the conviction of a missionary and, moreover, was also a dynamic and popular public speaker. Following the appearance of his book, which was lauded in the philosophizing was not Hitler's style, and, not surprisingly, met with the latter's contempt and angry dismissal. But some of d.i.c.kel's ideas building up a cla.s.sless community through national renewal, combating 'Jewish domination' through the struggle against 'interest slavery' bore undeniable similarities to those of both the NSDAP and the DSP. And d.i.c.kel, no less than Hitler, had the conviction of a missionary and, moreover, was also a dynamic and popular public speaker. Following the appearance of his book, which was lauded in the Volkischer Beobachter Volkischer Beobachter, he was invited to Munich, and with Hitler absent in Berlin proved a major success before a packed audience in one of Hitler's usual haunts, the Hofbrauhaus. Other speeches were planned for d.i.c.kel. The NSDAP's leadership was delighted to find in him a second 'outstanding speaker with a popular touch'.

Hitler, meanwhile, was still in Berlin. He failed to turn up at a meeting with a DSP representative on 1 July for further merger talks, and did not return to Bavaria until ten days later. He had evidently by then got wind of the alarming news that a delegation of the NSDAP's leaders was due to have talks there with d.i.c.kel and representatives of the Augsburg and Nuremberg branches of the Deutsche Werkgemeinschaft. He appeared before the NSDAP delegates themselves arrived, beside himself with rage, threatening the Augsburg and Nuremberg representatives that he would see that a merger was stopped. But when his own people eventually turned up, his uncontrolled fury subsided into sulky silence. Three hours of suggestions from d.i.c.kel for the formation of a loose confederation of the different groups and recommendations for improvements to the NSDAP's programme prompted numerous outbursts from Hitler before, being able to stand it no longer, he stormed out of the meeting.

If Hitler hoped his tantrums would convince his colleagues to drop the negotiations, he was mistaken. They were embarra.s.sed by his behaviour and impressed by what d.i.c.kel had to offer. Even Dietrich Eckart thought Hitler had behaved badly. It was accepted that the party programme needed amending, and that Hitler 'as a simple man' was not up to doing this. They agreed to take back d.i.c.kel's proposals to Munich and put them to the full party committee.

Hitler resigned from the party in anger and disgust on 11 July. In a letter to the committee three days later, he justified his move on the grounds that the representatives in Augsburg had violated the party statutes and acted against the wishes of the members in handing over the movement to a man whose ideas were incompatible with those of the NSDAP. 'I will and can not be any longer a member of such a movement,' he declared. Hitler had resigned 'for ever' from the party's committee in December 1920. As noted, he threatened resignation yet again following the Zeitz conference in late March 1921. The histrionics of the prima donna were part and parcel of Hitler's make-up and would remain so. It would always be the same: he only knew all-or-nothing arguments; there was nothing in between, no possibility of reaching a compromise. Always from a maximalist position, with no other way out, he would go for broke. And if he could not get his way he would throw a temper-tantrum and threaten to quit. In power, in years to come, he would sometimes deliberately orchestrate an outburst of rage as a bullying tactic. But usually his tantrums were a sign of frustration, even desperation, not strength. It was to be the case in a number of future crises. And it was so on this occasion. The resignation was not a carefully planned manoeuvre to use his position as the party's star performer to blackmail the committee into submission. It was an expression of fury and frustration at not getting his own way. His threat of resignation had worked before, after the Zeitz conference. Now he was risking his only trump card again. Defeat would have meant the party's amalgamation in d.i.c.kel's planned 'Western League' and left Hitler with only the option which he seems to have contemplated of setting up a new party and beginning again. There were those who would have been glad, whatever his uses as an agitator, to have been rid of such a troublesome and egocentric ent.i.ty. And the spread of the party that the merger with d.i.c.kel's organization presented offered more than a little compensation.

But the loss of its sole star performer would have been a major, perhaps fatal, blow to the NSDAP. Hitler's departure would have split the party. In the end, this was the decisive consideration. Dietrich Eckart was asked to intervene, and on 13 July Drexler sought the conditions under which Hitler would agree to rejoin the party. It was full capitulation from the party leadership. Hitler's conditions all stemmed from the recent turmoil in the party. His key demands to be accepted by an extraordinary members' meeting were 'the post of chairman with dictatorial power'; the party headquarters to be fixed once and for all as Munich; the party programme to be regarded as inviolate; and the end of all merger attempts. All the demands centred upon securing Hitler's position in the party against any future challenges. A day later the party committee expressed its readiness in recognition of his 'immense knowledge', his services for the movement, and his 'unusual talent as a speaker' to give him 'dictatorial powers'. It welcomed his willingness, having turned down Drexler's offers in the past, now to take over the party chairmanship. Hitler rejoined the party, as member no.3680, on 26 July.

Even now the conflict was not fully at an end. While Hitler and Drexler publicly demonstrated their unity at a members' meeting on 26 July, Hitler's opponents in the leadership had his henchman Hermann Esser expelled from the party, prepared placards denouncing Hitler, and printed 3,000 copies of an anonymous pamphlet attacking him in the most denigratory terms as the agent of sinister forces intent on damaging the party. But Hitler, who had shown once more to great effect how irreplaceable he was as a speaker in a meeting, packed to the last seat, in Circus Krone on 20 July, was now in the driving seat. Now there was no hesitancy. This was. .h.i.tler triumphant. To tumultuous applause from the 554 paid-up members attending the extraordinary members' meeting in the Festsaal of the Hofbrauhaus on 29 July, he defended himself and Esser and rounded on his opponents. He boasted that he had never sought party office, and had turned down the chairmanship on several occasions. But this time he was prepared to accept. The new party const.i.tution, which Hitler had been forced to draft hurriedly, confirmed on three separate occasions the sole responsibility of the First Chairman for the party's actions (subject only to the membership meeting). There was only one vote against accepting the new dictatorial powers over the party granted to Hitler. His chairmanship was unanimously accepted.

The reform of the party statutes was necessary, stated the Volkischer Beobachter Volkischer Beobachter, in order to prevent any future attempt to dissipate the energies of the party through majority decisions. It was the first step on transforming the NSDAP into a new-style party, a 'Fuhrer party'. The move had come about not through careful planning, but through Hitler's reaction to events which were running out of his control. Rudolf He's subsequent a.s.sault on Hitler's opponents in the Volkischer Beobachter Volkischer Beobachter not only contained the early seeds of the later heroization of Hitler, but also revealed the initial base on which it rested. 'Are you truly blind,' wrote He, 'to the fact that this man is the leader personality who alone is able to carry through the struggle? Do you think that without him the ma.s.ses would pile into the Circus Krone?' not only contained the early seeds of the later heroization of Hitler, but also revealed the initial base on which it rested. 'Are you truly blind,' wrote He, 'to the fact that this man is the leader personality who alone is able to carry through the struggle? Do you think that without him the ma.s.ses would pile into the Circus Krone?'

5.

The 'Drummer'

I.

Hitler was content in the early 1920s to be the 'drummer' whipping up the ma.s.ses for the 'national movement'. He saw himself at this time not as portrayed in Mein Kampf Mein Kampf, as Germany's future leader in waiting, the political messiah whose turn would arise once the nation recognized his unique greatness. Rather, he was paving the way for the great leader whose day might not dawn for many years to come. 'I am nothing more than a drummer and rallier,' he told the neo-conservative writer Arthur Moeller van den Bruck in 1922. Some months earlier, he had reputedly stated, in an interview in May 1921 with the chief editor of the Pan-German newspaper Deutsche Zeitung Deutsche Zeitung, that he was not the leader and statesman who would 'save the Fatherland that was sinking into chaos', but only 'the agitator who understood how to rally the ma.s.ses'. Nor, he allegedly went on, was he 'the architect who clearly pictured in his own eyes the plan and design of the new building and with calm sureness and creativity was able to lay one stone on the other. He needed the greater one behind him, on whose command he could lean.'

To be the 'drummer' meant everything to Hitler at this time. It was the 'vocation' that replaced his dreams of becoming a great artist or architect. It was his main task, practically his sole concern. Not only did it allow full expression to his one real talent. It was also in his eyes the greatest and most important role he could play. For politics to Hitler and so it would in all essence remain was was propaganda: ceaseless ma.s.s mobilization for a cause to be followed blindly, not the 'art of the possible'. propaganda: ceaseless ma.s.s mobilization for a cause to be followed blindly, not the 'art of the possible'.

Hitler owed his rise to at least regional prominence on the nationalist Right in Bavaria not simply to his unparalleled ability as a mob-orator at ma.s.s meetings in Munich. As before, this was his chief a.s.set. But linked to this, and of crucial importance, was the fact that he was the head of a movement which, in contrast to the earliest phase of the party's existence, now came to develop its own substantial paramilitary force and to enter the maelstrom of Bavarian paramilitary politics. It was above all in the peculiar conditions of post-revolutionary Bavaria that the private armies, with the toleration and often active support of the Bavarian authorities, could fully flourish.

The vehemently anti-socialist, counter-revolutionary regime of Minister President Gustav Ritter von Kahr turned Bavaria into a haven for right-wing extremists from all over Germany, including many under order of arrest elsewhere in the country. From a new protected base in Munich, for example, Captain Hermann Ehrhardt, a veteran of orchestrated anti-socialist violence in the Freikorps, including the suppression of the Raterepublik, and a leader of the Kapp Putsch, was able to use his Organisation Consul to build up a network of groups throughout the whole of the German Reich and carry out many of the political murders there were 354 in all perpetrated by the Right between 1919 and 1922 that stained the early years of the troubled new democracy. It was Ehrhardt, alongside Ernst Rohm, who was to play a leading role in establishing the NSDAP's own paramilitary organization, which was to emerge from 1921 onwards into a significant feature of the n.a.z.i Movement and an important factor in paramilitary politics in Bavaria.

Rohm was, more even than Hitler, typical of the 'front generation'. As a junior officer, he shared the dangers, anxieties, and privations of the troops in the trenches shared, too, the prejudice and mounting anger levelled at those in staff headquarters behind the lines, at the military bureaucracy, at 'incapable' politicians, and at those seen as shirkers, idlers, and profiteers at home. Against these highly negative images, he heroicized the 'front community', the solidarity of the men in the trenches, leadership resting on deeds rather than status, and the blind obedience that this demanded. What he wanted was a new 'warrior' elite whose actions and achievements had proved their right to rule. Though a monarchist, there was for Rohm to be no return to pre-war bourgeois society. His ideal was the community of fighting men. As for so many who joined the Freikorps and their successor paramilitary organizations, this ideal combined male fantasy with the cult of violence. Like so many, Rohm had gone to war in 1914 in wild enthusiasm, suffered serious facial injury within weeks when sh.e.l.l fragments tore away part of his nose, permanently disfiguring him, had returned to lead his company, but had been forced out of service at the front after being again badly injured at Verdun. His subsequent duties in the Bavarian War Ministry, and as the supply officer of a division, sharpened his political antennae and gave him experience in organizational matters. The trauma of defeat and revolution drove him into counter-revolutionary activity including service in the Freikorps Epp during its partic.i.p.ation in the crushing of the Raterepublik. After brief membership of the German Nationalists, the DNVP, he joined the tiny DAP soon after Hitler, in autumn 1919, and, as he himself claimed, was probably responsible for others from the Reichswehr entering the party. Rohm's interest continued, however, to be dictated by military and paramilitary, rather than party, politics. He showed no exclusive interest in the NSDAP before the SA became a significant element in paramilitary politics.

But Rohm's value to the party in engineering its paramilitary connections is hard to overrate. His access both to leading figures on the paramilitary scene and, especially, to weaponry was crucial. His position in control of weapon supplies for the Brigade Epp (the successor to the Freikorps unit, now integrated into the Reichswehr) gave him responsibility for providing the Einwohnerwehr with weapons. The semi-secrecy involved in concealing the extent of weaponry from Allied control not difficult since there was no occupying army to carry out inspections also gave Rohm a great deal of scope to build up a large stockpile of mainly small arms in 192021. After the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr, and the official confiscation of weaponry, various paramilitary organizations entrusted him with their weapon supplies. Presiding over such an a.r.s.enal, deciding when and if weapons should be handed out, the 'machine-gun king', as he became known, was thus in a pivotal position with regard to the demands of all paramilitary organizations. And, through the protection he gained from Epp, Kahr, and the Munich political police, he enjoyed influence beyond his rank on the politics of the nationalist Right.

From the beginning, the dual role of paramilitary organization (initially linked to Ehrhardt) and party shock troops under Hitler's leadership contained the seeds of the tension that was to accompany the SA down to 1934. The interest of Rohm and Ehrhardt lay on the paramilitary side. Hitler tried to integrate the SA fully into the party, though organizationally it retained considerable independence before 1924. The build-up of the SA was steady, not spectacular, before the second half of 1922. It was after that date, in conditions of rapidly mounting crisis in Bavaria and in the Reich, that the SA's numbers swelled, making it a force to be reckoned with on the nationalist Right.

Hitler, meanwhile, now undisputed leader of his party, carried on his ceaseless agitation much as before, able to exploit the continued tension between Bavaria and the Reich. The murder of Reich Finance Minister Matthias Erzberger on 26 August 1921 an indication of the near-anarchism that still prevailed in Germany and Kahr's refusal to accept the validity for Bavaria of the state of emergency declared by Reich President Friedrich Ebert, kept things on the boil. Material discontent played its own part. Prices were already rising sharply as the currency depreciated. Foodstuffs were almost eight times more expensive in 1921 than they had been at the end of the war. By the next year they would be over 130 times dearer. And that was before the currency lost all its value in the hyperinflation of 1923.

Hitler's provocation of his political enemies and of the authorities to gain publicity was stepped up. After one violent clash between his followers and his opponents, he was sentenced in January 1922 to three months' imprisonment for breach of the peace two months suspended against future good behaviour (though conveniently forgotten about when the good behaviour did not materialize). Even his powerful friends could not prevent him serving the other month of his sentence. Between 24 June and 27 July 1922 he took up residence in Stadelheim prison in Munich.

Apart from this short interlude, Hitler did not let up with his agitation. Brushes with the police were commonplace. For Hitler, these violent clashes with his opponents were the lifeblood of his movement. They were above all good for publicity. Hitler was still dissatisfied with the coverage even of a negative kind he received in the press. Nevertheless, the actions of the NSDAP and its leader ensured that they remained in the public eye. And while his leading supporters hinted darkly at dire consequences if the Bavarian government expelled him from Germany (as he had been warned might happen if the disturbances continued), Hitler made propaganda capital out of the threat of expulsion by pointing to his war record, when he had fought as a German for his country while others had done no more than stay at home and preach politics.

Hitler's most notable propaganda success in 1922 was his party's partic.i.p.ation in the so-called 'German Day' (Deutscher Tag) in Coburg on 1415 October. Coburg, on the Thuringian border in the north of Upper Franconia and part of Bavaria for only two years, was virgin territory for the n.a.z.is. He saw the German Day as an opportunity not to be missed. He sc.r.a.ped together what funds the NSDAP had to hire a special train in itself a novel propaganda stunt to take 800 stormtroopers to Coburg. The SA men were instructed by Hitler to ignore explicit police orders, banning a formation march with unfurled banners and musical accompaniment, and marched with hoisted swastika flags through the town. Workers lining the streets insulted them and spat at them. n.a.z.is in turn leapt out of the ranks beating their tormentors with sticks and rubber-truncheons. A furious battle with the socialists ensued. After ten minutes of mayhem, in which they had police support, the stormtroopers triumphantly claimed the streets of Coburg as theirs. For Hitler, the propaganda victory was what counted. The German Day in Coburg went down in the party's annals. The NSDAP had made its mark in northern Bavaria.

It was. .h.i.tler's second major success in Franconia within a few days. On 8 October, Julius Streicher, head of the Nuremberg branch of the Deutsche Werkgemeinschaft, had written to Hitler offering to take his sizeable following, together with his newspaper the Deutscher Volkswille Deutscher Volkswille, into the NSDAP. In the wake of the Coburg triumph, the transfer took place on 20 October. Streicher, a short, squat, shaven-headed bully, born in 1885 in the Augsburg area, for a time a primary school teacher as his father had been, and, like Hitler, a war veteran decorated with the Iron Cross, First Cla.s.s, was utterly possessed by demonic images of Jews. Shortly after the war he had been an early member of the DSP (German-Socialist Party), as antisemitic as the NSDAP, though he had left it in 1921. His newspaper Der Sturmer Der Sturmer, established in 1923 and becoming notorious for its obscene caricatures of evil-looking Jews seducing pure German maidens and ritual-murder allegations, would despite Hitler's personal approving comments, and view that 'the Jew' was far worse than Streicher's 'idealized' picture for a while be banned even in the Third Reich. Streicher was eventually tried at Nuremberg, and hanged. Now, back in 1922, in a step of vital importance for the development of the NSDAP in Franconia, in the northern regions of Bavaria, he subordinated himself personally to Hitler. The rival volkisch volkisch movement was fatally weakened in Franconia. The n.a.z.i Party practically doubled its membership. From around 2,000 members about the beginning of 1921 and 6,000 a year later, the party was overnight some 20,000 strong. More than that: the Franconian countryside piously Protestant, fervently nationalist, and stridently antisemitic was to provide the NSDAP with a stronghold far greater than was offered by its home city of Munich in the Catholic south of Bavaria, and a symbolic capital in Nuremberg later designated the 'city of the Reich Party Rallies'. It was little wonder that Hitler was keen to express his grat.i.tude to Streicher publicly in movement was fatally weakened in Franconia. The n.a.z.i Party practically doubled its membership. From around 2,000 members about the beginning of 1921 and 6,000 a year later, the party was overnight some 20,000 strong. More than that: the Franconian countryside piously Protestant, fervently nationalist, and stridently antisemitic was to provide the NSDAP with a stronghold far greater than was offered by its home city of Munich in the Catholic south of Bavaria, and a symbolic capital in Nuremberg later designated the 'city of the Reich Party Rallies'. It was little wonder that Hitler was keen to express his grat.i.tude to Streicher publicly in Mein Kampf Mein Kampf.

Even so, it was striking that, away from his Munich citadel, Hitler's power was still limited. He was the undisputed propaganda champion of the party. But away from his Munich base, his writ still did not always run.

This was in itself ample reason for the interest which his Munich following began to show in building up the leadership cult around Hitler. A significant boost to the aura of a man of destiny attaching itself to Hitler came from outside Germany. Mussolini's so-called 'March on Rome' on 28 October 1922 fict.i.tious though it was in the Fascist legend of a bold 'seizure of power' nevertheless deeply stirred the n.a.z.i Party. It suggested the model of a dynamic and heroic nationalist leader marching to the salvation of his strife-torn country. The Duce provided an image to be copied. Less than a week after the coup d'etat coup d'etat in Italy, on 3 November 1922, Hermann Esser proclaimed to a packed Festsaal in the Hofbrauhaus: 'Germany's Mussolini is called Adolf Hitler.' It marked the symbolic moment when Hitler's followers invented the Fuhrer cult. in Italy, on 3 November 1922, Hermann Esser proclaimed to a packed Festsaal in the Hofbrauhaus: 'Germany's Mussolini is called Adolf Hitler.' It marked the symbolic moment when Hitler's followers invented the Fuhrer cult.

The spread of fascist and militaristic ideas in post-war Europe meant that 'heroic leadership' images were 'in the air' and by no means confined to Germany. The emergence of the Duce cult in Italy provides an obvious parallel. But the German images naturally had their own flavour, drawing on particular elements of the political culture of the nationalist Right. And the crisis-ridden nature of the Weimar state, detested by so many powerful groups in society and unable to win the popularity and support of the ma.s.ses, guaranteed that such ideas, which in a more stable environment might have been regarded with derision and confined to the lunatic fringe of politics, were never short of a hearing. Ideas put into circulation by neo-conservative publicists, writers, and intellectuals were, in more vulgarized form, taken up in paramilitary formations and in the varied groupings of the bourgeois youth movement. The model of Mussolini's triumph in Italy now offered the opening for such ideas to be incorporated into the vision of national revival preached by the National Socialists.

The Fuhrer cult was not yet the pivot of the party's ideology and organization. But the beginnings of a conscious public profiling of Hitler's leadership qualities by his entourage, with strong hints in his own speeches, dates back to the period following Mussolini's 'March on Rome'. Hitler was beginning to attract fawning excesses of adulation even stretching to grotesque comparisons with Napoleon from admirers on the nationalist Right. The ground for the later rapid spread of the Fuhrer cult was already well fertilized.

There had been no trace of a leadership cult in the first years of the n.a.z.i Party. The word 'leader' ('Fuhrer') ('Fuhrer') had no special meaning attached to it. Every political party or organization had a leader or more than one. The NSDAP was no different. Drexler was referred to as the party's 'Fuhrer', as was. .h.i.tler; or sometimes both in practically the same breath. Once Hitler had taken over the party leadership in July 1921, the term 'our leader' had no special meaning attached to it. Every political party or organization had a leader or more than one. The NSDAP was no different. Drexler was referred to as the party's 'Fuhrer', as was. .h.i.tler; or sometimes both in practically the same breath. Once Hitler had taken over the party leadership in July 1921, the term 'our leader' ('unser Fuhrer') ('unser Fuhrer') became gradually more common. But its meaning was still interchangeable with the purely functional 'chairman of the NSDAP'. There was nothing 'heroic' about it. Nor had Hitler endeavoured to build up a personality cult around himself. But Mussolini's triumph evidently made a deep impression on him. It gave him a role-model. Referring to Mussolini, less than a month after the 'March on Rome', Hitler reportedly stated: 'So will it be with us. We only have to have the courage to act. Without struggle, no victory!' However, the reshaping of his self-image also reflected how his supporters were beginning to see their leader. His followers portrayed him, in fact, as Germany's 'heroic' leader before he came to see himself in that light. Not that he did anything to discourage the new way he was being portrayed from autumn 1922 onwards. It was in December 1922 that the became gradually more common. But its meaning was still interchangeable with the purely functional 'chairman of the NSDAP'. Ther