History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 45

Unwounded and taken prisoners: Two Officers; sixty-eight N.C.O.s and men.

Wounded and returned to camp: One Officer; twenty-two N.C.O.s and men.

The Boers stated their losses as one officer and eight men killed, seventeen men wounded.]

[Sidenote: Jan. 6th.]

In the evening the 1st Ess.e.x relieved the 1st Suffolk at Kloof camp, the latter battalion being sent first to Rensburg, and subsequently to the lines of communication to be re-officered.

[Sidenote: Jan. 7th, 1900. French reconnoitres Boer left.]

[Sidenote: Jan. 9th. Slingersfontein Farm on Boer left occupied.]

It was now evident to General French that the Boer right was so strong and so watchful as to be proof against either stratagem or open attack. He therefore turned at once to the other flank for opportunities, seeking by a reconnaissance on the 7th January a suitable point to the eastward from whence to threaten the enemy's rear along the line of the Norval's Pont railway. The operation, which was carried out under long-range fire both of artillery and rifles,[270] disclosed the fact that owing to lack of water none of the kopjes that were near enough to the line were tenable as permanent posts. At Slingersfontein farm, however, eleven miles south-east of Colesberg, and seven miles from the nearest point of the Norval's Pont line, an excellent position was found. On January 9th it was occupied by two squadrons Household cavalry, three squadrons the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), the N.S.W. Lancers and four guns, under command of Colonel Porter. To divert attention from this movement, the whole of the enemy's western flank was bombarded by twelve guns disposed from Kloof camp to Porter's Hill, whilst a section R.H.A. and a squadron 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons made an attack on the southern front above Palmietfontein farm, drawing in reply the fire of two field guns and two pom-poms.[271]

[Footnote 270: Casualties, January 7th:--One officer and four men missing.]

[Footnote 271: Casualties, January 9th:--Two men wounded; seventeen battery horses were struck by sh.e.l.ls during this engagement.]

[Sidenote: Feeling the enemy's left, Jan. 11th.]

During the 8th and 9th the 1st Yorkshire regiment arrived, and was posted at Rensburg. On the 10th Schoeman also received reinforcements from Norval's Pont, and these he placed so as to cover the railway south of Joubert siding, opposite to Porter, who turned out his men at Slingersfontein to stop further advance southward. French, on the 11th January, made a reconnaissance, employing the whole of Porter's force in an attempt to turn the left of this new development of the enemy.

But the Boers, after a short retirement, received further strong reinforcements from Norval's Pont, and prolonging the threatened left, showed a bold front. French, therefore, who had no intention of becoming seriously engaged, ordered Porter to return to Slingersfontein. An attempt by Major A. G. Hunter-Weston, R.E., to reach the railway line round the enemy's left flank, and destroy the telegraph wire, was foiled at Achtertang when on the very point of success. A Boer laager was in fact close at hand. At the same time Captain de Lisle, pushing out from the extreme left towards b.a.s.t.a.r.d's Nek, reconnoitred the country to the northward, and found the enemy in strength along the line b.a.s.t.a.r.d's Nek--Wolve Kop--Spitz Kop--Plessis Poort.[272]

[Footnote 272: Casualties, January 11th:--Wounded, five men; missing, one man.]

[Sidenote: Butcher places 15-pr. on precipitous height. Jan 11th.]

Whilst these affairs were in progress, a feat astonished both sides alike by its triumph over difficulty. Major E. E. A. Butcher, R.F.A., commanding the 4th Field battery, placed a 15-pr. gun upon the peak of Coles Kop, a kopje already described as standing by itself in the plain to the west of Colesberg. Rising to a height of 600 feet, its sides varying from the almost perpendicular to a slope of 30, and covered with boulders, the hill presented a formidable climb even to an unhampered man, and its use for any purpose but that of a look-out post seemed impossible. Nevertheless, aided by detachments of the R.A., R.E., and Ess.e.x regiment, Butcher had his gun on the summit in three hours and a half. The supply of ammunition for it, and of rations for the gunners, were more serious problems even than the actual haulage of the piece itself. These were ingeniously solved by the installation of a lift composed of wires running over s.n.a.t.c.h-blocks affixed to standards, which were improvised from steel rails, and driven in, in pairs, five yards apart, both at the top and bottom of the kopje. Those at the top were wedged into natural fissures in the rocks, the bottom pair being driven twelve inches into the ground, and held upright by guy-ropes fixed to bollards or anchorages. To the top of each upright was lashed a s.n.a.t.c.h-block, over which, from summit to base of the hill, were stretched the carrying wires. Along these, suspended by blocks and tackle, loads up to thirty pounds in weight were hauled by means of a thin wire, which was wound upon a drum fixed between, and pa.s.sed through, pulleys attached to the top of each of the two upper standards. The lift was so contrived as to be double-acting, the turning of the drum and a ratchet causing one wire bearing its load of supplies to ascend, whilst another descended, the hill.

[Sidenote: It has immediate effect. Jan. 12th.]

At 6 o'clock next morning this gun opened upon a laager in the very midst of the enemy's main position. The effect was instantaneous; the Boers, thunderstruck by the sudden visitation of shrapnel, which came they knew not whence, abandoned their camp and fled to the kopjes for shelter. Another laager, 2,000 yards more distant, then became the target with the same result, the enemy's doubt as to the situation of the gun being deepened by the simultaneous practice of two 15-prs.

fired from the plain below the kop. A few days later Butcher succeeded in getting a second gun up the hill, and by means of his great command, forced the Boers to shift every laager into sheltered kloofs, and caused them considerable losses.

[Sidenote: Jan. 14th. A flying column under Allenby threatens Boer connection with the bridge.]

[Sidenote: Jan. 15th. Boers attack Slingersfontein.]

[Sidenote: The Boers are repulsed.]

On Jan. 14th, a flying column[273] under Major E. H. H. Allenby (Inniskilling), marched northward along the Seacow river. Turning to the east, he demonstrated against the enemy's communications at the Colesberg road bridge, at which about twenty sh.e.l.ls were fired at 5,000 yards' range. The Boers thereupon appeared in three bodies in greatly superior numbers, and Allenby, having taken five prisoners, fell back, easily avoiding an attempt to cut him off. This reconnaissance had the effect of causing the enemy to cease to use the wagon road for transport purposes. Next day (15th) the Boers retaliated by a determined attack on the isolated post at Slingersfontein, held on that day by a half company 1st Yorkshire regiment,[274] commanded by Captain M. H. Orr and a company (58 men) New Zealand Mounted Rifles under Captain W. R. N. Madocks, R.A.

(attached). These had their trenches above the farm, the New Zealanders upon the eastern and the Yorkshire upon the western sides of a steep and high hill, the lower slopes of which were largely dead ground to those in the defences. Other kopjes, accessible to the Boers, were within rifle range. The position was thus to the Boer rifleman an ideal one for the most exceptional of his fighting practices, the close offensive. In the subsequent attack, every detail was typical of his methods on such occasions. At 6.30 a.m. a long-range sniping fire began to tease the occupants of the hill. They vainly searched amongst the broken kopjes for sight of an enemy.

Growing, certainly, but almost imperceptibly, in volume and accuracy, this fire was directed chiefly at the New Zealanders on the east, and by 10 a.m. had become so intense that an attack in that direction seemed imminent. Meanwhile, a body of the enemy had been crawling from exactly the opposite quarter towards the western side, upon which they succeeded in effecting a lodgment unseen. They then began to climb, scattering under cover of the boulders. Not until they were close in front of the sangars of the Yorkshire regiment was their presence discovered by a patrol which Madocks had sent from his side of the hill. Thereupon the Boers opened a hot fire, striking down both the officer and the colour-sergeant of the Yorkshire, whose men, taken by surprise and suddenly deprived of their leaders, fell into some confusion. The Boers then occupied the two foremost sangars. The hill seemed lost. Then Madocks, hearing the outburst on the further side from him, took a few of his men and hurried round to a.s.sist, appearing amongst the Yorkshire just as the enemy were all but into them.

Rallying the soldiers, and perceiving the Boers a few yards away behind the rocks, he immediately ordered a charge, and followed by a few, cleared the enemy out of the nearer of the two abandoned sangars.

The Boers continued to shoot rapidly from the wall beyond, and Madocks, a few moments later, charged again. Accompanied this time by but three men, he closed to within a few feet of the more distant sangar. Two of the men with him were here killed, and Madocks, seeing the uselessness of remaining, made his way back again to the sangar in rear with his sole companion, called together the rest of the Yorkshire detachment, and began hurriedly to strengthen the wall under a searching fire. At this moment a party of his own New Zealanders, for whom he had sent back, doubled up to the spot, and led by himself, whilst a storm of bullets broke over them from the surrounding kopjes, charged down on the Boers with fixed bayonets. The enemy fled at once, rising from behind the stones upon the hillside. Pursued by volleys from the crest of the British position, they made their way back to their lines, leaving twenty-one dead upon the field.[275]

[Footnote 273: Composition: One squadron 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, one squadron 10th Hussars, two companies M.I., and two guns R.H.A.]

[Footnote 274: This battalion had joined on January 8th and 9th. On January 12th, 1st half-battalion Welsh regiment and a squadron 10th Hussars had also arrived; they were followed on the 14th by half a battalion, 2nd Worcestershire regiment.]

[Footnote 275: Casualties, January 15th:--

Killed, six N.C.O.s and men; wounded, one officer, five N.C.O.s and men. Boer losses: twenty-one killed: about forty wounded.]

[Sidenote: Arrival, Jan. 15th, of Clements, and fresh troops then and later to Jan. 21st, causes changes in dispositions.]

Whilst this affair was in progress, a welcome reinforcement arrived.

Major-General R. A. P. Clements brought with him the 1st Royal Irish and the remainder of the 2nd Worcestershire of his brigade (12th), in all an addition of 18 officers and 874 men. Clements was immediately placed in command of the Slingersfontein area.[276] This increase of strength enabled French to extend his right still further by moving Porter's command[277] south-eastward to Potfontein farm, and that of Rimington,[278] hitherto stationed at Jasfontein farm, to Kleinfontein farm, five miles north of Porter. For a time Rimington was able to station some Household cavalry in close touch with the enemy at Rhenoster farm, on the Bethulie road, but it was thought prudent to withdraw them on January 21st, as a commando of 1,000 men had gathered opposite the post. A demonstration by Porter towards Hebron farm on the 19th disclosed, about Keerom, south of Achtertang, a large Boer laager, which was sh.e.l.led with effect. A deserter reported the enemy in this direction to consist of 6,000 men. During the next two days the following reinforcements reached the camp:--2nd Bedfordshire regiment, 2nd Wiltshire regiment, detachments of the 1st Ess.e.x and 1st Yorkshire regiments and details of Royal engineers and Army Service Corps, a total accession of about 50 officers and 1,900 men. Two howitzers,[279] which had come up on the 18th, sh.e.l.led Gra.s.sy Hill on the 19th and following days with effect, their fire being directed by telegraph from Coles Kop.

[Footnote 276: With the following:--1st Royal Irish and 2nd Worcestershire regiment, one squadron cavalry, one company New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and four guns.]

[Footnote 277: Three squadrons Carabiniers, two squadrons Household cavalry, N.S.W. Lancers, one company New Zealand Mounted Rifles and four guns.]

[Footnote 278: Rimington's Guides, one squadron Household cavalry, one company New Zealand Mounted Rifles.]

[Footnote 279: A section of the 37th Howitzer battery, from Modder River.]

[Sidenote: Jan. 24th. French seizes b.a.s.t.a.r.d's Nek.]

Recognising that he was blocked to the eastward by the superior and apparently constantly increasing commandos, French now turned once more to the westward for a chance of gaining commanding positions, such as alone could enable him to manoeuvre the enemy from Colesberg.

An opening seemed to offer, because of the reported partial or entire abandonment of the important defile known as Plessis Poort, through which ran the road from Colesberg northward to the bridge and Botha's Drift. The possession of this pa.s.s would not only cut the Boers' line of retreat and northerly communications, but would seriously imperil those leading to Norval's Pont; for high ground, running south-eastward from the Poort, in parts parallel to the road and railway, in parts impinging on them, practically commanded both for a distance of some twenty miles from Colesberg. French, therefore, determined to lose no time in reconnoitring and, if possible, seizing on so valuable a point, and on the evening of January 24th, despatched de Lisle to occupy b.a.s.t.a.r.d's Nek, a defile cutting the same range as Plessis Poort, and five miles to the westward of it. This being safely effected, early on the 25th a strong column[280] concentrated at the Nek. French's plan was as follows:--

[Footnote 280: Composition:--6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, 10th Hussars, a battery R.H.A., under Major-General Brabazon; four companies 1st Yorkshire, four companies 1st Ess.e.x, the 2nd Wiltshire regiment, the M.I., and a field battery, under Colonel T. E. Stephenson, 1st Ess.e.x regiment.]

[Sidenote: Jan. 25th. He strikes at Plessis Poort.]

[Sidenote: French avoids a trap, and returns to camp.]

Whilst the infantry, covered by a cross fire of artillery, pushed along the high ground towards Plessis Poort, the cavalry, diverging north-eastward, were to turn the Poort by the Boer right, and at the same time watch for any counter attack from the direction of the road bridge. To draw attention from these movements, demonstrations were to be made from every part of the British lines about Colesberg. As soon as it was light these operations began. Whilst McCracken, under cover of the howitzers and the two guns on Coles Kop, advanced from Kloof camp, whilst Clements, pushing out from Porter's Hill and Slingersfontein, sh.e.l.led once more the laager at Keerom, and Porter from Kleinfontein, made as if to fall upon the railway towards Van Zyl siding, Brabazon's mounted force drew out to the northward, and Stephenson sent the infantry, the Ess.e.x leading, along the ridge towards the Poort. By 10 a.m. the four R.H.A. guns were in action against the Poort at a point 2,400 yards north-west of it. Brabazon's cavalry started late, owing to a delay on the part of the battalion told off to relieve the intermediate posts: the enemy, getting wind of his presence, advanced from the north with two guns, and from the east, and so delayed him that his turning movement was completed too late in the day to be utilised. Meanwhile the infantry, covered by the fire of the 4th battery, worked rapidly towards the Pa.s.s, driving scattered parties before them, and by 2 p.m. had reached favourable ground within 1,500 yards of it. Here Stephenson deployed the 2nd Wiltshire regiment, and sent it forward with orders to establish itself within 800 yards of the enemy, unless heavily fired upon whilst advancing. This the Wiltshire, moving in six lines 100 yards apart, did without loss, under a fire so trifling that the enemy seemed to be falling back, and Stephenson sent word to the General requesting permission to push the attack home. But French, who knew his opponents, had grown suspicious because of their silence. The hour was late, the cavalry turning movement had not been carried out, and finally instructions from the Commander-in-Chief had enjoined him to avoid serious fighting.[281] At 4 p.m., therefore, he gave the order to retire, and the Wiltshire firing lines rose to obey. Scarcely had they done so, before a burst of fire, both of rifles and guns, from the enemy's ridges, showed the nature of the trap that had been prepared. But in spite of the heavy fusilade which followed them back, the Wiltshire, retiring as steadily as they had advanced, rejoined the column with a loss of but ten men wounded. The whole force then returned to its bivouacs.

[Footnote 281: See pages 434-5.]

[Sidenote: French, Jan. 29th, is summoned to Cape Town.]

This reconnaissance, though it failed to give General French the Poort, succeeded in disclosing to him the nature of the enemy's dispositions in this neighbourhood, especially of those behind the hitherto impenetrable Gra.s.sy Hill. Such knowledge might have gone far towards a solution of the problem which had so long engaged his energies, the ousting of the Boers from their stronghold on British territory. The more vital portion of his task, the prevention of a further inroad into the colony, he had already performed. He was now to be called away to a wider field. On January 29th he went down to Cape Town to receive instructions from the Commander-in-Chief. He returned to Rensburg on the 31st to break up his command. On February 6th he finally left Rensburg, after issuing an order in which he paid full tribute to the courage and energy of staff and troops, who had so long held in check "an enemy whose adroit skill in war demands the most untiring vigilance."[282] With French went all the Regular cavalry, except two squadrons, and also the 1st Ess.e.x and 1st Yorkshire regiments, the half-battalion 1st Welsh regiment, and O. and R. batteries, R.H.A. Major-General Clements was left at Rensburg with the remainder.[283]

[Footnote 282: Despatch, February 2nd, 1900.]

[Footnote 283: General Clements' command was as follows:--

Two squadrons 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons.

J. battery, R.H.A.

4th battery, R.F.A.

A section, 37th Howitzer battery, Royal Field Artillery.

The Australian M.I. (490 men).

The Victorian M.I. (175 men).

Mounted infantry (450 men).

2nd Bedfordshire regiment.

1st Royal Irish regiment.

2nd Worcester regiment.