History of Morgan's Cavalry Part 14

Although the men had been accustomed to look forward to the time of their arrival at Gallatin, as a period when they would enjoy profound rest, they were not long left quiet after quitting there. General John C. Breckinridge had just gotten to Murfreesboro' with a small force. He was desirous of impressing the enemy at Nashville with an exaggerated idea of his strength, so that the army of Buell (or of Rosecrans it was then), might not be in any too great haste to drive him away from Murfreesboro', when it reached Nashville. General Bragg was limping on so slowly, that it was by no means certain that a swinging march would not put the enemy in possession of the whole of Middle Tennessee (with scarcely a skirmish), and shut Bragg up in East Tennessee. With the instinct, too, which he felt in common with all men who are born generals, Breckinridge wished to press upon the enemy and strike him if he discovered a vulnerable point.

He learned that a large lot of rolling-stock (of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad), had been collected in Edgefield. There were, perhaps, three hundred cars in all. If these were burned, the damage done the enemy, and the delay occasioned him, would be very great. The cars were collected at a locality commanded by the batteries on the Capitol hill, and so near the river, that all the forces in the city could be readily used to protect them. Breckinridge depended upon Morgan to burn them, but planned a diversion on the south side of the river, which he hoped would attract the enemy's attention strongly, and long enough, to enable Morgan to do his work.

The day after we arrived at Gallatin, a dispatch was received from General Breckinridge, communicating his plan. Forrest was to move on the southeastern side of Nashville, supported by the Kentucky infantry brigade, and Morgan was instructed to dash into Edgefield and burn the cars, while Forrest was making all the racket he could. There was one flaw in this plan, which no one perceived until all was over. Morgan could not hope to succeed, unless, by moving all night, he got close enough to Edgefield, to dash in early in the morning, before his presence was even suspected. If he marched in the day time, or remained after daylight in the vicinity of the place, his presence would certainly be discovered, and preparations would be made to receive him. But if he attacked at daylight, he scarcely allowed time for the troops on the other side to commence their work, or at any rate, was likely to attack simultaneously with them; when their attack, rousing every thing, would, perhaps, do more harm than good. It so turned out.

Our brigade moved all night (of the 5th), and striking through the woods came upon the northern side of Edgefield. Just as we struck the pickets, we heard Forrest's guns on the other side of the river. The Second Kentucky was in advance, and as the head of the column was struggling over a very rough place in the railroad, it was opened upon by a company of infantry pickets, who came out from behind a small house, about sixty yards off. I never saw men fight better than these fellows did. They were forty or fifty strong, and had to retreat about half a mile, to reach their lines. The timber of the ground over which they had to retreat had been cut down to leave the way clear for the play of artillery and we could not charge them. Few men beside those in the advance guard got a chance at them. They turned and fought at every step. At least eight or ten were killed, and only three captured.

I lost three of my advance guard. Conrad of the guard was riding a large gray horse, which saved his life. He rode close upon the enemy, and one of them, presenting his gun within a few feet of his breast, fired; Conrad reined his horse tightly, making him rear and receive the ball in his chest. The horse fell dead, pinning his rider to the ground. We pressed on to within a hundred yards of the railroad embankment, in the bottom near the river, and quite through Edgefield. Some little time was required to get all the regiment up, and Hutchinson and I had just formed it, and the line was advancing, when Colonel Morgan ordered us back. He had reconnoitered, and had seen a strong force of infantry behind the embankment; and the fire slackening on the other side, induced him to suppose that more infantry, which we could see double-quicking across the pontoon bridge, was the entire garrison of that side coming to oppose him. It turned out that this force coming over the bridge, was small; but the Sixteenth Illinois and part of another regiment, were stationed behind the embankment, and among the cars we wished to burn. We succeeded in burning a few-Lieutenants Drake and Quirk (who generally hunted together) superintended the work. A good deal of firing was kept up by the enemy upon the detail engaged in the work of destruction, but without effect. So little attention was paid to what Forrest was doing, that when we drew off altogether, the enemy followed us a mile or two. As the column filed off from the by-road (by which it had approached Edgefield) on the Gallatin pike, the enemy drove back the pickets which had been sent down the pike.

The point at which we entered the pike is about a mile and a quarter from Nashville. For a while there seemed to be great danger that the enemy would take us in flank, but the column got fairly out upon the pike before the blue-coats hove in sight. A few of us remained behind after the rear guard pa.s.sed to ascertain the truth of a report the pickets brought, that the enemy were moving up artillery. The head of an infantry column had made its appearance on the pike, but halted about three hundred yards from where we were, and no firing had as yet occurred on either side. They seemed disposed to reconnoiter, and we were not anxious to draw their fire.

Hutchinson soon determined to see them closer, and called to one of the advance guard, whom he had kept with him, to accompany him. This man was celebrated, not only for his cool, unflinching courage, but also as the best shot in the Second Kentucky. Every old "Morgan man" will remember, if he has not already recognized, Billy Cooper. Breckinridge and I remonstrated with Hutchinson, and urged that his action would only precipitate the enemy's attack and our retreat-that we would be driven away before we had witnessed all that we wished to see. There were only seven or eight men in our party; Gano encouraged him to go-and he declared that he would go-unless I positively ordered him to remain. He accordingly started-Cooper with him. There was a considerable depression in the pike between our position and that of the enemy. Just as our enterprising friends got down into this hollow, and about half of the distance they were going, the enemy, having completed the necessary dispositions, commenced moving forward. I shouted to Hutchinson, informing him of it, but the noise of his horse's hoofs drowned my voice; before he discovered the enemy, he was in thirty paces of their column. He fired his pistol, and Cooper, rising in his stirrups, discharged his gun killing a man; both then wheeled and spurred away at full speed. They got back into the hollow in time to save themselves, but while we were admiring their rapid retreat and particularly noticing Hutchinson, who came back in great glee, whipping his horse with his hat as was his custom when in a tight place, a volley, intended for them, came rattling into us. Two or three citizens who had collected to see the fun fled like deer, although one of them was a cripple-and, to tell the truth, we left as rapidly.

I shall never forget this occasion, because it was the first and only time that I ever saw Colonel Richard M. Gano frightened. He was sitting on his horse, complacently eyeing Hutchinson's brisk retreat, and, apparently, not even remotely supposing that the enemy were likely to fire. One ball pierced a Mexican blanket which was wrapped around him, sending the red stuff with which it was lined flying about his head. I thought, and so did he, that it was his blood. If I had been mortally wounded, I could not have helped laughing at the injured look he at once drew on; it was the look of a man who had confided, and had been deceived. "Why, Duke," he said, "they're shooting at us." Some one told Major Alston that something was going on in the rear, "that would do to go in the papers," and he joined us, as the enemy fired a second volley, just in time to get his best horse shot. Although we burned a few cars, the expedition was a failure-we went to burn all. Returning to Gallatin that night (the 6th), we found that we were not yet to be permitted rest. Our scouts soon began to bring in news of the approach of Rosecrans' army, which was marching by the Louisville and Nashville pike, and the Scottsville and Gallatin pike, to Nashville. Crittenden's corps was in advance, a portion on each road. Colonel Morgan determined to ambuscade the division marching on the Louisville and Nashville road, at a point near Tyree Springs. He selected two hundred men for the expedition. So much excitement was antic.i.p.ated upon it, that all of his field officers begged to go. After a good deal of solicitation, he permitted Gano and myself to accompany him, leaving Hutchinson in command of the remainder of the brigade at Gallatin. The party detailed for this expedition, reached the neighborhood of the proposed scene of ambush late at night, and on the next morning (the 8th), at daybreak, took position.

The Federal troops had encamped at Tyree Springs the night before. First one or two sutlers' wagons pa.s.sed, which were not molested, although when we saw one fellow stop, and deliberately kill and skin a sheep and throw it into his wagon, a general desire was felt to rob him in his turn. After a little while, an advance guard of cavalry came, and then the infantry rolled along in steady column, laughing and singing in the fresh morning air. As soon as the head of the column approached our position, our line arose and fired. We were within seventy-five yards of the road, on a hill, which told against our chances of doing execution, but the men had been cautioned to aim low. The column, unprepared for such an entertainment, recoiled, but soon rallied and charged the hill. Artillery was brought up and opened upon us. We did not stay long. Our loss was one man killed. I have never been able to learn satisfactorily what was the enemy's loss. Many reports were received about it, some of which must have been greatly exaggerated. Colonel Morgan immediately moved rapidly to get in the rear of this column. He accordingly struck the road again, some three miles north of Tyree Springs. Posting the bulk of his force in a woods on the side of the road, he, himself, with Lieutenant Quirk and two or three others, went some distance up the pike, and occupied themselves in picking up stragglers, which he would send back to the main body, where they would be placed under guard. In this way some forty or fifty prisoners were taken. Suddenly Stokes' regiment came up the road from toward Tyree Springs, and drove the detachment immediately upon the road, consisting of about fifty men, back to the main body, thus cutting off Colonel Morgan and his party. Couriers were immediately sent to Colonel Morgan to warn him of his danger, but they did not reach him. He was returning, however, about that time, and quickened his pace when he heard a few shots fired. He was bringing back some ten or twelve prisoners. He, Lieutenant Quirk, and one or two men, forming the head of a column, of which the prisoners composed the body. Suddenly he rode right into this Federal regiment. He was, of course, halted and questioned. He stated that he was a Federal Colonel, that his regiment was only a short distance off, and that the prisoners with him were men he had arrested for straggling. His questioners strongly doubted his story, and said that his dress was a very strange one for a Federal Colonel, that rebels often wore blue clothes, but they had never heard of their officers wearing gray. The prisoners, who knew him, and never doubted that he would be now captured in his turn, listened, grinning, to the conversation, but said nothing. He suddenly pretended to grow angry, said that he would bring his regiment to convince them who he was, and galloped away. Quirk followed him. Before an effort could be made to stop them, they leaped their horses over the fence, and struck, at full speed, across the country. In the course of an hour they rejoined the rest of us, and relieved our minds of very grave apprehensions.

It is probable that no other man than Colonel Morgan would have escaped (in such a situation) death or capture. But his presence of mind and address, in the midst of a great and imminent danger, were literally perfect. I have known many similar escapes, where the chances were not so desperate; but in each case but this, there was some circ.u.mstance to intimidate, or to contribute to mystify the enemy. On this occasion every circ.u.mstance was adverse to him. He could expect no rescue from his friends, for we had managed so badly, that the enemy had gotten between him and us. He was dressed in full Confederate uniform. The enemy knew that the Confederate forces were near by, and it was reasonable to suppose that he was attached to them. The prisoners were there to tell on him. He had nothing to depend upon but the audacity and address which never failed him, and a quality even higher than courage-I can describe it only as the faculty of subjecting every one to his will, whom he tried to influence; it was almost mesmeric. The prisoners fifty or sixty in number, were paroled in the course of the day and started back to Kentucky by a route which would enable them to avoid meeting detachments of their own army. Our party encamped that night about seven miles from Gallatin. Colonel Morgan when he started upon this expedition, knew that Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions were marching toward Gallatin, and he cautioned Hutchinson not to make a fight, if during his absence the enemy approached the town, simultaneously, upon more than two roads. He knew that Hutchinson would be vigilant, but he feared that his indisposition to avoid fighting would induce him to engage a larger force of the enemy than he could repulse. Early in the morning of the day succeeding that on which the events I have just described occurred, the enemy marched into Gallatin. They had threatened the place on three sides during the night, but Hutchinson hoping to repulse them, would not retire.

In the morning, however, they demonstrated in such strength, as to convince him that he had better not fight-and so, sending the brigade on the Lebanon road to cross the c.u.mberland, he retained only the advance-guard of the Second Kentucky, and the howitzers, to salute the enemy as they entered. His guns were planted upon the eminence on the Lebanon road, just outside of town, and, as the head of a column of infantry turned into that road, they were opened, causing it to recoil. Several good shots were made, but as the little pieces were limbered up to move off, a line of infantry was discovered drawn up across the road in the rear of the party-it had taken position very quietly, while they were amusing themselves cannonading the troops in town.

Hutchinson, Breckinridge, Alston, and nearly every field and staff officer of the brigade, were in the trap. They tried to escape upon another road, and found that also blockaded. Finally, sending the howitzers and the advance-guard across a pasture into the Springfield road, Hutchinson, with the numerous "officials" in his train, made the best of his way across the country, and rejoined the brigade. The advance-guard and the howitzers dashed gallantly past a large body of the enemy, but were neither checked nor injured. The retreat of the others, diverted (as was intended) attention from them to some extent, and they rattled on down the pike at a brisk canter, confident, now (that they were not surrounded), that they could whip a moderate sized brigade.

About three miles from town, they met our detachment of two hundred men; at first (thinking us a party of the enemy sent to enter the town by that road), they prepared to attack and route us, but finding out who we were, let us off with the scare. We had already learned that the enemy had entered Gallatin, and I was especially rejoiced to find the "bull pups," and my advance-guard-the flower of my regiment-all safe. Colonel Morgan learned directly from the officer in command of this party, the particulars of the affair, and was satisfied that all had gotten away. We at once turned toward the river, and marching, until we reached it, through the woods and fields, crossed at a ford, some miles lower down than that which the brigade had crossed. We reached Lebanon on the same afternoon, and found our fugitive friends there. Colonel Morgan formally congratulated Hutchinson upon his "improved method of holding a town."

This was the 9th, and the bulk of the brigade went into camp, four miles from Lebanon, on the Murfreesboro' pike. As Rosecrans' army came pouring into Nashville, the commandant there manifested a strong disposition to learn how matters stood outside. On the night of the 9th, a force of the enemy came down the Nashville and Lebanon pike to Silver Springs, seven miles from Lebanon. Scouts were sent to examine this force, and returned, reporting that it manifested no disposition to move. Almost immediately after the scouts came back to Lebanon, the enemy came, too, having moved just behind the scouts. There was no force in Lebanon to meet them, and they held the place until Hine's company, of Breckinridge's battalion, was sent to drive them out. That night Breckinridge's entire battalion was sent to the town, supported by Bennett's regiment. On the evening of the 11th, they were both driven away, by a heavy force of infantry and cavalry, but, reinforced by Gano, checked the enemy a short distance from the town. When the enemy retreated, Gano pressed them, taking one hundred and fifty-eight prisoners, and a number of guns. On the 13th or 14th, the enemy returned, and Breckinridge drove them away, following them eleven miles on the Hartsville pike. On this occasion a very handsome feat was performed by a scouting party under command of Sergeant McCormick, of Breckinridge's battalion. Billy Peyton, who had killed an officer and brought off his horse and pistol, a day or two before, went with him as "military adviser." Major Breckinridge sent this scouting party to find where the enemy halted. It went through the woods and found the enemy encamped on the river bank, fifteen miles from Lebanon. Returning by the road, the party stumbled upon a vidette, stationed about a half mile from the camp, and between it and a picket base, which he said was a short distance off. He also informed them that all the pickets had been notified that a scouting party would shortly leave camp, and pa.s.s through them on that road. The idea at once occurred to McCormick to represent that scouting party with his; so, carrying the prisoner with him, he rode through the pickets at the head of his men, receiving and returning their salutes. John Haps, of Company F, Second Kentucky, tightly gripping the prisoner's throat, meanwhile, to prevent inopportune disclosures. Just as the party got clear of the base, they were discovered, and one man's horse falling, he was made prisoner. On the 15th, Breckinridge and Bennett were sent to Baird's mill, eight miles from Lebanon, and eleven from Murfreesboro', where the Second Kentucky had been encamped since the 10th. During that time it had been operating in the direction of Nashville, the most successful expedition having been made by Major Bowles, who defeated a body of the enemy superior in numbers to his own detachment, killing several and taking some prisoners. About this time a large force of the enemy took position at Jefferson, seven miles from Baird's mill. This force required constant watching, and scouts were kept in sight of the encampment at all hours of the twenty-four, with instructions to fire upon the pickets as often as each detail was relieved. Spence's battery was sent from Murfreesboro' to Baird's mill, to reinforce us. On the 16th, Gano, who had remained at Lebanon, was driven away by a large force of cavalry and two brigades of infantry. One of the latter got in his rear, and gave him a good deal of trouble. After making a gallant fight, he fell back to Baird's mill; and then carried Breckinridge, Bennett, and the Second Kentucky, back to Lebanon to attack the enemy there. Colonel Morgan had been at Black's shop, four miles nearer to Murfreesboro', for several days, and I had gone to Murfreesboro' on that day, the 16th. When I returned to Baird's mill, I found every thing gone, but a few pickets, and the scouts reported indications of an advance from Jefferson. When I reached Gano, I found him just taking position to fight (he thought), and planting his battery (Spence's) to sh.e.l.l the camp, the fires of which we could plainly see. I dissuaded him from opening with artillery, for I did not wish to fight at Lebanon, when there seemed such an imminent prospect of an attack upon Baird's mill. Gano was not satisfied to return until an examination showed the camp deserted. The enemy had moved off, leaving their fires burning. Gano had hurried from Baird's mill, with his reinforcements, so rapidly, that he had not given his scouts time to reconnoiter. I immediately carried the brigade back to Baird's mill. The saddles were kept upon the horses all night, and the men lay down in line of battle, but the enemy did not attack. Two or three days after this, Hutchinson was sent, with a portion of the Second Kentucky, to watch the Nashville and Lebanon pike, between Stone river and Silver Springs, at which latter place a strong force of the enemy was encamped. Information had been received that foraging parties of the enemy had been habitually resorting to that particular neighborhood, and it was thought that some of them could be caught. Hutchinson missed the foragers, but captured a picket detail thirty or forty strong, at Stone river, and brought his prisoners and their horses into camp. A little later Major Steele, with a detachment from his regiment, went on an expedition to Hartsville. Just as his column had crossed the river, and ascended the bank, it was attacked by a portion of Woolford's regiment. Major Steele was forced to recross the river and return, but before doing so, beat off his first a.s.sailants. On the 23rd, Hutchinson, with Company A, of Breckinridge's battalion, and a detail from the Second Kentucky, in all, two hundred men, and the howitzers, attacked the enemy encamped at Gallatin, landing on the southern side, and drove them out of their encampment and across the river. A good many other scouts and expeditions were made, replete with personal adventures, the details of which have escaped my memory.

It was a very busy season, and a good many prisoners were taken; they were brought in from some quarter every day. Our own loss was slight. Colonel Morgan believed that, with enemies so near him, in so many quarters, he could defend himself only by a.s.suming the offensive.

General Bragg's army did not get to Murfreesboro' until the 20th or 21st. During that time, General Breckinridge had some four thousand infantry. Rosecrans' army must have been concentrated in Nashville by the 12th. Two days' marching would have brought them to Murfreesboro'. General Breckinridge could not have repulsed it; of course it could have been subsisted for a week off of the country, or its foragers had lost their cunning. In that time General Bragg would have been forced, in all probability, to return to East Tennessee, without a chance to deliver battle with a rational hope of success. His army was footsore, weary, and could not have been readily concentrated. Buell was removed because he was thought to be "slow," and dull to perceive and seize favorable opportunities. There will always be a difference of opinion about which opportunities were the safest to seize. A very prevalent opinion obtained in "Morgan's cavalry" (who thought that they appreciated Buell), that had he been in command at Nashville, on the 12th of November, 1862, he would have marched without delay on Murfreesboro'. It is not too much to claim that Morgan's destruction of the railroads delayed, not only the concentration at Nashville, but the movement thence to Murfreesboro'. The activity of Morgan, Forrest and the other Confederate cavalry commanders, in November, and the firm att.i.tude of Breckinridge, also contributed to prevent it.

In the latter part of November, Colonels Cluke and Chenault rejoined the brigade. Their regiments were not improved by the trip through the mountains, and the list of absentees from each was large. Major Stoner also brought a battalion to Morgan, transferred from Marshall's brigade. About the same time, the men of the "Old Squadron," who had been captured at Lebanon, came to us. They had been exchanged a month or two previously, but had been unable to get to the brigade sooner. We were glad to welcome them back. They had been only seven months away, and they returned to find the command they had last seen as less than half a regiment, now grown to a brigade of five regiments and two battalions.

These men were organized by Colonel Morgan, into a company of scouts, to be attached to no regiment. Lieutenant Thomas Quirk was appointed to command them, and Lieutenant Owens, who had been captured and exchanged with them, was made their First Lieutenant. Lieutenant Sellers, who had been also captured at Lebanon, was a.s.signed to one of Bennett's companies; the scouts were at once armed, equipped and mounted-the company numbered about sixty, total effective, and was a very fine one. On the 24th, the Second Kentucky, under command of Hutchinson, and Breckinridge's battalion, were sent to Fayetteville, Lincoln county, Tennessee, to rest men and horses; and the other regiments of the brigade were less severely worked than during the past two or three weeks.

Rosecrans seemed extremely anxious to shut us out from the country around Gallatin and Hartsville-perhaps on account of the supplies of meat which could be obtained there, and which the sympathy of the people enabled us to obtain, if we could readily communicate with them. Strong garrisons were established at Gallatin and Castalian Springs, about six or eight miles from Hartsville, and at the latter place. The fact that any force of Confederates marching to attack these garrisons, unless they made a wide detour eastward, would expose its flank and rear to attack from Nashville-not to consider the resistance of the garrisons themselves-seemed to insure that country from Confederate intrusion.

But it was right hard to keep Morgan out of Sumner county-he had a great affection for it. He persistently applied for permission to attack the force stationed at Hartsville, and it was at length granted him. He was allowed to select two regiments from the Kentucky infantry brigade, and to take also Cobb's battery, a very fine one, attached to that brigade. The "Kentucky brigade" was commanded by Colonel Roger W. Hanson, who had been only a short time before exchanged, with his gallant regiment, the Second Kentucky infantry, which had been captured at Donelson. One of the colonels of the brigade, was Thomas H. Hunt, a very superior officer, who, with his regiment, the Ninth Kentucky, one of the best in the Confederate service, had seen arduous and hazardous service at Shiloh, Corinth and Baton Rouge. Colonel Morgan asked that this officer (his uncle) should command the infantry regiments, which were to form part of his force for the expedition; and Colonel Hunt selected his own regiment and the Second Kentucky (infantry).

On the morning of the 7th of December, Colonel Morgan set out on this expedition. The cavalry force was placed under my command, and consisted of Gano's, Bennett's, Cluke's and Chenault's regiments, and Stoner's battalion-in all numbering about fifteen hundred men. Hanson's brigade was encamped at Baird's mill. Here the infantry detachment joined us, seven hundred strong; the full strength of neither regiment was taken. Quirk's "scouts" and other scouting parties were sent to reconnoiter in the direction of Hartsville, to watch the enemy at Castalian Springs, and the fords of the river, and to picket the Nashville and Lebanon pike. The "combined forces" left Baird's mill about 11 a.m., and pa.s.sed through Lebanon about 2 p.m., taking the Lebanon and Hartsville pike. The snow lay upon the ground and the cold was intense.

The infantry had been promised that they should ride part of the way, and, accordingly, a few miles beyond Lebanon a portion of the cavalry gave up the horses to them. This, however, was an injudicious measure. The infantry had gotten their feet wet in trudging through the snow, and, after riding a short time, were nearly frozen and clamored to dismount. The cavalrymen had now gotten their feet saturated with moisture, and when they remounted, suffered greatly in their turn. There was some trouble, too, in returning the horses to the proper parties (as this last exchange was effected after dark), and the infantrymen d.a.m.ned the cavalry service with all the resources of a soldier's vocabulary.

The infantry and Cobb's battery reached the ferry where it was intended that they should cross, about ten o'clock at night, and were put across in two small leaky boats, a difficult and tedious job. When the cavalry reached the ford, where Colonel Morgan had directed me to cross, I found that the river had risen so much since the last reconnoisance that it was past fording at that point, and I had to seek a crossing further down. The ford (where I decided to cross) was so difficult to come at, that the operation of crossing was made very slow. The men could reach the river bank only by a narrow bridle path which admitted only one man at a time. They were then compelled to gather their horses and leap into the river, over the bluff about four feet high. Horse and man would generally be submerged by the plunge-a cold bath very unpleasant in such weather. The ascent on the other side was nearly as difficult. In a little while the pa.s.sage of the horses rendered the approach to the river even more difficult. The ford was not often used, and the unbeaten path became cut up and muddy. It grew worse and worse. The cold (after the ducking in the river) affected the men horribly; those who got across first built fires, at which they partially warmed themselves while the others were crossing. Only fifteen, however, were frozen so stiff that they had to be left.

Finding, as the night wore on, that day would appear before all got across, and fearing that I would detain Colonel Morgan, I moved (with those already on the northern bank) about three o'clock, leaving a great part of my column still on the southern side of the river. I posted pickets to watch the roads by which they could be attacked, and instructed the officers to hurry on to Hartsville as soon as practicable. I had about five miles to march to rejoin Colonel Morgan, and found him at the point he had designated, some three miles from Hartsville. He decided not to wait for the remainder of the cavalry, fearing that information would be taken to Castalian Springs (where six thousand Federal troops were encamped), and he would be himself attacked. He, therefore, moved forward at once. Just at daylight the cavalry, who were marching in front, came upon a strong picket force, about half a mile from the encampment, who fired and retreated. We were thus prevented from surprising the enemy before they formed. Colonel Morgan did not, however, expect to do so, for he had no certain plan of capturing the pickets without giving the alarm.

Bennett's regiment was immediately sent around the encampment, and into the town of Hartsville. Colonel Morgan ordered me to form Cluke's and Chenault's regiments opposite the right flank of the line the enemy were establishing, and partially outflanking it. The enemy was encamped in wooded ground, slightly elevated above the surrounding fields. The left flank of the line they formed rested upon open ground near the river. Opposite their right flank and center was a large meadow, between which and the woods was a slight depression, which gradually deepened toward the southward, until from a valley it became a ravine, and when it approached the river was perhaps ten feet deep, and its banks were almost precipitous. Colonel Morgan had intended to let the infantry of his command form in this ravine and attack from it, but the enemy's line was established so near to it that this was not attempted.

When we came in sight of the enemy and saw them forming, it was at once plain that the force there was much stronger than it had been represented to be. Instead of fifteen hundred men, as Colonel Morgan had estimated it to be from the reports of his spies, it was more than twenty-five hundred strong. I said to him, "You have more work cut out for you, than you bargained for." "Yes," he answered, "you gentleman must whip and catch these fellows, and cross the river in two hours and a half, or we'll have six thousand more on our backs." Cluke's and Chenault's regiments after deducting horse-holders, numbered four hundred and fifty men, between them. I formed Cluke opposite the One Hundred and Fourth Ohio Infantry, eight hundred strong, and formed Chenault obtusely to Cluke (on the latter's left), with his (Chenault's) left flank inclining toward the enemy, and outflanking him. The infantry were shortly afterward formed opposite the center of the enemy-Cobb's battery confronted the enemy's left flank. Our entire force in the fight (Bennett having been sent to Hartsville to prevent the escape of the enemy in that direction) was twelve hundred and fifty men. I have neglected to state that Stoner's battalion had been sent, with the "Bull pups," down the Hartsville and Lebanon pike to take position opposite the enemy's encampment. Stoner was instructed to maneuver in sight of the enemy, and sh.e.l.l away at them briskly. Colonel Morgan knew that the little pieces could not reach the encampment, but he wished the enemy's attention attracted to that quarter.

Stoner succeeded so well that the two Parrot guns which the enemy had were engaged with him, when we took position, and we were spared the annoyance they could have inflicted while we were forming. As I have said we failed to surprise the Federal force in its camp-and the only advantage which our sudden appearance gave us, was the partial demoralization which is apt to a.s.sail all troops, when unexpectedly and promptly attacked. The enemy naturally thought that we were in overwhelming force, or that we would not have incurred such risks.

One good sign was, that, as we formed in sight of each other, our ringing shouts were answered by the feeblest of cheers. Cluke and Chenault having formed at a gallop, immediately dismounted their men and advanced. The enemy's line was about four hundred yards distant. A line of skirmishers occupied the hollow, posted behind a fence, whose fire did us some little damage. These two regiments had never been under fire before (with the exception of a slight skirmish which Cluke's had witnessed in Kentucky) and I was not at first certain that they would drive their part of the line. But they moved on with perfect steadiness, halting (after having advanced about a hundred yards) to discharge a volley which dislodged the skirmishers, and then, after reloading, pressed on at a swift run. The enemy fired by rank, each volley pa.s.sing over our heads, for the men had reached the hollow. No time was given them to reload. When within sixty yards our fellows opened, Cluke pressing right upon the front, and Chenault having swept so far round, and then closed in, that the two regiments were firing almost into each other's faces.

The open cavalry formation not only enabled us with a smaller force, to cover the entire front of the enemy opposed to us, but while exposing us to less loss, made our fire more deadly. The One Hundred and Fourth Ohio backed about twenty steps, the men striving to reload their guns, and it then broke and ran in perfect disorder. Cluke and Chenault moved on, swinging around to the right, until they were formed at right angles to the original direction of their line, and the force confronting them was lapped back upon the rest of the enemy's line. This lasted about twenty minutes. By that time Colonel Hunt had formed his infantry, and he sent them in, in echelon, the Second Kentucky in advance. Cobb's battery had not been idle, and had gotten one caisson blown up by a sh.e.l.l from one of the enemy's Parrots.

The infantry had marched quite thirty miles, over slippery roads, and through the chilling cold, and I saw some of them stumble (as they charged), with fatigue and numbness, but the brave boys rushed in as if they were going to a frolic. The Second Kentucky dashed over the ravine, and as they emerged in some disorder, an unfortunate order was given them, to halt and "dress." There was no necessity for it-the regiment was within fifty yards of the enemy, who were recoiling and dropping before their fire. Several officers sprang to the front and countermanded the order-it was a matter of doubt who gave it-and Captain Joyes, seizing the colors, shouted to the men to follow him.

The regiment rushed on again, but in that brief halt, sustained nearly all of its loss. Just then, the Ninth Kentucky came to its support-the men yelling and gliding over the ground like panthers. The enemy gave way in confusion, and were pressed again on their right and rear by Cluke and Chenault, who were at this juncture reinforced by seventy-five men of Gano's regiment, who came up under Lieutenant Colonel Huffman, commanding the regiment in Gano's absence, and Major Steele, and at once went into the fight. A few minutes then sufficed to finish the affair. The enemy were crowded together in a narrow s.p.a.ce, and were dropping like sheep. The white flag was hoisted in an hour after the first shot was fired. Our loss in killed and wounded was one hundred and twenty-five, of which the Second Kentucky lost sixty-five, the Ninth, eighteen; the cavalry thirty-two, and Cobb's battery, ten. Lieutenant Colonel Coleman, a gallant and accomplished officer, was seriously wounded. His regiment, the Eighth Kentucky (Cluke's), was devotedly attached to him, and could ill afford to lose his valuable services. Some fine officers were lost by the infantry regiments. A loss which was deeply regretted by Morgan's entire command, was that of little Craven Peyton. Colonel Morgan invariably selected as his orderlies bright, intelligent, gentlemanly little fellows from among the boys of his command. They were not required to perform the ordinary services of an orderly, but were treated more like staff officers, and were a.s.signed such duties, as are usually required of an aide.

This was an excellent method of spoiling young soldiers-but Colonel Morgan permitted himself such luxuries. Of all these, Craven Peyton was the most celebrated and popular. His integrity and sense was such, that officers of the command would not hesitate to act upon an order which he bore, although unwritten, and he possessed the most remarkable daring and determination. Exposing himself in this fight with his usual recklessness, he received a wound, which disabled him so much that he could not be removed. He was made prisoner, and in a few days fretted himself to death. The enemy's loss, in killed and wounded, was over four hundred, and two thousand and four prisoners were carried off to Murfreesboro'. If there ever was a fight to which the time honored phrase, so frequent in official reports, was applicable, viz.: "That where all behaved so well," etc.,-it was this one. It would indeed be difficult to a.s.sign the palm. Every officer and man seemed inspired with the most perfect confidence and the most dauntless resolution. Every regiment and company rushed recklessly and irresistibly upon every thing confronting it, and the sudden discovery, at the beginning of the fight, that the enemy were so much stronger than we had supposed them to be, seemed only to increase their courage. They had literally made up their minds not to be beaten, and I firmly believe, that five thousand more could not have beaten them. The tents, and every thing which could not be carried off, were burned; a number of captured wagons were loaded with arms and portable stores, and hurried over the river-four or five wagons which did not cross the river, were driven into the woods and their contents secreted. Some of the most valuable captures, were in boots and shoes-for many of the men (especially of Cluke's and Chenault's regiments) had no other covering for their feet than old rags.

The prisoners were gotten across the river as rapidly as possible-and the infantry were taken over behind the cavalrymen. Some of the prisoners were made to wade the river, as the enemy from Castalian Springs began to press upon us so closely that we could not "stand upon the order of transportation." Cluke's regiment was posted upon the Gallatin road to hold the enemy in check-Quirk's scouts having already r.e.t.a.r.ded their advance. Gano's regiment was sent as soon as it got up to support Cluke. Nothing but the rapid style in which the fight had been conducted and finished saved us. We had no sooner evacuated the ground than the enemy occupied it, and our guns which opened upon them from the southern sh.o.r.e, were answered by their batteries.

No pursuit was attempted, and we marched leisurely back through Lebanon, regaining our camps late in the night. Two splendid pieces of artillery were among the trophies-which did good service in our hands, until they were recaptured upon the "Ohio raid." This expedition was justly esteemed the most brilliant thing that Morgan had ever done, and was referred to with pride by every man who was in it.

General Bragg in his congratulatory order issued to the army on account of it, spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of the troops-especially of the remarkable march of the infantry, and he says: "To Brigadier General Morgan and to Colonel Hunt the General tenders his thanks, and a.s.sures them of the admiration of his army. The intelligence, zeal and gallantry displayed by them will serve as an example and an incentive to still more honorable deeds. To the other brave officers and men composing the expedition the General tenders his cordial thanks and congratulations. He is proud of them and hails the success achieved by their valor as but the precursor of still greater victories. Each corps engaged in the action will in future bear upon its colors the name of the memorable field."

CHAPTER XII

The victory of Hartsville brought Colonel Morgan his long-expected and long-delayed commission of Brigadier-General. He had long been styled General by his men, and had been of late habitually so addressed in official communications from array headquarters. Many and urgent applications had been made by influential parties and officers of high rank for his promotion. General Smith had strongly urged it, General Bragg concurring, but while Brigadiers were being uttered as rapidly almost as Confederate money, he remained a simple Colonel. President Davis happened to visit Murfreesboro' a few days after the Hartsville affair, and gave him his commission, making Hanson, also, a Brigadier of even date. This promotion of my chief made me a Colonel, and Hutchinson a Lieutenant-Colonel, thus ill.u.s.trating that many felicitous consequences will sometimes flow from one good act. The latter had occupied a very anomalous position; while really a Captain, he had acted us, and been styled Lieutenant-Colonel. Being a most excellent officer, who had seen a great deal of service, and acting as second in command of an unusually large regiment, he was placed frequently upon detached service, and in very responsible situations, and frequently commanded Lieutenant-Colonels of legitimate manufacture, just as Morgan, while only a General "by courtesy," commanded floating Brigadiers who came within his vortex. It proved more agreeable to men, who were really modest, to take rank by the virtue of commissions rather than by the force of impudence, and the example was better. General Hardee urged that the commission should be made out as Major-General, but Mr. Davis said, "I do not wish to give my boys all of their sugar plums at once."

At Bryantsville, in Kentucky, Colonel Joseph Wheeler had been appointed Chief of Cavalry, and Morgan, Scott, Ashby-all of the cavalry commanders had been ordered to report to him. Colonel Wheeler was a very dashing officer, and had done excellent service, but he had neither the experience nor the record of Morgan, and the latter did not fancy having to serve under him. He was with Wheeler so little, however, in Kentucky, that he found not much inconvenience from having a "Chief of cavalry" to superintend him. Morgan was, of course, perfectly independent upon his retreat out of Kentucky, and in his operations afterward in North Middle Tennessee-indeed, with the exception of having to report to General Breckinridge, while the latter was in command at Murfreesboro', and afterward to the Commander-in-chief, he was perfectly independent until a period even later than that of his promotion. But this is a subject for a later chapter. A great many injudicious friends of Morgan were inclined to attribute the delay of his promotion to prejudice upon the part of Mr. Davis, against him in particular, and Kentuckians in general.

There is no doubt but that General Morgan's free and easy way of appointing his own officers and of conducting all of his military affairs, as well as his intense aversion to subordinate positions, had excited much official disapprobation and some indignation against him at Richmond. He had been careless and dilatory, too, in making out and forwarding the muster-rolls of his regiment, an omission which was undoubtedly censurable, and unpardonable in the eyes of the Pundits of the War Department, with whom such papers were the gospels of military government. General Morgan paid too little attention to matters of this kind, essential to the transaction of military business, and the proper conduct of the affairs of the army, and the authorities resented a neglect that looked a good deal like contumacious disrespect. He was, however, unlucky in this respect, to some extent, for when he appreciated, which was not until after he had raised the greater portion of his brigade, the necessity and the propriety of making full, formal, and prompt returns, he met with delays and accidents in transmitting them to Richmond, which were frequent and extraordinary. The officers, who acted as his Adjutant Generals at different periods previously to his promotion, will remember and can affirm, that returns and rolls of his regiments and battalions composing his brigade, were sent into them, and forwarded by them to Richmond. Officers were especially detailed to go to Richmond and look after these papers. And, yet, to every application made for the appointment of bonded officers (or rather for their commissions, for Morgan could manage appointments), by commanders of the oldest regiments in his brigade, the Secretary of War would politely inform the Colonel that his regiment was unknown "in the records of this office." Judging from the frequency of this reply, and the nature of some promotions that were made for that quarter, it would appear that the War Department at Richmond, and the cavalry on the western front, had no acquaintance in common. That all the evil might be cured, papers of formidable size and appearance, nearly square (I should say an acre by an arpent), were carefully made out, and forwarded to Richmond, showing the date of the organization of each regiment, the officers originally upon its rolls, all changes, and how they occurred, up to the date of the making out of the compendious doc.u.ment, the names of the officers serving in it at the time, and the manner in which they obtained their rank, whether by appointment, election, or promotion, and by whom appointed, when such was their status.

Notwithstanding the work expended upon the accursed things, and the perspiration, and, I regret to say, blasphemy, which they elicited from some of our officers, they did no good in the world; and after more labor and tribulation, ten to one, than an advance of the whole Federal army would have cost us, we found ourselves as much outsiders as ever. It must be distinctly understood, that nothing here written is intended as an insinuation against Mr. Davis; I will not do that which I would join in condemning in another man, whose antecedents are like my own. The profound respect I feel for him, prevents any attempt, upon my part, at even such criticism of his action as may seem legitimate; and unkind and carping reflections upon him are more becoming in the mouths of non-combatant rebels, than from ex-Confederate soldiers, whom self-respect should restrain from any thing of the kind. But there were certain officers at Richmond, who, if their souls had been tied up with red tape, indorsed in accordance with the latest orders, and stuffed into pigeon holes, would have preferred it to a guarantee of salvation. I honestly believe that these gentlemen thought, that when an officer made out a muster-roll, and forwarded it to them, he had done his full duty to his country, had gotten through with his part of the war, and might go to sleep without putting out pickets. It was said of a certain Confederate General, of high rank, that he would rather have from his subordinates "a neat and formal report of a defeat, than a slovenly account of a victory." It might have been said of the war office gentry, with equal propriety, that they would have preferred an army composed of Fallstaffian regiments, all duly recorded, to a magnificent soldiery unticketed at Richmond.

With this cla.s.s Morgan was always unpopular; not that a stronger personal dislike was felt for him, in the official bosom, than for other men of the same stamp and style, but all such men were gravely disliked by this cla.s.s. Such men were developing new ideas, not to be found in the books which the others had studied, and were in the habit of consulting. They were managing cavalry and winning fights in a thoroughly irregular and revolutionary manner; there was grave cause for apprehension that, if they were given high rank and corresponding command, they would innovate upon established infantry tactique, in the same unprecedented and demoralizing style. Mr. Davis did not dislike Morgan, but simply entertained no particular fancy for him, and did not believe that he was really a superior, although a successful officer; in fact, he knew very little about him.

To say Mr. Davis disliked Kentuckians, is absurd. The Kentucky vanity is as irritable, although not as radical, as the Virginian, and sees a slight in every thing short of a caress. He appointed some fifteen general officers from Kentucky, and he permitted the Kentucky loafers to secure their full share of "soft places." General Bragg, doubtless, was entirely free from any blinding affection for Kentuckians, and few of them felt a tenderness for him. Despite the terrors of his stern rule, they let few occasions escape of evincing their feeling toward him. It was said, I know not how truly, that at a later date General Bragg told Mr. Davis that "General Morgan was an officer who had few superiors, none, perhaps, in his own line, but that he was a dangerous man, on account of his intense desire to act independently."

When Morgan received this rank, his brigade was quite strong, and composed of seven regiments, Breckinridge's and Stoner's battalions were consolidated, and formed a regiment above the minimum strength. Breckinridge became Colonel, and Stoner Lieutenant Colonel. Shortly after the Hartsville fight, Colonel Adam R. Johnson reached Murfreesboro' with his regiment. It had been raised in Western Kentucky, and was very strong upon the rolls, but from losses by capture, and other causes, had been reduced to less than four hundred effective men. It was a fine body of men, and splendidly officered. Martin, the Lieutenant Colonel, was a man of extraordinary dash and resolution, and very shrewd in partisan warfare. Owens, the Major, was a very gallant man, and the disciplinarian of the regiment.

On the 14th of December, an event occurred which was thought by many to have materially affected General Morgan's temper, and subsequent fortunes. He was married to Miss Ready, of Murfreesboro', a lady to whom he was devotedly attached, and who certainly deserved to exercise over him the great influence which she was thought to have possessed. The marriage ceremony was performed by General Polk, by virtue of his commission as Bishop, but in full Lieutenant General's uniform. The residence of the Honorable Charles Ready, father of the bride, held a happy a.s.sembly that night-it was one of a very few scenes of happiness which that house was destined to witness, before its olden memories of joy and gayety were to give place to heavy sorrow and the harsh insolence of the invader. The bridegroom's friends and brothers-in-arms, and the Commander-in-Chief, and Generals Hardee, Cheatham and Breckinridge felt called upon to stand by him on this occasion.

Greenfell was in a high state of delight; although he had regretted General Morgan's marriage-thinking that it would render him less enterprising-he declared, that a wedding, at which an Episcopal bishop-militant, clad in general's uniform officiated, and the chief of an army and his corps commanders were guests, certainly ought not to soften a soldier's temper. On his way home that night he sang Moorish songs, with a French accent, to English airs, and was as mild and agreeable as if some one was going to be killed.

The seven regiments which composed the brigade, represented an aggregate force of over four thousand in camp-when they were gotten together, which was about the 18th, the Second Kentucky returning then from Fayetteville. Several hundred men, however, were dismounted, and totally unarmed and unequipped. This force was so unwieldy, as one brigade, that General Morgan determined to divide it into two parts, which should be organized in all respects as two brigades, and should lack but the sanction of the General commanding (which he hoped to obtain), to be such in reality. He accordingly indicated as the commanders of the two brigades (as I shall call them for the sake of convenience), Colonel Breckinridge and myself. There was no doubt of Colonel A.R. Johnson's seniority to all the other colonels, but, for some reason, he positively declined to accept the command of either brigade, and signified his willingness to serve in a subordinate capacity.

Instances of senior officers waiving rank, and consenting to serve under their juniors, were not unfrequent at that period, and continued to occur in Morgan's command. Such conduct was generous, and prompted by the manliest and most patriotic motives; but I can not help thinking that it is an unsafe practice, and one that may lead to very great injuries to the service in which it commonly obtains. The spirit which prompted many officers (for instance, who outranked General Morgan), to serve subordinately to him, because of the influence upon the troops of his high reputation, and because of his recognized skill, was perhaps, a proper as well as a chivalric one. But, except where the talent, character and influence of the junior, are as rare as acknowledged, and as commanding as in the case of Morgan or of Forrest, it is better for the senior to a.s.sume his legal position. No bad effects ever resulted from this practice in our command, partly, because it was one which had a "genius and const.i.tution" of its own, but, chiefly because (I do not think I am speaking too highly of my old comrades), it was officered by a cla.s.s of men of remarkable intelligence, and singular directness as well as strength of character. But, supposing this custom to prevail, generally, how apparent are the results prejudicial to discipline and efficiency, which may be naturally expected to flow from it.

The senior officer who "waives his rank," may do it in perfect good faith, and believing that the junior whom he consents to serve under, is, for certain reasons, the most proper man to command-and yet, if things go wrong, he may not unnaturally complain or advise with an emphasis and a freedom that may embarra.s.s the commander to whom it is addressed, and create the most improper feeling among other subordinates and the men. Or if matters do not go so far as this, there may yet arise a regret, in the mind of the officer who has relinquished his right to command, when he sees, or thinks he sees, evidences of incompetency in the conduct of the other-and a corresponding jealousy may be thus awakened in the mind of the junior commanding-and that harmony which is so necessary to efficiency may become impaired. Independently of these considerations, there is the fact that this condition is abnormal and highly irregular. The men and subaltern officers will recognize it to be so, and it may become more difficult to maintain the requisite subordination and respect for rank. It is a great deal better than to follow this practice-to adopt and run almost to extremes, the system of rapid promotion for merit and distinguished conduct. The probable evils of the one practice, which have been indicated, can prevail under no system where every man fills his legitimate place. There was some discussion as to whether Cluke or Breckinridge should command one of the brigades, after Johnson declined. It was a mooted question, whether Cluke's rank as Colonel dated from the period at which he received his commission to raise a regiment, or from the period at which his regiment became filled. In the former case, he would rank Breckinridge; in the latter, he would not. None of us, then, (with the exception of Johnson), had received our commissions, although our rank was recognized.

There was no wrangle for the position, however, between these officers, as might be inferred from my language. On the contrary, each at first declined, and urged the appointment of the other. General Morgan settled the matter by appointing Breckinridge.

The first brigade (mine) was composed of the Second Kentucky, Lieut.-Colonel Hutchinson, commanding; Gano's regiment, the Third Kentucky, Lieut.-Colonel Huffman commanding (Gano was absent on furlough); Cluke's regiment, the Eighth Kentucky, Colonel Leroy S. Cluke commanding; Palmer's battery of four pieces (two twelve-pounder howitzers, and two six-pounder guns,) was attached to this brigade. The second brigade (Breckinridge's) was composed of his own regiment, the Ninth Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Stoner commanding; Johnson's regiment, the Tenth Kentucky, Colonel Johnson commanding; Chenault's regiment, the Eleventh Kentucky, Colonel Chenault commanding; and Bennett's regiment, the Fourteenth Tennessee, Colonel Bennett commanding. To this brigade was attached one three-inch Parrot, commanded by Captain White, and the two mountain howitzers under Lieutenant Corbett.