Hispanic Nations of the New World Part 6

On the 5th of February a convention a.s.sembled at Queretaro promulgated a const.i.tution embodying substantially all of the radical program that Carranza had antic.i.p.ated in his decrees. Besides providing for an elaborate improvement in the condition of the laboring cla.s.ses and for such a division of great estates as might satisfy their particular needs, the new const.i.tution imposed drastic restrictions upon foreigners and religious bodies. Under its terms, foreigners could not acquire industrial concessions unless they waived their treaty rights and consented to regard themselves for the purpose as Mexican citizens. In all such cases preference was to be shown Mexicans over foreigners. Ecclesiastical corporations were forbidden to own real property. No primary school and no charitable inst.i.tution could be conducted by any religious mission or denomination, and religious publications must refrain from commenting on public affairs. The presidential term was reduced from six years to four; reelection was prohibited; and the office of Vice President was abolished.

When, on the 1st of May, Venustiano Carranza was chosen President, Mexico had its first const.i.tutional executive in four years. After a cruel and obstinately intolerant struggle that had occasioned indescribable suffering from disease and starvation, as well as the usual slaughter and destruction incident to war, the country began to enjoy once more a measure of peace. Financial exhaustion, however, had to be overcome before recuperation was possible. Industrial progress had become almost paralyzed; vast quant.i.ties of depreciated paper money had to be withdrawn from circulation; and an enormous array of claims for the loss of foreign life and property had rolled up.

CHAPTER XI. THE REPUBLICS OF THE CARIBBEAN

The course of events in certain of the republics in and around the Caribbean Sea warned the Hispanic nations that independence was a relative condition and that it might vary in direct ratio with nearness to the United States. After 1906 this powerful northern neighbor showed an unmistakable tendency to extend its influence in various ways. Here fiscal and police control was established; there official recognition was withheld from a President who had secured office by unconst.i.tutional methods. Nonrecognition promised to be an effective way of maintaining a regime of law and order, as the United States understood those terms. a.s.surances from the United States of the full political equality of all republics, big or little, in the western hemisphere did not always carry conviction to Spanish American ears. The smaller countries in and around the Caribbean Sea, at least, seemed likely to become virtually American protectorates.

Like their Hispanic neighbor on the north, the little republics of Central America were also scenes of political disturbance. None of them except Panama escaped revolutionary uprisings, though the loss of life and property was insignificant. On the other hand, in these early years of the century the five countries north of Panama made substantial progress toward federation. As a South American writer has expressed it, their previous efforts in that direction "amid sumptuous festivals, banquets and other solemn public acts" at which they "intoned in lyric accents daily hymns for the imperishable reunion of the isthmian republics," had been as illusory as they were frequent. Despite the mediation of the United States and Mexico in 1906, while the latter was still ruled by Diaz, the struggle in which Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and Salvador had been engaged was soon renewed between the first two belligerents. Since diplomatic interposition no longer availed, American marines were landed in Nicaragua, and the b.u.mptious Zelaya was induced to have his country meet its neighbors in a conference at Washington. Under the auspices of the United States and Mexico, in December, 1907, representatives of the five republics signed a series of conventions providing for peace and cooperation. An arbitral court of justice, to be erected in Costa Rica and composed of one judge from each nation, was to decide all matters of dispute which could not be adjusted through ordinary diplomatic means. Here, also, an inst.i.tute for the training of Central American teachers was to be established. Annual conferences were to discuss, and an office in Guatemala was to record, measures designed to secure uniformity in financial, commercial, industrial, sanitary, and educational regulations. Honduras, the storm center of weakness, was to be neutralized. None of the States was thereafter to recognize in any of them a government which had been set up in an illegal fashion. A "Const.i.tutional Act of Central American Fraternity," moreover, was adopted on behalf of peace, harmony, and progress. Toward a realization of the several objects of the conference, the Presidents of the five republics were to invite their colleagues of the United States and Mexico, whenever needful, to appoint representatives, to "lend their good offices in a purely friendly way."

Though most of these agencies were promptly put into operation, the results were not altogether satisfactory. Some discords, to be sure, were removed by treaties settling boundary questions and providing for reciprocal trade advantages; but it is doubtful whether the arrangements devised at Washington would have worked at all if the United States had not kept the little countries under a certain amount of observation. What the Central Americans apparently preferred was to be left alone, some of them to mind their own business, others to mind their neighbor's affairs.

Of all the Central American countries Honduras was, perhaps, the one most afflicted with pecuniary misfortunes. In 1909 its foreign debt, along with arrears of interest unpaid for thirty-seven years, was estimated at upwards of $110,000,000. Of this amount a large part consisted of loans obtained from foreign capitalists, at more or less extortionate rates, for the construction of a short railway, of which less than half had been built. That revolutions should be rather chronic in a land where so much money could be squandered and where the temperaments of Presidents and ex-Presidents were so bellicose, was natural enough. When the United States could not induce the warring rivals to abide by fair elections, it sent a force of marines to overawe them and gave warning that further disturbances would not be allowed.

In Nicaragua the conditions were similar. Here Zelaya, restive under the limitations set by the conference at Washington, yearned to become the "strong man" of Central America, who would teach the Yankees to stop their meddling. But his downfall was imminent. In 1909, as the result of his execution of two American soldiers of fortune who had taken part in a recent insurrection, the United States resolved to tolerate Zelaya no longer. Openly recognizing the insurgents, it forced the dictator out of the country. Three years later, when a President-elect started to a.s.sume office before the legally appointed time, a force of American marines at the capital convinced him that such a procedure was undesirable. The "corrupt and barbarous" conditions prevailing in Zelaya's time, he was informed, could not be tolerated. The United States, in fact, notified all parties in Nicaragua that, under the terms of the Washington conventions, it had a "moral mandate to exert its influence for the preservation of the general peace of Central America." Since those agreements had vested no one with authority to enforce them, such an interpretation of their language, aimed apparently at all disturbances, foreign as well as domestic, was rather elastic! At all events, after 1912, when a new const.i.tution was adopted, the country became relatively quiet and somewhat progressive. Whenever a political flurry did take place, American marines were employed to preserve the peace. Many citizens, therefore, declined to vote, on the ground that the moral and material support thus furnished by the great nation to the northward rendered it futile for them to a.s.sume political responsibilities.

Meanwhile negotiations began which were ultimately to make Nicaragua a fiscal protectorate of the United States. American officials were chosen to act as financial advisers and collectors of customs, and favorable arrangements were concluded with American bankers regarding the monetary situation; but it was not until 1916 that a treaty covering this situation was ratified. According to its provisions, in return for a stipulated sum to be expended under American direction, Nicaragua was to grant to the United States the exclusive privilege of constructing a ca.n.a.l through the territory of the republic and to lease to it the Corn Islands and a part of Fonseca Bay, on the Pacific coast, for use as naval stations. The prospect of American intervention alarmed the neighboring republics. a.s.serting that the treaty infringed upon their respective boundaries, Costa Rica, and Salvador brought suit against Nicaragua before the Central American Court. With the exception of the Nicaraguan representative, the judges upheld the contention of the plaintiffs that the defendant had no right to make any such concessions without previous consultation with Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras, since all three alike were affected by them. The Court observed, however, that it could not declare the treaty void because the United States, one of the parties concerned, was not subject to its jurisdiction. Nicaragua declined to accept the decision; and the United States, the country responsible for the existence of the Court and presumably interested in helping to enforce its judgment, allowed it to go out of existence in 1918 on the expiration of its ten-year term.

The economic situation of Costa Rica brought about a state of affairs wholly unusual in Central American politics. The President, Alfredo Gonzalez, wished to reform the system of taxation so that a fairer share of the public burdens should fall on the great landholders who, like most of their brethren in the Hispanic countries, were practically exempt. This project, coupled with the fact that certain American citizens seeking an oil concession had undermined the power of the President by wholesale bribery, induced the Minister of War, in 1917, to start a revolt against him. Rather than shed the blood of his fellow citizens for mere personal advantages, Gonzalez sustained the good reputation of Costa Rica for freedom from civil commotions by quietly leaving the country and going to the United States to present his case. In consequence, the American Government declined to recognize the de facto ruler.

Police and fiscal supervision by the United States has characterized the recent history of Panama. Not only has a proposed increase in the customs duties been disallowed, but more than once the unrest attending presidential elections has required the calming presence of American officials. As a means of forestalling outbreaks, particularly in view of the cosmopolitan population resident on the Isthmus, the republic enacted a law in 1914 which forbade foreigners to mix in local politics and authorized the expulsion of naturalized citizens who attacked the Government through the press or otherwise. With the approval of the United States, Panama entered into an agreement with American financiers providing for the creation of a national bank, one-fourth of the directors of which should be named by the Government of the republic.

The second period of American rule in Cuba lasted till 1909. Control of the Government was then formally transferred to Jose Miguel Gomez, the President who had been chosen by the Liberals at the elections held in the previous year; but the United States did not cease to watch over its chief Caribbean ward. A bitter controversy soon developed in the Cuban Congress over measures to forbid the further purchase of land by aliens, and to insure that a certain percentage of the public offices should be held by colored citizens. Though both projects were defeated, they revealed a strong antiforeign sentiment and much dissatisfaction on the part of the negro population. It was clear also that Gomez, intended to oust all conservatives from office, for an obedient Congress pa.s.sed a bill suspending the civil service rules.

The partisanship of Gomez, and his supporters, together with the constant interference of military veterans in political affairs, provoked numerous outbreaks, which led the United States, in 1912, to warn Cuba that it might again be compelled to intervene. Eventually, when a negro insurrection in the eastern part of the island menaced the safety of foreigners, American marines were landed. Another instance of intervention was the objection by the United States to an employers' liability law that would have given a monopoly of the insurance business to a Cuban company to the detriment of American firms.

After the election of Mario Menocal, the Conservative candidate, to the presidency in 1912, another occasion for intervention presented itself. An amnesty bill, originally drafted for the purpose of freeing the colored insurgents and other offenders, was amended so as to empower the retiring President to grant pardon before trial to persons whom his successor wished to prosecute for wholesale corruption in financial transactions. Before the bill pa.s.sed, however, notice was sent from Washington that, since the American Government had the authority to supervise the finances of the republic, Gomez would better veto the bill, and this he accordingly did.

A sharp struggle arose when it became known that Menocal would be a candidate for reelection. The Liberal majority in the Congress pa.s.sed a bill requiring that a President who sought to succeed himself should resign two months before the elections. When Menocal vetoed this measure, his opponents demanded that the United States supervise the elections. As the result of the elections was doubtful, Gomez and his followers resorted in 1917 to the usual insurrection; whereupon the American Government warned the rebels that it would not recognize their claims if they won by force. Active aid from that quarter, as well as the capture of the insurgent leader, caused the movement to collapse after the electoral college had decided in favor of Menocal.

In the Dominican Republic disturbances were frequent, notwithstanding the fact that American officials were in charge of the customhouses and by their presence were expected to exert a quieting influence. Even the adoption, in 1908, of a new const.i.tution which provided for the prolongation of the presidential term to six years and for the abolition of the office of Vice President-two stabilizing devices quite common in Hispanic countries where personal ambition is p.r.o.ne to be a source of political trouble-did not help much to restore order. The a.s.sa.s.sination of the President and the persistence of age-long quarrels with Haiti over boundaries made matters worse. Thereupon, in 1913, the United States served formal notice on the rebellious parties that it would not only refuse to recognize any Government set up by force but would withhold any share in the receipts from the customs. As this procedure did not prevent a revolutionary leader from demanding half a million dollars as a financial sedative for his political nerves and from creating more trouble when the President failed to dispense it, the heavy hand of an American naval force administered another kind of specific, until commissioners from Porto Rico could arrive to superintend the selection of a new chief magistrate. Notwithstanding the protest of the Dominican Government, the "fairest and freest" elections ever known in the country were held under the direction of those officials-as a "body of friendly observers"!

However amicable this arrangement seemed, it did not smother the flames of discord. In 1916, when an American naval commander suggested that a rebellious Minister of War leave the capital, he agreed to do so if the "fairest and freest" of chosen Presidents would resign. Even after both of them had complied with the suggestions, the individuals who a.s.sumed their respective offices were soon at loggerheads. Accordingly the United States placed the republic under military rule, until a President could be elected who might be able to retain his post without too much "friendly observation" from Washington, and a Minister of War could be appointed who would refrain from making war on the President! Then the organization of a new party to combat the previous inordinate display of personalities in politics created some hope that the republic would accomplish its own redemption.

Only because of its relation to the wars of emanc.i.p.ation and to the Dominican Republic, need the negro state of Haiti, occupying the western part of the Caribbean island, be mentioned in connection with the story of the Hispanic nations. Suffice it to say that the fact that their color was different and that they spoke a variant of French instead of Spanish did not prevent the inhabitants of this state from offering a far worse spectacle of political and financial demoralization than did their neighbors to the eastward. Perpetual commotions and repeated interventions by American and European naval forces on behalf of the foreign residents, eventually made it imperative for the United States to take direct charge of the republic. In 1916, by a convention which placed the finances under American control, created a native constabulary under American officers, and imposed a number of other restraints, the United States converted Haiti into what is practically a protectorate.

CHAPTER XII. PAN-AMERICANISM AND THE GREAT WAR

While the Hispanic republics were entering upon the second century of their independent life, the idea of a certain community of interests between themselves and the United States began to a.s.sume a fairly definite form. Though emphasized by American statesmen and publicists in particular, the new point of view was not generally understood or appreciated by the people of either this country or its fellow nations to the southward. It seemed, nevertheless, to promise an effective cooperation in spirit and action between them and came therefore to be called "Pan-Americanism."

This sentiment of inter-American solidarity sprang from several sources. The periodical conferences of the United States and its sister republics gave occasion for an interchange of official courtesies and expressions of good feeling. Doubtless, also, the presence of delegates from the Hispanic countries at the international gatherings at The Hague served to acquaint the world at large with the stability, strength, wealth, and culture of their respective lands. Individual Americans took an active interest in their fellows of Hispanic stock and found their interest reciprocated. Motives of business or pleasure and a desire to obtain personal knowledge about one another led to visits and countervisits that became steadily more frequent. Societies were created to encourage the friendship and acquaintance thus formed. Scientific congresses were held and inst.i.tutes were founded in which both the United States and Hispanic America were represented. Books, articles, and newspaper accounts about one another's countries were published in increasing volume. Educational inst.i.tutions devoted a constantly growing attention to inter-American affairs. Individuals and commissions were dispatched by the Hispanic nations and the United States to study one another's conditions and to confer about matters of mutual concern. Secretaries of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and other distinguished personages interchanged visits. Above all, the common dangers and responsibilities falling upon the Americas at large as a consequence of the European war seemed likely to bring the several nations into a harmony of feeling and relationship to which they had never before attained.

Pan-Americanism, however, was destined to remain largely a generous ideal. The action of the United States in extending its direct influence over the small republics in and around the Caribbean aroused the suspicion and alarm of Hispanic Americans, who still feared imperialistic designs on the part of that country now more than ever the Colossus of the North. "The art of oratory among the Yankees," declared a South American critic, "is lavish with a fraternal idealism; but strong wills enforce their imperialistic ambitions." Impa.s.sioned speakers and writers adjured the ghost of Hispanic confederation to rise and confront the new northern peril. They even advocated an appeal to Great Britain, Germany, or j.a.pan, and they urged closer economic, social, and intellectual relations with the countries of Europe.

It was while the United States was thus widening the sphere of its influence in the Caribbean that the "A B C" powers-Argentina, Brazil, and Chile-reached an understanding which was in a sense a measure of self-defense. For some years cordial relations had existed among these three nations which had grown so remarkably in strength and prestige. It was felt that by united action they might set up in the New World the European principle of a balance of power, a.s.sume the leadership in Hispanic America, and serve in some degree as a counterpoise to the United States. Nevertheless they were disposed to cooperate with their northern neighbor in the peaceable adjustment of conflicts in which other Hispanic countries were concerned, provided that the mediation carried on by such a "concert of the western world" did not include actual intervention in the internal affairs of the countries involved.

With this att.i.tude of the public mind, it is not strange that the Hispanic republics at large should have been inclined to look with scant favor upon proposals made by the United States, in 1916, to render the spirit of Pan-Americanism more precise in its operation. The proposals in substance were these: that all the nations of America "mutually agree to guarantee the territorial integrity" of one another; to "maintain a republican form of government"; to prohibit the "exportation of arms to any but the legally const.i.tuted governments"; and to adopt laws of neutrality which would make it "impossible to filibustering expeditions to threaten or carry on revolutions in neighboring republics." These proposals appear to have received no formal approval beyond what is signified by the diplomatic expression "in principle." Considering the disparity in strength, wealth, and prestige between the northern country and its southern fellows, suggestions of the sort could be made practicable only by letting the United States do whatever it might think needful to accomplish the objects which it sought. Obviously the Hispanic nations, singly or collectively, would hardly venture to take any such action within the borders of the United States itself, if, for example, it failed to maintain what, in their opinion, was "a republican form of government." A full acceptance of the plan accordingly would have amounted to a recognition of American overlordship, and this they were naturally not disposed to admit.

The common perils and duties confronting the Americas as a result of the Great War, however, made close cooperation between the Hispanic republics and the United States up to a certain point indispensable. Toward that transatlantic struggle the att.i.tude of all the nations of the New World at the outset was substantially the same. Though strongly sympathetic on the whole with the "Allies" and notably with France, the southern countries nevertheless declared their neutrality. More than that, they tried to convert neutrality into a Pan-American policy, instead of regarding it as an official att.i.tude to be adopted by the republics separately. Thus when the conflict overseas began to injure the rights of neutrals, Argentina and other nations urged that the countries of the New World jointly agree to declare that direct maritime commerce between American lands should be considered as "inter-American coastwise trade," and that the merchant ships engaged in it, whatever the flag under which they sailed, should be looked upon as neutral. Though the South American countries failed to enlist the support of their northern neighbor in this bold departure from international precedent, they found some compensation for their disappointment in the closer commercial and financial relations which they established with the United States.

Because of the dependence of the Hispanic nations, and especially those of the southern group, on the intimacy of their economic ties with the belligerents overseas, they suffered from the ravages of the struggle more perhaps than other lands outside of Europe. Negotiations for prospective loans were dropped. Industries were suspended, work on public improvements was checked, and commerce brought almost to a standstill. As the revenues fell off and ready money became scarce, drastic measures had to be devised to meet the financial strain. For the protection of credit, bank holidays were declared, stock exchanges were closed, moratoria were set up in nearly all the countries, taxes and duties were increased, radical reductions in expenditure were undertaken, and in a few cases large quant.i.ties of paper money were issued.

With the European market thus wholly or partially cut off, the Hispanic republics were forced to supply the consequent shortage with manufactured articles and other goods from the United States and to send thither their raw materials in exchange. To their northern neighbor they had to turn also for pecuniary aid. A Pan-American financial conference was held at Washington in 1915, and an international high commission was appointed to carry its recommendations into effect. Gradually most of the Hispanic countries came to show a favorable trade balance. Then, as the war drew into its fourth year, several of them even began to enjoy great prosperity. That Pan-Americanism had not meant much more than cooperation for economic ends seemed evident when, on April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany. Instead of following spontaneously in the wake of their great northern neighbor, the Hispanic republics were divided by conflicting currents of opinion and hesitated as to their proper course of procedure. While a majority of them expressed approval of what the United States had done, and while Uruguay for its part a.s.serted that "no American country, which in defense of its own rights should find itself in a state of war with nations of other continents, would be treated as a belligerent," Mexico veered almost to the other extreme by proposing that the republics of America agree to lay an embargo on the shipment of munitions to the warring powers.

As a matter of fact, only seven out of the nineteen Hispanic nations saw fit to imitate the example set by their northern neighbor and to declare war on Germany. These were Cuba-in view of its "duty toward the United States," Panama, Guatemala, Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Since the Dominican Republic at the time was under American military control, it was not in a position to choose its course. Four countries Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay-broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. The other seven republics-Mexico, Salvador, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay-continued their formal neutrality. In spite of a disclosure made by the United States of insulting and threatening utterances on the part of the German charge d'affaires in Argentina, which led to popular outbreaks at the capital and induced the national Congress to declare in favor of a severance of diplomatic relations with that functionary's Government, the President of the republic stood firm in his resolution to maintain neutrality. If Pan-Americanism had ever involved the idea of political cooperation among the nations of the New World, it broke down just when it might have served the greatest of purposes. Even the "A B C" combination itself had apparently been shattered.

A century and more had now pa.s.sed since the Spanish and Portuguese peoples of the New World had achieved their independence. Eighteen political children of various sizes and stages of advancement, or backwardness, were born of Spain in America, and one acknowledged the maternity of Portugal. Big Brazil has always maintained the happiest relations with the little mother in Europe, who still watches with pride the growth of her strapping youngster. Between Spain and her descendants, however, animosity endured for many years after they had thrown off the parental yoke. Yet of late, much has been done on both sides to render the relationship cordial. The graceful act of Spain in sending the much-beloved Infanta Isabel to represent her in Argentina and Chile at the celebration of the centennial anniversary of their cry for independence, and to wish them G.o.dspeed on their onward journey, was typical of the yearning of the mother country for her children overseas, despite the lapse of years and political ties. So, too, her ablest men of intellect have striven n.o.bly and with marked success to revive among them a sense of filial affection and grat.i.tude for all that Spain contributed to mold the mind and heart of her kindred in distant lands. On their part, the Hispanic Americans have come to a clearer consciousness of the fact that on the continents of the New World there are two distinct types of civilization, with all that each connotes of differences in race, psychology, tradition, language, and custom-their own, and that represented by the United States. Appreciative though the southern countries are of their northern neighbor, they cling nevertheless to their heritage from Spain and Portugal in whatever seems conducive to the maintenance of their own ideals of life and thought.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

For anything like a detailed study of the history of the Hispanic nations of America, obviously one must consult works written in Spanish and Portuguese. There are many important books, also, in French and German; but, with few exceptions, the recommendations for the general reader will be limited to accounts in English.

A very useful outline and guide to recent literature on the subject is W. W. Pierson, Jr., "A Syllabus of Latin-American History" (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1917). A brief introduction to the history and present aspects of Hispanic American civilization is W. R. Shepherd, "Latin America" (New York, 1914). The best general accounts of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial systems will be found in Charles de Lannoy and Herman van der Linden, "Histoire de L'Expansion Coloniale des Peuples Europeans: Portugal et Espagne" (Brussels and Paris, 1907), and Kurt Simon, "Spanien and Portugal als See and Kolonialmdchte" (Hamburg, 1913). For the Spanish colonial regime alone, E. G. Bourne, "Spain in America" (New York, 1904) is excellent. The situation in southern South America toward the close of Spanish rule is well described in Bernard Moses, "South America on the Eve of Emanc.i.p.ation" (New York, 1908). Among contemporary accounts of that period, Alexander von Humboldt and Aime Bonpland, "Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of America", 3 vols. (London, 1881); Alexander von Humboldt, "Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain", 4 vols. (London,1811-1822); and F. R. J. de Pons, "Travels in South America", 2 vols. (London, 1807), are authoritative, even if not always easy to read.

On the wars of independence, see the scholarly treatise by W. S. Robertson, "Rise of the Spanish-American Republics as Told in the Lives of their Liberators" (New York, 1918); Bartolome Mitre, "The Emanc.i.p.ation of South America" (London, 1893)-a condensed translation of the author's "Historia de San Martin", and wholly favorable to that patriot; and F. L. Petre, "Simon Bolivar" (London, 1910)-impartial at the expense of the imagination. Among the numerous contemporary accounts, the following will be found serviceable: W. D. Robinson, "Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution" (Philadelphia, 1890); J. R. Poinsett, "Notes on Mexico" (London, 1825); H. M. Brackenridge, "Voyage to South America," 2 vols. (London, 1820); W. B. Stevenson, "Historical and Descriptive Narrative of Twenty Years' Residence in South America", 3 vols. (London, 1895); J. Miller, "Memoirs of General Miller in the Service of the Republic of Peru", 2 vols. (London, 1828); H. L. V. Ducoudray Holstein, "Memoirs of Simon Bolivar", 2 vols. (London, 1830), and John Armitage, "History of Brazil", 2 vols. (London, 1836).

The best books on the history of the republics as a whole since the attainment of independence, and written from an Hispanic American viewpoint, are F. Garcia Calderon, "Latin America, its Rise and Progress" (New York, 1913), and M. de Oliveira Lima, "The Evolution of Brazil Compared with that of Spanish and Anglo-Saxon America" (Stanford University, California, 1914). The countries of Central America are dealt with by W. H. Koebel, "Central America" (New York, 1917), and of South America by T. C. Dawson, "The South American Republics", 2 vols. (New York, 1903-1904), and C. E. Akers, "History of South America" (London, 1912), though in a manner that often confuses rather than enlightens.

Among the histories and descriptions of individual countries, arranged in alphabetical order, the following are probably the most useful to the general reader: W. A. Hirst, "Argentina" (New York, 1910); Paul Walle, "Bolivia" (New York, 1914); Pierre Denis, "Brazil" (New York, 1911); G. F. S. Elliot, "Chile" (New York, 1907); P. J. Eder, "Colombia" (New York, 1913); J. B. Calvo, "The Republic of Costa Rica" (Chicago, 1890); A. G. Robinson, "Cuba, Old and New" (New York, 1915); Otto Schoenrich, "Santo Domingo" (New York, 1918); C. R. Enock, "Ecuador" (New York, 1914); C. R. Enock, "Mexico" (New York, 1909); W. H. Koebel, "Paraguay" (New York, 1917); C. R. Enock, "Peru" (New York, 1910); W. H. Koebel, "Uruguay" (New York, 1911), and L. V. Dalton, "Venezuela" (New York, 1912). Of these, the books by Robinson and Eder, on Cuba and Colombia, respectively, are the most readable and reliable.

For additional bibliographical references see "South America" and the articles on individual countries in "The Encyclopaedia Britannica", 11th edition, and in Marrion Wilc.o.x and G. E. Rines, "Encyclopedia of Latin America" (New York, 1917).

Of contemporary or later works descriptive of the life and times of eminent characters in the history of the Hispanic American republics since 1830, a few may be taken as representative. Rosas: J. A. King, "Twenty-four Years in the Argentine Republic" (London, 1846), and Woodbine Parish, "Buenos Ayres and the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata" (London, 1850). Francia: J. R. Rengger, "Reign of Dr. Joseph Gaspard Roderick [!] de Francia in Paraguay" (London, 1827); J. P. and W. P. Robertson, "Letters on South America", 3 vols. (London, 1843), and E. L. White, "El Supremo", a novel (New York, 1916). Santa Anna: Waddy Thompson, "Recollections of Mexico" (New York, 1846), and F. E. Ingles, Calderon de la Barca, "Life in Mexico" (London, 1859.). Juarez: U. R. Burke, "Life of Benito Juarez" (London, 1894). Solano Lopez: T. J. Hutchinson, "Parana; with Incidents of the Paraguayan War and South American Recollections" (London, 1868); George Thompson, "The War in Paraguay" (London, 1869); R. F. Burton, "Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay" (London, 1870), and C. A. Washburn, "The History of Paraguay", 2 vols. (Boston, 1871). Pedro II: J. C. Fletcher and D. P. Kidder, "Brazil and the Brazilians" (Boston, 1879), and Frank Bennett, "Forty Years in Brazil"(London, 1914). Garcia Moreno: Frederick Ha.s.saurek, "Four Years among Spanish Americans"(New York, 1867). Guzman Blanco: C. D. Dance, "Recollections of Four Years in Venezuela" (London, 1876). Diaz: James Creelman, "Diaz, Master of Mexico" (New York, 1911). Balmaceda: M. H. Hervey, "Dark Days in Chile" (London, 1891-1890. Carranza: L. Gutierrez de Lara and Edgc.u.mb Pinchon, "The Mexican People: their Struggle for Freedom" (New York, 1914).