Hero_ The Life And Legend Of Lawrence Of Arabia Part 11

More important than all these problems was the fact that the president of the United States was planning to join in the peace talks himself, bringing with him a host of unwelcome ideas, including a "general a.s.sociation of nations." The New World was embarking on an effort to remake and reform the Old. "Even the Good Lord contented himself with only ten," Clemenceau grumbled, when he read Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points with the skeptical eye of an old-fashioned French nationalist who already knew what he wanted: Alsace; Lorraine; the Rhineland; formidable, crippling reparations; client states in the east to hold Germany in check; and, of course, last but not least, Syria, Lebanon, Mosul with its oil, and a share in the Holy Land.

At the same time, the prospect of President Wilson's partic.i.p.ation in the peace talks, together with a formidable American delegation,* made his majesty's government more inclined to collaborate with the French. Only by standing together, arm in arm, made his majesty's government more inclined to collaborate with the French. Only by standing together, arm in arm, bras dessus, bras dessous, bras dessus, bras dessous, could the two princ.i.p.al European powers hope to resist what they both saw as Woodrow Wilson's starry-eyed idealism and naivete. could the two princ.i.p.al European powers hope to resist what they both saw as Woodrow Wilson's starry-eyed idealism and naivete.

In the meantime, reports and advice on the Middle East continued to pour in to the Eastern Committee. Both Clayton and Hogarth sent long, detailed recommendations, basically echoing Lawrence's views. They were quickly countered by an equally long memorandum from Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office, outlining the views of the government of India. These amounted to a sharp reminder that what really mattered was the oil deposits of Mesopotamia, rather than the Syrian Desert, and a warning that it was not worth jeopardizing British interests in Mesopotamia for the sake of nebulous promises that may have been made to Hussein and his sons. Hirtzel expressed polite scorn for Lawrence, whose contempt for the Indian government and the Indian army on his brief visit to Baghdad in 1916 during the siege of Kut had not been forgotten or forgiven: "Without in the least wishing to deprecate [Lawrence's] achievements and his undoubted genius, it must be said about him that he does not at all represent-and would not, I think, claim to represent-the local views of Northern Mesopotamia and Iraq; of the latter, indeed, he has practically no first-hand knowledge at all."

Hirtzel also warned strongly against Lawrence's proposal to place one of Hussein's sons on a throne in Baghdad as king of Iraq, and another on a throne in Mosul to rule over the Kurds,* and suggested that if Britain raised objections to France's ruling over Lebanon and Syria, the French would hardly be likely to accept British rule over Iraq. and suggested that if Britain raised objections to France's ruling over Lebanon and Syria, the French would hardly be likely to accept British rule over Iraq.

Even the joy of victory did not prevent Stephen-Jean-Marie Pichon, the French foreign minister, from administering a sharp rap on the knuckles to the British Foreign Office, reminding them that so far as France was concerned, the Sykes-Picot agreement was still in force and that France expected to receive everything it had been promised. Pichon reminded the British Foreign Office of France's "historic duty towards the peoples of Syria," just in case the members of the Eastern Committee had forgotten, or might have plans to denounce the Sykes-Picot agreement to President Wilson as exactly the kind of secret diplomacy that the Fourteen Points were intended to prevent.

Much as the British might deprecate the exaggerated territorial claims of King Hussein, or the ambitions of Syrian nationalists, when it came to the Middle East there was more sympathy for the Arabs in London-partly because of Lawrence-than for the French. Lawrence's capacity for communicating enthusiasm was now concentrated on the task of getting Feisal to the Peace Conference, despite strong French opposition.

European diplomacy: A diminutive Lawrence tries to restrain Feisal from being tempted by France at the Peace Conference. Cartoon by Sir Mark Sykes.

In this, he succeeded triumphantly. By November 21, when he attended the next Eastern Committee meeting, Feisal's partic.i.p.ation was now considered indispensable by most of the members. "You do not want to divide the loot," Jan s.m.u.ts warned the committee; "that would be the wrong policy for the future." What s.m.u.ts meant, of course, was that the British should not be seen seen to be dividing the loot, least of all in cooperation with the French. They should, in the words of Curzon, "play [Arab] self-determination for all it was worth ... knowing in the bottom of [their] hearts that we are more likely to benefit from it than anybody else." Lord Robert Cecil argued for the presence of a friendly Arab prince and felt "it was essential that Feisal and the British government have the same story." This carried the implication that Lawrence, the only person who knew Feisal, should be present to coach his friend on a common "story," one that would-it was hoped-satisfy the Americans without alarming the French. to be dividing the loot, least of all in cooperation with the French. They should, in the words of Curzon, "play [Arab] self-determination for all it was worth ... knowing in the bottom of [their] hearts that we are more likely to benefit from it than anybody else." Lord Robert Cecil argued for the presence of a friendly Arab prince and felt "it was essential that Feisal and the British government have the same story." This carried the implication that Lawrence, the only person who knew Feisal, should be present to coach his friend on a common "story," one that would-it was hoped-satisfy the Americans without alarming the French.*

From November 8 to November 21, Lawrence had not only looked after Feisal's interests but also placed himself as one of the central figures at the forthcoming Peace Conference-for by now n.o.body could doubt that "Colonel Lawrence" would be part of the British delegation. For a man who denied altogether having any ambition, Lawrence had played his cards as adroitly as Machiavelli.

In fact, Feisal and his exotic entourage, which included his personal slave and the newly promoted Brigadier-General Nuri as-Said, were already at sea, on board the cruiser HMS Gloucester. Gloucester. Just as Lawrence had been able, after Aqaba, to summon naval ships and airplanes when he needed them, now he had adroitly managed to have the Royal Navy deliver Feisal to Europe. This was not only proof of Lawrence's prestige, but a very visible statement of British backing for the Hashemite family and its pretensions. Unfortunately, this move had not been announced to the French government, perhaps owing to a failure of communication, perhaps by an oversight, or more likely because n.o.body wanted to take responsibility for doing so. When the French were finally informed by their secret services that Feisal would be landing at any moment in Ma.r.s.eille from a British cruiser, they were predictably outraged. Just as Lawrence had been able, after Aqaba, to summon naval ships and airplanes when he needed them, now he had adroitly managed to have the Royal Navy deliver Feisal to Europe. This was not only proof of Lawrence's prestige, but a very visible statement of British backing for the Hashemite family and its pretensions. Unfortunately, this move had not been announced to the French government, perhaps owing to a failure of communication, perhaps by an oversight, or more likely because n.o.body wanted to take responsibility for doing so. When the French were finally informed by their secret services that Feisal would be landing at any moment in Ma.r.s.eille from a British cruiser, they were predictably outraged.

Lawrence was dispatched by the Foreign Office at once to extinguish the fire, and arrived in Ma.r.s.eille, via Paris, with orders to smooth things down and get Feisal to Paris, or, if necessary, to London, with as little fuss as possible. Although the French claimed that Lawrence wore his white robes to greet Feisal, this seems not to have been the case. In photographs of their meeting, Lawrence is in British uniform, but he had borrowed the Arab headdress and agal agal of a Meccan officer. He gave further offense to the French by not wearing the ribbons of a of a Meccan officer. He gave further offense to the French by not wearing the ribbons of a chevalier chevalier of the Legion of Honor or his two Croix de Guerre. He was regarded in Paris as Feisal's "evil genius," and as a sinister agent of the British secret services. Colonel Bremond-France's former military representative in Jidda and Lawrence's old bete noire-was ordered to intercept Feisal and Lawrence posthaste, and inform them of France's displeasure. Regarding Lawrence, Bremond's instructions were uncompromising: "You must be quite candid with Lawrence, and point out to him that he is in a false position. If he is in France as a British colonel in British uniform, we welcome him. But we don't accept him as an Arab, and if he remains in fancy dress, he is not wanted here." of the Legion of Honor or his two Croix de Guerre. He was regarded in Paris as Feisal's "evil genius," and as a sinister agent of the British secret services. Colonel Bremond-France's former military representative in Jidda and Lawrence's old bete noire-was ordered to intercept Feisal and Lawrence posthaste, and inform them of France's displeasure. Regarding Lawrence, Bremond's instructions were uncompromising: "You must be quite candid with Lawrence, and point out to him that he is in a false position. If he is in France as a British colonel in British uniform, we welcome him. But we don't accept him as an Arab, and if he remains in fancy dress, he is not wanted here."

A brief tussle took place at Ma.r.s.eille; the British wanted Feisal to travel directly to Paris; but the French, playing for time, had quickly arranged a leisurely tour of the major battlefields, including Verdun-no doubt to show him how much greater France's sacrifices had been in the war than those of the Hejaz-as well as a number of factories, to impress him with France's wealth. Lawrence accompanied Feisal as far as Lyon, where Colonel Bremond finally caught up with them. The French warning regarding Lawrence was read to them, and Lawrence, possibly choosing this occasion to return his cross of the Legion of Honor to Bremond, bowed to French pressure and left Feisal to travel on to Paris alone. Throughout this trying episode Feisal behaved with a degree of dignity and patience that won him great admiration, but did nothing to change minds in Paris about Syria and Lebanon.

The French hoped that by keeping Feisal away from Paris they could persuade the British to confirm the Sykes-Picot agreement before the American delegation arrived in Paris. The two European powers could then present President Wilson with a fait accompli on the subject of the Middle East: a British Mesopotamia, a French Syria (including Lebanon), and some sort of face-saving arrangement in Palestine that would satisfy Britain, France, and American Zionists, for in Paris and London the Jews were-mistakenly-thought to have great influence over the American delegation. In large part because of Lawrence's skillful propaganda, the British still felt themselves under obligation to Feisal, and deeply uncom fortable with the Sykes-Picot agreement. British troops were still occupying Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, and were stubbornly (and perhaps unrealistically) prepared to play what would turn out to be a losing hand, supporting Feisal and his father against the French.

As is so often the case in politics, unforeseeable events conspired to make Feisal's case for an independent Arab government in Syria even less promising than it had been. While Feisal was still being kept busy touring French factories (displaying a dignified, polite, but remote smile of interest), the French prime minister, Georges Clemenceau, arrived in London on what was supposed to be a ceremonial visit. At seventy-eight, the oldest of the Allied leaders, Clemenceau was a man of great intelligence, biting wit, and ferocious energy, nicknamed le tigre le tigre for his savage and unforgiving political skill, whose uncompromising leadership had saved France from defeat. Stocky, powerful, speaking excellent English (in his youth he had taught French and riding for a time at a girls' school in Connecticut), with piercing eyes and a bristling walrus mustache, his hands always clad in gray cotton gloves to hide his eczema, Clemenceau was an imposing figure, perhaps the most feared politician in France. Only the prolonged bloodletting of Verdun, the disaster of General Nivelle's offensive, and the widespread mutinies in the French army that followed it could have brought Clemenceau back to power in 1917. Now, after victory, he was faced with making a peace that would justify or repay France's sacrifices. Among the Allies, the only leader whom he considered his equal was David Lloyd George, but the two men loathed and distrusted each other, perhaps because they were cut from the same cloth. for his savage and unforgiving political skill, whose uncompromising leadership had saved France from defeat. Stocky, powerful, speaking excellent English (in his youth he had taught French and riding for a time at a girls' school in Connecticut), with piercing eyes and a bristling walrus mustache, his hands always clad in gray cotton gloves to hide his eczema, Clemenceau was an imposing figure, perhaps the most feared politician in France. Only the prolonged bloodletting of Verdun, the disaster of General Nivelle's offensive, and the widespread mutinies in the French army that followed it could have brought Clemenceau back to power in 1917. Now, after victory, he was faced with making a peace that would justify or repay France's sacrifices. Among the Allies, the only leader whom he considered his equal was David Lloyd George, but the two men loathed and distrusted each other, perhaps because they were cut from the same cloth.

Lawrence at the Paris Peace Conference, as part of Feisal's delegation. Feisal's Sudanese slave and bodyguard, towering over everbody else, is on the right.

As the two leaders stood together in the French emba.s.sy in London Clemenceau, who had no gift for polite small talk, and was determined to cement good relations between France and Britain before Wilson arrived, bluntly asked Lloyd George what he wanted. Lloyd George quickly replied that he wanted Mesopotamia, and all of Palestine, "from Beersheba to Dan," as well as Jerusalem. "What else?" Clemenceau asked. "I want Mosul." "You shall have it," Clemenceau replied. This appeared to be a burst of generosity, but it was followed by a request for Britain's agreement, in return, to "a unified French administration in the whole of Syria, including the inland area reserved for an independent Arab administration."

Lloyd George knew his Old Testament-"from Beersheba to Dan" was the territory granted by Abimelech to Abraham, and claimed by David as the southern and northern limits of his kingdom-but "Dan" was to provide numerous difficulties for the lawyers and mapmakers at the Peace Conference, since it had vanished altogether from modern maps of Palestine. (It was just north of the Sea of Galilee, and just southeast of the Litani River and the present border between Israel and Lebanon. From the point of view of Lloyd George, the important thing was that this area included Jerusalem.) South Hill, in Delvin, County Westmeath, Ireland, the home Thomas Chapman abandoned when he left his family for Sarah.

Sarah, about 1895, at Langley Lodge, Hampshire, Janet Laurie, at about the time Ned proposed to her.

Gertrude Bell, in her desert riding costume.

Cairo, 1917. At left, Lawrence, for once in uniform; center, Hogarth; right, Alan Dawnay.

Aqaba, as it was when Lawrence captured it.

Photograph by Lawrence of Feisal's camp at dawn The vanguard of the Arab army arrives in Yenbo. Feisal is the figure on the black horse with a white blaze, to the right, in the lead, preceded by his slaves on foot. The figure behind him in white, mounted on a camel, is Lawrence.

Photograph by Lawrence of the Arab army on the move. Note the furled banners December 1917: Allenby enters Jerusalem on foot.

British and French officers congratulate each other after the entry into Jerusalem. Lawrence, in a borrowed uniform, is the short figure, third from left.

A Turkish train and railway station after Lawrence wrecked them both.

FRAMES FROM THE FILM FOOTAGE LOWELL THOMAS AND HARRY CHASE SHOT IN AQABA, 1918:.

Arab cavalry deploying.

Lawrence's armored cars, attacking the railway line between Maan and Medina The bridge at Yarmuk.

Emir Abdulla, the future king of Jordan, reviews troops. The figure between the two British officers may be Lawrence; the tall officer on the right is Allenby Lawrence, in 1918. The dagger is the one he bought in Mecca, and later sold to put a new roof on his cottage.

T. E. Lawrence and Lowell Thomas pose together in Arab dress for Harry Chase. This photograph was probably taken after the war, in England (note the gra.s.s and the shrubbery in the background).

March 20, 1921: the imperial conference at Cairo. Figures immediately below the Sphinx's head are, left to right, Winston Churchill, Gertrude Bell, and Lawrence Two of England's most famous and celebrated figures: Nancy Astor and Bernard Shaw, surrounded by admirers.

Bernard and Charlotte Shaw a rare glimpse of them together, and apparently at leisure Nancy Astor, in a characteristically energetic and combative pose.

Lawrence, barefoot, standing on a float of a seaplane Clare Sydney Smith Lawrence in RAF uniform, at Cattewater, about the time he became a friend of both Smiths.

Lawrence relaxes with Clare (seated, far right), with two of her friends, and dogs.

Clare and Lawrence, then Aircraftman Shaw, in the Biscuit. Biscuit. Clare is at the wheel. Clare is at the wheel.

Lawrence, at the wheel, puts the Biscuit Biscuit through its paces at high speed, towing a water-skier through its paces at high speed, towing a water-skier Front page of the Daily Sketch, Daily Sketch, announcing Lawrence's death. announcing Lawrence's death.

Eric Kennington's bust of Lawrence for the memorial in the crypt of St. Paul's Cathedral, London.

Eric Kennington works on his effigy of Lawrence.

Eric Kennington's effigy of Lawrence, in St. Martin's Church, Warcham, Dorset.

Lloyd George did not immediately inform the cabinet of his spur-of-the-moment gentleman's agreement with Clemenceau, no doubt because he knew that some cabinet members would object. Nor was Clemenceau anxious to let his foreign minister, Pichon, know that he had just given away the oil of Mosul and the city of Jerusalem to the man who was known in Britain, not for nothing, as the "Welsh wizard." Clemenceau soon came under attack from French imperialists and rightists for having betrayed France; and Lloyd George had inadvertently agreed to keep in place just those clauses of the Sykes-Picot agreement that most of his cabinet thought should be dropped or modified.

The day after this extraordinary example of impulsive personal diplomacy, Lawrence arrived back in Britain from France and went straight to see Lord Robert Cecil, to tell him about Feisal's unfortunate reception in France. Cecil, as always sympathetic to Lawrence, immediately sent a note to Lloyd George asking him to meet with "Colonel Lawrence (the Arabian)" [sic], [sic], who wished to warn him of Clemenceau's plans to undercut British and Arab aspirations in the Middle East. Because Lloyd George, unbeknownst to Cecil, had already agreed to those plans, the prime minister carefully avoided meeting with Lawrence, who was instead fobbed off with an invitation to attend his third session of the Eastern Committee, three days later. The opinion of the members was still strongly against the Sykes-Picot agreement-even Lawrence's old opponent Lord Curzon spoke scathingly about the arrangements for Syria, describing them as "fantastic" and predicting (correctly) that they would be a source of "incessant friction between the French and ourselves, and the Arabs as third parties." who wished to warn him of Clemenceau's plans to undercut British and Arab aspirations in the Middle East. Because Lloyd George, unbeknownst to Cecil, had already agreed to those plans, the prime minister carefully avoided meeting with Lawrence, who was instead fobbed off with an invitation to attend his third session of the Eastern Committee, three days later. The opinion of the members was still strongly against the Sykes-Picot agreement-even Lawrence's old opponent Lord Curzon spoke scathingly about the arrangements for Syria, describing them as "fantastic" and predicting (correctly) that they would be a source of "incessant friction between the French and ourselves, and the Arabs as third parties."

Clearly, Curzon, like Cecil, had not yet been told of the prime minister's bargain with Clemenceau; but A. J. Balfour apparently had, had, for to everyone's surprise, since he seldom appeared at the committee, he spoke at length, emphasizing that Britain could not possibly repudiate the Sykes-Picot agreement, and that France's claim to Syria and Lebanon must be respected to the letter. Balfour's manner was famously languid and aloof, and even his friends complained that while he seemed urbane, he was ice-cold, but on this occasion he was unusually frank. If the Americans "chose to step in and cut the knot," that was their business, "but we must not put the knife into their hand." Balfour was foreign secretary, and while it could not be said that he enjoyed Lloyd George's confidence, he was the senior Conservative member of the coalition government, and Lloyd George would almost certainly have revealed to Balfour what he still regarded as a coup, a triumph that gave the British everything they wanted in exchange for Syria and Lebanon, where they had nothing to gain. Those whose political instincts were sharp (and Lawrence was certainly among them) must have guessed that the government had in effect abandoned Feisal to make the best deal it could with the French. for to everyone's surprise, since he seldom appeared at the committee, he spoke at length, emphasizing that Britain could not possibly repudiate the Sykes-Picot agreement, and that France's claim to Syria and Lebanon must be respected to the letter. Balfour's manner was famously languid and aloof, and even his friends complained that while he seemed urbane, he was ice-cold, but on this occasion he was unusually frank. If the Americans "chose to step in and cut the knot," that was their business, "but we must not put the knife into their hand." Balfour was foreign secretary, and while it could not be said that he enjoyed Lloyd George's confidence, he was the senior Conservative member of the coalition government, and Lloyd George would almost certainly have revealed to Balfour what he still regarded as a coup, a triumph that gave the British everything they wanted in exchange for Syria and Lebanon, where they had nothing to gain. Those whose political instincts were sharp (and Lawrence was certainly among them) must have guessed that the government had in effect abandoned Feisal to make the best deal it could with the French.

On the other hand, the British, being British, were anxious to put a good face on things, and with that in mind the Foreign Office hastened to add Lawrence's name to the members of the British delegation to the Peace Conference as an "advisor on special subjects," in addition to being "a member of Feisal's staff." Thus Lawrence was placed in much the same ambiguous position at the Peace Conference as he had been in Arabia in 1917. Once again he was called on to manage Feisal on behalf of the British government, while at the same time attempting to secure for Feisal what he already knew Feisal wouldn't get.

Lawrence himself would describe the postwar experience hauntingly in Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, speaking for many of his generation who shared his bitterness: "We lived many lives in those whirling campaigns, never sparing ourselves: yet when we achieved and the new world dawned, the old men came out again and took our victory to re-make in the likeness of the former world they knew. Youth could win, but had not learned to keep: and was pitiably weak against age. We stammered that we had worked for a new heaven and a new earth, and they thanked us kindly and made their peace." speaking for many of his generation who shared his bitterness: "We lived many lives in those whirling campaigns, never sparing ourselves: yet when we achieved and the new world dawned, the old men came out again and took our victory to re-make in the likeness of the former world they knew. Youth could win, but had not learned to keep: and was pitiably weak against age. We stammered that we had worked for a new heaven and a new earth, and they thanked us kindly and made their peace."

Feisal arrived in Britain on December 10. It is not certain whether Lawrence went to Paris to meet him, in uniform, or met him on the dock at Boulogne in his white robes, looking-according to Colonel Bre-mond-"like a choir boy" as he came down the gangplank of a British destroyer under gray skies. Since Bremond's job, as long as Feisal was on French soil, was to stick as close to him as a watchdog on behalf of the French, it seems likely Bremond was correct.

Lawrence stayed with Feisal and his entourage at the Carlton Hotel in London, acting as Feisal's interpreter, and dressed in a British officer's khaki uniform, with an Arab headdress. Two days after Feisal arrived, he and Lawrence called on the foreign secretary, A. J. Balfour, to whom Feisal expressed his determination to fight the French if they tried to take control of Syria-a threat that failed to shake Balfour's majestic calm. Later in the day Feisal had a cordial meeting at the Carlton Hotel with Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader who had journeyed to Aqaba to meet with Feisal in June 1918. This time Lawrence was the interpreter, and he made sure to impress on Feisal the importance of good relationships with the Zionists, especially because of American public opinion. Feisal was very conscious of this. One of the formal dinner parties in his honor was given by Lord Rothschild; and the Jewish Chronicle Jewish Chronicle commented favorably on his meeting with Weizmann. During that meeting, Feisal had stressed his belief that there was plenty of land for Jewish settlement in Palestine, and Weizmann had said that the Jews would finance and carry out large-scale public works and agricultural improvement to the benefit of both peoples, and that as many as 4 million or 5 million Jews could settle there without encroaching on Arab land. commented favorably on his meeting with Weizmann. During that meeting, Feisal had stressed his belief that there was plenty of land for Jewish settlement in Palestine, and Weizmann had said that the Jews would finance and carry out large-scale public works and agricultural improvement to the benefit of both peoples, and that as many as 4 million or 5 million Jews could settle there without encroaching on Arab land.

Lawrence and Feisal would be together in Britain for almost three weeks, during which time the government did its best to keep Feisal busy. The activities included a journey to Scotland to attend a number of "civic functions," among them a formal visit on board the British battleship HMS Orion, Orion, where Feisal and Lawrence were photographed seated glumly on the deck, Feisal looking bored and dejected, and Lawrence, a tiny figure in British uniform beside him, appearing cold, and also furious at what must have seemed to him an irrelevant waste of time. The two of them are flanked and dwarfed by the ship's captain and a rear-admiral smiling for the camera, the admiral apparently the only happy person in the group. Efforts to keep Feisal amused seem to have been no more successful in Britain than they had been in France, especially since it cannot have escaped his attention that he was being excluded from substantive discussions. The visit to Scotland was no doubt primarily intended to keep him out of London and away from the attention of journalists; this perhaps explains why he and Lawrence look more like the victims of a hijacking than honored guests. where Feisal and Lawrence were photographed seated glumly on the deck, Feisal looking bored and dejected, and Lawrence, a tiny figure in British uniform beside him, appearing cold, and also furious at what must have seemed to him an irrelevant waste of time. The two of them are flanked and dwarfed by the ship's captain and a rear-admiral smiling for the camera, the admiral apparently the only happy person in the group. Efforts to keep Feisal amused seem to have been no more successful in Britain than they had been in France, especially since it cannot have escaped his attention that he was being excluded from substantive discussions. The visit to Scotland was no doubt primarily intended to keep him out of London and away from the attention of journalists; this perhaps explains why he and Lawrence look more like the victims of a hijacking than honored guests.

Lawrence tried to present Feisal's case by writing a long piece on Arab affairs for the Times, Times, displaying, not for the first or last time, both his skill at dealing with newspaper editors and his skill at writing polemics. He gave a condensed but spirited account of the Arabs' sacrifices and risks during the war; drew attention to the fact that Feisal, like himself,had had a price on his head; and listed the promises made to them by the British-but despite British sympathy for the Arabs, the article does not seem to have been successful. Feisal was later invited to an invest.i.ture at Buckingham Palace at which the king decorated him with the chain, ribbon, and star of a Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, and at which Lawrence wore his white robes and headdress with a gold displaying, not for the first or last time, both his skill at dealing with newspaper editors and his skill at writing polemics. He gave a condensed but spirited account of the Arabs' sacrifices and risks during the war; drew attention to the fact that Feisal, like himself,had had a price on his head; and listed the promises made to them by the British-but despite British sympathy for the Arabs, the article does not seem to have been successful. Feisal was later invited to an invest.i.ture at Buckingham Palace at which the king decorated him with the chain, ribbon, and star of a Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, and at which Lawrence wore his white robes and headdress with a gold agal. agal. Reading between the lines suggests that Lawrence's presence at the palace in white robes caused a certain amount of fuss with the king's military secretary beforehand; but the king, who by now must have been resigned to Lawrence's ways, does not seem to have raised any objection himself, whatever he may have thought of a British officer appearing at court in Arab dress. Reading between the lines suggests that Lawrence's presence at the palace in white robes caused a certain amount of fuss with the king's military secretary beforehand; but the king, who by now must have been resigned to Lawrence's ways, does not seem to have raised any objection himself, whatever he may have thought of a British officer appearing at court in Arab dress.*

On January 3 there was another meeting with Weizmann, and during its course, Feisal, Weizmann, and Lawrence drew up one of the most remarkable and controversial doc.u.ments in the modern history of the Middle East. In some ways, it was the most important result of Feisal's visit to Britain. Just as the Sykes-Picot agreement represents the great betrayal of the Arab Revolt, the agreement negotiated between Feisal and Weizmann on January 3, 1919, with Lawrence's help, was the first attempt to define the relationship between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. It embodied many of Lawrence's ideas on the subject, and it remains even today, for most Arabs, a blueprint of what they hoped would take place. It is perhaps one of the most interesting "might have beens" in modern Middle Eastern history.

It is not a lengthy doc.u.ment, and some of its nine articles are still being fought over today, both at the conference table and on the ground. Article I establishes that Palestine will be separated from the "Arab State," by which Feisal, Weizmann, and Lawrence meant what is now Syria and Lebanon, and controlled with "the most cordial goodwill and understanding" by duly accredited agents of the Arab and Jewish territories-in other words, it already presupposes a part.i.tion of Palestine into two separate territories. Article III envisages drawing up a const.i.tution. Article IV permits Jewish immigration "on a large scale, and as quickly as possible, to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil," while preserving the existing rights of Arab peasants and tenant farmers, and "a.s.sisting them in their economic development." Article V provides for absolute freedom of religion, and prohibits any "religious test" for "the exercise of civil or political rights." Article VI guarantees that Muslim holy places will remain "under Mohammedan control." Article VII provides that "the Zionist organization will use its best efforts" to provide the means for developing the natural resources and economic possibilities of Palestine. Article VIII-perhaps the key to the entire agreement-binds the two parties to act in "complete accord and harmony" at the coming peace conference: in short, to present a united front toward the British and the French.

The agreement can be summed up as proposing joint Jewish-Arab control over Palestine, with Britain playing a role as the guarantor and final arbiter of any disputes between the two parties, and with no limit on Jewish immigration. Feisal had already conceded that Palestine could contain 4 million to 5 million Jewish immigrants without harm to the rights of the Arab population. Since the population of Israel today is approximately 7.4 million, of which just over 1 million are Muslim, it is not so very far from what Feisal had in mind in 1919.

It is important to note that the agreement proposes neither an Arab nor a Jewish state, but rather a state under joint Arab-Jewish control, with absolute religious freedom for all, and that no limit is set on Jewish immigration. This would have produced an incalculably different history for both Palestinians and Zionists, as opposed to the ultimately doomed attempt of the British to rule Palestine under a "mandate," from 1920 to 1948, and to set tight limits on Jewish immigration.

Feisal was already aware that the chances of putting this agreement into practice were rapidly diminishing, since when he signed it he added,in graceful Arabic script above his signature, a handwritten "reservation," which Lawrence translated and wrote out in English, for attachment to the agreement: "If the Arabs are established as I have asked in my manifesto of Jan. 4th* addressed to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will carry out what is written in this agreement. If changes are made, I can not be answerable for failing to carry out this agreement. Feisal ibn Hussein." addressed to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will carry out what is written in this agreement. If changes are made, I can not be answerable for failing to carry out this agreement. Feisal ibn Hussein."

In short, the t.i.tle deed to a joint Arab-Jewish Palestine was conditional on the Arabs' getting an independent Arab state in Syria with Damascus as its capital, and including Lebanon and its ports, without which any such state would have been strangled at birth. Indeed Feisal had already remarked that Syria without Lebanon would be "of no use to him." It was already clear to both Feisal and Lawrence that this was not likely to happen; so, as idealistic as the agreement with Weizmann may seem, it can also be read as a bold attempt to win Jewish support (and particularly American American Jewish support) for Feisal's claim to Syria, as well as Jewish financing for the Arab state. Lawrence was, at the time, steeped in realpolitik. He would later write to his comrade in arms Alan Dawnay that Feisal didn't need financing from France: " 'He'll say that he doesn't want their money, because by then the Zionists will have a centre in Jerusalem, and for their concessions they will finance him (this is all in writing, and fixed, but don't put it in the press for G.o.d's sake).' ... Lawrence went on to say that the Zionists are not a Government, and not British, and their action does not infringe the Sykes-Picot Agreement.... 'They will finance the whole East, I hope, Syria and Mesopotamia alike. High Jews are unwilling to put much cash into Palestine only, since that country offers nothing but a sentimental return. They want 6%.' " Jewish support) for Feisal's claim to Syria, as well as Jewish financing for the Arab state. Lawrence was, at the time, steeped in realpolitik. He would later write to his comrade in arms Alan Dawnay that Feisal didn't need financing from France: " 'He'll say that he doesn't want their money, because by then the Zionists will have a centre in Jerusalem, and for their concessions they will finance him (this is all in writing, and fixed, but don't put it in the press for G.o.d's sake).' ... Lawrence went on to say that the Zionists are not a Government, and not British, and their action does not infringe the Sykes-Picot Agreement.... 'They will finance the whole East, I hope, Syria and Mesopotamia alike. High Jews are unwilling to put much cash into Palestine only, since that country offers nothing but a sentimental return. They want 6%.' "

Thus the price for unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine was to be Jewish financial a.s.sistance, and Jewish support for Feisal's claim to Syria. Like Balfour, Lloyd George, and many other people in Britain, Lawrence hugely overestimated the influence and wealth of the Jews, in America and elsewhere. Within less than fourteen years, most of Europe and America would turn a blind eye to the fate of the Jews. Even Weizmann, of all people, understood the Jews' lack of power. The importance of Zionism was not symbolic; the pressure that made Jews in Poland, Russia, and eastern Europe consider seriously the prospect of resettling in a strange, distant, and hostile land and climate was a product of poverty, intense discrimination, and fear. Rich philanthropists like Lord Rothschild might make the Zionist settlements in Palestine possible, but those who undertook the long journey there were for the most part poor and desperate.

In the end, neither the Arabs nor the Zionists would have much effect on the Paris Peace Conference. In the long memorandum to Balfour, which Lawrence had drafted, Feisal ended by begging "the Great Powers ... to lay aside the thought of individual profits, and their old jealousies" and to think of the Arabs "as one potential people, jealous of their language and liberty, [who] ask that no step be taken inconsistent with the prospect of an eventual union of these areas under one sovereign government." The "Great Powers," of course, did nothing of the sort, and instead shared the Arab lands between themselves, with frontiers rough-hewn by European bureaucrats and statesmen. The effect was, more or less, to guarantee that there would never be "one sovereign power" in the Middle East.

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 was the largest, most ambitious, and most comprehensive attempt to remake the world in the history of mankind. It began on January 18, 1919, and continued for more than a year, during which Paris was filled with the huge staffs of more than thirty national delegations, as well as thousands of people from all over the world lobbying for every imaginable cause. The Peace Conference took on itself such matters as the international regulation of air travel (then still in its infancy) and the attempt to define fishing rights in the open seas, still a subject of fierce controversy between nations today; but its two major challenges were to remake Europe in the aftermath of Germany's defeat and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and to deal with the former possessions of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East.

The Peace Conference was under siege, from the very beginning, by an incredible array of issues, some of them defying any rational solution or compromise, and by demands for justice from every possible national, racial, or linguistic group. None presented themselves with more dignity or with a better-prepared case than the Arabs, led by Feisal in his robes as an emir and a sharif, and Lawrence omnipresent beside him, either in British uniform with an Arab headdress or, on more formal occasions, in white robes, with his curved gold dagger. From the outset, the French Foreign Office made difficulties. Feisal was left off the list of official delegates until the British protested on his behalf, and even then he was allowed to represent only the Hejaz. In addition, his mail was opened and his cables were intercepted and deciphered by the British, and every possible obstacle was placed in his path by the French.

The British delegates were housed in three hotels: the Majestic and the Astoria, with the overflow relegated to the Hotel Continental, a thirty-minute walk away from the other two. Lawrence was allocated a small room there, which, in the tradition of French hotels of the day that were not in the grand luxe grand luxe cla.s.s, had no bath. Having to use the one bathroom on his floor of the hotel was always a trial to Lawrence, whose only self-indulgence was taking long, very hot baths. By inference, his room had no telephone, either-Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, CBE, DSO, Lawrence's rival as a daring intelligence officer, had the room below Lawrence's at the Continental (with a bath), and reported that when Lawrence wished to communicate with him at night, he would thump on the floor to alert Meinertzhagen, then lower a message or a sheaf of ma.n.u.script on a string to Meinertzhagen's window. When Meinertzhagen wished to communicate with Lawrence at night, he would thump on the ceiling-not such a problem for Meinertzhagen, since he was very tall. According to Meinertzhagen, Lawrence continued to wear the badges of a full colonel on his uniform, even though that rank had been given to him only for the duration of his trip home in 1918. When cla.s.s, had no bath. Having to use the one bathroom on his floor of the hotel was always a trial to Lawrence, whose only self-indulgence was taking long, very hot baths. By inference, his room had no telephone, either-Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, CBE, DSO, Lawrence's rival as a daring intelligence officer, had the room below Lawrence's at the Continental (with a bath), and reported that when Lawrence wished to communicate with him at night, he would thump on the floor to alert Meinertzhagen, then lower a message or a sheaf of ma.n.u.script on a string to Meinertzhagen's window. When Meinertzhagen wished to communicate with Lawrence at night, he would thump on the ceiling-not such a problem for Meinertzhagen, since he was very tall. According to Meinertzhagen, Lawrence continued to wear the badges of a full colonel on his uniform, even though that rank had been given to him only for the duration of his trip home in 1918. When Lawrence asked if he could take a bath in Meinertzhagen's room late one night, there were "red weals on his ribs, standing out like tattoo marks," presumably where the Turkish bey at Deraa had plunged and twisted a bayonet between Lawrence's ribs.

Meinertzhagen and Lawrence had what might best be described as a wary relationship, and the veracity of Meinertzhagen's diaries, which he revised, edited, and retyped later in life, is not necessarily to be relied on, though some of his account rings true. He referred to Lawrence affectionately as "little Lawrence," and Lawrence described him as "a silent, masterful man, who took as blithe a pleasure in deceiving his enemy (or his friend) by some unscrupulous jest," which is what a lot of people said or thought about Lawrence. Meinertzhagen claimed to be the inventor of the famous "haversack ruse": he had ridden close to the Turkish lines in 1917, pretended to be wounded, and galloped away, dropping his haversack, which contained 20, faked love letters, and a falsified map and war diaries, all intended to persuade the Turks that Allenby's attack would be aimed at Gaza. Meinertzhagen's role at the Peace Conference was, in some ways, a.n.a.logous to Lawrence's-though not Jewish, he was the expert on, the true believer in, and the spokesman for Zionist aspirations, as Lawrence was for the Arabs (a street in Jerusalem is now named after Meinertzhagen). He was wealthy and well connected; was a cousin of Beatrice Webb (a cofounder of the London School of Economics); had attended Harrow with Winston Churchill; and had once shot and killed the leader of a Kenyan tribal uprising while shaking his hand at a meeting to negotiate a truce.

Meinertzhagen, though his own nature was overbearing-his sheer size and his reputation for killing prisoners by smashing their heads in with his k.n.o.bkerrie alarmed most people-seems to have understood and liked Lawrence very much. His a.n.a.lysis of Lawrence's character is at once sympathetic and penetrating: "his mind," he wrote, "was pure as gold. Indelicacy, indecency, any form of coa.r.s.eness or vulgarity repelled him physically.... He had perfect manners if consideration for others counts and he expected good manners from others.... The war shattered his sensitive nature. He was shaken off his balance by the stresses, hardships and responsibilities of his campaign. These all went to accentuate and develop any little eccentricities of his youth."

He and Lawrence shared a taste for schoolboy pranks. Meinertzhagen claims that they hid themselves at the top of the stairs of the Astoria Hotel, unfurled rolls of toilet paper, and dropped them down in long strips on the heads of Lloyd George, Balfour, and Lord Hardinge, who were standing in the lobby, prompting Hardinge to remark: "There is nothing funny about toilet paper." Lawrence may have revealed to Meinertzhagen the fact that he was illegitimate, and the intimate details of his rape at the hands of the bey and the bey's men in Deraa. Meinertzhagen would probably have been a good choice of confidant, since he was unshockable: on the subject of illegitimacy he merely told Lawrence he was "in good company for Jesus was born out of wedlock." In late life Meinertzhagen claimed that Lawrence began to write the story of his involvement with the Arabs while he was in Paris.

Lawrence's pace of writing was remarkable-he wrote 160,000 words in less than six months, while putting in long days at the Peace Conference, or in meetings with Feisal and the British delegation, as well as enjoying a full social schedule. In the words of Gertrude Bell-who also became part of the British delegation, to lobby for Britain's control over what was to become Iraq-Lawrence was "the most picturesque" figure at the conference; also, he realized early on the need to win over journalists and members of the American delegation to Feisal's cause, and dined with them constantly.

Almost everybody who was at the Peace Conference seems to have noticed Lawrence. A typical example is Professor James Thomson Shotwell of Columbia University, a member of the American delegation, who wrote of Lawrence, after their first meeting: "He has been described as the most interesting Briton alive, a student of Mediaeval history at Magdalen, where he used to sleep by day and work by night and take his recreation in the deer park at four in the morning-a Sh.e.l.ley-like person, and yet too virile to be a poet. He is a rather short, strongly built man of not over twenty-eight years, with sandy complexion, a typical English face, bronzed by the desert, remarkable blue eyes and a smile that responded swiftly to that on the face of his friend [Feisal]. The two men were obviously very fond of each other. I have seldom seen such mutual affection between grown men as in this instance. Lawrence would catch the full drift of Feisal's humor and pa.s.s the joke along to us while Feisal was still exploding with his idea; but at the same time it was funny to see how Feisal spoke with the oratorical feeling of the South and Lawrence translated in the lowest and quietest of English voices, in very simple and direct phrases, with only here and there a touch of Oriental poetry breaking through."

Lawrence made many friends in Paris, among them Lionel Curtis, some of whose ideas about turning the British Commonwealth into a multinational, multiracial federation resembled those of Lawrence; and Arnold Toynbee, the historian. Even so, it is impossible to think of the time that Lawrence spent in Paris, however productive, as happy; indeed, if Meinertzhagen is to be believed, Lawrence was frequently (and "intensely") depressed. The ambiguity of his own role continued to disturb him-he was at the same time the most important (and most visible) part of Feisal's small "team," and a member of the British delegation, where Feisal was already seen as a lost cause.

Lawrence wrote home briefly on January 30, while waiting for his breakfast, to say that he was busy, and had dined only once at his own hotel since arriving in Paris (with his old friend and comrade in arms Colonel Stewart Newcombe). Certainly he saw everybody who mattered, starting with President Woodrow Wilson himself, into whose head Lawrence seems to have put the idea of a committee of inquiry into the wishes of the Syrians.* Lawrence a.s.siduously cultivated American journalists, and gave them long interviews. With his startling good looks, his youth, his reputation as a war hero, and his exotic headdress, he got enough attention and s.p.a.ce in American newspapers to worry both the French and the more cautious of his colleagues in the British delegation. He fancied that he had persuaded Wilson, and the American public, to take responsibility for a free, democratic Arab state in Syria, instead of a French colony, but in this he was overoptimistic. Wilson, despite his belief in democracy and the self-determination of peoples, was wary of making any promises about America's becoming the G.o.dfather of an independent Arab state. Lawrence a.s.siduously cultivated American journalists, and gave them long interviews. With his startling good looks, his youth, his reputation as a war hero, and his exotic headdress, he got enough attention and s.p.a.ce in American newspapers to worry both the French and the more cautious of his colleagues in the British delegation. He fancied that he had persuaded Wilson, and the American public, to take responsibility for a free, democratic Arab state in Syria, instead of a French colony, but in this he was overoptimistic. Wilson, despite his belief in democracy and the self-determination of peoples, was wary of making any promises about America's becoming the G.o.dfather of an independent Arab state.

On February 6, Lawrence appeared in what was widely acknowledged as one of the most dramatic scenes of the Paris Peace Conference. Feisal's and Lawrence's appearance before the Council of Ten (the leaders of the Allied governments) to argue the case for an independent state in Syria had been widely antic.i.p.ated, and was the subject of considerable backstage maneuvering by the French. Unwisely, Lawrence had been telling people the story of how Feisal had addressed an audience in Scotland in Arabic by reciting the Koran to them, and then whispered to Lawrence to make up whatever he pleased as the English translation. This may have been true, since Feisal had been bored and irritated at being sent on a Scottish tour by the British government. When word of it had reached the French, they hoped to catch him out playing a similar trick in Paris. Therefore they provided themselves with a Moroccan civil servant to see if Lawrence's translation corresponded with what Feisal said. Fortunately, Lawrence had antic.i.p.ated that the French would do something of the sort. He wrote out Feisal's speech in Arabic for him, then translated it into English for himself. Opinions differ as to what Lawrence wore for the occasion. Lloyd George wrote that he was dressed "in flowing robes of dazzling white," and Arnold Toynbee, the future author of the twelve-volume A Study of History, A Study of History, and a more reliable witness than the prime minister, recorded that Lawrence was "in Arab dress." Lawrence himself insisted that he was in British uniform with an Arab headdress. Feisal, at any rate, wore the white and gold embroidered robes of a sharif of Mecca, with a curved gold dagger at his waist and a gold-thread and a more reliable witness than the prime minister, recorded that Lawrence was "in Arab dress." Lawrence himself insisted that he was in British uniform with an Arab headdress. Feisal, at any rate, wore the white and gold embroidered robes of a sharif of Mecca, with a curved gold dagger at his waist and a gold-thread agal agal on his headdress, impressing everybody, even the French, with his gravity, his melodic voice, and his dignified bearing. When he had finished his speech, Lawrence read it aloud in English, but several of the ten heads of government were still unable to understand what had been said. "President Wilson then made a suggestion. 'Colonel Lawrence,' he said, 'could you put the Amir Feisal's statement into French now for us?' " Lawrence then started again and read the whole speech aloud in flawless French. "When he came to the end of this unprepared piece of translation, the Ten clapped. Lawrence's spell had made the Ten forget, for a moment, who they were and what they were supposed to be doing. They had started the session as conscious arbiters of the destinies of mankind; they were ending it as the captive audience of a minor supplicant's interpreter." on his headdress, impressing everybody, even the French, with his gravity, his melodic voice, and his dignified bearing. When he had finished his speech, Lawrence read it aloud in English, but several of the ten heads of government were still unable to understand what had been said. "President Wilson then made a suggestion. 'Colonel Lawrence,' he said, 'could you put the Amir Feisal's statement into French now for us?' " Lawrence then started again and read the whole speech aloud in flawless French. "When he came to the end of this unprepared piece of translation, the Ten clapped. Lawrence's spell had made the Ten forget, for a moment, who they were and what they were supposed to be doing. They had started the session as conscious arbiters of the destinies of mankind; they were ending it as the captive audience of a minor supplicant's interpreter."

The "minor supplicant's interpreter" had effectively upstaged "the minor supplicant" in the eyes of most of the delegates, but Feisal did not seem to mind. Photographs taken at the Peace Conference show him looking sad, like a man who already suspects that he is presenting a lost cause, whereas Lawrence, always standing tactfully a pace behind him, has his usual faint, cynical smile. Behind both of them, an unusual figure even at the Peace Conference, stands Feisal's tall, broad-shouldered black Sudanese slave and bodyguard in full Arab robes and cloak.

Despite Lawrence's "amazing" feat, Feisal's statement fell on deaf ears. The Italians, the Serbs, the Belgians, and the rest of the smaller Allied countries had no great interest in Syria-it was effectively a contest between Britain and France, with the United States as a neutral referee. Any hope of a united autonomous Arab state from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was dead, since the British had occupied Mesopotamia and clearly intended to stay there; and to obtain increased British support Feisal voluntarily conceded Palestine, which the British were also occupying. He-or Lawrence, as his speechwriter-included numerous references to self-determination, in an effort to please Wilson. During the prolonged questions that followed, Feisal more than held his own against Clemenceau, pointing out, with superb tact, both how grateful he was for French military support and how minimal it had been; and when Clemenceau noted that French interest in Syria went back to the Crusades, he gently asked the French prime minister: who had won the Crusades?

A spokesmen in favor of French rule in Syria went on at such length that at one point Clemenceau angrily asked his foreign minister, Pichon, "What did you get that fellow here for anyway?" Wilson signified his own impatience with the proceedings by getting up and walking around the room. "Poor Lawrence wandered among Versailles' well-cut hedges, casting hateful glances at Arthur Balfour's aristocratic features and baggy clothes," commented an exiled czarist n.o.bleman. Harold Nicolson, a member of the British delegation, remarked on "the lines of resentment hardening around his boyish lips ... an undergraduate with a chin."

A hint that Lawrence's patience and good nature were fraying can be found in the interview he gave to Lincoln Steffens, the famous American muckraking journalist and progressive. By the time he saw Steffens, Lawrence may have had enough of American journalists, although Steffens was the kind of man Lawrence normally admired. Still, Lawrence was not without a certain streak of skepticism and sn.o.bbery on the subject of Americans, as well as a high degree of impatience with the professed moral superiority of Woodrow Wilson, especially in view of the Americans' reluctance to take on any commitments in the Middle East. Steffens, who called the interview "the queerest I have ever had in all my interviewing life," met with Lawrence in the latter's hotel room, and found the young colonel at his most difficult, argumentative, and ironic-very much a regression to the image of the languid poseur he had sometimes cultivated as an Oxford undergraduate. It didn't help, perhaps, that Steffens wanted to talk about the Armenians, whereas Lawrence wanted to present Feisal's case for Syria. Lawrence was far from disliking Armenians-the wealthy Altounyan family in Aleppo had been friends of his during his days at Carchemish-but he probably regarded the Armenians as a lost cause, since the Turks had murdered 1.5 million of them in 1915 without provoking the United States into breaking off diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire.* In any case, Steffens's somewhat holier-than-thou att.i.tude brought out the worst in Lawrence, who suggested, deadpan, that the Armenians deserved to be killed off, and that the United States, with its particular combination of idealism and commerce and its experience at destroying the American Indians, was the best power to take on the task of completing what the Turks had begun. Steffens does not seem to have fully understood that Lawrence was pulling his leg, but what emerges from the interview more strongly than anything else is Lawrence's irritation with America's naive good intentions, particularly when they were coupled with its total unwillingness to take on the hard part of rebuilding a new world. Lawrence also played a curious cat-and-mouse game: Steffens was forced to put Lawrence's ideas into words, so that Lawrence could later deny having said them. In any case, Steffens's somewhat holier-than-thou att.i.tude brought out the worst in Lawrence, who suggested, deadpan, that the Armenians deserved to be killed off, and that the United States, with its particular combination of idealism and commerce and its experience at destroying the American Indians, was the best power to take on the task of completing what the Turks had begun. Steffens does not seem to have fully understood that Lawrence was pulling his leg, but what emerges from the interview more strongly than anything else is Lawrence's irritation with America's naive good intentions, particularly when they were coupled with its total unwillingness to take on the hard part of rebuilding a new world. Lawrence also played a curious cat-and-mouse game: Steffens was forced to put Lawrence's ideas into words, so that Lawrence could later deny having said them.

The United States was offered the mandate for Armenia at the Peace Conference and needless to say turned it down, condemning thousands more Armenians to death. Wilson also turned down all suggestions for an American mandate over Palestine, though Felix Frankfurter, then a professor at Harvard Law School, was rushed in to mediate a disagreement between Feisal and Weizmann over the number of Jews who could be admitted into Palestine every year. Lawrence not only was present but drafted Feisal's letter, which solved the dispute. Throughout March and much of April Feisal and Lawrence met with the French, the British, and the Americans, attempting to create a compromise for Syria that would be acceptable to the Arabs and the French. In the end the best they could do was to accept President Wilson's suggestion of "an inter-Allied commission of inquiry," if only as a delaying tactic. Lawrence wrote Feisal's letter to Clemenceau accepting the commission, and it conveys unmistakably Lawrence's gift for deadpan irony, as well as his bitterness, which Clemenceau can hardly have failed to notice.

The Spanish flu pandemic, which would kill between 100 million and 150 million people worldwide, raged from 1918 to 1920, and reached its peak in 1919. It was as if by some malignant stroke of irony the war had ended with a final, and even greater, human disaster. It killed Lawrence's ebullient friend Sir Mark Sykes in Paris in February (prompting Lloyd George to remark rather ungraciously, "He was responsible for the agreement which is causing us all the trouble with the French.... Picot ... got the better of him"), and on April 7 it killed Lawrence's father. A telegram from Oxford warned him that Thomas Lawrence was suffering from influenza and pneumonia, and Lawrence set off immediately for England to see him, but arrived too late. He returned to Paris, and did not tell anyone, not even Feisal, that his father had died, until a week later, when he requested permission to go home and see his mother. Feisal admired Lawrence's "control of personal feelings," and that a.s.sessment is fair enough, but Lawrence had long since made control of his personal feelings something of a fetish. He would certainly have deeply mourned the unexpected death of his father, and perhaps even more, dreaded being exposed once again to the emotional demands of his mother. Thomas Lawrence had tried, whenever he could, in his patient, gentle way, to diminish, control, or redirect those demands, but now he was no longer there to protect Ned from the full force of his mother's attempts to intrude into his life. He must have felt overwhelmed by his father's death, by his failure to secure Syria for the Arabs, and by the demands of his book, which forced him to relive the experiences of two years of war. He persuaded Feisal to return to Syria, rather than stay on in Paris watching his position erode, a decision Gertrude Bell endorsed. Lawrence himself decided to return to Egypt to retrieve the notes he had left behind in the Arab Bureau's files, and now needed.

Taking advantage of the fact that the Royal Air Force (upgraded from the Royal Flying Corps into a new and independent service in 1918) was about to send fifty big Handley-Page bombers to Egypt-the first sign that Britain was going to back up its occupation of Mesopotamia, Palestine, and what is now Jordan-Lawrence sought permission to fly out with one of the first squadrons. He left Paris on May 18 for what was intended to be a week's leave. Airplanes and the air force had always interested him, and he must have relished the opportunity of a long flight in the RAF's biggest bomber. He must also have welcomed the chance of getting away from Paris, where the French press had been running a series of hostile articles about him, accusing him of turning Feisal's head with notions of a united, independent Arab state; of being willing to do "a disservice" to his own country for his "sacred mission"; and of becoming "a second Gordon"*-all this carefully or