History of the Nineteenth Army Corps Part 18

CHAPTER x.x.xIV. CEDAR CREEK.

The ground whereon the Army of the Shenandoah now found itself was the same on which Sheridan had left it, the troops were the same, and the formations were in all important particulars the same as when he had been present in command, strengthened, however, by additional entrenchments. Twice before the army had occupied the same line, and on both occasions Sheridan had emphatically condemned it as a very bad one. Briefly, the position was formed by the last great outward bend of Cedar Creek before its waters mingle with those of the Shenandoah, the left flank resting lightly on the river, the centre strongly across the valley road, and the extreme right on the creek near the end of the bow.

Crook held a high and partly wooded height or range of heights on the left or east (1) of the valley road, and nearly parallel with it. Thoburn occupied the most advanced spur overlooking the mouth of the creek, while on his left and rear Hayes and Kitching faced toward the Shenandoah with their backs to the road. As the road descended to cross Cedar Creek by the bridge (2) and ford, it followed the course of a rivulet on its left, and three quarters of a mile from Crook, on the opposite side of this ravine and of the road, Emory was posted on a hill whose crest rose steeply a hundred and fifty feet above the bed of the creek. Here Emory planted nearly the whole of his artillery to command the bridge and the neighboring ford and the approaches on the opposite bank, but the slope and crest of this hill were completely and easily commanded from the higher ground held by Thoburn and by Hayes. From the valley road on the left, Emory's line stretched crescent-wise, until its right rested upon a natural bastion formed by the highest part of the hill, whence the descent is precipitous, not only to the creek in front, but on the flank to the gorge of Meadow Brook. This little stream rising some miles farther north near Newtown, and flowing now between high banks and again through marshy borders in a general direction nearly parallel to the road, empties into Cedar Creek about three quarters of a mile above the bridge. Just below the mouth of the brook Cedar Creek can be crossed by a ford lying nearly in a direct prolongation of the line of the valley road from the point where in descending it swerves to the east to pa.s.s the bridge, and midway between the bridge and the Meadow Brook ford is still another ford overlooked by Emory's right wing and commanded by the guns of his artillery. Dwight's division formed the right of Emory's line and Grover's the left. From right to left the front line was composed of the brigades of Thomas, Molineux, Birge, and Macauley, with Davis in reserve supporting Thomas, and Shunk, likewise in reserve, supporting Macauley and Birge.(3)

The fronts of Emory and Crook overlooking the creek were strongly entrenched, and Crook was engaged in extending his line of works toward the left and rear of Thoburn to cover the front of Hayes, but this fresh line was as yet unoccupied. Wright's corps, commanded by Ricketts during the absence of Sheridan, while Wright himself commanded the army, was held in reserve on the high ground known as Red Hill overlooking Meadow Brook from the eastward, the divisions encamped for convenience in a sort of irregular echelon, with Ricketts's, under Keifer, in front, Upton's, commanded by Wheaton, on the right and rear in close support, and Getty's on the left and rear of both, and thus nearer to the valley road than either. Behind the Sixth Corps, opposite Middletown, on the high ground on both sides of Marsh Run, was Merritt, and far away on his right, watching the approaches and the crossing by the back road, stood Custer.

As the Sixth Corps held no part of the front, but formed a general reserve, its position was not entrenched. Torbert, Emory, and Crook each picketed and watched his own front, and there was not a horseman between the infantry and the supposed position of the enemy at or beyond Fisher's Hill.

Emory had for some days been distrustful of the excessive tranquillity, and on the previous evening his uneasiness had rather been augmented by a report that came to him from Thomas of a little group of men in citizens' dress that had been seen during the day moving about on the edge of Hupp's Hill, as if engaged in noting with more intentness than is usual among civilians the arrangement of the Union camps. This incident Emory reported to Wright for what it might be worth, and Wright, on his part, being already doubtful of the exactness of the information brought in by Harris, ordered Emory and Torbert each to send out a strong reconnoitring party in the early morning, to move in parallel columns on the valley road and on the back road, with the significant caution that they were to go far enough to find out whether Early was still at Fisher's Hill or not.

After crossing the Shenandoah and reaching the foot of Three Top, Gordon halted his men for a few hours' rest before the hard work awaiting them. At one o'clock he silently took up the line of march over the rugged trail toward McInturff's and Bowman's fords, and at five o'clock seized both crossings, with the merest show of resistance from Moore's outlying brigade, and pressed on to Cooley's house, the white house he had noted from Three Top. This landmark, as he knew, was barely thirteen hundred yards from the nearest flank of his enemy. He pa.s.sed nearly half that distance beyond the house and, as pre-arranged, silently formed his three divisions for the attack. Within five minutes he could be in Kitching's camp.

At the last moment, hearing that Crook was strengthening his entrenchments, Early so far changed his plan as to part company with Wharton at Strasburg, and then, bearing off to the right, to conduct Kershaw to the banks of Cedar Creek at the ford that now bears the name of Roberts. This is about twelve hundred yards above the mouth of the creek; and there, at half-past three in the morning, in the long shadows of the full moon,(4) Early stood with Kershaw at his back and the sleeping ranks of Thoburn directly in his front, and waited only for the appointed hour. At half-past four, Early again set Kershaw in motion. The crossing of Cedar Creek was un.o.bserved and unopposed. Once on the north bank, Kershaw deployed to the right and left, and stood to arms listening for Gordon.

Wharton, who had already formed under cover of the tress, on the edge of Hupp's Hill, crept down the slope to the front of the wood, and there, likewise in shadow, hardly a thousand feet from the bridge and the middle ford, he too watched for the signal.

To crown all, as the dawn drew near a light fog descended upon the river bottom and covered all objects as with a veil.

Almost from the beginning it had been the custom of the Nineteenth Army Corps, at all times when in the presence of the enemy, to stand to arms at daybreak. Moreover as Molineux was to go out on a reconnoissance by half-past five, his men had breakfasted and were lying on their arms waiting for the order to march. Birge and Macauley were to be ready to follow in support after a proper interval, and Shunk was to cover the front of all three during their absence. McMillan had also been notified to support the movement of Grover's brigades. Emory himself was up and dressed, the horses of his staff were saddled, and his own horses were being saddled, when from the left a startling sound broke the stillness of the morning air.

This was the roar of the one tremendous volley by which Kershaw made known his presence before the sleeping camp of Thoburn. In an instant, before a single shot could be fired in return, before the muskets could be taken from the stacks, before the cannoneers could reach their pieces, Kershaw's men, with loud and continuous yells, swarmed over the parapet in Thoburn's front, seized the guns, and sent his half-clad soldiers flying to the rear. Thus Kershaw, who a moment before had been without artillery, suddenly found himself in possession of the seven guns that had been planted to secure Thoburn's ground. Then upon Emory and upon Hayes, as well as against the flying fugitives, he turned the cannon thus s.n.a.t.c.hed from their own comrades.

At the first sound Molineux moved his men back into the rifle-pits they had left an hour before, and Emory, ordering his corps to stand to arms, rode at once to the left of his line at the valley road to find out the meaning of this strange outbreak. Knowing that Molineux was near and ready, Emory drew from him two regiments, the 22d Iowa and the 3d Ma.s.sachusetts, to support the artillery planted on the left to command the bridge. Hardly had this been done when the sh.e.l.ls began to fall among the guns and to enfilade the lines of the infantry. What could this mean but the thing that had actually happened to Thoburn? Grover joined Emory, Crook came from Belle Grove, and Wright from his camp beyond Meadow Brook. The fugitives from Thoburn's unfortunate division went streaming by.

Then suddenly from the left and rear came the startling rattle of the rifles that told of Gordon's attack on the exposed flank of Hayes and Kitching. While all eyes were directed toward Kershaw, Gordon, still further favored by the fog, the outcry, and the noise of the cannonade, was not perceived by the troops of Hayes and Kitching until the instant when his solid lines of battle, unheralded by a single skirmisher of his own, and unannounced by those set to watch against him, fell upon the ranks of Crook. He tried in vain to form on the road. Startled from their sleep by the surprise of their comrades on their right, and naturally shaken by the disordered rush of the fugitives through their ranks, his men, old soldiers and good soldiers as they were, gave way at the first onset, before the fire of Gordon had become heavy and almost without stopping to return it.

Then swiftly Gordon and Kershaw moved together against the uncovered left and rear of Emory, while at the same time Early, who after seeing Kershaw launched, had ridden back for Wharton and the artillery, was bringing them into position for a front attack. Besides the sounds that had aroused Emory and Crook, Wright, from his more remote position, had listened to the rattle of Rosser's carbines,(5) but after a moment of natural doubt had perceived that the true attack was on the left, and accordingly he had ordered Ricketts to advance with Getty and Keifer to the valley road toward the sound of the battle. If this was to be of the least advantage, the valley road must be somehow held by somebody until Ricketts should come. Emory sent Thomas across the road into the ravine and the wood beyond, and bade him stand fast at all hazards. But the time was too short. Thomas, after a desperate resistance, was forced back by the overwhelming ma.s.ses of Kershaw, yet not until this tried brigade had left a third of its number on the ground to attest its valor. About the colors of the 8th Vermont the fight was furious. Again and again the colors were down; three bearers were slain; before the sun rose two men out of three had fallen, that the precious emblems might be saved.(6) Thus were many priceless minutes won. Then, as there was no longer anything to hinder the advance of Kershaw on the left, and of Gordon on the rear, while Wharton and the forty guns of Early's artillery were beginning their work in front, from the left toward the right, successively the brigades of the Nineteenth Corps began to give way; yet as they drifted toward the right and rear, in that stress the men held well to their colors, and although there may and must have been many that fell out, not a brigade or a regiment lost its organization for a moment.

When the pressure reached Molineux and Davis on the reverse side of the entrenchments, both brigades began moving off, under Emory's orders, by the right flank to take position near Belle Grove on the right of Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, which had come up and was trying to extend its line diagonally to reach the valley road. To cover this position and to hold off the onward rush of Gordon, Emory had already posted the 114th and the 153d New York on the commanding knoll five hundred yards to the southward overlooking the road. When driven off these regiments rejoined their brigade before Belle Grove. Thither also came the detached regiments of Molineux, and there Neafie joined them with the 3d brigade, after a strong stand at their breastworks, wherein Macauley fell severely wounded, and the 156th and 176th had hard fighting hand-to-hand to keep their colors, at the cost of the staves. Birge retired along the line of works to the open ground beyond Meadow Brook, where Shunk joined him.

In quitting their posts at the breastworks Haley, having lost forty-nine horses killed in harness, had to abandon three guns of his 1st Maine battery, and Taft lost three pieces of his 5th New York battery at the difficult crossing of Meadow Brook. There, too, from the same cause, three guns of the 17th Indiana and two of the Rhode Island battery were abandoned. The losses of the infantry were to be counted in thousands. Grover was slightly wounded; Macauley, as has been said, severely. Emory had lost both his horses, and was for a time commanding the corps afoot. Birge rode a mule. Thus the Nineteenth Corps lost eleven guns. Crook had already lost seven, and the Sixth Corps was presently to lose six.

With Gordon on his flank and rear, every moment drawing nearer to the mastery of the valley road, Wright had to think, and to think quickly, of the safety and the success of the army he commanded. For it there was no longer a position south of Middletown. What security was there that Custer and Powell would be able all day long to hold off, as in the event they did, the flank and rear attacks of Rosser and of Lomax? What if the Longstreet message were true and yet a third surprise in store? Time, time was needed, whether to bring up the troops or to change front, to march to the rear past the faces of the advancing enemy, to hold him in check, and to re-form. Whatever was to be done was to be done quickly; and Wright, throwing prudence into the balance, made up his mind for a retreat to a fresh position, where his line of communications would be preserved and its flanks protected. Middletown and the cavalry camp pointed out the ground. Accordingly he gave the word to Getty, Ricketts being wounded, to retire on Middletown, guiding on the valley road, and to Emory to form on Getty's right-that is, on the left of the Sixth Corps in retreat. The battle had been raging for nearly an hour when Wright gave this order to abandon Belle Grove. The retreat threw upon Getty's division, now under Grant, the severe task of covering the exposed right flank of the army in retreat, while the left was gradually swinging into the direction of the new line. Getty, having handsomely performed this service, crossed Meadow Brook abreast with Middletown and took position on the high and partly wooded ground that rises beyond the brook to the west of the village and on a line with Merritt's camp. Here, on the southern edge of the village cemetery and on the crest behind it, Getty planted his artillery, posted Grant to hold the immediate front, and somewhat in his rear, under the trees, following the contour of the hill, as it rises toward the west, he placed Wheaton and Keifer.

To reach his position on the left of Getty in retreat, Emory had to gain ground to the westward, to descend the hill from Belle Grove, to cross Meadow Brook, and climbing the opposite slope to face about and re-form his line in good order on the crest of Red Hill. Here, before Dr. Shipley's house, nearly across the ground where the men of Wheaton and of Getty had slept the night before, for the best part of an hour Emory stood at bay. Kershaw followed over the Belle Grove Hill, across Meadow Brook, up the slope of Red Hill, and formed line facing north; but then, seeing the fighting part of Emory's infantry before him and the formidable array of Merritt's cavalry in close support, he refrained from renewing the attack until Early could send Gordon to his aid. Thus the bold stand at Red Hill gave the time the situation craved, and while Kershaw waited, Emory, following his orders from Wright, crossed over to the cemetery (7) and placed himself on the west of Getty. Thomas rejoined McMillan. Torbert meanwhile had moved over with Merritt to the left flank. Thus around the cemetery, about half-past seven, the unshaken strength of the Army of the Shenandoah was gathered, every eye looking once more toward the south.

While awaiting the general attack for which Early was plainly preparing, Wright deployed his lines, according to the ground, from the south wall of the cemetery overlooking Meadow Brook on the left, in a rough echelon of divisions to Marsh Brook on the right, in order of Grant, Keifer, Wheaton, Grover, McMillan. Between the arms of Marsh Brook, in front and behind the Old Forge road, on open ground nearly as high as Getty's, Emory formed his corps in echelon of brigades. Here, not doubting that the decisive combat of the day was to be fought, Emory began fortifying his front with the help of loose rails and stones.

To protect himself against the menacing movement of the cavalry on his right in front of Middletown, Early posted Ramseur with two batteries directly across the valley road, and when he saw Getty's stand near the cemetery, he brought Wharton directly down the road and sent him to the attack, but this Getty easily threw off and drove back Wharton in such confusion that before renewing the attempt Early waited to complete a new line of battle almost perpendicular to his first and therefore to the road. From the right at Middletown to the left at Red Hill the new line was formed by Pegram, Ramseur, Kershaw, and Gordon, with Wharton behind Pegram. On the right of this line also Early ma.s.sed the forty guns of his artillery augmented by some of the twenty-four pieces taken from the Union army.

And now the increasing heat of the sun dissolved the fog, and revealed to the combatants the true situation of affairs. To Early the position of the Union army, its salient, as it were, lying directly before him where he stood, seemed so strong that he hesitated to hazard another attack until the concentrated fire of his artillery should have produced an impression, while to Wright, not only was the menace of Early's artillery very obvious, but the weakness of his own left flank, broken by Meadow Brook and adhering lightly to the valley road, was still present.

The force of Early's first onset was spent; his one chance of seizing and holding the valley road in the rear of the Union army had slipped away, while his cavalry had utterly failed to accomplish any part of the task confided to it. Time and strength had both been lost to the Confederates by the uncontrollable plunder of the camps and the sutlers' stores.

The Old Forge road is but a country lane that crosses the field from the north end of Middletown. It afforded no position, its chief value being as uniting the wings of the army, and Wright's object in taking up this line was simply to gain time to develop a better fighting line still farther to the rear. Now, seeing that Getty had accomplished his purpose in holding on at the cemetery, Wright ordered him to move slowly, in line of battle, toward the north, guiding on the valley road, with Merritt's cavalry beyond it following and covering the operation, while Emory, taking up the movement in his turn, was to look to Wheaton for his guide. Wright's order found Emory's men in the act of completing their hasty defences, while Emory was moving about among them strongly declaring his purpose not to go back another inch.

Getty began by withdrawing Grant, and when Grant had pa.s.sed for some distance beyond the left of Keifer, his right in retreat, Keifer followed, while on his left, in retreat, Wheaton, and on Wheaton's left Emory marched, as nearly as may be, shoulder to shoulder in a solid line. Thus Keifer formed the centre of the retreating line of battle, with Ball on his right and Emerson on his left. Having to pa.s.s over rough ground and among trees, the line was broken to the reversed front by the right of regiments, the head of each guiding on its right-hand neighbor. Thus it happened (8) that in pa.s.sing through a thick wood, Keifer's division was split in two, his brigades losing sight of one another, so that on coming once more into the open field, Ball found himself alone with no other troops in sight on either hand; but soon hearing the sound of Getty's guns over the right shoulder, he faced about and marched back to a stone wall upon a lane, where he found Getty already in position. Emerson, however, moving more quickly through the wood, because the ground was easier, continued his march toward the north, continually bearing to the right as he went, in order to regain the lost touch with Ball, while on the left Wheaton and Emory, knowing nothing of the break, naturally and gradually conformed to the movement of Emerson. Finally, when the left of the line once more entered the woods, Emerson, gradually changing the direction toward the right, drifted Wheaton away from Emory, and when this was perceived by the commanders, each began to look for his neighbor. It is also probable that when the separation took place the interval was gradually widened by Emory's movement with his right resting on a road that, while apparently following the true line of direction, really carried him every moment a little farther toward the left. However that may be, when almost at the same instant Wheaton and Emory halted and faced about, they found themselves about eight hundred yards apart, a thousand yards behind the line that Getty had just taken up, on the westward prolongation of which Keifer had joined him with the brigade of Ball.

The affair had now lasted five hours; the retreat was at an end; a tactical accident had carried it half a mile farther than was intended; as it was, from the extreme front of Emory at daybreak to his extreme rear at eleven o'clock, the measured distance was but four miles. Every step of the way had been traversed under orders-under orders that had carried the Nineteenth Corps three times across the field of battle, so that its march, from Belle Grove to the Old Forge road, might be represented by the letter N.

When Early saw the Union line retreating, he moved forward to the cross-road beyond the cemetery, and posted his troops behind the stone walls. Wharton extended the line on the east side of the turnpike, with three batteries ma.s.sed between him and the road. Pegram covered the turnpike, his left resting on Meadow Brook, and beyond it Ramseur, Kershaw, and Gordon carried the line to the east bank of Middle Marsh Brook. Early had now two courses open to him: one was to extricate his army from its position, with its enemy directly in front and Cedar Creek in rear, before the Union commander could take the initiative; the other was to attack vigorously with all his force before the Union infantry should be able to complete the new line of battle now plainly in the act of formation. In either case, although he could easily see than on both flanks the line of his infantry far overlapped that of his antagonist, Early must have perceived that he had to reckon with the whole ma.s.s of the Union cavalry, unshaken and as yet untouched. Moreover, his men had already done a long and hard day's work after a short night.

Depleted as were the ranks of the Union infantry by the heavy battle losses of the early morning, and the still heavier losses by the misconduct of the stragglers of all the corps except the cavalry, it was not to be doubted that the men who stood by the colors on the Old Forge road meant to abide to the end. As all old soldiers know, the fighting line, granting that enough remain to make a fighting line, is never so strong as the moment after the first shock of battle has shaken out the men that always straggle on the march and skulk on the field. When, therefore, the first compact line faced about, it was with determination and with hope; yet scarcely had the fires of resolution been relit and begun to kindle to a glow than they were suddenly extinguished and all was plunged in gloom by the unlooked-for order to retreat. Upon the whole army a lethargy fell, and though every man expected and stood ready to do his duty, it was with a certain listlessness amounting almost to indifference that he waited for what was to come next. In the sensations of most, hunger was perhaps uppermost, and while some munched the bread and meat from their haversacks and other waited to make coffee, many threw themselves upon the ground where they stood and fell asleep.

Far down the road from among the crowd of fugitives, where no man on that field cared to look, came a murmur like the breaking of the surf on a far-off sh.o.r.e. Nearer it drew, grew louder, and swelled to a tumult. Cheers! The cheers of the stragglers. As the men instinctively turned toward the sound, they were seized with amazement to see the tide of stragglers setting strongly toward the south. Then out from among them, into the field by the roadside, cantered a little man on a black horse, and from the ranks of his own cavalry arose a cry of "Sheridan!" Through all the ranks the message flashed, and, as if it had been charged by the electric spark, set every man on his feet and made his heart once more beat high within him.

This was Wednesday, and Sheridan, before finally setting out for Washington, had told Wright to look for him on Tuesday. Rapidly despatching, as has been seen, his business at the War Office, Sheridan left Washington by the special train he had asked for at noon on the 17th, accompanied by the engineers charged with the duty of selecting the position that Halleck wished to fortify. They slept that night at Martinsburg, and rode the next day, the 18th of October, to Winchester. There Sheridan learned that all was well with his army and was also told of the reconnoissances projected for the next morning. He determined to remain at Winchester in order to go over the ground the next morning with the engineers. Aroused about six o'clock by the report of heavy firing, he ascribed it to the reconnoitring column, and thought but little of it until, between half-past eight and nine, having finished his breakfast, he became uneasy at the continued sound of the cannon. Then mounting "Rienzi," accompanied by his staff and followed by his escort, he rode out to join his army where he had left it, fourteen miles away, on the banks of Cedar Creek. The fight of the morning had come to an end an hour ago. Riding at an easy trot half a mile out on the hill beyond Abraham's Creek,(9) he was shocked to see the tattered and dishevelled head of the column of stragglers, every man making the best of his way toward the Potomac, without his arms, his equipments, or his knapsack, carrying, in short, nothing but what he wore. Most of these must have been shaken out of the ranks when Kershaw surprised the camp of Thoburn. If this be so, they had travelled more than thirteen miles in little more than three hours.

This appalling sight brought to Sheridan's mind the Longstreet message, "Be ready when I join you, and we will crush Sheridan." Should he stop his routed army at Winchester and fight there? No, he must go to his men, restore their broken ranks, or share their fate. How he rode on has been made famous in song and story, yet never so well told as in the modest narrative, stamped in every line with the impress of the soldier's truthful frankness, than in the entertaining volumes that were the last work of the great leader's life.(10)

Once arrived on the field, about half-past ten or perhaps eleven o'clock, Sheridan lost no time in a.s.suming personal command of the army. Establishing his headquarters on the hill behind Getty, he proceeded to complete the dispositions he found already in progress. He saw at a glance that the line on which Wright had placed Getty was well chosen; and though knowing nothing of the break that had taken place during the accidental loss of direction by the left wing of Getty's corps, and so wrongly inferring from what he saw that Getty was a mere rear-guard, he yet adopted the position for his fighting line, sent his staff officers with orders for the rest of the troops to form on that line, and thus actually completed the arrangements begun by Wright. It sufficed that Emerson, Wheaton, and Emory should face about, as they were already about to do, and should form on the prolongation of Getty's line. This they did promptly and in perfect order. Wright resumed the command of the Sixth Corps and Getty of his own division. Then feeling his left quite strong enough under Merritt's care, Sheridan sent Custer, for whom he had other designs, back to the right flank.

It was past noon before all this was accomplished. Then Sheridan, content with the position and appearance of his own army, and perceiving that Early was getting ready to attack him, acted on the suggestion of Major George Forsyth, his aide-de-camp, and rode the length of the line of battle in order to show himself to his men. A tumult of cheers greeted him and followed him as, hat in hand, he pa.s.sed in front of regiment after regiment, speaking a few words of encouragement to each. Sheridan possessed in a degree unequalled the power of raising in the hearts of his soldiers the sort of enthusiasm that, trans.m.u.ting itself into action, causes men to attempt impossibilities, and to disregard and overcome obstacles. Almost from the moment of entering the valley he had gained the confidence of the infantry, to whom he had been a stranger. By the cavalry he had long been idolized. The feeling of an army for its general is a thing not to be reasoned with or explained away; once aroused, it belongs to him as exclusively as the expression of his face, the manner of his gait, or the form of his signature, and is not to be transferred to his successor or delegated even to the ablest of his lieutenants, whatever the skill, the merit, or the reputation of either. The mere presence of Sheridan in the ranks of the Army of the Shenandoah that day brought with it the a.s.surance of victory.

Emory at first formed his corps in two lines, the First division under Dwight, whom Sheridan had released from arrest, on the right, and Grover on the left; but soon the whole corps was deployed in one line in the order from right to left by brigades of McMillan, Davis, Birge, Molineux, Neafie, Shunk.

When the line of the Old Forge road was abandoned by Wright, Early moved forward and occupied it. Between one and two o'clock he advanced Gordon and Kershaw to attack Wheaton and Emory. Seeing that the weight of the attack was about to fall on the right, Sheridan sent Wheaton to the support of Emory. However, Gordon's onset proved so light that no a.s.sistance was needed, for, after three or four volleys had been exchanged, the attack was easily and completely thrown off. Kershaw's movement was even more feeble.

Several causes now delayed the counter attack of Sheridan. Crook was endeavoring to re-form the stragglers on his colors behind Merritt. Apprehension of the coming of Longstreet was only dissipated by the information gained from prisoners during the afternoon, and finally arose a false rumor of the appearance of a column of Confederate cavalry in the rear toward Winchester; and this seemed plausible enough until at last word came from Powell that he was still holding off Lomax. Then Sheridan gave the signal for the whole line to go forward against the enemy, beginning with Getty on the left, as a pivot, while the whole right was to sweep onward, and, driving the enemy before it, to swing toward the valley road near the camps of the morning.

About four Getty started, and the movement being taken up in succession toward the right, in a few minutes the whole line was advancing steadily. From that moment to the end the men hardly stopped an instant for anything. The resistance of the Confederates, though at first steady, and here and there even spirited, was of short duration. For a few moments, indeed, the attack seemed to hang on the extreme right as McMillan, rushing on even more rapidly than the order of the combat demanded, found himself suddenly enveloped by the right wheel of the brigade of Evans, forming the extreme left of the division of Gordon and of the Confederate army. But while McMillan was thus attacked and his leading troops were called to meet the danger, this, as suddenly as it had come, was swept away by the swift onset of Davis directly upon the front and flank of Evans. To do this Davis had not only to act instantly, but also to change front under a double fire; yet he and his brigade were equal to the emergency, and McMillan joining in, together they not only threw off the attack of Evans, but bursting through the re-entrant angle of Gordon's line, quickly swept Evans off the field. Knowing this to be the critical point of his line, because the wheeling flank, Sheridan was there. "Stay where you are," was his order, "till you see my boy Custer over there."

Then upon the high ground appeared Custer at the head of his bold troopers, making ready to swoop down upon the broken wing of Gordon. Almost at the same instant, the whole right of the line rushed to the charge, and while Custer rode down Gordon's left flank, Dwight, with McMillan and Davis, began rolling up the whole Confederate line. Meanwhile, on the left centre the Union attack likewise hung for a moment, where Molineux, on the southerly slope of a wooded hollow, saw himself confronted by Kershaw on the opposite crest, only to be reached by climbing the steep bare side of the "dirt hill." But the keen eye of Molineux easily saw through the difficulties of the ground, and when he was ready his men and Birge's, rising up and together charging boldly out of the hollow, up the hill, across the open ground, and over the stone wall, in the face of a fierce fire, settled the overthrow of Kershaw and sent a panic running down the line of Ramseur. Wright attacking with equal vigor, soon the disorder spread through every part of Early's force, and in rout and ruin the exultant victors of the morning were flying up the valley.

"Back to your camps!" had been the watchword ever since Sheridan showed himself on the field. Dwight's men were the first to stand once more upon their own ground, but by that time Sheridan's army had executed, though without much regard to order, a complete left wheel. While the infantry took up its original positions, the cavalry pursued the flying enemy with such vigor that an accidental displacement of a single plank on a little bridge near Strasburg caused the whole of Early's artillery that had not yet pa.s.sed on, to fall into the hands of Sheridan. Thus were taken 48 cannon, 52 caissons, all the ambulances that had been lost in the morning, many wagons, and seven battle flags; of the artillery 24 pieces were the same that had been lost in the early morning. From every part of the abandoned field great stacks of rifles were gathered. The prisoners taken were about 1,200, according to the reports of Sheridan's officers, or something over 1,000 by Early's account. Early also gives his loss in killed and wounded, without distinguishing between the two, as 1,860, and reports the capture of 1,429 prisoners from the Union army in the early hours of the day. Of these he had made sure by sending them promptly to the rear. Ramseur was mortally wounded in the last stand made by his division, and died a few days later in the hands and under the care of his former comrades of Sheridan's army.

Sheridan's loss was 644 killed, 3,430 wounded, and 1,591 captured or missing; in all, 5,665. Of these the Sixth Corps had 298 killed, 1,628 wounded-together, 1,926; the Nineteenth Corps 257 killed, 1,336 wounded-together, 1,593. Crook lost 60 killed, 342 wounded -together, 402; the cavalry 29 killed, 224 wounded-together, 253. The missing were thus divided: Wright 194, Emory 776, Crook 548, Torbert 43. The greatest proportionate loss of the day was suffered by the 114th New York, which had 21 killed, 86 wounded, including 17 mortally, and 8 missing-in all, 115 out of 250 engaged. Its fatal casualties reached 15.2, and the killed and wounded 42.8 per cent. of the number engaged. These figures are from the corrected reports of the War Department. The missing exceed the captured, as set down in Early's report, by only 132. Among the killed and mortally wounded were Bidwell, Thoburn, Kitching, and that superb soldier and accomplished gentleman, General Charles Russell Lowell, who, although severely wounded in the morning, at the head of his brigade held fast to the stone wall until, in the last decisive charge, his death-blow came. Grover received a second severe wound early in the final charge that broke the Confederate left. Birge then took his division.

Without a halt and with scarcely a show of organized resistance, Early retreated to Fisher's Hill. Merritt and Custer, uniting on the south bank of Cedar Creek, kept up the pursuit until the night was well advanced, but soon their captures became so heavy in men and material, that help was needed to take care of them, so, barely an hour after going into camp the jaded infantry of Dwight once more turned out and marched with alacrity to Strasburg.

Toward morning Early withdrew his infantry from the lines of Fisher's Hill, and marched on New Market, leaving Rosser to cover the movement. In the morning, upon Torbert's approach, Rosser retired, closely pursued to Edenburg, sending Lomax to the Luray to guard the right flank of the retreating Confederates.

The strength of the contending forces in this remarkable battle may always give ground for dispute. No official figures exist to determine the question directly; therefore on either side the numbers are a matter of opinion. The author's, formed after a careful consideration of all the authorities, is that when the battle began, Wright commanded an effective force of not more than 31,000 officers and men of all arms, made up of 9,000 in the Sixth Corps, 9,500 in the Nineteenth Corps, 6,000 in Crook's command, and 6,500 cavalry. The infantry probably numbered 23,000: Ricketts 8,500, Emory 9,000, Crook 5,500. Of these, therefore, the hard fighting fell on 17,500. The losses in the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, nearly all incurred in the early morning, being about 4,500, the two corps should have mustered 13,500 for the counter-attack of the afternoon, yet the ground they then stood upon, from the road to the brook, measures barely 7,400 feet. With all allowances, therefore, Sheridan cannot have taken more than 8,000 of his infantry into this attack. This leaves out Crook's men bodily, and calls for 5,500 unrepentant stragglers from the ranks of Emory and Wright -one man in three. After all is said, unhappily there is nothing so extraordinary in this, but strange indeed would it have been if many of these skulkers had come back into the fight, as Sheridan considerately declares they did.

As to Early's force, the difficulty of coming to a positive conclusion is even greater. General Early himself says he went into the battle with but 8,800 muskets. General Dawes, perhaps the most accomplished statistician of the war, makes the total present for duty 22,000; of these 15,000 would be infantry. The figures presented by the unprejudiced statistician of the "Century War Book" (11) call for 15,000 of all arms. Of these 10,000 would be infantry.

Early may be said to have accomplished the ultimate object of his attack at Cedar Creek, yet at a fearful cost, for although all thought of transferring any part of Sheridan's force to the James was for the moment given up, on the other hand Early had completed the destruction (12) of his prestige, had suffered an irreparable diminution of numbers, and had seen his army almost shaken to pieces.

Grant once more returned to his favorite project of a movement in force on Charlottesville and Gordonsville, but Sheridan continuing to oppose the scheme tenaciously, it came to nothing. His own plan, eventually carried out, was to hold the lower valley in sufficient strength, and to move against the line of the Virginia Central railway with all his cavalry. The rails of the Mana.s.sas Gap line, so often relaid, were once more and for the last time taken up from the Blue Ridge back to Augur's outposts at Bull Run, and so this will-o'-the-wisp, that had danced before the eyes of the government ever since 1861, was at last extinguished, while from Winchester to the Potomac the railway, abandoned by Johnston when he marched to Bull Run, was re-constructed to simplify the question of supplies.

(1) Strictly southeast, for the course of the turnpike toward Winchester is about northeast.

(2) The present bridge is a short distance above where the old one was.

(3) Dwight having been in arrest during the past fortnight by Emory's orders under charges growing out of criticisms and statements made in his report of the battle of the Opequon, McMillan commanded the First division, leaving his brigade to Thomas. Beal had gone home on leave of absence when the campaign seemed ended, and Davis commanded his brigade.

(4) Being actually three days past the full, the moon rose October 18-19, 1864 at 8.5 P.M., southed at 2.25 A.M., and set at 8.45 A.M. Daylight on the 19th was at 5.40 A.M.; the sun rose at 6.14, set at 5.16; twilight ended 5.50 P.M.