History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 37

[Sidenote: The part of 9th brigade and use of the balloon on Dec.

11th.]

The 9th brigade were unable to play any important part in the battle.

Major-General Pole-Carew, hampered by the necessity of leaving a considerable body of men to guard the camp, could only demonstrate along the railway in small force. This feint caused Cronje no anxiety, and did not prevent him from withdrawing many of the Potchefstroom commando from his right to strengthen his left during the action. The officer in charge of the balloon, despite a strong wind which impeded his operations, observed and reported this movement. He also informed Lord Methuen of the gradual trickling back of the Highlanders, and of the arrival of reinforcements for the enemy from Spytfontein and the north-east. Thanks also to the help of the balloon, the howitzer battery obtained the range of Boer ponies, concealed behind the low ridge, and accounted for more than 200 of them.

[Sidenote: British and Boer losses.]

The British casualties amounted in all to 22 officers and 188 other ranks killed, 46 officers and 629 other ranks wounded, and 1 officer and 62 other ranks missing. Of this total the Highland brigade lost 15 officers killed and 30 wounded, 173 other ranks killed, 529 wounded and missing. Among the battalions engaged the Black Watch suffered most severely: 7 officers were killed, and 11 wounded; 86 men were killed, and 199 wounded. The Boers are believed to have lost 87 killed and 188 wounded.

[Sidenote: Dec. 12th. Lord Methuen decides to fall back to Modder.]

Soon after daylight on the 12th, Lord Methuen made a personal reconnaissance. He hoped to find that, as at Modder river, the Boers had withdrawn before dawn. His own observations confirmed reports he had received during the night, showing that the ground was still strongly held. Major R. N. R. Reade, his intelligence officer, accompanied by a colonial scout named Harding, making his way across the battlefield, had investigated the Boer trenches, and found them occupied. A patrol from the Scots Guards had been received with many shots from the foot of Magersfontein Hill. The General then summoned his brigadiers and the Headquarter Staff to discuss the situation.

Major-General Colvile suggested that the troops should continue to retain what had been gained; but Lord Methuen, agreeing with the remainder of his subordinates who took a different view, gave orders for a retirement to the Modder River camp at noon. He left the execution of the operation to Major-General Colvile.

[Sidenote: The gathering in of the wounded.]

While the dead and wounded were being gathered in, a messenger, bearing a flag of truce from the Boers, arrived at the outposts of the Scots Guards to say that the British might send ambulances for those who were lying near the foot of Magersfontein Hill. This was done, and the Royal Army Medical Corps worked side by side with the Boer doctors. For a moment this unofficial armistice was broken by the fire of a gun. The officer in charge of it had not been informed of the suspension of hostilities. A medical officer was sent with an apology, explaining the incident, and the labour of mercy proceeded unhindered.

[Sidenote: The retreat carried out by 4 p.m. Dec. 12th/99.]

When the truce was over, a rearguard, composed of the cavalry brigade and mounted infantry, G. battery R.H.A., and the 62nd Field battery, the Guards' brigade and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, was detailed to cover the retreat. The enemy's guns, which during the battle had been notably silent, sent a few sh.e.l.ls after the column, but they were soon stopped by the batteries of the rearguard, and by the 47-in. gun, which fired 50 rounds during the 12th. By 4 p.m. Lord Methuen's division, not otherwise molested, was once more collected round Modder River station.

The successful choice of the reverse slope at Horse Artillery Hill by Major Allason raises a point of considerable interest.

During the war of 1870 the Germans habitually preferred the slope facing their enemy. Though as yet we have not had sufficient details as to the action of the j.a.panese to enable us to draw definite conclusions, it is practically certain that they will, at least at first, have followed their German instructors in this matter. Yet the two experiences, those of Magersfontein and of the greater wars, are not really in conflict. The reason of the selection of the forward slope during these was that when the battles began the two opposed artilleries were engaged against one another. The sh.e.l.l taking the curve of the hill was found to produce deadly effects both upon the guns, when placed on the reverse slopes, and on the limbers and wagons in rear. The target for the hostile layers against those placed on the slope nearest to them was much more difficult. Moreover, the Germans wished to be able to depend on the arm itself for the protection of its immediate front. For that purpose it was essential that the guns should be able to cover with their sh.e.l.ls all the ground that lay before them: there must be no "dead ground." But at Magersfontein the Boer artillery was insignificant, the rifle fire exact and deadly. The circ.u.mstances therefore bore no a.n.a.logy to one another, and Major Allason's judgment was unquestionably right.

The infantry were not about to carry out any aggressive movement, and could without injury to the conduct of the whole operation occupy the "dead ground," and so render the position safe.

Furthermore, the long array of the guns of a vast army affords very much more security for the artillery front than is given to a solitary battery which could be approached much more easily by skirmishers, so that some independent guardians were needed. It would, however, be a misfortune if this example were taken as one of general application under conditions different from those of this particular day.

CHAPTER XXI.

SIR REDVERS BULLER IN FACE OF COLENSO.[213]

[Footnote 213: See maps Nos. 3, 4, 15, and freehand sketch.]

[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, 25th Nov./99, to 6th Dec./99, in Natal.]

[Sidenote: The force available for him at Frere.]

Sir Redvers Buller reached Durban on 25th November. He was greeted by the good news that the invaders were falling back from Mooi river, that Lord Methuen had driven the Boers from Belmont and Graspan, and that Generals French and Gatacre were holding their own at Naauwpoort and Queenstown. He spent a few days at Maritzburg in inspecting this advanced base of the Natal army, and in directing preparations for the reception of a large number of wounded. He then pushed on to Frere, reaching that place on 6th December. The enemy's raiding columns had now retired across the Tugela, and by the 9th a well-equipped British force of all three arms was concentrated at Frere. The mounted brigade, commanded by Colonel the Earl of Dundonald, consisted of the Royal Dragoons, 13th Hussars, Thorneycroft's and Bethune's newly-raised regiments of mounted infantry, the South African Light Horse, also only just enlisted and brought round from Cape Town, a squadron of the Imperial Light Horse, detachments of the Natal Carbineers and Natal Police, and one company of British mounted infantry. The Naval brigade, commanded by Capt. E. P. Jones, H.M.S.

_Forte_, was composed of detachments (or landing parties) from H.M.S.

_Terrible_, _Forte_, and _Tartar_; to it were attached the Natal Naval Volunteers; its armament consisted of two 4.7-in. and fourteen 12-pr.

12-cwt. guns. The Field artillery consisted of the 1st brigade division (7th, 14th, and 66th batteries) under Lt.-Col. H. V. Hunt, and the 2nd brigade division (64th and 73rd[214]) under Lt.-Col. L.

W. Parsons. The infantry formed four brigades: the 2nd brigade, under Major-General H. J. T. Hildyard, consisting of the 2nd Royal West Surrey, 2nd Devonshire, 2nd West Yorkshire, and 2nd East Surrey; the 4th brigade, under Major-General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, comprising 2nd Scottish Rifles, 3rd King's Royal Rifle Corps, 1st Durham Light Infantry, and 1st Rifle Brigade; the 5th brigade, under Major-General A. FitzRoy Hart, composed of 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 1st Border, 1st Connaught Rangers, and 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers; the 6th brigade, under Major-General G. Barton, formed of the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers. The 17th company R.E. and A. Pontoon troop were with the command.

[Footnote 214: The 3rd battery of this brigade division had not yet arrived, having been shipwrecked on its voyage out.]

[Sidenote: Tabular statement of strength.]

The following table shows the approximate strength of the force:--

Arms. Officers. Other Horses, Guns Ranks. Riding & Naval. Naval Field Machine.

Draught. 47-in. 12-pr. 15-pr.

Staff 34 137 123 -- -- -- -- Naval brigade 31 297 6 2 12 -- -- Mounted Troops 126 2,561 2,700 -- -- -- 2 Royal Artillery 39 1,074 869 -- -- 30 -- Royal Engineers 14 419 255 -- -- -- -- Infantry(4 brigades) 416 13,521 716 -- -- -- 16 A.S. Corps 16 217 550 -- -- -- -- R.A.M. Corps 30 464 336 -- -- -- --

Total 706 18,672 5,555 2 12 30 18

[Sidenote: On line of communication.]

Two battalions of regular infantry (the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers and the 2nd Somerset Light Infantry), and three Colonial corps (the Natal Royal Rifles, the Durban Light Infantry and the Imperial Light Infantry), with four Naval 12-pounders, manned by detachments from H.M.S. _Philomel_ and _Forte_, and the Natal Field battery, held the line of communication with Durban.

[Sidenote: Method of issuing orders.]

Although Sir Redvers Buller had a.s.sumed personal command, it was arranged that, in the absence of the Headquarter staff, his orders should be issued by the divisional staff of Lieutenant-General Sir C.

F. Clery, who had hitherto been the senior officer south of the Tugela.

[Sidenote: Boers in the Natal region Dec. 6th-Dec. 14th.]

In the chapter dealing with the const.i.tution of the Boer army, it has been pointed out that any statement of the strength of a Boer force at a particular period is quite misleading, if regarded like a formal "daily state" of a European force in the field. Subject to this reservation, the aggregate strength of the original commandos, which invaded Natal on the outbreak of war, has already been a.s.sessed at 23,500, and it has been stated that Transvaal reinforcements, amounting to some 3,000 men, had subsequently been added; but this increase was reduced by the departure at the end of November of three Free State commandos to oppose Lord Methuen's advance on Kimberley.

The commandos remaining in Natal were, moreover, much weakened by the practice of burghers returning to their farms to visit their families without leave, and, although some Natal Dutchmen had been commandeered to take up arms, the total Boer forces actually serving in Natal at this period did not probably much exceed 20,000 men. A detachment of 800 was at Helpmakaar,[215] watching the Tugela Ferry and the western frontier of Zululand, from which, throughout the middle of the month, the Boer Intelligence department expected an attack. Another detachment of 500 piqueted the river from the Tugela Ferry up to Colenso. To the west four commandos were stationed near Potgieters and Skiet's drifts, and detachments watched the intermediate crossings.

The attacks of the Ladysmith garrison on Gun Hill and Surprise Hill and the destruction of the Waschbank bridge produced a considerable feeling of uneasiness at Boer Headquarters soon after Sir Redvers reached Frere. Their own official records show that there was a reluctance to detach any more burghers than were deemed absolutely necessary to the Tugela. Having regard to these facts, although no exact figures can be given, it is probable that an estimate made on 13th December by General Buller's Intelligence staff, that about 6,000 to 7,000 men had been concentrated under Louis Botha in the neighbourhood of Colenso, was not far from the mark. On the other hand, the Boer official telegrams of that date put the number as low as 5,000.

[Footnote 215: Map No. 3.]

[Sidenote: Close connection between Boer main army in Natal and Botha.]

Botha's detachment and the Boer main army were, however, within an hour's ride of each other, and thus could readily render mutual a.s.sistance, unless an attack from the south should be combined with an exactly-timed sortie by the Ladysmith garrison. Yet the Boers had reason to fear this combination against them. The troops under Sir George White were still mobile, and the enterprises against Gun Hill and Surprise Hill, in the second week of December, had shown that both officers and men were keen to be again let slip at the enemy.[216]

Moreover, the large number of mounted men, who, though shut up in Ladysmith, were in fact astride of the Boers' lines of communication, both with the Transvaal and with the Free State, would be likely to prove a serious danger in the event of Botha's defeat by Sir Redvers.

[Footnote 216: See Volume II.]

[Sidenote: A formidable natural fortress.]

Nevertheless, the task which the British commander-in-chief had decided to undertake was not an easy one. From Potgieters Drift on the west to the junction of the Tugela with Sunday's river, about 30 miles east of Colenso, a ridge of hills, broken only by narrow kloofs and dongas, line like a continuous parapet the northern bank of the former river.

Westward the ridge is connected by the Brakfontein Nek with that spur of the Drakensberg which is ent.i.tled the Tabanyama Range. This was destined, a month later, to bar the advance of the relieving army on that side. The eastern flank was guarded by the lower slopes of the Biggarsberg, which run parallel to Sunday's river and fill the area lying between that stream and the Buffalo. The approaches to the beleaguered town from the south were thus covered by an immense natural redoubt. Opposite to the very centre of the front face of this redoubt lay Colenso. Behind this centre, and at right angles to the parapet, a cl.u.s.ter of hills was flung back to the ridge of Caesar's Camp, immediately to the south of Ladysmith. Through this confused ma.s.s of broken ground, so favourable to the methods of fighting of its defenders, ran the three roads which connect Colenso and Ladysmith. Of these roads the western pa.s.sed over three very strong and presumably entrenched positions. The central had become by disuse impa.s.sable.[217]

Much of the eastern was only fit for ox-wagons. Along the face of this strategic fort ran the Tugela, an admirable moat, as completely commanded by the heights on its left bank as is the ditch of a permanent work by its parapet. West of Colenso this moat was traversable by guns and wagons at only five places, _i.e._, Robinson's, Munger's, Skiet's, Maritz, and Potgieters drifts. Of these the four first named were difficult for loaded wagons. Eastward of Colenso the only practicable drift was that by which the Weenen road crosses the river. Other fords, through which single hors.e.m.e.n or men on foot, breast-high, could wade, existed both to the east and to the west, but with the exception of a bridle drift near Colenso they were not marked on the maps in possession of the troops, and could only be discovered by enquiry and reconnaissance.

[Footnote 217: This central road, or old track, is not shown on maps 3 and 4, but is shown on map 15.]

[Sidenote: Botha depends on mobility for holding his long line of defence.]

The commandos a.s.signed to General Louis Botha for the defence of the line of the Tugela were obviously insufficient to man the whole of this immense position; yet he was able to rely on the mobility of his burghers; and on this, also, that he was so situated that his a.s.sailant would, in order to attack him anywhere, have to traverse distances greater than Botha need cover to reinforce from the centre either flank as soon as threatened. Moreover, not only did the heights he held afford a perfect view for miles over the country to the south, but the Tugela hills are precipitous and rocky as to their southern faces, while the approaches to them from the north present, as a rule, easy slopes and gentle gradients.

[Sidenote: Difficulty of finding out where the Boers were.]