History of the Nineteenth Army Corps Part 7

Chickering marched from Barre's Landing on the morning of the 21st of May. His force consisted of his own regiment, the 41st Ma.s.sachusetts, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Sargent and mounted on prairie horses, the 52d Ma.s.sachusetts, the 22d Maine, the 26th Maine, the 90th New York, the 114th New York, under Lieutenant-Colonel Per Lee, Company E of the 13th Connecticut, and Snow's section of Nims's battery.

The 90th New York, Colonel Joseph S. Morgan, was among the older regiments in the Department of the Gulf, having been mustered into the service in December, 1861. In January, 1862, it went to Florida with Brannan, on his appointment to command the Department of Key West; and in June, 1862, it formed the garrison of Fort Jefferson on the Dry Tortugas and of Key West; in November it was relieved by the 47th Pennsylvania, and joined Seymour's brigade on Port Royal Island, South Carolina. In March, 1863, it was back at Key West. There both regiments remained together until May. Meanwhile the district, then commanded by Woodbury, had been transferred from the Department of the South to the Department of the Gulf by orders from the War Office dated the 16th of March. These Banks received on the 10th of April, just before leaving Brashear, and as soon as he learned the condition and strength of the post, he called in the 90th New York. The regiment arrived at Barre's Landing just in time to go back to Brashear with Chickering. Morgan, though Chickering's senior in rank, waived his claim to the command and accepted a temporary brigade made up of all the infantry and the artillery.

The 114th New York, after quitting the column on the 19th of April, before pa.s.sing the Vermilion, and performing the unpleasant duty of driving before it to Brashear all the beeves within its reach, was so unfortunate as to arrive at Cheneyville, on the return march, on the 12th of May, at the moment when Banks had made up his mind to retire to Brashear, and so just in time to face about and once more retrace its weary steps. Pa.s.sing through Opelousas and Grand Couteau, the 114th turned to the left by the Bayou Fusilier and fell in with Chickering on the Teche.

The way was by the Teche, on either bank. By this time Mouton, reinforced by a brigade of three regiments under Pyron, with a light battery, probably Nichols's, had recrossed the Calcasieu under orders sent him by Kirby Smith on the 14th of May, before he knew of Banks's latest movement, and was approaching the Vermilion just in time to harry the flank and rear of Chickering's column, scattered as it was in the effort to guard the long train that stretched for eight miles over the prairies, with a motley band of 5,000 negroes, 2,000 horses, and 1,500 beeves for a c.u.mbrous accompaniment. With the possible exception of the herd that set out to follow Sherman's march through Georgia, this was perhaps the most curious column ever put in motion since that which defiled after Noah into the ark.

On the 21st of May, Chickering halted near Breaux Bridge; on the 22d, above Saint Martinville; on the 23d, above New Iberia; on the 24th, at Jeannerette. On the following afternoon the column had halted five miles beyond Franklin, when a small force of the enemy, supposed to be part of Green's command or of Fournet's battalion, fell upon the rear-guard and a few shots were exchanged, with slight casualties on either side, save that Lieutenant Almon A. Wood, of the 110th New York, fell with a mortal wound. However, although the troops had already traversed twenty-five miles, this decided Morgan, who seems by this time to have taken the command, to push on, and the march being kept up throughout the night, the wearied troops, after a short rest for breakfast arrived at Berwick Bay at eleven o'clock on the following morning. In the last thirty-one hours the command had marched forty-eight miles. In the forty-one days that had pa.s.sed since the campaign opened the 114th New York had covered a distance of almost 500 miles, nearly every mile of it afoot and with but three days' rest. The same afternoon the crossing began, and by the 28th every living thing was in safety at Brashear.

Banks had sent his despatches of the 13th of May to Grant by the hands of Dwight, with instructions to lay the whole case before Grant and to urge the view held by Banks with regard to the co-operation of the two armies. Dwight proceeded to Grand Gulf by steamboat, and thence riding forward, overtook Grant just in time to witness the battle of Champion's Hill on the 16th of May. That night he sent a despatch by way of Grand Gulf, promising to secure the desired co-operation, but urging Banks not to wait for it. The message arrived at headquarters at Simmes's plantation on the evening of the 17th, and was at once sent on to Brashear to be telegraphed to the commanding general at New Orleans. This a.s.surance sent by Dwight really conveyed no more than his own opinion, but Banks read it as a promise from Grant, and once more convinced that it would be futile to attempt a movement toward Grand Gulf with the limited means of transport he had at hand, he again changed his plan and determined to go directly to Bayou Sara, hoping and trusting to meet there on the 25th of May a corps of 20,000 men from Grant's army.

The effective strength of the force now a.s.sembled near the head of the Atchafalaya was 8,400 infantry, 700 cavalry, 900 artillery; in all, 10,000. This great reduction was not wholly due to the effects of the climate, hardships, and long marches, but is partly to be ascribed to heavy detachments. These included the six regiments with Chickering, one at b.u.t.te-a-la-Rose, and one at Brashear.

At Simmesport the Corps sustained its first loss by expiration of service. The 6th New York, having completed the two years' term for which it had enlisted, went by the Atchafalaya and the railway to New Orleans, and there presently took transport for New York to be mustered out.

The movements of the army, though pressed as much as possible, were greatly r.e.t.a.r.ded by the scanty means of water transportation and the pressing need of coal. From this cause the navy was also suffering, and urgent means had to be taken to supply the deficiency.

Reconnoissances, conducted by Lieutenant Harwood, in the course of which the enemy's cavalry was seen but not engaged, showed the roads from the Atchafalaya to Waterloo to be practicable for all arms. A detachment of cavalry sent out on the 18th to ascertain whether the Confederates had any force on the west bank of the Mississippi, encountered near Waterloo about 120 men of the 1st Alabama regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, who had been sent over the day before from Port Hudson in skiffs to prevent any communication between the upper and the lower fleets. A skirmish followed, with slight loss on either side.

First placing Emory in command of the defences of New Orleans, and ordering Sherman to take Dow and Nickerson and join Augur before Port Hudson, Banks left the city on the 20th of May, rejoined his headquarters on the 21st, and at once set his troops in motion toward Bayou Sara. At half-past eight o'clock on the morning of the 21st of May, Paine broke up his bivouac on the Atchafalaya and marched to Morganza, after detaching the 131st New York and the 173d New York with a section of artillery to guard the ammunition train. Grover followed by water as fast as the steamboats could be provided. At two o'clock on the morning of the 22d of May, Banks and Grover, with the advance of Grover's division, landed at Bayou Sara without meeting any opposition from the enemy, who, up to this time, seems not to have suspected the movement. The other troops followed as rapidly as the means of transport permitted. Grover's division was sent ash.o.r.e, followed by two brigades of Paine's division from Morganza. The wagon train went on down the road to the landing directly opposite Bayou Sara, under the escort of the 110th New York, and the 162d New York, with one section of Carruth's battery, all under the command of Benedict.

Soon after the landing at Bayou Sara, a party of cavalry rode in, bringing the news of Augur's battle of the 21st. Hearing that Augur was at that moment engaged with the enemy, Banks pressed forward his troops. In a violent storm of wind and rain Grover pushed on until he met Augur's outlying detachments. Then, finding all quiet, he went into bivouac near Thompson's Creek, north-west of Port Hudson. Paine followed, and rested on the Perkins plantation, a mile in the rear of Grover. Banks made his headquarters with Grover. Augur covered the front of the position taken up by the enemy after the battle of Plains Store. On the same day, the 22d, Sherman came up the river, landed at Springfield, and went into position on the Bayou Sara road on Augur's left. Thus at night on the 22d the garrison of Port Hudson was practically hemmed in.

On the 18th, Banks had ordered Augur to march with his whole disposable force to the rear of Port Hudson to prevent the escape of the garrison. As early as the 13th of May, while yet the plan of campaign was in suspense, Augur had sent Grierson with the cavalry and Dudley with his brigade to Merritt's plantation, near the junction of the Springfield Landing and Bayou Sara roads, to threaten the enemy and discover his movements. Dudley then took post near White's Bayou, a branch of the Comite, and remained in observation, covering the road to Clinton and the fork that leads to Jackson. On the 20th of May Augur moved the remainder of his force up to Dudley, in order to be ready to cover T. W. Sherman's landing at Springfield, as well as to meet the advance of the main column under Banks from Bayou Sara, now likely to occur at any moment. With Augur now were Dudley, Chapin, Grierson, G.o.dfrey's squadron composed of troops C and E of the Louisiana cavalry, two sections of Rawles's battery, Holcomb's battery, and one section of Mack's commanded by Sergeant A. W. McCollin. At six o'clock on the morning of the 21st of May Augur marched toward the crossing of the Plains Store and Bayou Sara roads to seize the enemy's line of retreat and to open the way for Banks. When Grierson came to the edge of the wood that forms the southern boundary of the plain, his advance fell in with a detachment of the garrison under Colonel S. P. Powers of the 14th Arkansas regiment, and a brisk skirmish followed. The same afternoon Gardner sent out Miles, with his battalion, about 400 strong, and Boone's battery, to feel Augur's advance and perhaps to drive it away. This brought on the action known as the battle of Plains Store. Unfortunately, no complete reports of the affair were made and the regimental narratives are meagre.

In the heavy forest that then masked the crossroads and formed the western border of the plain, Miles met Augur moving into position; Dudley, on the right of the road that leads from Plains Store to Port Hudson, supporting Holcomb's guns, and Chapin on the left supporting Rawles's guns. For about an hour the artillery fire was brisk. The 48th Ma.s.sachusetts, being badly posted in column on either side of the Port Hudson road, gave way in some confusion under the sharp attack of Miles's men coming on through the thicket, and thus exposed the guns of Beck's section of Rails. As the 48th fell back through the advancing ranks of the 49th Ma.s.sachusetts, the progress of that regiment was momentarily hindered, but a brisk charge of the 116th New York restored the battle. On the right, a section of Boone's battery got an enfilade fire on Rails and Chapin, and enabled Miles to draw off and retire behind the breastworks. Thus the affair was really ended before Augur, whose duty it was to act with prudence, had time to complete the proper development of his division as for a battle with the full force of the enemy, which he was bound to suppose was about to engage him. Then he completed the task of making good his position, and proceeded to open communication with Banks and with Sherman.

The main loss fell upon Chapin, Dudley's casualties numbering but 18, Grierson's but 2. The total casualties were 15 men killed, 3 officers and 69 men wounded, and 25 men missing-in all, 102. Miles reports his loss as 8 killed, 23 wounded, and 58 missing,-in all, 89.

When Augur quitted Baton Rouge he placed Drew with the 4th Louisiana Native Guards in Fort Williams to hold the place, supported by the fleet, and ordered Nelson with the 1st and 3d Louisiana Native Guards to be ready to follow the division to Port Hudson.

CHAPTER XVI. THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MAY.

Port Hudson was now held by Gardner with a force of about seven thousand of all arms. During the interval that had elapsed since its first occupation a formidable series of earthworks had been thrown up, commanding not only the river but all the inland approaches that were deemed practicable. The first plan for land defence was mainly against the attack expected to come from the direction of Baton Rouge. Accordingly, about four miles below Port Hudson a system of works was begun that, if completed, according to the original trace, would have involved a defensive line eight miles in length, requiring thirty-five thousand men and seventy guns to hold it. As actually constructed, the lines were four and a half miles long, and ran in a semicircular sweep from the river near Ross Landing, below Port Hudson, to the impa.s.sable swamp above. Following this line for thirteen hundred yards after leaving the river on the south, the bluff is broken into irregular ridges and deep ravines, with narrow plateaus; thence for two thousand yards the lines crossed the broad cotton fields of Gibbons's and of Slaughter's plantations; beyond these for four hundred yards they were carried over difficult gullies; beyond these again for fourteen hundred yards their course lay through fields and over hilly ground to the ravine at the bottom of which runs Sandy Creek. Here, on the day of the investment, the line of Confederate earthworks stopped, the country lying toward the northeast being considered so difficult that no attack was looked for in that quarter. Sandy Creek finds its way into the marshy bottom of Foster's Creek, and from Sandy Creek, where the earthworks ended, to the river at the mouth of Foster's Creek, is about twenty-five hundred yards. Save where the axe had been busy, nearly the whole country was covered with a heavy growth of magnolia trees of great size and beauty. This was a line that, for its complete defence against a regular siege, conducted according to the strict principles of military science, as laid down in the books, should have had a force of fifteen thousand men. At the end of March the garrison consisted of 1,366 officers, 14,921 men of all arms present for duty, making a total of 16,287. The main body was organized in 5 brigades, commanded by Beall, Buford, Gregg, Maxey, and Rust. The fortifications on the river front mounted 22 heavy guns, from 10-inch columbiads down to 24-pounder siege guns, manned by 3 battalions of heavy artillerists, while 13 light batteries, probably numbering 78 pieces, were available for the defence of all the lines: of these batteries only 5 were now left, with 30 guns.

When, early in May, Pemberton began to feel the weight of Grant's pressure, he called on Gardner for reinforcements; thus Rust and Buford marched to the relief of Vicksburg on the 4th of May, Gregg followed on the 5th, and Maxey on the 8th. Miles was to have followed Maxey; in fact the preparations and orders had been given for the evacuation of Port Hudson; but now the same uncertainty and vacillation on the part of the Confederate chiefs that were to seal the doom of Vicksburg began to be felt at Port Hudson. Gardner, who had moved out with Maxey, had hardly arrived at Clinton when he was met by an order from Pemberton to return to Port Hudson with a few thousand men and to hold the place to the last. But ten days later, on the 19th of May, Johnston, who was then engaged in carrying out his own ideas, which differed radically from those of Davis and Pemberton, ordered Gardner to evacuate Port Hudson and to march on Jackson, Mississippi. This order, sent by courier as well as by telegraph, Gardner received just as Augur was marching from Baton Rouge to cut him off. Then it was too late, and when on the 23d Johnston peremptorily renewed his order for the evacuation, even the communication was closed.

The investment was made perfect by the presence in the river, above and below Port Hudson, of the ships and gunboats of the navy. Just above the place and at anchor around the bend lay the Hartford, now Commodore Palmer's flagship, with the Albatross, Sachem, Estrella, and Arizona. Below, at anchor off Prophet's Island, were the Monongahela, bearing Farragut's flag, the Richmond, Genesee, Ess.e.x, and the mortar flotilla. Both the upper and the lower fleets watched the river at night by means of picket-boats in order to discover any movement and to intercept any communication with the garrison.

At the Hermitage plantation, on the west bank of the river, Benedict was stationed with his own regiment, the 162d New York, the 110th New York, and a section of artillery to prevent the escape of the Confederates by water. As soon as Weitzel joined, on the 25th of May, Banks began to close in his lines along the entire front. Weitzel moved up to the sugar-house on the telegraph road near the bridge over Foster's Creek; Paine advanced into the woods on Weitzel's left; Grover moved forward on the north of the Clinton Railway, crossed the ravine of Sandy Creek, and occupied the wooded rest of the steep hill in front. Augur prolonged the line across the Plains Store road under cover of the woods, yet in plain view of the Confederate entrenchments. Sherman held the Baton Rouge road, occupying the skirt of woods that formed the eastern edge of Slaughter's and Gibbons's fields.

The 1st and 3d Louisiana Native Guards, under Nelson, having come up from Baton Rouge, were posted at the sugar-house near Foster's Creek, forming the extreme right of the line of investment.

Banks now placed Weitzel in command of the right wing of the army, comprising his own brigade under Thomas, Dwight's brigade of Grover's division under Van Zandt, together forming a temporary division under Dwight, the six regiments that remained of Paine's division after the heavy detachments, and the two colored regiments under Nelson. During the day of the 25th Weitzel gained the wooded slope covering the Confederate left front. The Confederate advanced guard on this part of their line, composed in part of the 9th battalion of Louisiana partisan rangers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wingfield, resisted Weitzel's advance stoutly, but was steadily and without difficulty pushed back into the entrenchments.

When night fell on the 26th of May the division commanders met at headquarters at Riley's on the Bayou Sara road to consider the question of an a.s.sault. No minutes of this council were kept, and to this day its conclusions are a matter of dispute. They may safely be regarded as sufficiently indicated by the orders for the following day. By at least one of those present any immediate movement in the nature of an a.s.sault was objected to because of the great distance that still separated the lines of investment from the Confederate earthworks; it was urged that the troops would have to move to the attack over ground the precise character of which was as yet unknown to them or to their commanders, although it was known to be broken and naturally difficult and to be obstructed by felled timber. The general opinion was, however, that prompt and decisive action was demanded in view of the unusual and precarious nature of the campaigns on which the two armies of Grant and Banks were now embarked, the uncertainty as to what Johnston might do, and the certainty that a disaster at Vicksburg would bring ruin in Louisiana. Moreover, officers and men alike were in high spirits and full of confidence in themselves, and they outnumbered the Confederates rather more than two to one. This was the view held by Banks himself. Upon his mind, moreover, the disapproval and the repeated urgings of the government acted as a goad. Accordingly, as soon as the council broke up he gave orders for an a.s.sault on the following morning.

All the artillery was to open upon the Confederate works at daybreak. For this purpose the reserve artillery was placed under the immediate orders of Arnold. He was to open fire at six.

Weitzel was to take advantage of the attacks on the left and centre to force his way into the works on his front, since it was natural to expect that, whether they should prove successful or not, these attacks would distract the attention of the enemy and serve to relieve the pressure in Weitzel's front.

Grover was thus left with five regiments to support the left centre, to reinforce either the right or left, and to support the right flank of the reserve artillery, or to force his way into the works, as occasion might require.

Augur, holding the centre, with Dudley's brigade forming his right and Chapin his left, and Sherman, at the extreme left, separated from Augur by a thick wood, were to begin the attack during the cannonade by advancing their skirmishers to kill the enemy's cannoneers and to cover the a.s.sault. They were to place their troops in position to take instant advantage of any favorable opportunity, and, if possible, to force the enemy's works at the earliest moment.

Each division commander was to provide his own means for pa.s.sing the ditch. These, for the most part, consisted of cotton bags, fascines, and planks borne by detachments of men, furnished by detail or by volunteering.

It will be observed that no time was fixed for the a.s.sault of either column nor any provision made to render the several attacks simultaneous. Moreover, although the order wound up with the emphatic declaration that "Port Hudson must be taken to-morrow," an impression prevailed in the minds of at least two of the division commanders that there were still to be reconnoissances by the engineers, and that upon the results of these would depend the selection of the points of attack.

There were no roads along the front or rear of the investing army, and the only means by which communication was maintained between the left, the centre, and the right was either by wide detours or through dense and unknown woods and thickets. It was impossible to see the troops in front or rear or on either flank. On no part of the line was either division in sight of the other.

The forest approached within 250 yards at the nearest point on Weitzel's front, within 450 yards on Grover's, within 500 yards on Augur's, and within 1,200 yards on Sherman's front. The field to be pa.s.sed over was partly the cleared land of the plantations, crossed by fences and hedges, but in many places, especially on Augur's approach, the timber had been recently felled, and, lying thick upon the ground, made a truly formidable obstacle.

The morning of the 27th of May broke bright and beautiful. As the early twilight began to open out along the entire front the artillery began a furious cannonade. At first the Confederate guns replied with spirit, but it soon became apparent that they were overweighted, and, moreover, the necessity of husbanding their scanty store of ammunition no doubt impressed itself upon the minds of the Confederate commanders.

About six o'clock, when Weitzel judged that the movement on the left must be well advanced, he put his columns in motion through the dense forest in his front, forming his command, as far as the nature of the ground admitted, in column of brigades, Dwight's brigade under Van Zandt leading, followed by Weitzel's brigade under Thomas. Paine formed his division in two lines in support, his own brigade under Fearing in front, and Gooding's in reserve. The Confederate skirmishers and outposts continued to occupy the forest and the ravines on this part of their front, and the first hour was spent in pressing them back behind their entrenchments. Then Thomas moved forward through Van Zandt's intervals, and deploying from right to left the 160th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Van Petter; 8th Vermont, Lieutenant-Colonel Dillingham; 12th Connecticut, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck; and 75th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Babc.o.c.k, advanced to the attack. Van Zandt, owing to the inequalities of the ground and the difficulty of finding the way, drifted somewhat toward the right. Thereupon Paine, finding his front uncovered, moved forward into the interval. Then began what has been aptly termed a "huge bushwack."

Until within three days a part of the Confederate lines in front of Weitzel had not been fortified at all, the defence resting on the great natural difficulties of the approaches no less than of the ground to be held; but in the interval Gardner had taken notice of the indications that pointed to an advance in this quarter, and had caused light breastworks to be constructed in all haste. This the great trees that covered the hill rendered an easy task. On the morning of the 27th of May, therefore, the works that Weitzel was called upon to attack consisted mainly of big logs on the crest and following the contour of the hill, rendered almost unapproachable by the felled timber that choked the ravines. Thus, while Weitzel's men could not even see their enemy, they were themselves unable to move beyond the cover of the hollows and the timber without offering an easy mark for a destructive fire of small-arms, as well as of grape, sh.e.l.l, shrapnel, and canister. When finally, after climbing over hills, logs, and fallen trees, and forcing the ravines filled with tangled brush and branches, Weitzel had driven the Confederates into their works, he held the ridge about two hundred yards distant from the position to be attacked.

Paine's position at this time was to the right and rear of battery No. 6, as shown on the map; Weitzel and Dwight were on the same crest near batteries 3, 4, and 5. The pioneers worked like beavers to open the roads as fast as the infantry advanced, and with such skill and zeal that hardly had the infantry formed upon the crest than the guns of Duryea, Bainbridge, Nims, Haley, and Carruth unlimbered and opened fire by their side.

At length Thomas succeeded in making his way across the rivulet known as Little Sandy Creek, and, working gradually forward, began to fortify with logs the hill on the right, afterward known as Fort Babc.o.c.k, in honor of the Lieutenant-Colonel of the 75th New York.

To support Weitzel's movement, Grover sent the 159th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Burt, and the 25th Connecticut by a wide detour to the right to make their way in on Paine's left. Taking advantage of the protection afforded by the ravine, at the bottom of which ran or rather trickled Sandy Creek, these regiments, after the most difficult and exhausting scramble through the brush and over the fallen timber, came to the base of a steep bluff, near the position afterward occupied by siege battery No. 6. This, although the works directly opposite were as yet light, was naturally one of the ugliest approaches on the whole front. In spite of every exertion, it took the 159th an hour to move half a mile. Just before reaching the foot of the hill over which they were to charge, they captured a Confederate captain and six skirmishers, who lay concealed in the ravine, cut off by the advance and unable to retire. So crooked and obscure was the path and so difficult was it to see any thing, even a few feet ahead, that the officers had to stand at every little turning to tell the men which way to go. At last the regiment formed, and, with a rush, began the a.s.sault of the bluff, but they could get no farther than the crest, where they were met by a destructive flank fire from the Confederate riflemen. There, within thirty yards of the works, the men sought shelter.

To try the effect of a diversion, Grover put in the 12th Maine, supported by the remaining fragment of his division, reduced to the 13th and 25th Connecticut, against the partly exposed west face of the bastion that formed the left of the finished portion of the Confederate earthworks. The point of attack is shown at X. and XI., and the position whence Grover moved at 1 and 7.

After the first attack on the right had wellnigh spent itself, and when its renewal, in conjunction with an advance on the centre and left, was momentarily expected, Dwight thought to create a diversion and at the same time to develop the strength and position of the Confederates toward their extreme left, where their lines bent back to rest on the river, and to this end he ordered Nelson to put in his two colored regiments. This portion of the Confederate line occupied the nearly level crest of a steep bluff that completely dominates the low ground by the sugar-house, where the telegraph road crosses Foster's Creek. Over this ground the colored troops had to advance unsupported to receive their first fire. The bridge had been burned when the Confederates retired to their works. Directly in front of the crest, and somewhat below it, a rugged bluff stands a little apart, projecting boldly from the main height with a sharp return to the right, so as to form a natural outwork of great strength, practically inaccessible save by the road that winds along the bottom of the little rivulet at the foot of the almost perpendicular flank. This detached ridge is about four hundred yards in length. It was held by six companies of the 39th Mississippi regiment, under Colonel W. B. Shelby, while behind, in the positions of land batteries III. and IV., were planted six field pieces, and still farther back on the water front the columbiads of Whitfield and Seawell, mounted on traversing carriages, stood ready to rake the road with their 8-inch and 10-inch sh.e.l.l and shrapnel.

Shortly after seven o'clock, Nelson sent in the 1st Louisiana Native Guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ba.s.sett, in column, to force the crossing of the creek. The 3d Louisiana Native Guards followed in close support. Just before the head of the column came near the creek, the movement was perceived by the Confederates, who immediately opened on the negroes a sharp fire of musketry from the rifle-pits on the detached bluff; at the same moment the field guns opened with sh.e.l.l and shrapnel from the ridge behind, and as the men struggled on through the creek and up the farther bank they became exposed to the enfilade fire of the columbiads. When, in mounting the narrow gorge that led up the hill, the head of the column, necessarily shattered as it was by this concentrated fire, had gained a point within about two hundred yards of the crest, suddenly every gun opened on them with canister. This was more than any man could stand. Ba.s.sett's men gave back in disorder on their supports, then in the act of crossing the creek, and the whole column retired in confusion to its position near the sugar-house on the north bank. Here both regiments were soon re-formed and again moved forward in good order, antic.i.p.ating instructions to renew the attack; yet none came, and, in fact, the attack was not renewed, although the contemporary accounts, some of them even official, distinctly speak of repeated charges. In this abortive attempt, Captain Andrew Cailloux and Second Lieutenant John H. Crowder, of the 1st regiment, were instantly killed. Cailloux, who is said to have been a free man of color, although all the officers of his race were at that time supposed to have resigned, fell at the head of the leading company of his regiment, while gallantly cheering on his men. The 1st regiment lost, in this brief engagement, 2 officers, and 24 men killed and 79 wounded-in all, 105. The 3d, being far less exposed, as well as for a shorter time, lost 1 officer and 5 men killed, and 1 officer wounded-in all, 7.

The morning was drawing out when these movements were well spent, and the advanced positions simply held without further effort to go forward. The hour may have been about ten o'clock. Grover, Paine, and Weitzel listened in vain for any sounds of musketry on their left to indicate that either Augur or Sherman was at work, yet no sound came from that quarter save the steady pounding of the Union artillery. Now Weitzel believed that, by pursuing his advance in what might be called skirmishing order and working his way gradually forward from the vantage-ground of Fort Babc.o.c.k, he might gain, without great addition to his losses, already heavy, a foothold on the high ground held by the Confederate left; yet of the character of the defences of this part of the line Weitzel knew but little, and of the nature of the ground behind these defences and the direction of the roads, neither he nor any one in the Union army knew any thing. The topography of the ground in sight afforded the only indication of what might be expected farther on, and this was confusing and difficult to the last degree. Weitzel had, therefore, strong reason for believing that his difficulties, instead of ending with the capture of the Confederate works, might be only beginning. There was, of course, the chance that the garrison along the whole front might throw down their arms or abandon their defences the moment they should find themselves taken in reverse at any point, for it was known that they had no reserves to be reckoned with after breaking through the line. Grover had been ordered to support either the right or the left, or to attempt to make his way into the works, as circ.u.mstances might suggest. This last he had tried, and failed to accomplish. On his left there was no attack to support. When riding toward the right he met Weitzel, who, although commanding the right wing, was his junior in rank as well as in experience, Grover gave Weitzel the counsel of prudence, and Weitzel fell in with these views. The two commanders decided to ask fresh orders or to wait for an a.s.sault on the centre or left before renewing the attack on the right.

All this time Augur stood ready, his division formed and all in perfect order, waiting for the word from Banks, who made his headquarters close at hand, and who, in his turn, waited for the sound of Sherman's musketry as the signal to put in Augur. With Sherman, Augur was in connection along the front, although not in easy communication. The precise nature of the causes that held Sherman back it is, even now, impossible to state, nor would it be easy, in the absence of the facts, to form a conjecture that should seem to be altogether probable and at the same time reasonable. The most plausible surmise seems to be that Sherman supposed he was to wait for the engineers to indicate the point of attack, and that he himself did not choose to go beyond what he conceived to be his orders to precipitate a movement whose propriety he doubted. Sherman was an officer of the old army, of wide experience, favorably known and highly esteemed throughout the service for his intelligence, his character, and his courage. He was known as one of the most distinguished of the chosen commanders of the few light batteries that the government of the United States had thought itself able to afford in the days before the war. Before coming to Louisiana he had commanded a department, and in that capacity had carried to a successful conclusion the brilliant operations that gave Hilton Head and Port Royal to the forces of the Union. Neither in his previous history was there any thing to his personal discredit as a man or as a soldier. The fact remains, however, account for it how we may, that when about noon, greatly disturbed by the check on the right, and still more by the silence on the left, Banks himself rode almost unattended to Sherman's headquarters, he found Sherman at luncheon in his tent, surrounded by his staff, while in front the division lay idly under arms, without orders. Hot words pa.s.sed, the precise nature of which has not been recorded, and Banks returned to his headquarters determined to replace Sherman by the chief-of-staff of the department. The roads had not yet been opened, and it was half-past one before these orders could be given. Andrews rode directly to the left, accompanied by but a single aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Fiske. When he came on the ground he found Sherman's division deployed, and Sherman himself on horseback at the head of his men, ready to lead them forward. Then Andrews, with great propriety, deferred the delivery of the orders placing him in command, and, after a few words, at a quarter past two Sherman moved to the a.s.sault. Andrews remained to witness the operation.

Nickerson moved forward on the right in column of regiments. The 14th Maine, deployed as skirmishers, covered his front, followed by the 24th Maine, 177th New York, and 165th New York in line. After emerging from the woods, Nickerson's right flank rested on the road that runs past Slaughter's house, near the position of battery 16.

Dow formed the left of the division and of the army. He advanced at the same time as Nickerson, and in like order, his right resting near the position of battery 17 and his left near Gibbons's house, marked as the position of battery 18. The 6th Michigan led the brigade, followed by the 15th New Hampshire, 26th Connecticut, and 128th New York.

In the interval between the two brigades rode Sherman, surrounded by his whole staff and followed by his escort.

No sooner had the line emerged from among the trees than the Confederates opened upon every part of it, as it came in sight, a galling fire of musketry and artillery. At first the troops moved forward steadily and at a good pace, but as they drew nearer to the enemy and the musketry fire grew hotter, their progress was delayed and their formation somewhat broken by four successive and parallel lines of fence that had to be thrown down and crossed. Once clear of the young corn, they found themselves entangled with the abatis that covered and protected the immediate front of the Confederate works on this part of the line. This had been set on fire by the exploding sh.e.l.ls, and the smoke and flame now added to the difficulty of the movement. Here the men suffered greatly, many being shot down in the act of climbing the great trunks of the fallen trees, and many more having their clothing reduced to tatters and almost torn from their bodies in the attempt to force their way through the entangled branches. The impetus was soon lost, the men lay down or sought cover; numbers of Dow's men made their way to the grove in their rear and into the gully on their left; of Nickerson's, many drifted singly and in groups into the ravine on their right.

Long before this, indeed within a few minutes after the line first marched out from the wood, Sherman had fallen from his horse, severely wounded in the leg; under the vigorous fire concentrated upon this large group of hors.e.m.e.n in plain sight of the Confederates and in easy range, two of his staff officers had shared the same fate. This would have brought Dow to the command of the division; but nearly at the same instant Dow himself was wounded and went to the rear, and so the command fell to Nickerson, who was with his brigade, and, in the confusion of the moment, was not notified. Thus, for some interval, there was no one to give orders for fresh dispositions among the regiments. Many officers had fallen; the 128th New York had lost its colonel, Cowles; the 165th New York, at last holding the front of Nickerson's line, had lost two successive commanders, Abel Smith and Carr, both wounded, the former mortally, while standing by the colors. To retire was now only less difficult than to advance. Nickerson's men, lying down, held their ground until after dark; but Dow's, being nearer the cover of the woods, fell back to their first position.

Andrews now took command of the division, in virtue of the written orders of the commanding general, and prepared to obey whatever fresh instructions he might receive. None came; there was, indeed, nothing to be done but to withdraw and to restore order.

As soon as Banks heard the rattle of the musketry on the left, and saw from the smoke of the Confederate guns that Sherman was engaged, he ordered Augur forward. Augur, as has been said, had been ready and waiting all day. His arrangements were to make the attack with Chapin's brigade, deployed across the Plains Store road, and to support it with Dudley's, held in reserve under cover of one of the high and thick hedges of the Osage orange that crossed and divided the fields on the right of the road. Chapin's front was covered by the skirmishers of the 21st Maine; immediately in their rear were to march the storming column of two hundred volunteers, under Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien, of the 48th Ma.s.sachusetts. The stormers rested and waited for the word in the point of the wood on the left of the Plains Store road, nearly opposite the position of battery 13. Half their number carried cotton bags and fascines to fill the ditch. On the right of the road the 116th New York was deployed; on its left the 49th Ma.s.sachusetts, closely supported by the 48th Ma.s.sachusetts, the 2d Louisiana, of Dudley's brigade, and the reserve of the 21st Maine.

O'Brien shook hands with the officer who brought him the last order, and, turning to his men, who were lying or sitting near by, some on their cotton bags, others on the ground, said in the coolest and most business-like manner: "Pick up your bundles, and come on!" The movement of the stormers was the signal for the whole line. A truly magnificent sight was the advance of these battalions, with their colors flying and borne st.u.r.dily toward the front; yet not for long. Hardly had the movement begun when the whole force -officers, men, colors, stormers, and all,-found themselves inextricably entangled in the dense abatis under a fierce and continuous discharge of musketry and a withering cross-fire of artillery. Besides the field-pieces bearing directly down the road, two 24-pounders poured upon their flank a storm of missiles of all sorts, with fragments of railway bars and broken chains for grape, and rusty nails and the rakings of the sc.r.a.p-heap for canister. No part of the column ever pa.s.sed beyond the abatis, nor was it even possible to extricate the troops in any order without greatly adding to the list of casualties, already of a fearful length. Banks was all for putting Dudley over the open ground directly in his front, but, before any thing could be done, came the bad news from the left, and at last it was clear to the most persistent that the day was miserably lost. When, after nightfall, the division commanders reported at headquarters, among the wounded under the great trees, it was known that the result was even worse than the first accounts.