History of Holland Part 3

The invasion of Lewis had nevertheless the result of raising the siege of Leyden; but only for a time. After the victory at Mook the Spanish troops were free to continue the task of reconquering rebel Holland for the king. On May 26 a strong force under Valdez advanced to Leyden and completely isolated the town by surrounding it with a girdle of forts.

The attack came suddenly, and unfortunately the place had not been adequately provisioned. So strong was the position of the Spaniards that the stadholder did not feel that any relieving force that he could send would have any chance of breaking through the investing lines and revictualling the garrison. In these circ.u.mstances he summoned, June 1, a meeting of the Estates of Holland at Rotterdam and proposed, as a desperate resource, that the d.y.k.es should be cut and the land submerged, and that the light vessels of the Sea-Beggars under Boisot should sail over the waters, attack the Spanish forts and force an entrance into the town. After considerable opposition the proposal was agreed to and the waters were allowed to flow out upon the low-lying fields, villages and farms, which lie between the sea, the Rhine, the Waal and the Maas.

Unfortunately the season was not favourable, and though the water reached nearly to the higher land round Leyden on which the Spanish redoubts were erected, and by alarming Valdez caused him to press the blockade more closely, it was not deep enough even for the light-draught vessels, which Boisot had gathered together, to make their way to the town. So the month of August pa.s.sed and September began. Meanwhile the prince, who was the soul of the enterprise, was confined to his sick-bed by a violent attack of fever, and the pangs of famine began to be cruelly felt within the beleaguered town. A portion of the citizens were half-hearted in the struggle, and began to agitate for surrender and even sent out emissaries to try to make terms with the Spanish commander. But there were within Leyden leaders of iron resolution, the heroic Burgomaster Pieter Adriaanzoon van der Werf; the commandant of the garrison, Jan van der Does; Dirk van Bronkhorst, Jan van Hout and many others who remained staunch and true in face of the appalling agony of a starving population; men who knew the fate in store for them if they fell into the enemy's hands and were determined to resist as long as they had strength to fight. At last in mid-September faint hopes began to dawn. William recovered, and a fierce equinoctial gale driving the flood-tide up the rivers gradually deepened the waters up to the very d.y.k.e on which the entrenchments of the besiegers stood. Urged on by Orange, Boisot now made a great effort. Anxiously from the towers was the approach of the relieving fleet watched. The town was at the very last extremity. The people were dying of hunger on every side. Some fierce combats took place as soon as the Sea-Beggars, experts at this amphibious warfare, arrived at the outlying Spanish forts, but not for long. Alarmed at the rising of the waters and fearing that the fleet of Boisot might cut off their escape, the Spaniards retreated in the night; and on the morning of October 3 the vessels of the relieving force, laden with provisions, entered the town. The long-drawn-out agony was over and Leyden saved from the fate of Haarlem, just at the moment when further resistance had become impossible. Had Leyden fallen the probability is that the whole of South Holland would have been conquered, and the revolt might have collapsed. In such a narrow escape well might the people of the town see an intervention of Providence on their behalf. The prince himself hastened to Leyden on the following day, reorganised the government of the town and in commemoration of this great deliverance founded the University, which was to become in the 17th century one of the most famous seats of learning in Europe.

The successful relief of Leyden was followed by a mutiny of the army of Valdez. They were owed long arrears of pay, had endured great hardships, and now that they saw themselves deprived of the hope of the pillage of the town, they put their commander and his officers under arrest and marched under a leader elected by themselves into Utrecht. Other mutinies occurred in various parts of the southern provinces, for Requesens had no funds, and it was useless to appeal to Philip, for the Spanish treasury was empty. This state of things led to a practical cessation of active hostilities for many months; and Requesens seized the opportunity to open negotiations with Orange. These were, however, doomed to be fruitless, for the king would not hear of any real concessions being made to the Protestants. The position of William was equally beset with difficulties, politically and financially. In the month following the relief of Leyden he even threatened to withdraw from the country unless his authority were more fully recognised and adequate supplies were furnished for the conduct of the war. The Estates accordingly, November 12, asked him to a.s.sume the t.i.tle of Regent or Governor, with "absolute might, authority and sovereign control" of the affairs of the country. They also voted him an allowance of 49,000 guilders a month; but, while thus conferring on the man who still claimed to be the "Stadholder of the king" practically supreme power, the burgher-corporations of the towns were very jealous of surrendering in the smallest degree that control over taxation which was one of their most valued rights. The exercise of authority, however, by the prince from this time forward was very great, for he had complete control in military and naval matters, and in the general conduct of affairs he held all the administrative threads in his own hands. He had become indispensable, and in everything but name a sovereign in Holland and Zeeland.

The first part of 1575 was marked by a lull in warlike operations, and conferences were held at Breda between envoys of Orange and Requesens, only to find that there was no common ground of agreement. The marriage of the prince (June 24) with Charlotte de Bourbon, daughter of the Duke of Montpensier, was a daring step which aroused much prejudice against him. The bride, who was of the blood-royal of France, had been Abbess of Jouarre, but had abjured her vows, run away and become a Calvinist. This was bad enough, but the legality of the union was rendered the more questionable by the fact that Anne of Saxony was still alive. On all sides came protests--from Charlotte's father, from John of Na.s.sau, and from Anne's relations in Saxony and Hesse. But William's character was such that opposition only made him more determined to carry out his purpose. The wedding was celebrated at Brill with Calvinist rites. The union, whether legitimate or not, was undoubtedly one of great happiness.

Meanwhile the governor-general, unable to obtain any financial help from Spain, had managed to persuade the provinces, always in dread of the excesses of the mutinous soldiery, to raise a loan of 1,200,000 guilders to meet their demands for arrears of pay. Requesens was thus enabled to put in the late summer a considerable army into the field and among other successes to gain possession of the Zeeland islands, Duiveland and Schouwen. On September 27 a force under the command of the veteran Mondragon waded across the shallow channels dividing the islands, which fell into their hands. Zierikzee, the chief town of Schouwen, made a stout resistance, but had at length to surrender (July, 1576). This conquest separated South Holland from the rest of Zeeland; and, as Haarlem and Amsterdam were in the hands of the Spaniards, the only territory over which the authority of Orange extended was the low-lying corner of land between the Rhine and the Maas, of which Delft was the centre.

The situation again appeared well-nigh desperate, and the stadholder began to look anxiously round in the hope of obtaining foreign a.s.sistance. It was to the interest of both France and England to a.s.sist a movement which distracted the attention and weakened the power of Spain. But Henry III of France was too much occupied with civil and religious disturbances in his own country, and Elizabeth of England, while receiving with courtesy the envoys both of Orange and Requesens, gave evasive replies to both. She was jealous of France, and pleased to see the growing embarra.s.sment of her enemy Philip, but the Tudor queen had no love either for rebels or for Calvinists. While refusing therefore openly to take the side of the Hollanders and Zeelanders, she agreed to give them secret help; and no obstacle was placed in the way of the English volunteers, who had already since 1572 been enlisting in the Dutch service. It was at this time that those English and Scottish Brigades were first formed which remained for nearly two centuries in that service, and were always to be found in the very forefront of the fighting throughout the great war of Liberation.

On March 4, 1576, Requesens died; and in the considerable interval that elapsed before the arrival of his successor, the outlook for the patriot cause became distinctly brighter. The Estates of Holland and Zeeland met at Delft (April 25, 1576); and the a.s.sembly was noteworthy for the pa.s.sing of an Act of Federation. This Act, which was the work of Orange, bound the two provinces together for common action in defence of their rights and liberties and was the first step towards that larger union, which three years later laid the foundations of the Dutch Republic. By this Act sovereign powers were conferred upon William; he was in the name of the king to exercise all the prerogatives of a ruler.

It required all his influence to secure the insertion of articles (1) extending a certain measure of toleration to all forms of religious worship that were not contrary to the Gospel, (2) giving authority to the prince in case of need to offer the Protectorate of the federated provinces to a foreign prince. Orange knew only too well that Holland and Zeeland were not strong enough alone to resist the power of Spain.

His hopes of securing the support of the other provinces, in which Catholics were in the majority, depended, he clearly saw, on the numerous adherents to the ancient faith in Holland and Zeeland being protected against the persecuting zeal of the dominant Calvinism of those provinces. In any case--and this continued to be his settled conviction to the end of his life--the actual independence of the whole or any portion of the Netherlands did not seem to him to lie within the bounds of practical politics. The object for which he strove was the obtaining of substantial guarantees for the maintenance of the ancient charters, which exempted the provinces from the presence of foreign officials, foreign tribunals, foreign soldiery and arbitrary methods of taxation. As Philip had deliberately infringed all those privileges which he had sworn to maintain, it was the duty of all patriotic Netherlanders to resist his authority, and, if resistance failed to bring redress, to offer the sovereignty with the necessary restrictions to some other prince willing to accept it on those conditions and powerful enough to protect the provinces from Spanish attack. In order to grasp the principles which guided William's policy during the next few years it is essential to bear in mind (1) that he sought to bring about a union of all the Netherland provinces on a basis of toleration, (2) that he did not aim at the erection of the Netherlands into an independent State.

On the death of Requesens the Council of State had a.s.sumed temporary charge of the administration. There had for some time been growing dissatisfaction even amongst the loyalist Catholics of the southern provinces at the presence and over-bearing att.i.tude of so many Spanish officials and Spanish troops in the land and at the severity of the religious persecution. Representations were made to the king by the Council of State of the general discontent throughout the country, of the deplorable results of the policy of force and repression, and urging the withdrawal of the troops, the mitigation of the edicts, and the appointment of a member of the royal house to the governorship. To these representations and requests no answer was sent for months in accordance with Philip's habitual dilatoriness in dealing with difficult affairs of State. He did, however, actually nominate in April his b.a.s.t.a.r.d brother, Don John of Austria, the famous victor of Lepanto, as Requesens'

successor. But Don John, who was then in Italy, had other ambitions, and looked with suspicion upon Philip's motives in a.s.signing him the thankless task of dealing with the troubles in the Low Countries.

Instead of hurrying northwards, he first betook himself to Madrid where he met with a cold reception. Delay, however, so far from troubling Philip, was thoroughly in accordance with the whole bent of his character and policy. For six months Don John remained in Spain, and it was a half-year during which the situation in the Netherlands had been to a very large extent transformed.

The position of Orange and his followers in Holland and Zeeland in the spring of 1576 had again darkened. In June the surrender of Zierikzee to Mondragon was a heavy blow to the patriot cause, for it gave the Spaniards a firm footing in the very heart of the Zeeland archipelago and drove a wedge between South Holland and the island of Walcheren.

This conquest was, however, destined to have important results of a very different character from what might have been expected. The town had surrendered on favourable terms and pillage was forbidden. Baulked of their expected booty, the Spanish troops, to whom large arrears of pay were due, mutinied. Under their own "eletto" they marched to Aalst, where they were joined by other mutineers, and soon a large force was collected together, who lived by plunder and were a terror to the country. The Council declared them to be outlaws, but the revolted soldiery defied its authority and scoffed at its threats. This was a moment which, as Orange was quick to perceive, was extremely favourable for a vigorous renewal of his efforts to draw together all the provinces to take common action in their resistance to Spanish tyranny. His agents and envoys in all parts of the Netherlands, but especially in Flanders and Brabant, urged his views upon the more influential members of the provincial estates and upon leading n.o.blemen, like the Duke of Aerschot and other hitherto loyal supporters of the government, who were now suspected of wavering. His efforts met with a success which a few months earlier would have been deemed impossible. The conduct of the Spanish troops, and the lack of any central authority to protect the inhabitants against their insolence and depredations, had effected a great change in public opinion. In Brussels Baron de Heze (a G.o.d-child of the prince) had been appointed to the command of the troops in the pay of the Estates of Brabant. De Heze exerted himself to arouse popular opinion in the capital in favour of Orange and against the Spaniards. To such an extent was he successful that he ventured, Sept. 21, to arrest the whole of the Council of State with the exception of the Spanish member Roda, who fled to Antwerp. William now entered into direct negotiations with Aerschot and other prominent n.o.bles of Flanders and Brabant. He took a further step by sending, at the request of the citizens of Ghent, a strong armed force to protect the town against the Spanish garrison in the citadel. In the absence of any lawful government, the States-General were summoned to meet at Brussels on September 22. Deputies from Brabant, Flanders and Hainault alone attended, but in the name of the States-General they nominated Aerschot, Viglius and Sasbout as Councillors of State, and appointed Aerschot to the command of the forces, with the Count of Lalaing as his lieutenant. They then, Sept.

27, approached the prince with proposals for forming a union of all the provinces. As a preliminary it was agreed that the conditions, which had been put forward by William as indispensable--namely, exclusion of all foreigners from administrative posts, dismissal of foreign troops, and religious toleration--should be accepted. The proposals were gladly received by William, and Ghent was chosen as the place where nine delegates from Holland and Zeeland should confer with nine delegates nominated by the States-General as representing the other provinces.

They met on October 19. Difficulties arose on two points--the recognition to be accorded to Don John of Austria, and the principle of non-interference with religious beliefs. Orange himself had always been an advocate of toleration, but the representatives of Holland and Zeeland showed an obstinate disinclination to allow liberty of Catholic worship within their borders; and this att.i.tude of theirs might, in spite of the prince's efforts, have led to a breaking-off of the negotiations, had not an event occurred which speedily led to a sinking of differences on the only possible basis, that of mutual concession and compromise.

The citadel of Antwerp was, during this month of October, garrisoned by a body of mutinous Spanish troops under the command of Sancho d'Avila, the victor of Mook. Champagney, the governor, had with him a body of German mercenaries under a certain Count Oberstein; and at his request, such was the threatening att.i.tude of the Spaniards, the States-General sent Havre with a reinforcement of Walloon troops. On Sunday, November 4, the garrison, which had been joined by other bands of mutineers, turned the guns of the citadel upon the town and sallying forth attacked the forces of Champagney. The Germans offered but a feeble resistance.

Oberstein perished; Champagney and Havre took refuge on vessels in the river; and the Spaniards were masters of Antwerp. The scene of ma.s.sacre, l.u.s.t and wholesale pillage, which followed, left a memory behind it unique in its horror even among the excesses of this blood-stained time.

The "Spanish Fury," as it was called, spelt the ruin of what, but a short time before, had been the wealthiest and most flourishing commercial city in the world.

The news of this disaster reached the States-General, as they were in the act of considering the draft proposals which had been submitted to them by the Ghent conference. At the same time tidings came that Don John, who had travelled through France in disguise, had arrived at Luxemburg. They quickly therefore came to a decision to ratify the pact, known as the _Pacification of Ghent,_ and on November 8 it was signed.

The _Pacification_ was really a treaty between the Prince of Orange and the Estates of Holland and Zeeland on the one hand, and the States-General representing the other provinces. It was agreed that the Spanish troops should be compelled to leave the Netherlands and that the States-General of the whole seventeen provinces, as they were convened at the abdication of Charles V, should be called together to decide upon the question of religious toleration and other matters of national importance. Meanwhile the placards against heresy were suspended, and all the illegal measures and sentences of Alva declared null and void.

His confiscated property was restored to Orange, and his position, as stadholder in Holland and Zeeland, acknowledged. Don John was informed that he would not be recognised as governor-general unless he would consent to dismiss the Spanish troops, accept the Pacification of Ghent, and swear to maintain the rights and privileges of the Provinces.

Negotiations ensued, but for a long time to little purpose; and Don John, who was rather an impetuous knight-errant than a statesman and diplomatist, remained during the winter months at Namur, angry at his reception and chafing at the conditions imposed upon him, which he dared not accept without permission from the king. In December the States-General containing deputies from all the provinces met at Brussels, and in January the Pacification of Ghent was confirmed, and a new compact, to which the name of the Union of Brussels was given, was drawn up by a number of influential Catholics. This doc.u.ment, to which signatures were invited, was intended to give to the Pacification of Ghent the sanction of popular support and to be at the same time a guarantee for the maintenance of the royal authority and the Catholic religion. The Union of Brussels was generally approved throughout the southern provinces, and the signatories from every cla.s.s were numbered by thousands. Don John, who was at Huy, saw that it was necessary to temporise. He was willing, he declared, to dismiss the foreign troops and send them out of the country and to maintain the ancient charters and liberties of the provinces, provided that nothing was done to subvert the king's authority or the Catholic faith. Finally, on February 12, a treaty called "The Perpetual Edict," a most inappropriate name, was signed, and the States-General acknowledged Don John as governor-general. The agreement was princ.i.p.ally the work of Aerschot and the loyalist Catholic party, who followed his leadership, and was far from being entirely acceptable to Orange. He had no trust in the good faith of either Philip or his representative, and, though he recommended Holland and Zeeland to acquiesce in the treaty and acknowledge Don John as governor-general, it was with the secret resolve to keep a close watch upon his every action, and not to brook any attempt to interfere with religious liberty in the two provinces, in which he exercised almost sovereign power and with whose struggles for freedom he had identified himself.

The undertaking of Don John with regard to the Spanish troops was punctually kept. Before the end of April they had all left the country; and on May 1 the new governor-general made his state entry into Brussels. It was to outward appearances very brilliant. But the hero of Lepanto found himself at once distrusted by the Catholic n.o.bles and checkmated by the influence and diplomacy of the ever watchful William of Orange. Chafing at his impotence, and ill-supported by the king, who sent no reply to his appeals for financial help, Don John suddenly left the capital and, placing himself at the head of a body of Walloon troops, seized Namur. Feeling himself in this stronghold more secure, he tried to bring pressure on the States-General to place in his hands wider powers and to stand by him in his efforts to force Orange to submit to the authority of the king. His efforts were in vain. William had warned the States-General and the n.o.bles of the anti-Spanish party in Brabant and Flanders that Don John was not to be trusted, and he now pointed to the present att.i.tude of the governor-general, as a proof that his suspicions were well-founded. Indeed the eyes of all true patriots began to turn to the prince, who had been quietly strengthening his position, not only in Holland and Zeeland, where he was supreme, but also in Utrecht and Gelderland; and popular movements in Brussels and elsewhere took place in his favour. So strongly marked was the Orange feeling in the capital that the States-General acceded to the general wish that the prince should be invited to come in person to Brussels.

Confidence was expressed by Catholics no less than by Protestants that only under his leadership could the country be delivered from Spanish tyranny. A deputation was sent, bearing the invitation; but for a while William hesitated in giving an affirmative reply. On September 23, however, he made his entry into Brussels amidst general demonstrations of joy and was welcomed as "the Restorer and Defender of the Father-land's liberty." Thus, ten years after he had been declared an outlaw and banished, did the Prince of Orange return in triumph to the town which had witnessed the execution of Egmont and Hoorn. It was the proudest day of his life and the supreme point of his career.

CHAPTER V

WILLIAM THE SILENT

The position of William at Brussels after his triumphant entry, September 23, 1577, was by no means an easy one. His main support was derived from a self-elected Council of Eighteen, containing representatives of the gilds and of the citizens. This Council controlled an armed munic.i.p.al force and was really master in the city.

In these circ.u.mstances the States-General did not venture upon any opposition to the popular wishes, in other words to William, whose influence with the ma.s.ses was unbounded. The States-General, therefore, under pressure from the Eighteen, informed Don John, October 8, that they no longer recognised him as governor-general; and the Estates of Brabant appointed the prince to the office of _Ruward_ or governor of the province. Meanwhile a fresh factor of disturbance had been introduced into the troubled scene. Certain of the Catholic n.o.bles opposed to Spanish rule, but suspicious of Orange, had invited the twenty year old Archduke Matthias, brother of the emperor, to accept the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Matthias, who was of an adventurous spirit, after some parleying agreed. He accordingly left Vienna secretly, and at the end of October arrived in the Netherlands. Not content with this counter-stroke, Aerschot went to Ghent to stir up opposition to the appointment of William as Ruward of Brabant. The populace however in Ghent was Orangist, and, rising in revolt, seized Aerschot and a number of other Catholic leaders and threw them into prison. They were speedily released, but the breach between the Catholic n.o.bles and the Calvinist stadholder of Holland was widened. William himself saw in the coming of Matthias a favourable opportunity for securing the erection of the Netherlands into a const.i.tutional State under the nominal rule of a Habsburg prince. By his influence, therefore, the States-General entered into negotiations with the Archduke; and Matthias finally was recognised (December 8) as governor on condition that he accepted the Union of Brussels, He was also induced to place the real power in the hands of Orange with the t.i.tle of Lieutenant-General. Matthias made his state entry into Brussels, January 18, 1578. His position appeared to be strengthened by a treaty concluded with the English queen (January 7) by which Elizabeth promised to send over a body of troops and to grant a subsidy to the States, for the repayment of which the towns of Middelburg, Bruges and Gravelines were to be pledges.

The news however of the step taken by Matthias had had more effect upon Philip II than the despairing appeals of his half-brother. A powerful army of tried Spanish and Italian troops under the command of Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, son of the former regent Margaret, was sent to Flanders. Farnese was Don John's nephew, and they had been brought up together at Madrid, being almost of the same age. Already Philip had determined to replace Don John, whose brilliance as a leader in the field did not compensate for his lack of statesmanlike qualities. In Farnese, whether by good fortune or deliberate choice, he had at length found a consummate general who was to prove himself a match even for William the Silent in all the arts of political combination and intrigue. At Gembloux, January 31, Don John and Parma fell upon the levies of the States and gained a complete and almost bloodless victory.

Had Philip supplied his governor-general with the money he asked for, Don John might now have conquered the whole of the southern Netherlands, but without funds he could achieve little.

Meanwhile all was confusion. The States-General withdrew from Brussels to Antwerp; and William, finding that Matthias was useless, began negotiations with France, England and Germany in the hope of finding in this emergency some other foreign prince ready to brave the wrath of Philip by accepting the suzerainty of the Netherlands. The Duke of Anjou, brother of the French king, was the favoured candidate of the Catholic party; and William, whose one aim was to secure the aid of a powerful protector in the struggle against Spain, was ready to accept him. Anjou at the head of an army of 15,000 men crossed the frontier at Mons, July 12; and, on the following August 13, a treaty was agreed upon between him and the States-General, by which the French duke, with the t.i.tle of _Defender of the Liberties of the Netherlands_, undertook to help the States to expel the Spaniards from the Low Countries. But, to add to the complications of the situation, a German force under the command of John Casimir, brother of the Elector Palatine, and in the pay of Queen Elizabeth, invaded the hapless provinces from the east. The advent of John Casimir was greeted with enthusiasm by the Calvinist party; and it required all the skill and sagacity of the Prince of Orange to keep the peace and prevent the rival interests from breaking out into open strife in the face of the common enemy. But Don John was helpless, his repeated appeals for financial help remained unanswered, and, sick at heart and weary of life, he contracted a fever and died in his camp at Namur, October 1, 1578. His successor in the governor-generalship was Alexander of Parma, who had now before him a splendid field for the exercise of his great abilities.

The remainder of the year 1578 saw a violent recrudescence of religious bitterness. In vain did Orange, who throughout his later life was a genuine and earnest advocate of religious toleration, strive to the utmost of his powers and with untiring patience to allay the suspicions and fears of the zealots. John Casimir at Ghent, in the fervour of his fanatical Calvinism, committed acts of violence and oppression, which had the very worst effect in the Walloon provinces. In this part of the Netherlands Catholicism was dominant; and there had always been in the provinces of Hainault, Artois, and in the southern districts generally, a feeling of distrust towards Orange. The upholding of the principle of religious toleration by a man who had twice changed his faith was itself suspect; and Farnese left no means untried for increasing this growing anti-Orange feeling among the Catholic n.o.bles. A party was formed, which bore the name of "The Malcontents," whose leaders were Montigny, Lalaing and La Motte. With these the governor-general entered into negotiations, with the result that an alliance was made between Hainault, Artois, Lille, Douay and Orchies (January 6, 1579), called the Union of Arras, for the maintenance of the Catholic faith, by which these Walloon provinces and towns expressed their readiness to submit to the king on condition that he were willing to agree to uphold their rights and privileges in accordance with the provisions of the Pacification of Ghent. The Union of Arras did not as yet mean a complete reconciliation with the Spanish sovereign, but it did mean the beginning of a breach between the Calvinist north and the Catholic south, which the statecraft of Parma gradually widened into an impossible chasm. Before this took place, Anjou, Matthias and John Casimir had alike withdrawn from the scene of anarchic confusion, in which for a brief time each had been trying to compa.s.s his own ambitious ends in selfish indifference to the welfare of the people they were proposing to deliver from the Spanish yoke. The opening of the year 1579 saw Orange and Parma face to face preparing to measure their strength in a grim struggle for the mastery.

In the very same month as witnessed the signing of the Union of Arras, a rival union had been formed in the northern Netherlands, which was destined to be much more permanent. The real author however of the Union of Utrecht was not Orange, but his brother, John of Na.s.sau. In March, 1578, John had been elected Stadholder of Gelderland. He, like William, had devoted himself heart and soul to the cause of Netherland freedom, but his Calvinism was far more p.r.o.nounced than his brother's. From the moment of his acceptance of the stadholdership he set to work to effect a close union between Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht with Gelderland and the adjoining districts which lay around the Zuyder Zee. It was a difficult task, since the eastern provinces were afraid (and not unjustly) that its much greater wealth would give Holland predominance in the proposed confederation. Nevertheless it was accomplished, and an Act of Union was drawn up and signed at Utrecht, January 29, 1579, by the representatives of Holland, Zeeland, the town and district (_sticht_) of Utrecht, Gelderland and Zutphen, by which they agreed to defend their rights and liberties and to resist all foreign intervention in their affairs by common action as if they were one province, and to establish and maintain freedom of conscience and of worship within their boundaries. William does not seem at first to have been altogether pleased with his brother's handiwork. He still hoped that a confederation on a much wider scale might have been formed, comprising the greater part of those who had appended their signatures to the Pacification of Ghent. It was not until some months had pa.s.sed and he saw that his dreams of a larger union were not to be realised, that he signed, on May 3, the Act of Union drawn up at Utrecht. By this time he was well aware that Parma had succeeded in winning over the malcontent n.o.bles to accept his terms. On May 19 the Walloon provinces, whose representatives had signed the Union of Arras, agreed to acknowledge, with certain nominal reservations, the sovereignty of Philip and to allow only Catholic worship. In fact the reconciliation was complete.

Thus, despite the efforts of Orange, the idea of the federation of all the seventeen provinces on national lines became a thing of the past, henceforth unattainable. The Netherlands were divided into two camps.

Gradually in the course of 1580 Overyssel, Drente and the greater part of Friesland gave in their adherence to the Union of Utrecht, and Groningen and the Ommelanden allied themselves with their neighbours. In the rest of the Low Countries all fell away and submitted themselves to the king's authority, except Antwerp and Breda in Brabant, and Ghent, Bruges and Ypres in Flanders. William felt that Parma was constantly gaining ground. Defection after defection took place, the most serious being that of George Lalaing, Count of Renneberg, the Stadholder of Groningen. Negotiations were indeed secretly opened with William himself, and the most advantageous and flattering terms offered to him, if he would desert the patriot cause. But with him opposition to Spain and to Spanish methods of government was a matter of principle and strong conviction. He was proof alike against bribery and cajolery, even when he perceived, as the year 1580 succeeded 1579, that he had no staunch friends on whom he could absolutely rely, save in the devoted provinces of Holland and Zeeland.

For things had been going from bad to worse. The excesses and cruelties committed by the Calvinists, wherever they found themselves in a position to persecute a Catholic minority, and especially the outrages perpetrated at Ghent under the leadership of two Calvinist fanatics, De Ryhove and De Hembyze, although they were done in direct opposition to the wishes and efforts of Orange, always and at all times the champion of toleration, did much to discredit him in Flanders and Brabant and to excite bitter indignation among the Catholics, who still formed the great majority of the population of the Netherlands. William felt himself to be month by month losing power. The action he was at last compelled to take, in rescuing Ghent from the hands of the ultra-democratic Calvinist party and in expelling De Ryhove and De Hembyze, caused him to be denounced as "a papist at heart." Indeed the bigots of both creeds in that age of intolerance and persecution were utterly unable to understand his att.i.tude, and could only attribute it to a lack of any sincere religious belief at all. Farnese, meanwhile, whose genius for Machiavellian statesmanship was as remarkable as those gifts for leadership in war which ent.i.tled him to rank as the first general of his time, was a man who never failed to take full advantage of the mistakes and weaknesses of his opponents. At the head of a veteran force he laid siege in the spring of 1579 to the important frontier town of Maestricht. He encountered a desperate resistance, worthy of the defence of Haarlem or of Leyden, and for four months the garrison held out grimly in the hope of relief. But, despite all the efforts of Orange to despatch an adequate force to raise the siege, at last (June 29) the town was carried by a.s.sault and delivered up for three days to the fury of a savage soldiery. By the possession of this key to the Meuse, Parma was now able to cut off communications between Brabant and Protestant Germany. Had he indeed been adequately supported by Philip it is probable that at this time all the provinces up to the borders of Holland might have been brought into subjection by the Spanish forces.

The position of William was beset with perils on every side. One by one his adherents were deserting him; even in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland he was losing ground. He saw clearly that without foreign help the national cause for which he had sacrificed everything was doomed. In this emergency he reopened negotiations with Anjou, not because he had any trust in the French prince's capacity or sincerity, but for the simple reason that there was no one else to whom he could turn. As heir to the throne of France and at this time the favoured suitor of Queen Elizabeth, his acceptance of the sovereignty of the Netherlands would secure, so Orange calculated, the support both of France and England. It was his hope also that the limiting conditions attached to the offer of sovereignty would enable him to exercise a strong personal control over a man of weak character like Anjou. The Duke's vanity and ambition were flattered by the proposal; and on September 19, 1580, a provisional treaty was signed at Plessis-les-Tours by which Anjou accepted the offer that was made to him, and showed himself quite ready to agree to any limitations imposed upon his authority, since he had not any intention, when once he held the reins of power, of observing them.

The first effect of William's negotiations with Anjou was to alienate the Calvinists without gaining over the Catholics. Anjou was suspect to both. The action of the Spanish government, however, at this critical juncture did much to restore the credit of the prince with all to whom the Spanish tyranny and the memory of Alva were abhorrent. Cardinal Granvelle, after fifteen years of semi-exile in Italy, had lately been summoned to Madrid to become chief adviser to the king. Granvelle spared no pains to impress upon Philip the necessity of getting rid of Orange as the chief obstacle to the pacification of the Netherlands, and advised that a price should be placed upon his life. "The very fear of it will paralyse or kill him" was the opinion of the cardinal, who ought to have had a better understanding of the temper and character of his old adversary. Accordingly at Maestricht, March 15, 1581, "a ban and edict in form of proscription" was published against the prince, who was denounced as "a traitor and miscreant, an enemy of ourselves and of our country"; and all and everywhere empowered "to seize the person and goods of this William of Na.s.sau, as enemy of the human race." A solemn promise was also made "to anyone who has the heart to free us of this pest, and who will deliver him dead or alive, or take his life, the sum of 25,000 crowns in gold or in estates for himself and his heirs; and we will pardon him any crimes of which he has been guilty, and give him a patent of n.o.bility, if he be not n.o.ble." It is a doc.u.ment which, however abhorrent or loathsome it may appear to us, was characteristic of the age in which it was promulgated and in accordance with the ideas of that cruel time. The ban was a declaration of war to the knife, and as such it was received and answered.

In reply to the ban the prince at the close of the year (December 13) published a very lengthy defence of his life and actions, the famous _Apology_. To William himself is undoubtedly due the material which the doc.u.ment embodies and the argument it contains, but it was almost certainly not written by him, but by his chaplain, Pierre L'Oyseleur, Seigneur de Villiers, to whom it owes its rather ponderous prolixity and redundant verbiage. Historically it is of very considerable value, though the facts are not always to be relied upon as strictly accurate.

The _Apology_ was translated into several languages and distributed to the leading personages in every neighbouring country, and made a deep impression on men's minds.

The combined effect of the _Ban_ and _the Apology_ was to strengthen William's position in all the provinces where the patriot party still held the upper hand; and he was not slow to take advantage of the strong anti-Spanish feeling which was aroused. Its intensity was shown by the solemn Act of Abjuration, July 26, 1581, by which the provinces of Brabant, Flanders, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Gelderland renounced their allegiance to Philip II on the ground of his tyranny and misrule.

But after signing this Act it never seems to have occurred to the prince or to the representatives of the provinces, that these now derelict territories could remain without a personal sovereign. Orange used all his influence and persuasiveness to induce them to accept Anjou. Anjou, as we have seen, had already agreed to the conditions under which he should, when invited, become "prince and lord" of the Netherlands. In the autumn of 1581 the position was an ambiguous one. The States-General claimed that, after the abjuration of Philip, the sovereignty of the provinces had reverted to them, as the common representative of a group of provinces that were now sovereign in their own right, and that the conferring of that sovereignty on another overlord was their prerogative. The position of Orange was peculiar, for _de facto_ under one t.i.tle or another he exercised the chief authority in each one of the rebel provinces, but in the name of the States-General, instead of the king. His influence indeed was so great as to over-shadow that of the States-General, but great as it was, it had to be exerted to the utmost before that body could be induced to accept a man of Anjou's despicable and untrustworthy character as their new ruler. William however had committed himself to the candidature of the duke, through lack of any fitter choice; and at last both the States-General and the several provincial Estates (Holland and Zeeland excepted) agreed to confer the sovereignty upon the French prince subject to the conditions of the treaty of Plessis-les-Tours.

William himself exercised the powers with which Holland and Zeeland had invested him in the name of the king, whose stadholder he was, even when waging war against him. After the Abjuration this pretence could no longer be maintained. The Estates of Holland and Zeeland had indeed pet.i.tioned Orange to become their count, but he refused the t.i.tle, fearing to give umbrage to Anjou. Finding, however, the two provinces resolute in their opposition to the Valois prince, he consented, July 24, 1581, to exercise provisionally, as if he were count, the powers of "high supremacy," which had already been conferred upon him.

Meanwhile Anjou was dallying in England, but on receiving through Ste Aldegonde an intimation that the States could brook no further delay, he set sail and landed at Flushing. Lord Leicester and a brilliant English escort accompanied him; and Elizabeth asked the States to receive her suitor as "her own self." At Antwerp, where he took up his residence, Anjou was (February 19) solemnly invested with the duchy of Brabant, and received the homage of his new subjects. He was far from popular, and William remained at his side to give him support and counsel. On March 18 (Anjou's birthday) an untoward event occurred, which threatened to have most disastrous consequences. As Orange was leaving the dinner-table, a young Biscayan, Juan Jaureguy by name, attempted his a.s.sa.s.sination, by firing a pistol at him. The ball entered the head by the right ear and pa.s.sed through the palate. Jaureguy was instantly killed and it was afterwards found that he had, for the sake of the reward, been instigated to the deed by his master, a merchant named Caspar Anastro. Anjou, who was at first suspected of being accessory to the crime, was thus exculpated. It was a terrible wound and William's life was for some time in great danger; but by the a.s.siduous care of his physicians and nurses he very slowly recovered, and was strong enough, on May 2, to attend a solemn service of thanksgiving. The shock of the event and the long weeks of anxiety were however too heavy a strain upon his wife, Charlotte de Bourbon, who had recently given birth to their sixth daughter. Her death, on May 5, was deeply grieved by the prince, for Charlotte had been a most devoted helpmeet and adviser to him throughout the anxious years of their married life.

During the whole of the summer and autumn William remained at Antwerp, patiently trying to smooth away the difficulties caused by the dislike and suspicion felt by the Netherlanders for the man whom they were asked to recognise as their sovereign. It was an arduous task, but William, at the cost of his own popularity, succeeded in getting the duke acknowledged in July as Lord of Friesland and Duke of Gelderland, and in August Anjou was solemnly installed at Bruges, as Count of Flanders.

Meanwhile he was planning, with the help of the large French force which Anjou had undertaken to bring into the Netherlands, to take the offensive against Parma. The truth is that he and Anjou were really playing at cross-purposes. Orange wished Anjou to be the _roi-faineant_ of a United Netherland state of which he himself should be the real ruler, but Anjou had no intention of being treated as a second Matthias. He secretly determined to make himself master of Antwerp by a sudden attack and, this achieved, to proceed to seize by force of arms some of the other princ.i.p.al cities and to make himself sovereign in reality as well as in name. He resented his dependence upon Orange and was resolved to rid himself of it. With shameless treachery in the early morning of January 17, 1583, he paid a visit to the prince in Antwerp, and, with the object of gaining possession of his person, tried to persuade him to attend a review of the French regiments who were encamped outside the town. The suspicions of William had however been aroused, and he pleaded some excuse for declining the invitation.

At midday some thousands of Anjou's troops rushed into the city at the dinner-hour with loud cries of "Ville gagnee! Tue! Tue!" But the citizens flew to arms; barricades were erected; and finally the French were driven out with heavy loss, leaving some 1500 prisoners in the hands of the town-guard. Many French n.o.bles perished, and the "French Fury," as it was called, was an ignominious and ghastly failure.

Indignation was wide and deep throughout the provinces; and William's efforts to calm the excitement and patch up some fresh agreement with the false Valois, though for the moment partially successful, only added to his own growing unpopularity.

The prince in fact was so wedded to the idea that the only hope for the provinces lay in securing French aid that he seemed unable to convince himself that Anjou after this act of base treachery was impossible. His continued support of the duke only served to alienate the people of Brabant and Flanders. The Protestants hated the thought of having as their sovereign a prince who was a Catholic and whose mother and brothers were looked upon by them as the authors of the ma.s.sacre of St Bartholomew. The Catholics, cajoled by Parma's fair words, and alarmed by the steady progress of his arms, were already inclining to return to their old allegiance. The marriage of Orange, April 7, 1583, to Louise, daughter of the famous Huguenot leader Admiral Coligny, and widow of the Sieur de Teligny, added to the feelings of distrust and hostility he had already aroused, for the bride was a Frenchwoman and both her father and husband had perished on the fatal St Bartholomew's day.

Finding himself exposed to insult, and his life ever in danger, William, at the end of July, left Antwerp and took up his residence again at Delft in the midst of his faithful Hollanders. They, too, disliked his French proclivities, but his alliance with Louise de Teligny seemed to be an additional pledge to these strong Calvinists of his religious sincerity.

Meanwhile Anjou had already returned to France; and Parma had now a freer field for his advance northwards and, though sorely hampered by lack of funds, was rapidly taking town after town. In the spring of 1584 he took Ypres and Bruges, and a strong party in Ghent was in traitorous correspondence with him. Many n.o.bles had fallen away from the patriot cause, among them William's brother-in-law, Count van den Berg, who had succeeded John of Na.s.sau as Stadholder of Gelderland. The hold of Orange upon Brabant and the Scheldt was, however, still ensured by the possession of Antwerp, of which strongly fortified town the trusty Ste Aldegonde was governor.

Meanwhile the prince, who was still striving hard to persuade the provinces that were hostile to Spanish rule that their only hope lay in obtaining aid from France through Anjou, was living at the old convent of St Agatha, afterwards known as the Prinsenhof at Delft. His manner of life was of the most modest and homely kind, just like that of an ordinary Dutch burgher. He was in fact deeply in debt, terribly worried with the outward aspect of things, and his position became one of growing difficulty, for on June 10, 1584, the miserable Anjou died, and the policy on which he had for so long expended his best efforts was wrecked. Even his own recognition as Count of Holland and Zeeland had led to endless negotiations between the Estates and the various town councils which claimed to have a voice in the matter; and in July, 1584, he had, though provisionally exercising sovereign authority, not yet received formal homage. And all this time, in addition to the other cares that weighed heavily upon him, there was the continual dread of a.s.sa.s.sination. Ever since the failure of the attempt of Jaureguy, there had been a constant succession of plots against the life of the rebel leader and heretic at the instigation of the Spanish government, and with the knowledge of Parma. Religious fanaticism, loyalty to the legitimate sovereign, together with the more sordid motive of pecuniary reward, made many eager to undertake the murderous commission. It was made the easier from the fact that the prince always refused to surround himself with guards or to take any special precautions, and was always easy of access. Many schemes and proposed attempts came to nothing either through the vigilance of William's spies or through the lack of courage of the would-be a.s.sa.s.sins. A youth named Balthazar Gerard had however become obsessed with the conviction that he had a special mission to accomplish the deed in which Jaureguy had failed, and he devoted himself to the task of ridding the world of one whom he looked upon as the arch-enemy of G.o.d and the king. Under the false name of Francis Guyon he made his way to Delft, pretended to be a zealous Calvinist flying from persecution, and went about begging for alms. The prince, even in his poverty always charitable, hearing of his needy condition sent to the man a present of twelve crowns. With this gift Gerard bought a pair of pistols and on July 10, 1584, having managed on some pretext to gain admittance to the Prinsenhof, he concealed himself in a dark corner by the stairs just opposite the door of the room where William and his family were dining. As the prince, accompanied by his wife, three of his daughters and one of his sisters, came out and was approaching the staircase, the a.s.sa.s.sin darted forward and fired two bullets into his breast. The wound was mortal; William fell to the ground and speedily expired. Tradition says that, as he fell, he exclaimed in French: "My G.o.d, have pity on my soul! My G.o.d, have pity on this poor people!" But an examination of contemporary records of the murder throws considerable doubt on the statement that such words were uttered. The nature of the wound was such that the probability is that intelligible speech was impossible.

Balthazar Gerard gloried in his deed, and bore the excruciating tortures which were inflicted upon him with almost superhuman patience and courage. He looked upon himself as a martyr in a holy cause, and as such he was regarded by Catholic public opinion. His deed was praised both by Granvelle and Parma, and Philip bestowed a patent of n.o.bility on his family, and exempted them from taxation.

In Holland there was deep and general grief at the tragic ending of the great leader, who had for so many years been the fearless and indefatigable champion of their resistance to civil and religious tyranny. He was accorded a public funeral and buried with great pomp in the Nieuwe Kerk at Delft, where a stately memorial, recording his many high qualities and services, was erected to his memory.

William of Orange was but fifty-one years of age when his life was thus prematurely ended, and though he had been much aged by the cares and anxieties of a crushing responsibility, his physicians declared that at the time of his death he was perfectly healthy and that he might have been spared to carry on his work for many years, had he escaped the bullets of the a.s.sa.s.sin. But it was not to be. It is possible that he should be reckoned in the number of those whose manner of death sets the seal to a life-work of continuous self-sacrifice. The t.i.tle of "Father of his Country," which was affectionately given to him by Hollanders of every cla.s.s, was never more deservedly bestowed, for it was in the Holland that his exertions had freed and that he had made the impregnable fortress of the resistance to Spain that he ever felt more at home than anywhere else. It was in the midst of his own people that he laid down the life that had been consecrated to their cause. As a general he had never been successful. As a statesman he had failed to accomplish that union of the Netherlands, north and south, which at one triumphant moment had seemed to be well-nigh realised by the Pacification of Ghent. But he had by the spirit that he had aroused in Holland and its sister province of Zeeland created a barrier against Spanish domination in the northern Netherlands which was not to be broken down.